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2ABSTRACT
In studying foreign images, it is generally necessary to examine the views of 
relevant actors, and few, if any, actors are more relevant than diplomats as they are 
directly related to foreign diplomacy or relations between countries. While many works 
have been written on popular images of Meiji Japan as perceived by Western visitors, 
very few have so far touched on images of Meiji Japan as viewed by British diplomats. 
Using mainly archive materials, this thesis aims to study British diplomatic views of 
political, economic and social change in Japan during the crucial early stages of that 
country's modernisation in the first half of the Meiji period. The thesis examines various 
patterns of diplomatic views as they witnessed the different changes that took place in 
Meiji Japan, most notably the diversity of views and images of the modernisation of the 
country. In addition, the thesis also addresses the question of whether British diplomatic 
views of Japan fit an ‘Orientalist’ interpretation of Western superiority and Oriental 
inferiority as popularized by Edward Said. Nevertheless, instead of discussing the issue 
of ‘Orientalism’ in depth, this thesis only attempts to test the validity of the Said’s theory 
based on the views held by British diplomats. Given the various changing aspects of 
Meiji Japan covered in this work, it is hoped that this thesis will help to contribute to the 
study of Meiji Japan and the history o f images of Japan in Western minds. And, since the 
diplomats’ views and attitudes were based on close observation of contemporary 
conditions and often reflected the opinions of Japanese leaders, it is also hoped that this 
investigation will help to illuminate the background of British diplomacy and thus assist 
in providing a fuller understanding of British policy towards Meiji Japan.
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INTRODUCTION
In the history of the modem world, no country has ever surpassed Japan in its 
awe-inspiring leap from a feudal state to become a world Power in less than fifty years. 
For this, Japan was greatly indebted to those enlightened leaders who worked 
relentlessly, especially after the Meiji Ishin, to effect the modernisation1 of the country. 
Their motivation was clear, that is, as illustrated in the slogan ‘fukoku kyohei\ they 
sought to create a modem strong and rich Japan that would stand on an equal footing with 
the more advanced West and free of the so-called unequal treaties, which were damaging 
to the country. In pursuing this goal, the Meiji leaders strove to ensure that their 
modernising endeavours would be appreciated not only by their own people but also by 
foreigners, especially Western diplomats in Japan. Although the diplomats did not 
influence public images in their own countries in the same way that Western travelers and 
visitors who wrote about Japan did, it was their reports which directly informed their 
respective governments of developments in Japanese society, economic practices, 
political systems and foreign policy. This was particularly important as the fact that they 
were official representatives of their governments meant that if  anything was to be done 
to convince the West of Japanese progress and, more specifically, show that the 
continuation of the much detested unequal treaties was unnecessary, the Meiji leaders 
would have to influence the views and images held by these diplomats.
This thesis will focus on the views and perceptions of British diplomats2 in Japan 
since they represented the major world Power with the greatest interests in East Asia and, 
unlike most British citizens who visited or worked in Japan, the nature of their work gave 
particular insights into the modernising process in the country, and more significantly,
1 While the word seems to be used almost synonymously with ‘Westernisation’, the two words are not 
equivalent in meaning. One definition o f  ‘modernisation’ is ‘a process -  a movement from traditional or 
quasi-traditional order to certain desired types o f  technology and associated form o f social structure, value 
orientations and motivations and norms.’ Unlike ‘Westernisation’, ‘modernisation’ is not just a simple 
process o f  imitation or superficial acquisition o f some isolated traits o f  the more advanced countries. 
Rather, it involves selection o f  required elements for integration into the culture. Furthermore, unlike 
‘Westernisation’, the model used is not necessarily related to Western societies for non-Westem societies 
too can provide the models for ‘modernisation’. See S. C. Dube, ‘Modernisation and Its Adaptive Demands 
on Indian Society’, in Pandey, Rajendra, Modernisation and Social Change (New Delhi: Criterion 
Publications), 198B, pp. 33-35. To illustrate further the meaning o f  ‘modernisation’, it has also been 
defined as ‘a process that increases the economic and political capabilities o f  a society: it increases 
economic capabilities through industrialization, and political capabilities through bureaucratization.’ 
Inglehart, R., Modernization and Postmodernization (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press), 1997, 
p.5. Compared to these broader meanings o f ‘modernisation’, ‘Westernisation’ strictly refers to a process in 
which non-Westem societies embrace Western culture and systems.
2 By British diplomats I mean not only the British Minister or Charge d’Affaires who was in charge o f  the 
Legation at the capital Tokyo (previously known as Yedo or Edo), but also the secretaries and lesser 
officials who acted as assistants and interpreters to the minister, and the consuls and vice-consuls who were
gave them access to the leaders of Meiji Japan. As a result, much valuable information 
and many interesting comments on Meiji Japan are found in the diplomats’ reports. 
Moreover, their official reports to Whitehall, unlike the written accounts by Western 
visitors, are likely to have influenced the British government’s policies towards Meiji 
Japan.
In assessing the views held by British diplomats, this thesis will analyze to what 
extent the diplomats approved or disapproved of what they saw during the modernisation 
process of the country; what, if any, were the aspects of changing Japan that the 
diplomats tended to stress or ignore; whether there were underlying continuities in British 
diplomatic views and perceptions of Japan; to what degree there were similarities or 
differences in British diplomatic views; how much the views changed in accordance with 
changes that took place in Meiji Japan; in what measure the diplomatic views contributed 
to British general policy towards Japan; and whether British diplomatic reports 
exemplified the attitudes which according to Edward Said typified Western ideas of the 
Middle East and, by extension, of the East in general. In this last respect British 
diplomatic views and images of Japan can be seen in some measure as a test case for 
assessing the validity of the concept of ‘Orientalism’ as put forward by Said and others.3
In examining these views, I have separated this thesis into six main chapters, each 
concerned with a particular aspect of changing Japan. The first chapter focuses on British 
diplomatic views of the Meiji Restoration from 1868 to 1871; the second chapter 
discusses British diplomats’ perceptions of the dismantling o f Japanese feudalism in 
1871-1877; the third chapter analyzes British diplomats’ perceptions of Japanese political 
development in 1878-1890; the fourth chapter examines British diplomats’ views of early 
Meiji economic development; the fifth chapter discusses British diplomats’ views of 
social change in early Meiji Japan; and the sixth chapter deals with British diplomats’ 
perceptions of Japan as an East-Asian power.
In writing this thesis, I have used primarily official diplomatic dispatches kept at 
the Public Record Office. Sent by the British minister or charge d’affaires to their 
superiors at Whitehall, these reports often contained detailed accounts of events that 
happened in Japan during 1868-90. While the existing published works on Japan tend to 
ignore these official materials because they are unpublished, except for those dispatches 
reproduced in Blue Books, they are valuable first-hand testimonies of changing Japan by
stationed at different Japanese treaty ports such as Hyogo and Osaka, Kanagawa, Yokohama, Niigata aj.d 
Hakodate.
3 See Said, Edward E,, Orientalism: Western Conceptions o f  the Orient (London: Penguin), 1978.
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men who enjoyed a somewhat different vantage point from other Westerners. The reports 
provide new insights and information, some of which was unknown to contemporaries 
and in a number of cases has even escaped the attention of historians. The fact that the 
diplomats were involved in regular diplomatic dealings with Japanese statesmen provided 
them, to some extent at least, with access to inside information about the intentions and 
aims behind various Japanese policies and changes, as well as the kinds o f problems 
faced by the Japanese government in modernisation. This is particularly so in the case of 
Ernest Satow who, thanks to his Japanese language skill and friendship with some 
Japanese leaders, enjoyed an exceptional insight into their minds and into the working of 
Japanese government.
In addition, I have also used consular reports, which were regular letters sent to 
the British minister at Yedo or Tokyo by consuls in the treaty ports. Kept at the Public 
Record Office, these unpublished materials are also illuminating in that they often 
provided the stories behind the local trade figures, indirectly revealing the tensions and 
conflicts within the foreign communities at the ports or the Japanese economic policies 
and practices. Moreover, their reports sometimes provide details o f particular events that 
occurred in nearby areas and highlight some information which had political significance 
or was related to the social policies of the Meiji government.
In addition to the official and consular reports, the thesis also makes use, where 
they are available, of British diplomats5 personal diaries and of private letters sent by 
them to family members in Britain. These unofficial records are helpful in providing a 
fuller picture of diplomats5 attitudes and views, as they often contained frank and 
forthright comments on Meiji modernisation.
While the unpublished official and consular reports add usefully to the sum of 
knowledge of the history of Meiji Japan, they also have few weaknesses. The stationing 
of the British minister and consuls at major cities and treaty ports like Tokyo, Yokohama, 
Osaka, Niigata and Hokkaido means that the reports are concerned mainly with ongoing 
trading activities at these places, with minimal infoimation on what was happening in tl e 
interior of Japan. Only on rare occasions were special visits made by British diplomatic 
officers into more distant districts and villages to gather particular information such as on 
the silk, tea and mining industries. Moreover, not all British diplomats had close contacts 
or knew the Japanese language. Having no useful means or tools to obtain information, 
some of the diplomats concentrated in their dispatches mainly on trade and the obvious 
changes that they saw taking place at the cities and ports. Furthermore, the reports, 
letters and diaries of the British diplomats did not cover all aspects of modernisation of
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Meiji Japan. They failed, for instance, to give attention to changes in Japanese literature 
and culture, and even to important political issues like the Charter Oath of 1868, the 
major Doctrinal Promulgation Campaign of the 1870s and the details of the provisions of 
the Meiji Constitution. As to why they ignored these issues, one can only speculate, but 
one major reason clearly is that what diplomats saw as important and gave their main 
attention to were the expansion of British foreign trade in Japan, the issue of Christianity 
and the anti-foreign movement in Japan, and the protection of British interests and 
influence in Japan against other Western Powers.
As to the sources of images held by British diplomats, unlike many writers on 
Japan, the diplomats were mostly resident there for a substantial period, during which 
they had direct experience of what was going on in Japan and saw for themselves the 
various political, social and economic changes that were taking place. Moreover, being m 
Japan and acting as diplomatic representatives of a foreign country brought them into 
contact with Japanese leaders. The longer they stayed in Japan, the more likely they were 
to have more and better contacts with Japanese leaders. Such contacts thus served as a 
source of images as they provided the diplomats with substantial amounts of information, 
some of which would not even have been available to many Japanese. The nature of the 
contacts, however, varied from informal and friendly encounters to formal and serious 
meetings, and they were the results of both diplomatic expediency and curiosity on the 
part of British diplomats and Japanese statesmen. There were times when British 
diplomats and Japanese leaders had to come together out of necessity to discuss issues 
affecting both countries and there were times when British diplomats and Meiji leaders 
took the initiative to establish contacts in order to keep abreast of ongoing developments.
The status of individual diplomats also affected the nature and extent of the 
information that they acquired or received. While their official position itself was not 
always relevant in that sometimes lesser officers gained better access to Japanese leaders 
(for instance, due to language skill or closer acquaintance with Japanese leaders), an 
official of superior rank such as the British minister had the advantage of constantly 
dealing with prominent Japanese leaders with regard to various issues affecting the 
relationship and interests of both countries. Moreover, as his discussions with Japanese 
leaders covered various political, economic, social and foreign policy matters, the British 
minister was able to acquire a more rounded view of Meiji Japan compared to the lesser 
diplomatic officials. In addition, as the latter were required to send through the legation in 
Tokyo regular reports on developments at different treaty ports and on various issues or
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events relating to Japan, this further enhanced the knowledge acquired by the British 
minister.
Nevertheless, like those of other Westerners, British diplomatic images of Meiji 
Japan may also have been based on older writings by both Westerners and Japanese, such 
as the History o f  Japan by Engelbert Kaempfer (published in 1727) and works by Philipp 
Franz von Siebold (published during the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s). Similarly, later works 
by Westerners such as The Capital o f the Tycoon by British diplomat Rutherford Alcock 
(1863), Unbeaten Tracks o f  Japan by female British traveler Isabella Bird (1880) or the 
more popular Madam Chrysanthemum by Frenchman Pierre Loti (1885) may well have 
been read by British diplomats. A series of essays on Japan published in Encyclopedia 
Britannica (the first edition published in 1771) could have also been sources of reference 
in formulating images of Japan. Moreover, written accounts by foreigners at Japanese 
treaty ports whose views appeared in locally published English-language newspapers 
may also have contributed to diplomats’ views and images of the country. In addition to 
these Western accounts, British diplomats may have also based their images on Japanese 
written sources. This was possible through skilled interpreters like Algernon Mitford, 
William Aston and Ernest Satow, whose knowledge of Japanese enabled them to gather 
and disseminate information culled from either Japanese newspapers or Meiji 
government publications.
The fact that some British diplomats became involved in the academic study of 
Japan also helped to develop their images of the country. Their involvement in The 
Asiatic Society o f  Japan, which met regularly and published learned articles in its 
Transactions, enabled them to acquire more information and accordingly form better and 
more accurate images of Meiji Japan. The society, which was formed in 1872 with an 
aim of studying Japanese culture, history and language (i.e. Japanology) in detail, had as 
its co-founders (among others) Satow and Aston, who, during their periods o f service in 
Japan, involved themselves in many scholarly discussions and presented papers on 
various issues relating to Japan. Such interests and the opportunities to make 
acquaintance with leading Japanese scholars not only helped the diplomats to refine their 
images and views of Japan, but explain the greater amount o f information contained in 
their reports and also, arguably, the sympathetic attitudes shown particularly by Satow 
towards Meiji Japan. Both Satow and Aston wrote extensively on Japanese history, 
literature, language and religion. Another diplomat who only served for a short period in 
Japan yet had an enthusiasm for Japanese history and art was Algernon Mitford, who 
wrote Tales o f  Old Japan.
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As to the findings of this thesis, one will find that British diplomatic views ranged 
from the extremely critical to highly commendatory. Again, several of the mentioned 
factors were responsible for this, namely the dates and lengths of their periods of service 
in Japan, the different positions held by different diplomats in the diplomatic service, the 
differing nature of their contacts with Japanese statesmen, the extent of their knowledge 
of the Japanese language and of their involvement in scholarly study and research on 
Meiji Japan, and their awareness o f written works and materials by either earlier or 
contemporary writers on Japan. Other additional factors were the substantial number of 
British diplomats in Meiji Japan (who outnumbered representatives o f any other foreign 
Power), British diplomats’ historical and working experience before coming to Japan, 
and last but not least British diplomats’ own personalities. In addition to the diversity of 
views and images of Japan, the thesis will demonstrate that certain aspects of Meiji Japan 
tended to be emphasized by the diplomats while others received less attention or were 
completely ignored. Furthermore, one may find some underlying continuities and certain 
persistent patterns in British diplomatic views, and these include similarities and 
differences of views on certain aspects of Meiji Japan. Another finding is that while some 
diplomatic images or views changed with the ongoing developments in Japan, some other 
images or views remained unchanged.
In relation to British diplomatic images of Meiji Japan, it is worthy o f note that 
the importance of images4 in understanding foreign policy has been recognized by a 
number of historians, notably Iriye. In Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese 
Relations, which is concerned with self-images and mutual images between American 
and Japanese, Iriye asserts that ‘the importance of studying images is now taken for 
granted as a starting point for any study o f foreign relations’5, thus suggesting that images 
held by the people affected government policies. He further maintains that while 
discussions of international relations tend to concentrate on global strategy, national 
security and economic interests, in reality, however, a country’s policies are more likely 
to be based on the way the people see themselves in relation to the world and their 
images of another country in a number of different contexts, namely, globalism, 
cosmopolitanism, nationalism, particularism and provincialism.6 Based on this suggestion 
of Iriye, one may argue that if popular images are important, then images held by
4 I have used the word loosely with ‘views’ or ‘perceptions’ to mean ideas formed as a result o f British 
diplomats’ encounter with the process o f modernisation and change in Meiji Japan.
5 Iriye, A., (ed,), Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London: Harvard Univ. Press), 1975, p. 8.
6 Iriye, op. cit., pp. 17-23.
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policymakers as a result of reading reports by informed officials are likely to carry even 
more weight in shaping a country’s policies. In another work, Across the Pacific: An 
Inner History o f  American-East Asian Relations, Iriye again touches on images, this time 
dealing with how policy makers and people in America, China and Japan viewed 
themselves and each other and how these images inevitably found their ways into official 
policy. As he puts it, ‘All international relations...are relations among ideas, among 
images people and nations have of themselves and each other. The human mind must
n %
always intervene between the world and a given policy’. Stressing the underlying images 
and stereotypes behind the respective government policies, he points out that not only 
were these images the results of emotion, prejudice, sentiments and moral considerations, 
but also of the way the people related themselves to their historical experiences and the 
world.8 R. S. Schwantes’s Japanese and Americans: A Century o f  Cultural Relations, 
also emphasizes mutual images, arguing that in addition to political and economic 
considerations, cultural relations also influenced Americans and Japanese opinions about, 
and attitudes towards, each other and contributed to the formulation of each country’s 
foreign policy.9
Following Iriye and Schwantes, this thesis seeks to examine the background of 
diplomatic images o f Japan which may have influenced policy-making and need to be 
taken into account by historians of Anglo-Japanese relations, and here I would like to 
point out that until now nobody has undertaken this task. This undertaking, however, is 
by no means easy since, as maintained by Daniels, British perceptions of Japan have been 
‘moulded and remoulded by complex and rapidly changing circumstances.’10 I should 
also note that in assessing the relationship of images to the making o f policy, diplomats’ 
views about matters which were not strictly diplomatic, such as Japanese modernisation 
and change, ought also to be taken into account even if such a factor cannot be easily 
weighed. This is because, as asserted in Iriye’s work, ‘considerations of national interests 
do not always dictate’ how one views another country.11 Moreover, this research attempts 
to demonstrate that British diplomats’ views may have influenced not only British 
government policy but also, perhaps, Japanese decision-making in order to gain foreign
7 Iriye, A., Across the Pacific: An Inner History o f  American-East Asian Relations (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc.), 1967, p. 326.
8 Iriye, Across the Pacific, p. xvi.
9 Schwantes, R. S., Japanese and Americans: A Centuiy o f  Cultural Relations (New York: Harper & 
Brothers), 1955, p. 3.
10 Daniels, G., Elites, Governments and Citizens: Some British Perceptions o f  Japan, 1850-2000, in 
Daniels, G., and Tsuzuki, C,, (eds.), The H istoiy o f  Anglo-Japanese Relations, l600-2000:Social and  
Cultural Perspectives Vol. 5. (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and N ew  York: Palgrave Macmillan), 
2002, p. 3.
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support for Japanese policies. Furthermore, in bringing forward British diplomatic views 
of Japanese modernisation and progress, and their reports about Japanese leaders’ 
attitudes towards modernisation and the problems which resulted from it, this thesis also 
provides material for comparing how other late developing countries’ efforts to 
modernize have been viewed by Western governments.
Besides examining the relation between images and policy-making, the neglect, in 
the existing literature dealing with Western perceptions of Meiji Japan, o f British 
diplomats’ views and images is also a justification for this thesis. For instance, Endymion 
Wilkinson’s Japan versus the West focuses mainly on popular views and images of Japan 
held by Western adventurers and visitors.12 A work drawing on more diversified sources 
yet also concerned with popular images is Jean-Pierre Lehmann’s The Image o f  Japan: 
From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1859-1905. Basing himself particularly on 
contemporary newspapers and magazines, he makes use of writings by Westerners of 
different backgrounds, notably Britons and Frenchmen but also Americans and 
Germans.13 Using mainly monthly and quarterly reviews and magazines, Toshio 
Yokoyama’s Japan in the Victorian Mind concerns itself with images held by the British 
general public towards Japan in 1850-80. Studying a wide variety o f images relating to 
Japanese international relations, politics, economics, religion, society and arts and crafts, 
it is unfortunate that the work stops short of considering British views in the 1880s, 
during which many significant and visible changes took place in Japan.14 A recent work, 
The History o f  Anglo-Japanese Relations 1600-2000: Social and Cultural Perspectives, 
edited by Gordon Daniels and Chushichi Tsuzuki is an extensive study of mutual images 
held by British and Japanese covering the period over four centuries from 1600-2000. It 
does contain an analysis by Daniels of images held by British diplomatic personnel (in 
particular, Laurence Oliphant, Sir Rutherford Alcock, Algernon Mitford and William 
Aston) who served in Japan in 1868-90 as Daniels both discusses the kinds of images 
formed before and after the opening of Japan and examines changes in diplomats’
i c  t
views. This is, however, quite brief.
As to the nature of images, Wilkinson for instance, maintains that in the minds of 
both Europeans and Japanese, there has long existed a limited stock of stereotyped
11 Iriye, Mutual Images, p. 19.
12 Wilkinson, E., Japan versus the West: Image and Reality (London: Penguin), 1980.
13 Lehmann, J. P., The Image o f  Japan: From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1859-1905  (London: 
George Allen & Unwin), 1978.
14 Yokoyama, T., Japan in the Victorian Mind: A Study o f  Stereotyped Images o f  a Nation, 1850-80 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: Macmillan), 1987.
15 See a chapter by Daniels in Daniels and Tsuzuki, op. cit.
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images, both positive and negative, about each other from which, depending on the 
situation of the day, the relevant image can be recalled which in turn influences reality. 
The difference is, he added, that Japanese images of Europe have tended to be more
* T 6positive and closer to reality than European images of Japan. Among such common 
stereotyped images o f Japan are those contributed by a French naval officer, Pierre Loti 
in his work, Madam Chrysanthemum, which emphasizes the exotic and aesthetic aspect 
of Japan. As to Lehmann, from a standpoint of sympathy towards Japanese efforts for 
modernisation, he criticizes the West for their images of Japan, which, to him, indicates 
the Western paternalistic propensity to threaten Japan with a combination of contempt 
and alarm deriving from its own arrogance and the feeling of white racial superiority.17 A 
similar stance is demonstrated to have existed by Richard Tames in Encounters with 
Japan, which is based on writings by visitors to Japan between 1853-1922. While some 
of the Westerners’ comments were friendly enough, nearly all, whether generous, 
amusing and scornful, were, in Tames’ view, patronizing. Among the barriers that 
hindered the exchange of true information of Japan between the Westerners and Japanese 
are found to be language, prejudice and preconception.18
As with Wilkinson, Yokoyama also maintains that despite the rapid developments 
in Japan and the increase in British knowledge and understanding of Japanese history and 
culture, the past ideas about the country continued to survive as they had become so 
firmly imprinted in the British minds.19 Daniels in The History o f  Anglo-Japanese 
Relations also suggests the persistence of certain images through time, while adding that 
others are subjected to many forces such as the countries’ socio-economic and political 
developments and the growth of social and cultural contacts.20
In relation to these works on images, this thesis will illustrate that while some 
British diplomats’ views did resemble the stereotyped Western images of Japan, more 
were based on reality, particularly with regard to social and political changes. The same, 
however, can not be said about their views of Japan’s economic development or military 
modernisation since the diplomats showed a disinclination to recognize Japan’s potential 
as a modem manufacturing country, a future commercial rival of the West and a military 
power.
16 Wilkinson, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
17 Lehmann, op. cit., pp. 13-14.
18 Tames, R., Encounters with Japan  (New York: St. Martin’s Press), 1991, p. 9.
19 Yokoyama, op. cit., p. 2
20 Daniels, op. cit., in Daniels and Tsuzuki, op. cit., p. 3.
15
As the thesis also is concerned with the idea of * Orientalism’, a short analysis of 
the approach of Edward Said and of recent discourse on ‘Orientalism’ is called for. In 
Orientalism: Western Conceptions o f  the Orient, Said sees ‘Orientalism’ as a discourse of 
power formulated to justify the domination of the West over the Eastern countries based 
on the idea or feeling of inherent or innate Western superiority over the Orient. He also 
describes ‘Orientalism’ as an institution ‘dealing with the Orient -  by making statements 
about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it and ruling it’. In 
short, ‘Orientalism’ is a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority 
over the Orient.
Other writers have followed Said’s line of approach. For instance, in a series of 
essays, Marshall Hodgson has argued that ‘Orientalism’ is a discipline and discourse of 
power that has perpetuated the dominance of the West over the non-West founded on the 
belief in the cultural as well as moral superiority of Western Europe to the rest of 
humanity. Such an idea, in Hodgson’s view, was rooted in a distinctively Western notion 
of world history in which the history of the West is a story of freedom and rationality and
« 99the history of the East is a story o f despotism and cultural stagnation.
Ziauddin Sardar in his work, Orientalism, also shared Said’s view that 
‘Orientalism’ is an ideology deployed to justify the assumption of the innate superiority 
of Europe over the Orient. Using Western civilization as the yardstick to measure 
Oriental cultures and civilizations, the latter came to signify all that the West is not and is 
consistently found to be inferior and backward. While the West is expected to experience 
progresses and changes, the Orient supposedly remains unchanging in its adherence to 
tradition, and hence remains backward. Rather than based on reality, ‘Orientalism,’ in 
Sardar’s view, is a constructed ignorance deliberately concocted and manufactured as an 
instrument to ‘contain’ and ‘manage’ Oriental cultures and civilizations - it justified the 
imperial powers’ exploitation of Asian people and their political subjugation.23
Also placing stress on the factor of belief in innate Western superiority is V. 
Kieman’s The Lords o f  Human Kind, which is a history of Western misunderstanding 
based on accounts of Westerners who had served or been in colonized states. Presented as 
a survey of the attitudes towards ‘inferior races’ engendered by European imperialism, it 
attempts to show that while Western attitudes towards non-Westem countries varied, 
their comments were generally paternalistic, condescending and censorious. Pointing out
21 Said, op. cit., p. 3.
22 Collected together in Hodgson, M.G., Rethinking World History (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 
1993, p. xv.
23 Sardar, Ziauddin, Orientalism  (Buckingham and Philadelphia: Open Univ. Press), 1999, pp. 3-4, 8, 10.
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the relation between such attitudes and the issues of race and class, Kieman argued that 
as the Western colonial Powers wanted to preserve their dominance and empires, this had 
put them under an inner compulsion to believe that the colonized societies inadequate by 
birth and blood would never be able to manage their own affairs. Hence, only the Powers 
themselves with their own superior talent could do so.24
A more direct study of class and race relations is by Philip Mason in Prospero’s 
Magic: Some Thoughts on Class and Race. In this work, which is concerned mainly with 
the similarities and differences between race and class prejudice, Mason argues that in 
commanding self-esteem, a European or Westerner would be likely than a non-Westerner 
to express contempt and assert the superiority of his race over others -  that he is superior 
just because he is white.
Having mentioned some works which support or are in line with Said’s, one 
should, however, note several criticisms of Said’s idea of ‘Orientalism.’ One common 
criticism is that he presented ‘Orientalism’ as a monolithic discourse. Said’s argument is 
a massive and complex one in that he deals with ‘Orientalists’ of different backgrounds 
including academics, adventurers, bureaucrats, novelists, philosophers, and maintains that 
‘Orientalism’ is not simply a style of thought and set of ideas, but a corporate institution. 
In contrast to this broad scope of ‘Orientalism’, his notion of the ‘Orient’ is limited, since 
it looks closely at only British and French experience of cultural contacts with the Islamic 
Middle East. Furthermore, Said is also charged with over-emphasizing the role of 
imperialism, by concentrating predominantly on how Europe invented the fiction of the 
‘Orient’ and the ‘Orientals’ and how these representations were used as instruments for 
control and subjugation in colonialism.
Opting for a different argument from Said’s, Bernard Lewis in the essays 
collected in Islam and the West, reasserted the traditional view that ‘Orientalism’ is 
actually a neutral, rather innocent, classical and specialized discipline called philology 
that concerns itself with the discovery, study, publication and interpretation of texts 
related to the Middle East and surrounding areas. Moreover, he argues that ‘Orientalism’ 
has nothing to do with politics and power, and that there is no connection between 
‘Orientalism’ and imperialism or the European acquisition of empires in Asia and 
Africa.26
24 Kieman. V. G., The Lords o f  Human Kind: European Attitudes towards the Outside World in the 
Imperial Age  (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson), 1969, pp. xxviii-xxxi.
25 Mason, P., P rospero’s Magic: Some Thoughts on Class and Race (London, N ew  York and Toronto: 
Oxford Univ. Press), 1962, p. 4.
26 Lewis, B., Islam an dthe West (New York: Oxford Univ. Press), 1993, pp. 101, 109, 117-118.
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In considering the relevance of Said’s ‘Orientalism’ to Japan, it is important to 
recognize that when Said refers to the ’Orient’, he means the Middle East, which is not 
only near to Europe and a source of its civilizations and languages, but also its oldest 
rival. Japan, on the other hand, being among the remotest countries of the Far East, was 
relatively unknown to the West and there was no actual domination over Japan - Japan 
unlike most regions of the Middle East, did not become a Western colony. Moreover, 
there were few cultural ties between the West and Japan, nor did Japan, at least until the 
twentieth century, pose a special threat to Europe. Unlike the ‘Orient’ described by Said, 
which depended on Western representations, Japan did not need the West to discover its 
own past, its history and its identity. Even in the mid-eighteenth century, Japan was not 
hopelessly backward as it already showed desire to progress.
Despite these differences between Japan and the ‘Orient’, still, some Western 
images o f Japan epitomized ‘Orientalism’ as Said understood it. For instance, images of 
Japan being a topsy-turvy and absurd country, an Alice in Wonderland world, an exotic 
land of the East, and a country not worth taking seriously, to name but a few, have found 
their way into the writings of Westerners on Japan. It is against the background of such a 
tendency to misunderstand Japan or produce an oversimplified representation of Japan 
that this thesis will attempt to identify how and to what extent British diplomatic views 
and images of Meiji Japan in 1868-90 resemble or differ from the kind of ‘Orientalism’ 
postulated by Said.
27 Richard H. Minear, ‘Orientalism and the Study o f  Japan’ in Journal o f  Asian Studies, Vol. XXXIX, No.
3, May 1980, pp. 514-515.
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CHAPTER 1 
BRITISH DIPLOMATIC VIEWS OF 
THE MEIJI RESTORATION, 1868-71
1868 was a turning point in the history of modem Japan in that following the 
overthrow of the Tokugawa Bakufli, a considerable number of key political, social 
and economic reforms began to be adopted by the new government to effect the 
dismantling of the centuries-old feudal system. To almost all historians, the period 
1868-1871 was a crucial, if not the most crucial stage in the modernisation process of 
the country. It was a period when political unification and modernisation of the 
political system, in particular, figured prominently in the agenda of the new 
government. The fact that Britain is often believed to have been behind the Meiji 
government in its initial stages, makes it all the more important to examine both the 
way British diplomats observed developments in Japan during these years and the 
extent to which they perceived how fundamental the changes which were taking place 
were.
The Later Years of the Bakufu Rule
To British diplomats, Japan under the Bakufu not only practised a feudal 
political system1 but also a peculiar system of government. It was peculiar in the 
sense that religious belief and superstitions were specially formulated to promote the 
government in power,2 and there also existed a unique dualistic system: the Shogun 
(the Temporal leader’) governed but did not reign while the Emperor (the ‘Spiritual 
leader’) was merely a titular sovereign. On the ruling government of Japan, the 
Tokugawa Bakufu (or Shogunate) itself, Britain’s first diplomatic representative in 
Japan, Rutherford Alcock in particular expressed some ‘Orientalist’ views as he 
described the Bakufu as an Oriental government of a ‘treacherous and vindictive 
race’3 and as Eastern rulers who were jealous and distrustful of foreign relations.4 He 
also depicted the Bakufu as consisting of lazy government officials whose 
sluggishness and ineffectiveness were part of Eastern practice or Oriental diplomacy.5 
Though less forthright than his predecessor, Parkes also expressed his discontent with 
what he saw as the procrastinating attitude of the Bakufu in matters related to 
foreigners and foreign trade. Apart from their dissatisfaction with the government’s
1 Alcock, R., The Capital o f the Tycoon: A Narrative o f A Three Years’ Residence in Japan, Vol. 2, 
(London: Longman), 1863, pp. 239-240, 242.
2 Ibid,, p. 343.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2., p. 29.
4 Ibid., pp. 47-48.
5 Ibid., pp. 163-164.
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supposedly obstructive and monopolistic policy in commerce, the critical diplomatic 
views were also due to their frustration with the government’s inability to curb anti- 
foreign activities that threatened the lives of foreigners in Japan,
Nevertheless, British diplomats generally showed sympathy towards the 
Bakufu in its struggle against the Western daimyo, particularly of Choshu and 
Satsuma, as they considered the former to be the stabilising force that could best unify 
the country. The fact that it was the Bakufu which had in 1858 agreed to sign the 
treaties opening the country to foreign trade, doubtless influenced their attitudes. The 
same attitude was held by Charge d’Affaires Charles Winchester, who observed that 
only by supporting the Bakufu’s cause could foreign relations with Japan rest on a 
safe foundation.6 While Parkes felt that it was important for the future of Japan that 
the three elements of Shogun, Emperor and daimyo be reconciled with each other, the 
former seemed the safest foundation.7 Moreover, Parkes was also convinced that, in 
effecting political reform, far more might be done through the Shogun than through 
the daimyo as the latter quarrelled among themselves and had no real control over 
their own territories.8
As to the causes of the daimyo opposition to the Shogunate, British diplomats 
observed that besides xenophobia on the part of the daimyo, the latter were also 
discontented with the Bakufu’s monopoly of foreign trade and feared that the opening 
of the port of Hyogo would result in the strengthening of the Shogun’s influence at 
Kyoto.9 Moreover, British diplomats also noted political dissatisfaction among the 
daimyo, notably those of Choshu and Satsuma, as they wanted to have some share in 
the administration of the country.10 Another problem that Parkes saw as crucial in 
Bakufu-daimyo relations was the rivalry between the Bakufu and Choshu: while the 
Bakufu desired to crush that domain entirely, the daimyo of the West had grouped 
themselves in support of Choshu.11
Notwithstanding the general sympathy of British diplomats towards the 
Bakufu, it is noteworthy that their policy, apart from their actions in 1863-4 against 
Satsuma and Choshu (to seek reparation from Satsuma and re-open the Shimonoseki 
Straits — which indirectly strengthened the Bakufu and weakened the anti-foreign
6 FO 46/53, Winchester to Russell, Yokohama, February 15, 1865.
7 Daniels, G., Sir Harty Parkes: British Representative in Japan 1865-83 (Richmond, Surrey: Japan 
Library), 1996, p. 53. For British policy in the 1860s, see also Adams, F. O., The History of Japan 
(London: Henry S. King & Co.), 1875; Fox, G., Britain and Japan 1858-1883 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press), 1969.
8 FO 46/69, No. 123, Parkes to Clarendon, July 24, 1866.
9 E.g., Parkes Papers, 6/3, Copy, No. 69, H. M. Perseus, November 28, 1865.
10 FO 391/1, Hammond Papers, Milan, August 25, 1865; FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, 
August 14, 1866.
11 FO 46/83, No. 226, Parkes to Stanley, Osaka, December 22, 1867; also see FO 46/82, No. 166, 
Parkes to Stanley, Yedo, October 1,1867.
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movement) remained one of neutrality. This was in line with the instructions from the 
Foreign Office which enjoined them not to take sides in any contest between the 
Shogun and the daimyo and to concern themselves mainly with the security of British 
commercial interests. Historians have often assumed that Britain adopted an anti- 
Bakufu stance in the internal struggle of the 1860s and the subsequent civil war, and 
in support of this view they have cited the British government’s contact with a 
Satsuma delegation in London and Parkes’s visit to the Satsuma castle-town of 
Kagoshima in 1866, British arm sales to Satsuma, and alleged signs of partiality in the 
war between the Bakufu and Choshu in the summer of 1866. In actual fact, however, 
British diplomats showed no disposition to deviate from the view of Whitehall that 
any commitment might promote civil war and revive xenophobia among the Japanese 
against foreigners.12 Nevertheless, not all British diplomats were sympathetic towards 
the Bakufu. In contrast to Alcock, Winchester and Parkes, Legation Secretary Ernest 
Satow supported the strengthening of the daimyo party and favoured the 
establishment of a new government under the Emperor and he even wrote an 
anonymous article in a Yokohama newspaper to that effect.13
As to future political developments of Japan, British diplomats had 
suggestions for achieving political reforms. Alcock, for instance, believed in a broader 
reform involving political concessions from the Shogun to the daimyo, though with 
the former retaining his position as ruler,14 and he also regretted the want of accord 
between Emperor and the Shogun.15 Similarly, Winchester recognised as essential the 
need for some sort of political reform in Japan.16 When it was proposed in 1866 that a 
general assembly should be established in Japan, Parkes welcomed the idea since he 
saw that the assembly could provide a means of effecting an understanding between 
the Emperor, Shogun and the daimyo as to the powers that each should exercise. 
Apart from providing a peaceful solution to the problem of division of authority in 
Japan between the Emperor and the Shogun, and to the daimyo"s demand for some 
voice in the administration, Parkes observed that the granting of power to the general 
assembly could also strengthen the Bakufu, which he regarded as essential to the 
stability of the country.17 Satow too expressed his support for political reform but in 
his case solely because he wished to see the involvement of the daimyo party in the 
administration of the country.
12 See Daniels, op. c/7,, pp. 51-51.
13 PRO 30/33/15/1, Satow Papers, January 8,1867.
14 FO 391/1, Hammond Papers, Milan, August 25, 1865.
15 Cortazzi, H., ‘Sir Rutherford Alcock, the first British Minister to Japan 1859-1864: A Reassessment’, 
Lecture to the Asiatic Society of Japan, April 1994, p. 38.
16 FO 46/55, No. 91, Winchester to Russell, Yokohama, May 26, 1865.
17 FO 46/78, Parkes to Stanley, Yedo, February 28, 1867.
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In bringing about political stability in Japan, British diplomats also had 
suggestions for economic reforms since they believed that commerce would foster 
political stability and that the widening of commercial opportunities would lessen 
political discontent among the daimyo who had found it difficult to participate in 
foreign trade. For that reason, the diplomats hoped for the creation of a commercial 
middle class in Japan. Alcock, for instance, from mid-1864 laid stress on the need for 
an accommodation between the rival factions in Japan and one way of doing this, he 
argued to the Bakufu, was through unrestricted free trade.18 A similar view was 
expressed by Charge d’Affaires Winchester when he hinted to the Bakufu that while 
the Shogun needed foreign support for its continued rule, this might be reversed if the 
Shogun’s trade policy proved to be too conservative.19 Parkes also adopted the same 
approach and in line with an instruction from the Foreign Office to impress upon the 
Bakufu the desirability of ‘the creation through the Agency of Commerce of a 
prosperous and enlightened middle class throughout the whole country,’ 20 Parkes 
repeatedly urged Bakufu officials to abandon the old exclusive system. To advance 
this policy Parkes sought both a lowering of tariffs and an end to the restrictive 
measures which, he claimed, hindered Japan’s foreign commerce at all levels.21
While they encouraged such developments, British diplomats had, 
nevertheless, some reservations about the Japanese potential ability to achieve change. 
Alcock, for instance, observed that despite a claim of the existence of a progressive 
party as opposed to a conservative party in Japan, he doubted that such a party was 
real. Rather, he believed that the true distinction among Japanese leaders was their 
degree of opposition to foreigners; those who were timid advocated a temporising 
policy to gain time for better preparation against foreigners, while the more 
courageous favoured the immediate expulsion of foreigners by force.22 While Parkes 
acknowledged the benefits that the Bakufu might gain in sharing the burden of 
governing the country with qualified daimyo, he was at the same time pessimistic 
about the likely outcome. When it seemed likely that the daimyo would meet to 
discuss future national policy, Parkes was seriously concerned that the liberal daimyo 
might be out-voted when the implementation of existing treaties was discussed. 
Furthermore, he was still pessimistic about the ability of the daimyo to unite and 
overcome their mutual jealousies in forming a national assembly23 and he remained 
uncertain whether the daimyo would be really satisfied with a constitutional
18 FO 46/45, No. 51, Alcock to Russell, Yokohama, August 25,1864.
19 FO 46/55, No. 83, Winchester to Russell, May 11, 1865.
20 FO 46/63, No. 30, Clarendon to Parkes, Foreign Office, February 20, 1866.
21 Daniels, op. cit., p. 46.
22 Alcock, op. cit., Vol. 1., p. 221.
23 Daniels, op. cit., p. 58.
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government, which must involve some surrender of their pretensions: the 
contemplated changes, in his view, were too vast to be speedily accomplished.24 Apart 
from the daimyo, there was also likely to be opposition from their samurai retainers, 
whom Parkes thought likely to cause trouble when some of them came together to 
participate in the general assembly 25 Moreover, Parkes was also depressed by the 
impression that the Japanese population at large appeared to have no interest in this 
political issue, and that their loyalty was only to the Emperor. This meant that any 
party of progress would have to cany out the additional task of trying to wean the 
Emperor away from his conservative courtiers and win him to their side.26 Besides 
Parkes, Satow also held a pessimistic view as he observed that the council had been 
called by Tokugawa Keiki not only because he was tired of being harassed by the 
opposition, but also to give unity to his own camp. Furthermore, Satow maintained 
that in the event of such a council being established, the ex-Shogun would probably 
be reinstated by a majority of votes and this would result in his power becoming 
stronger than it was before.27 And while Parkes hoped for a peaceful transition 
following the abdication of Tokugawa Keiki in November 1867, Satow learned from 
Japanese contacts that a civil war was imminent.28 Moreover, he maintained that the 
fact that the assembly had not yet been properly set up might also lead to a war among 
the daimyo as it was probable that any decision reached by the few daimyo who were 
in Kyoto would be protested against by others 29
Similarly, in foreign trade, Parkes observed the procrastinating attitude on the 
part of the Bakufu in the opening of the port of Hyogo. He also felt that despite the 
daimyo's wish for trade, they were averse to opening their own harbours and tended 
to be opposed to the settlement of foreigners.30 In Satsuma’s case, Parkes maintained 
that his main motivation in opposing the Shogunate seemed to be his personal 
ambition in rather than the need for the expansion of trade.31
The Japanese Civil War
As far as the knowledge of British diplomats of the Meiji Ishin is concerned, 
while British Minister Parkes was aware of the increasing opposition by several
24 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yedo, December 16, 1867.
25 Parkes Papers, 2/F14, Private, Parkes to Flowers, Yokohama, November 23, 1867; also see FO 
391/14, Hammond Papers, Yedo, November 28, 1867.
26 Daniels, op. cit., p. 58.
27 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow Papers, December 7, 1867.
28 Ibid., December 14, 1867; Ibid., December 20,1867; Ibid., December 24, 1867.
29 Ibid., December 18, 1867.
30 Daniels, op. cit., p. 45. Parkes, for instance, noted that the daimyo in Kyushu were reported to fear 
that the opening of Hyogo might interfere with the prosperity of Nagasaki in which, as the port nearest 
to their territories, they had a more direct interest. FO 46/78, No. 8, Parkes to Stanley, Yedo, January 
18, 1867.
31 Daniels, op. cit., p. 56.
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leading Western han against the Shogun's government, nothing his dispatches 
suggests that he was anticipating a drastic movement by the Western daimyo and their 
influential retainers to overthrow the regime in early January of 1868, Even more 
surprisingly, the same was also true of Secretary of Legation Ernest Satow, who, 
although he had a close friendship with some of the anti-Bakufu samurai and noted 
the sense of looming political crisis, did not foresee that it would break out so soon 
into a civil war. This is demonstrated in his intention on January 1, 1868 to effect a 
conciliation between the rival factions through the mediation of Parkes.32 Even after 
the coup had taken place, British diplomats were left in the dark about the actual 
events in Kyoto where the Shogun's opponents had seized control of the palace and 
the Emperor and had had an Imperial Decree issued abolishing the office of Shogun. 
Only rumours were available concerning the event. Perhaps because the Shogun's 
earlier abdication had brought no obvious changes in the management of diplomacy, 
it was difficult for Western diplomats to judge whether there would now be any 
drastic change in the existing form of government.33 It was not until January 6 that the 
Legation was informed of what had been happening in Kyoto by a Bakufu official, 
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Ishikawa Kawachi no Kami.34
In explaining the driving motive of the party that launched the coup d'etat, 
Parkes in a dispatch of January, observed that not only did the leading daimyo party 
not believe in the sincerity of the Shogun in surrendering his political power to the 
Mikado, but they also saw the Shogun's proposal for the assembly ‘as a plan to bring 
him in again to a chief if not sovereign position by the vote of a small packed 
assembly.’35 Satow also shared this view, writing on January 14 that 'the Taikun's idea 
of a general council was one in which by the majority he was certain of, he could feel 
sure of getting a vote reinstating him in his power authority. This was his stratagem 
and it has failed of course through Satsuma's bold stroke of getting possession of the 
Mikado's person.' In addition, from his earlier conversation with Kuroda Shinyemon 
and Koba Dainori of the daimyo party, Satow observed that the protest of more than a 
dozen other han, who opposed the Shogun's returning of sovereign power into the 
hands of the Mikado, also contributed to the decisive action by the Western han, and 
this explained why they 'were in such a hurry; they wanted to do their work before 
others could come up.'37 Interestingly, in contrast to these views, a wholly different 
reason was given by Iwakura Tomomi to Charge d'Affaires Francis Adams in 1871,
32 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, January 1, 1868.
33 Daniels, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
34 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow’s Diary, January 6, 1868.
35 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Osaka, January 10, 1868; also see FO 410/12, No. 5, Parkes to 
Stanley, Osaka, January 5, 1868.
36 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, January 14, 1868.
37 Ibid., January 12, 1868.
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when he pointed to the Dai Nihon Shi as the main cause for the Ishin. According to 
the Japanese statesman,
...it was a mistake to suppose, that the notion of restoring the 
governing Power into the hands of the Mikado was a thing of 
yesterday. More than 150 years ago...this principle was broached in 
a history of Japan contained in 100 Volumes published by the then 
Prince of Mito. This book had been extensively read throughout 
Japan, its leading idea had germinated in the minds of men, had 
grown in strength with every succeeding generation, and had thus 
been the principal cause of the events of 1B68.38
Amidst rumours of possible fighting between the Mikado and Tokugawa 
forces, Parkes observed in early January that though a civil war was to be regretted, it 
was nevertheless, inevitable as a means to end corruption.39 Later in July, he further 
observed that the fighting would pave the way for the establishment of a centralised 
government:
I also think that until the parties have had an opportunity of 
measuring their strength in several sharp fights there is little chance 
of an adjustment of affair being carried out...I suppose too, that in 
Japan as elsewhere, the weakening of the baronial forces must 
precede the establishment of a central Power.40
Satow too, while he preferred a peaceful settlement between the rival forces, did not 
rule out the possibility that civil war might bring about political changes in Japan. As 
he wrote following a conversation with Kuroda Shinyemon on Januaiy 10, 'I advised 
them not to fight [the Tycoon] if they could help it, but if they felt it necessary to do it 
at once.'41 Nevertheless, as a civil war broke out and dragged on, Parkes expressed his 
concern that prolonged fighting might result in Russian encroachment of Japanese 
territory.42 This followed a report by Vice-Admiral Henry Keppel from his cruise in 
the Gulf of Tartary that Russia had renewed her aggression to annex the Southern 
island of the Kurile group and that this might lead to the occupation of Iturup and 
Hokkaido.43
As to whether British diplomats directly involved themselves in the Meiji 
Ishin, none of Parkes's dispatches gives such evidence. His views and actions were 
consistent with his advocacy of a non-interference policy. A few days after the Meiji 
Ishin, Parkes observed to Under Secretary of State Edmund Hammond that while the
38 FO 46/141, No. 73, Adams to Granville, Yedo, September 15, 1871.
39 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Osaka, January 10, 1868.
40 Ibid., Yokohama, July 10, 1868.
41 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, January 10, 1868.
42 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, September 12, 1868.
43 FO 410/12, No. 216, Conf., Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, September 5, 1868. See the encl. Keppel's 
report to Admiralty, August 23, 1868.
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French Minister in Japan, Leon Roches, had continued to cultivate the idea that the 
Shogun could be brought back to power and was urging that what was going on at 
Kyoto was a revolt against the regular government, he himself had declined to accept 
such a view or 'to exhibit the least desire to interfere’ and 'shall be as ready as any one 
else to open relations with the new administration, whether directed by the Tycoon or 
whoever may be duly appointed for the purpose.’44 Moreover, in February, in response 
to a request by Prince Higashi-Kuze, the Mikado's envoy, for the observance of strict 
neutrality on the part of Britain,45 Parkes issued a general notification to British 
subjects at different open ports in Japan prohibiting any involvement in the civil 
war;46 and he re-issued it in July, following an official instruction from Foreign 
Secretary Lord Stanley 47 Another proof may also be seen in his refusal to meet the 
request of the new government in December 1868 to assist in arranging for 
Yamaguchi Hanzo, its representative, to secure passage on board an English vessel to 
Hakodate to go and treat with the rebels. To the officials who made the request, he 
defended his action on the ground of maintaining neutrality on the part of Britain 48 
As the fighting came to an end in mid-1869, Parkes attributed the better position 
gained by Britain in Japan, as opposed to that of France, to the observance of strict 
neutrality during the Japanese civil war:
The great ’Mission Militaire’ of M. Roches which was to have made 
Japan French is now ended, & has been accompanied with very 
different results to those hoped for by its projector. I trust I may say 
without vanity that British influence, from having aimed only at 
legitimate ends, has not sustained any similar defeat & occupies a 
position that is worthy of i t49
Nevertheless, as has been mentioned before, the same neutrality could not perhaps be 
said about Satow, whose close connection with some individuals of the daimyo party 
might have influenced his conduct in relation to the Meiji Ishin, in that he clearly 
expressed his support to the anti-Tokugawa party. This is evident in an article entitled 
the 'Sakurori, which he published in 1867 in the Japan Times, promoting the cause of 
the daimyo party and suggesting direct relations between Britain and the Mikado.50
As to signs of modernising interest on the part of Japanese during the civil 
war, diplomats noted the employment of Western weaponry such as rifles and guns
44 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Osaka, January 5, 1868.
45 FO 46/122, No. 29, Parkes to Stanley, Hyogo, February 15, 1868.
46 Ibid., No. 40, February 25, 1868.
47 Ibid., No. 174, Yokohama, July 22, 1868; Ibid., No. 61, Draft, Foreign Office to Parkes, April 24, 
1868.
48 PRO 30/33/15/3, Satow's Diary, December 21, 1868. Instead, Parkes advised the Mikado officials to 
send a coolie in a boat from Awamori with a letter offering to treat with the Tokugawa rebels.
49 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yedo, June 26, 1869.
50 Fox, op. cit., pp. 248-249; Checkland, O., Britain's Encounter with Meiji Japan, 1868-1912 (London: 
MacMillan Press), 1989, pp. 8,12.
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alongside traditional swords and lances by both Imperial and Tokugawa forces. In his 
diary, Satow noted that Japanese with whom he had spoken considered the more 
widespread and effective use of modern arms by the Imperial forces to have been a 
decisive factor in their victory over the Tokugawa forces at the battle of Fushimi.51 In 
mentioning the Japanese interest in modem weapons, however, Satow showed no 
surprise, as he was already aware that the Japanese had, during the closing years of 
the Bakufu, been involved in the purchase of arms from foreign merchants.32
Nevertheless, Satow was not impressed with the military appearance of the 
Japanese forces. Of the procession of Mikado's soldiers into Tokyo in November 
1868, he wrote, 'It was not splendid, because the effect of what was Oriental was 
marred by the horribly untidy soldiers with unkempt hair & clothes vilely imitated 
from the West.'53 A similar comment was made on the Shogun's drilled soldiers, 
retreating to Osaka in January 1868. To Satow, they did not present a very martial 
appearance, and he described them as 'a herd of men in fantastic costumes, some 
wearing helmets with long wigs of black or white hair reaching down to the middle of 
their backs, others in ordinary helmets, jingasa, flat hats, & armed some with long 
spears, short spears, Spencer rifles, Swiss rifles, muskets, or plain two swords.'54
While Parkes also noted the Japanese interest in modern weaponry during the 
civil war, he dealt more with the importation of arms at Niigata. For example, in 
reporting on the ongoing state of war in the neighbourhood of Niigata, Parkes 
observed that the daimyo of Aizu, one of the Tokugawa's staunchest supporters, was 
not averse to the arrival of foreign ships at the port as their appearance would 
facilitate the importation of arms.55 In a later dispatch, he observed that the sale of 
arms at Niigata appeared to form 'a more substantial object of trade in that quarter' 
than the purchase of silkworm eggs.56 Satow also reported transactions of arms 
between foreigners and Japanese, yet in a different perspective, he noted complaints 
by the new Mikado's government not only of foreigners selling guns to the Tokugawa 
rebels at Niigata, but also of the indifference shown by foreign ministers, despite the 
government's request to put a stop to the illegal trade. In response, Satow advised the 
government to issue a notification proclaiming a blockade at the port57- a suggestion,
51 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, February 1, 1868; ibid., February 5 and February 17, 1868.
52 Ibid, October 12, 1867; For increasing Japanese interest in modern weapons during the Bakufu
period, see Harries, M. and Harries, S., Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall o f the Imperial Japanese 
Army 1868-1945 (London: Heinemann), 1991, pp. 5-7, 9,
53 PRO 30/33/15/3, Satow's Diary, November 26, 1868.
54 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, January 7, 1868.
55 FO 46/94, No. 147, Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, June 26, 1868.
56 FO 46/96, No. 219, Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, September 5, 1868.
57 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow’s Diary, August 21, 1868.
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which was later adopted by the Japanese government.
The Establishment of the New Administration
Regarding the new Imperial government that came to power in January 1868, 
British diplomats showed themselves to be fundamentally favourable but cautious. 
During the initial stage of its formation, British diplomats had had some doubts of its 
strength and power as they observed a lack of unity and mutual rivalry among the 
Imperial forces, which included Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen. In a private letter 
of January 10, 1868 to Hammond, Parkes mentioned that 'whether strengthening 
themselves or becoming isolated, I am as yet wholly unable to say.'58 Given the well- 
known fact that Satsuma and Choshu had long been a rival to one another, Parkes's 
statement is not surprising. Besides, as he noted in another dispatch, the leading 
daimyo, who were responsible for the coup, 'represent a considerable diversity of 
interest.'59 Furthermore, Parkes may have also reflected on the remarks by the ex- 
Shogun, who, during an interview with both Parkes and Roches after his withdrawal 
to Osaka, maintained that Kyoto was occupied by 'a set of men who did nothing but 
quarrel among themselves, anything but govern.'60 Moreover, a number of Japanese 
officials spoke to Parkes of the dissatisfaction felt by some other daimyo with the 
high-handed proceedings of Satsuma against the ex-Shogun. From Ishikawa no Kami, 
Parkes gained information that not only was the Satsuma proposal in early January to 
abolish the Shogunate and the traditional offices of Kampaku, Tenso and Giso, and to 
establish in their places, the SosaU Gijo and Sanyo, opposed by fudai daimyoi the 
adherents of the ex-Shogun, but also some of the Kokushi, or highest order of daimyo, 
who argued that if such sweeping changes were suddenly introduced, the highest and 
oldest institutions in the country, including the position of the Emperor, could not be 
considered safe.61 Furthermore, Satsuma's action in fighting the Tokugawa forces at 
Toba-Fushimi was also reported to have caused some dissatisfaction among those 
daimyo who favoured a more conciliatory policy towards the ex-Shogun.62
Parkes made no specific comments on the establishment of Sosai, Gijo and 
Sanyo, but in a conversation with Iwakura he expressed the view that Japan should 
adopt a gradual policy towards centralisation by taking into account local needs and 
circumstances. Parkes's view is worthy of note as it resembled the gradualist policy of
58 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Osaka, January 10,1868.
59 FO 46/91, No. 9, Parkes to Stanley, Osaka, January 10, 1868.
50 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, January 8, 1868.
51 FO 46/91, Parkes to Stanley, Osaka, January 10, 1868; also see FO 410/12, No. 9, Parkes to Stanley, 
Osaka, January 10, 1868; PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, January 6, 1868.
62 From conversations between Parkes and several Japanese officials as recorded in PRO 30/33/15/2, 
Satow's Diary, January 28, 1868; ibid., January 29, 1868.
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some Meiji leaders. In response to a query by Iwakura on January 9 as to what 
direction the Japanese government might profitably adopt with regard to Western 
institutions in view of the inferiority of Japanese civilization in many respects, Parkes 
replied that
It may not be desirable however that those changes should be too 
rapidly made or that all the institutions of foreign countries should 
be found suited to the actual condition of Japan. It would be better 
that improvement should be grafted upon the old stock rather than 
[that] the latter should be destroyed in order to make way for 
novelties. The government of the country having now been 
reconstituted under the Mikado, it is obvious that the latter must be 
supported by a central organisation and by material power; and 
although much may still be left to local administration, still certain 
cardinal functions of government such as legislation, national 
defences, foreign affairs &c. should be conducted from the centre, 
and means should be found to correct the disintegration which has 
so long been the leading feature in the Japanese polity.63
From his close friendship with Japanese officials, Satow also noted the 
disharmonious relations within the Imperial party. Not only had some Japanese 
officials spoken of this,64 but there was also a written document65 attesting to the 
feeling of dissatisfaction of other daimyo with Satsuma's action and the division 
within the party. Regarding Satsuma's proposal for changes in the political structure, 
Satow's comments are significant since he compared the proposed offices with 
Western institutions in Britain; the Sosai, in his view, might be seen as similar to 
Secretaries of State, the Gijo resembled a Cabinet, and finally the Sanyo were similar 
to Under Secretaries of State. Referring to his previous conversations with Goto of 
Tosa on the British political system, he added that the reform 'looks marvellously like 
the hints we gave to Goto Shojiro about forming an executive'.66 (Neither he nor 
Parkes, however, showed an awareness that the proposed reforms were in reality 
based on a pre-feudal model, the Taiho Code of 701-04 A.D.67) However, despite 
what he saw as positive signs towards the modernisation of political institutions in 
Japan, Satow remained skeptical of the solidarity of the men in power. From his
63 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, January 30, 1869.
64 On January 7, 1868 Satow was informed by Toshima, a hard o f Tosa, that the daimyo were divided 
where by in dealing with the Shogun, Satsuma wanted to do everything by main force, Tosa by reason. 
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conversation with Goto Shojiro, Yoshii Kosuke and Saionji in February 1868, Satow 
recorded in his diary that it appeared that 'it is by no means decided as yet who is to 
be what, and that the chief men find it rather difficult to manage each other' since 'the 
jealousy of each other & especially of Satsuma prevents their working together.'68
When a new structure was proposed in February 1868, which included the 
establishment of seven departments, namely the Ecclesiastical, Home, Foreign 
Affairs, War, Finance, Judiciary and Legislation Department - each to be headed by 
appointed daimyo -, and the participation of retainers of the daimyo in a deliberative 
assembly, a fairly positive view was forthcoming from Parkes. As he put it: 'It must 
be granted that in the formation of a new Constitution the reforming party have set 
themselves an onerous task which will require time for its accomplishment, but there 
is reason to hope that it will be attended, in the end, with beneficial results.' The slow 
process that would necessarily take place before the success of the reform, he thought, 
was mainly due to the jealousies among the daimyo. 69
By March, though he still observed the problem of solidarity among the 
daimyo, Parkes's comments indicate a growing confidence in the Imperial party. To 
Hammond, Parkes wrote that he was 'confident that good will come out of this 
movement'70 and that a responsible government might materialise.71 Again, when two 
officials were sent by the new regime in mid-April to begin a formal communication 
with the Legation, Parkes observed that though these officials might not at first give 
satisfaction, particularly in matters related to foreign trade, ‘I trust we may see a 
competent & responsible Government.’72 A still more positive comment was made 
following the publication in April 1868 by the government of political documents on 
the deliberative duties of Sosai, Gijo and Sanyo, the executive functions of eight state 
departments, and the consultative general assembly known as the Koshi. As Parkes 
put it, 'they furnish convincing proof of vigor, intelligence, & sound organisation, on 
the part of the new administration...The boldness of the language in which the reform 
of the old institutions is advocated and free discussion invited, both on Home and 
Foreign Affairs, is deserving of much admiration.'73 Surprisingly, in reporting the 
reforms in April, Parkes made no mention of the important Charter Oath promulgated 
on April 6, 1868. Nor was there any report on the Oath by Satow.74
68 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, February 20, 1868.
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Nevertheless, when the Tokugawa forces in Northern Japan began a new 
assault on the Meiji government in the mid-1868, Parkes's views somewhat changed, 
indicating the uncertainties in Japan. Although he observed that the sense of danger 
that resulted from the opposition movement might contribute to more cohesion among 
the Imperial party,75 he also felt that the government still lacked the unity and 
resources needed to create a strong government. As he wrote to Hammond on June 
27, 1868:
The Japanese love to act in a desultory & uncertain way & to leave 
it as much as possible to events to bring about their own solutions. It 
is most difficult to find out what is going on - chiefly because there 
are so many little actions and so few great ones & all of them 
wishing apparently to play independent parts. Unless some means 
can be hit upon to create more adhesion among parties I shall be 
afraid that a long period of discord is before us.76
Parkes further observed that not only was the new government suffering from 
a financial problem in that it did not yet have an Imperial treasury, but it also lacked 
qualified men as the daimyo as a class did not have sufficient administrative skills. 
The best administrators, in Parkes's views, were to be found among the principal 
retainers of the daimyo.77 It is significant that in writing these reports, Parkes (like
7RSatow ) showed no interest in making comments on the extensive administrative 
reform in June 1868 known as the Seitaisho, which entailed the re-distribution of 
government posts and a great reduction in the number of officials and concentrated 
power into the hands of a few han, notably Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen.79 
Parkes's subsequent dispatches further indicate the difficulty of the government in 
getting effective cooperation from the daimyo. This prompted Parkes to conclude that 
'The growth of a Government in a country where the elements of government do not 
exist must necessarily be slow.'80 Satow, on the other hand, noted the introduction in 
December 1868 of the system of promotion by merit and ability by the government in 
the place of the old hereditary office holding,81 yet he made no connection between
Institutions’, in Jansen, M. (ed.), The Cambridge History o f Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. 
Press) Vol. 5., 1989, pp. 623-624.
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76 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, June 27, 1868.
77 Ibid.
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this reform and the government's efforts to effect uniformity in local administration in 
cities and han,82
One modernising reform that attracted much comment from British diplomats 
was the establishment of a general assembly of daimyo and leading samurai. Having 
been proposed in 1868, the assembly commenced its first session in mid-May 1869. 
Parkes's comments prior to its inauguration indicate his positive expectations. As he 
stated to Hammond in April 1869, 'I cordially wish them success & view with deep 
interest their efforts to give order & consistency to their proceedings.'83 Parkes's 
attitude is not suiprising when one remembers that he had already encouraged the 
establishment of representative government or more like a baronial council in Japan 
during the closing years of the Bakufu, with the Shogun sharing political power with 
the daimyo}4
In contrast to Parkes, Satow had at first had expressed some scepticisms with 
regard to the idea of representative government in Japan. In reply to a remark by a 
Japanese hard, Toshima in January 1868 that Goto Shojiro's plan for representative 
system was good but that Japan was not yet ripe for such a change, Satow said, 'I 
agree too that a system of representative government would be a curious 
change...from the hitherto existing despotic form.' Instead, he saw some sort of a 
council, which included the ex-Shogun, as more suitable to Japan, though he 
suspected that the daimyo party wished to exclude the ex-Shogun and destroy the 
office altogether.85 Nevertheless, six weeks later, when Goto Shojiro lamented that 'he 
despaired of getting a deliberative assembly because the majority would always be 
stupid & wrongheaded,' Satow advised him to experiment with the assembly anyway, 
adding that 'if they [the assembly members] did run their heads against a block they 
would learn wisdom by it.'86 In explaining his changed attitude, one can only 
speculate. Satow may have at first felt unsure of the ability of the daimyo party to 
make a representative system work in view of their lack of unity, but subsequently 
may have seen evidence of determination on the part of the new government, as 
shown in the more elaborated administrative reforms undertaken in February 1868.
Parkes welcomed the creation of the assembly for several reasons. One reason, 
as he pointed out in mid-1869, was because it served as a peaceful means to unite 
different views in Japan.87 The fact that the subjects for debates were chosen by the 
government, in Parkes's view, also meant that the assembly might prove to be 'an
82 Beasley, Meiji Restoration, p. 328.
83 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, April 13, 1869.
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useful instrument in promoting the establishment of united and regular Government,' 
in that the members might become more susceptible to the importance of carrying out
QQ
necessary reforms towards a centralised administration. Furthermore, as 'a vent for 
discussion,' the assembly, as he saw it, could also tone down the anti-foreign views of 
the reactionary or conservative party.89 One final factor that may have contributed to 
Parkes's view was his desire for Japan to adopt a system based on the British 
parliamentary system. This is evident from the observation in Satow's diary that 
during a visit to the ex-Shogun at Osaka on January 15, 1868, Parkes brought up the 
topic of the British Constitution.90
On the capacity of the assembly members to participate in the debates 
concerning Japanese national policy, Parkes observed that despite their lack of 
experience, some showed good sense and thoughtfulness in their speeches. For 
instance, with regard to the question of foreign commerce, Parkes wrote that 'In 
judging of it we have to bear in mind the limited experience of the speakers on 
commercial matters and on business generally, and although some of the opinions are 
crude and absurd, others again are marked by common sense and liberality.'91 Similar 
commendation was also forthcoming on more sensitive issues such as Christianity, on 
which he noted that the debate showed that 'even in their hastily improvised 
parliament, the Japanese have men who can take an intelligent & moderate view on 
such an exciting & delicate subject as that of religion.'92
Nevertheless, Parkes did have some reservations about the working of the 
assembly, particularly regarding the inefficiency of its highest-ranking members. As 
he put it in April 1869, 'The Daimios who in most cases have had but slight 
experience of the earnest business of life were not eager to devote themselves to the 
labours of an onerous and voluntary office.' As a result, it became necessary that
practical and able men were selected from the daimyo's retainers, who were really the
administrators of the affairs of the han. Even then, he concluded that the way in which 
the system would develop could not easily be foreseen: 'It remains to be seen in what 
degree the action of the representatives will be separated from that of their Chiefs, or 
whether the latter will agree to form themselves into another and a higher chamber, 
and thus take that part in the legislation of the nation to which, if willing to exercise it 
they are naturally entitled by this superior Rank.'93 In a later dispatch in June, Parkes 
again saw the assembly's future development as a necessarily gradual process. In view
88 FO 46/110, No. 138, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, June 26, 1869.
89 Ibid.', FO 46/111, No. 155, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, August 9, 1869.
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of the 'very imperfectly organized' state of the assembly, he wrote, 'I need not observe 
that time must elapse before these proceedings can assume a definitive shape or the 
functions of the assembly be clearly defined. At the present date and probably for 
some time to come it can be regarded as little more than a tentative measure - as the 
mere germ of an institution which can only be developed by experience.'94 A more 
lengthy comment on the shortcomings of the assembly may be found in Parkes's 
report of August 1869, in which he asserted that not only were the assembly's 
members 'elected more or less arbitrarily,' but also 'Legislative functions do not 
appear to have been conferred upon the assembly, and the Government reserve to 
themselves the right of considering all the opinions sent up to them by the members, 
whether given singly or collectively, and of determining how far these should be 
carried out into effect.' Given these imperfections, Parkes again emphasized the need 
for time and experience before the assembly could operate effectively.95 His 
reservations were far less, though, than those which the Meiji government came to 
have: it abandoned its experiment with consultation in 1870 and the assembly was 
abolished in October 1871.
The Consolidation of the Meiji Government
In creating a new modem and strong Japan, the Meiji leaders undertook a 
range of measures which aimed at the centralisation and consolidation of the country, 
for they knew that political unification was a prerequisite for modernisation. One was 
the establishment of the supreme role of the Emperor as the real Sovereign through 
the abandonment by the Court of some of its ancient customs and practices. Instead of 
shutting himself away in the Kyoto palace far from the gaze of his subjects, the 
Emperor began to appear in public and participate in important state functions. This 
elicited favourable comments by British diplomats. Following his first audience with 
the Mikado in Kyoto on March 26, 1868, Parkes observed that unlike the previous 
practice where the Japanese Sovereign was 'kept in the strictest seclusion and 
regarded as a demigod by his people,' the Emperor 'has now for the first time placed 
himself in communication with the outer world.'96 A lengthy positive view of this 
'striking innovation'97 was recorded by Parkes after the audience of the foreign
94 FO 46/110, No, 138, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, June 26, 1869.
95 FO 46/111, No. 155, Parkes to Clarendon, Yokohama, August 9, 1869.
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representatives with the Emperor in Tokyo on January 5, 1869. As he reported to Lord 
Stanley:
I must confess, My Lord, to a feeling of some admiration on 
observing the sensible and unostentatious way in which this 
sovereign - accustomed to think of himself and a long line of 
ancestors as demi-gods - addresses himself, upon the advice of his 
councillors, to the practical duties of his new station. No attempt at 
compromise between his former pseudo sacred and his present 
secular position appears to be attempted. The object aimed at seems 
to be that he shall be known as a sovereign possessing no 
exceptional or unnatural attributes but charged with the welfare of 
some millions of his fellow beings whose interests he is to watch 
over by the aid of national advisers.98
Nevertheless, no similar awareness was shown by British diplomats of such measures 
to enhance the people's reverence for the Emperor and obedience to the will of the 
Court as the prominent position given to the Department of Shinto (Jingikari) over 
other state departments in 1869, and the emphasis on Shinto through the Great 
Teaching Promulgation campaign, which began in 1870.99
Another important change towards centralisation was the movement of the 
capital from Kyoto to Edo (later renamed Tokyo). The plan was first announced by 
the government in August 1868. This was welcomed by British diplomats not only 
because Tokyo, as Parkes mentioned to Hammond in 1868, was seen as superior to 
Kyoto,100 but more importantly, it would enable the new government to govern the 
country effectively, especially in view of the opposition of the Northern daimyo 
against the Mikado's government. The latter purpose was confirmed by Inoue Iwami, 
who stated to Satow on August 22 that he thought the Mikado must come to Tokyo 
and make it his capital or the Northern rebels could not be kept in order.101 In a 
conversation with some government officials in October, Parkes was informed that 
the 'thirteen states' which formed the Northern portion of Japan and comprised about 
one third of its territory were too remote to be conveniently ruled from Kyoto.102 
Nevertheless, as rightly observed by Parkes, the question could not be easily solved, 
as the conservative party who 'cling fast to Kioto which is a second Mecca to them,1 
objected to the departure of the Mikado to the new capital.103 Therefore, when the 
Mikado finally departed for Tokyo in November 1868, Parkes described the move as
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a 'healthy indication of a growth of power'104 and stated that if Tokyo was 
successfully made a capital, it meant that 'another great step will have been made 
towards the solution of difficulties, & the establishment of a consolidated power.'105 
Parkes's positive comments on the movement of the capital were also partly motivated 
by the question of the security of foreigners in Japan, as Kyoto was known to be the 
centre of the conservative or reactionary party.106 In relation to foreign interests, 
Parkes may have also welcomed the step because the new capital was nearer to 
Yokohama which symbolized Western interests. Not only would this make it easier 
for the foreign diplomats to exert their influence and pressure upon the new 
government, but it also meant that the Japanese authorities would be more aware of 
foreign needs. However, no such reasoning is to be found in British diplomatic 
reports.
Another important requirement for a centralised Meiji government was the 
establishment of an Imperial treasury. In this context, British diplomats noted that one 
difficulty faced by the Meiji government in 1868 was the refusal of the ex-Shogun 
and his followers to the government's demand for the surrender by the ex-Shogun of 
large areas of his territory to form the basis of national treasury.107 Their anticipation 
that the issue would not be settled without a fight proved to be true, and only after the 
defeat at Toba-Fushimi did the ex-Shogun surrender his territory to the new 
government. In addition to the ex-Shogun's lands, Satow reported, following a 
conversation with Terajima Munenori in January 1868, that Tosa and some other han 
had also proposed that each daimyo should give up a smaller proportion of their 
territory to form the nucleus of a national treasury, but that the plan was opposed by 
Satsuma.108
Despite his initial reluctance, Shimazu Hisamitsu, the father of the Satsuma 
daimyo did finally join the lords of Choshu, Tosa and Hizen in presenting a memorial 
of March 1869, submitting their men, revenue and lands to the Mikado, and in July all 
daimyo were appointed governors (Chiji) of their respective han. British diplomats 
praised the measure as a further consolidation of the new government. Already in 
February 1868, when reporting on the efforts by several leading Choshu samurai to 
persuade their lord to join in presenting the memorial, Satow had expressed the view 
that 'If all the daimios would do this, a powerful govt, might be formed, which is 
impossible under the present system. Japan can't be strong when every daimio can
104 Ibid., November 13, 1868.
105 Ibid., November 18, 1868.
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withdraw his assistance at pleasure, & when each prince drills his men after a 
different fashion. It's the story of the German confederation over again: they must all 
be swallowed up in something bigger.'109 Like Satow, Parkes had also favoured the 
consolidation of Japan through the abolition of feudal privileges of the han  ^ which 
included the possession of independent armed bodies. As he observed in December 
1868, the disorder among the followers of the daimyo should be seen by the 
government as a weakness arising from the feudal practice of retaining independent 
military bodies.110 Therefore, following the issuance of the joint memorial, Parkes 
positively wrote: 'I am glad to say that light breaks out through the cloud. Satsuma, 
Choshiu & several of the leading Daimos have came forward & offered to surrender 
the government of their own territories - their revenue, forces - ...into the hands of the 
Mikado's Govt, in order that a strong central Power may be created. This is a 
substantial step in the right direction.'111
Nevertheless, as to whether the measure would be peacefully accepted by the 
people of Japan, Parkes at first had some doubts. This was because, he observed, not 
only would the measure entail a great magnitude of changes, but there were also some 
hostile elements in the country, especially the armed samurai, whose discontent might 
be expected, as they would be greatly affected by the changes. On the commencement 
of the deliberation on the question in the general assembly at Tokyo, Parkes wrote in a 
private letter to Hammond dated May 28, 1869:
If the work of consolidation goes on we may hope to see the 
Government supported by effective power, & able to maintain peace 
and order. But the interests affected by the proposed changes are so 
great & manifold that it is very difficult to foretell the result of these 
deliberations. The movement amounts to a remodelling of all the 
institutions of the country & should of course be deliberately 
proceeded with. But when was it found possible to divest a 
revolution of strife and excitement! There is less of it in Japan than 
might have been looked for, considering the looseness of the 
restraint exercised over the armed or dangerous class.112
In another instance, in response to a query by the Foreign Office on his opinion as to 
the necessity of the maintenance of British forces in Japan amidst the changes in
Japan, Parkes argued that, in addition to the samurai class, difficulties might also arise
from the agricultural and merchantile class in Japan. As he put it to Lord Clarendon,
The Revolution of which the late war was only one of the earlier 
features, is still going on. It is not only a political but...also a great
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social revolution and it is difficult to estimate the extent of the 
changes that must be effected before the movement shall have run 
its course. Japan appears to be endeavouring to pass at a stride from 
feudalism to monarchical Government of a constitutional type. The 
movement is not confined to the direction of a few of the leading 
nobles. Not only are the lower grades of the armed class extensively 
concerned in it but even the agricultural and the industrial classes 
are claiming consideration for their position. It is not in the nature of 
things that so vast a change should be easily or immediately effected 
or that the transition should not be marked by much uncertainty.113
Parkes's reservation was supported by Iwakura's assertion, in a meeting in June, that 
every daimyo was 'a little Mikado in his own right' and that 'it is easier to talk of 
controlling such men than to do it.' More difficult to control than the daimyo, he 
added, were their retainers or armed followers 'who form to each Daimio a sort of 
guard which compels the Daimio to act according to their wishes.' In response to 
Parkes's statement that he thought the daimyo were readily surrendering their 
authority and revenues to the Mikado, and were bent in establishing a strong central 
power, Iwakura significantly replied that those were their professions, 'but when in 
the history of the world did you see such a measure carried in a day,' Consequently, 
Parkes concluded his dispatch to Hammond on an apprehensive note, by pointing out 
the similarity between what was happening in Japan and the abolition of feudalism in 
medieval Europe:
I trust affairs may still go on without an explosion but in a country 
so utterly disconnected as Japan is, it is impossible to say from day 
to day what may occur...I confess that one feels at times rather 
weary of contending with' such unmanageable difficulties. I suppose 
however that the middle ages in Europe were equally disturbed, & 
we were engaged in endeavouring to fit into similar state of 
things.114
Following the surrender of the han, several decrees were issued by the government to 
further diminish the power of the han. Nevertheless, while diplomats reported on the 
government's effort to abolish the han's right to issue their own coinage,115 they 
scarcely mentioned other limits imposed by the government on the power of han 
officials.
The lack of opposition by daimyo in mid-1869 encouraged Parkes to write to 
Hammond on August 28 that the measure was a great step 'which has been achieved 
noiselessly & without violence'.116 In October he similarly reported to Clarendon that 
although 'very much remains to be done before so extensive a scheme for the
113 FO 46/109, No. 116, Conf., Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 28, 1869.
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reorganization of the offices, functions, and revenues of government can be brought 
into effective operation,' 'I have not heard that this great fundamental change in the 
Constitution has yet encountered opposition in the country Districts.'117 Apart from 
the daimyo1 s apparent acquiescence, several other factors may have also contributed to 
Parkes's optimism, one being a decree issued in August by which the government 
reserved to itself the approval of all appointments or offices in the han. To Parkes, as 
he reported on August 23, this was 'another obvious step towards the subordination of 
all the local administration to that of the central government.'118 This assessment may 
have been influenced by his knowledge that, not only had the government 
successfully suppressed the Tokugawa insurgents at Hakodate and concentrated the 
administration at the capital of Tokyo, but it had also established effective control 
over the troublesome samurai bodyguard of the Emperor.119 Moreover, the closing 
speech by the Mikado that followed the debates on the question of the surrender of the 
han in the general assembly should also be taken into account. While Parkes did note 
the existence of differences of opinion among the assembly members as to the extent 
and pace of the reform, he emphasized that the Emperor spoke of the unanimity that 
prevailed as to the necessity of the work of administration being conducted by a 
centralised government.120 In view of the Emperor's standing, Parkes may have 
deduced from this that the measure would readily be accepted without serious 
opposition by the people of Japan.
The Problem of Opposition and the Abolition of the Han
Another major modernising reform was the abolition of feudal domains 
(haihan chikeri) on August 29, 1871, and their replacement by a prefectural system. 
Yet before this took place, there were several incidents that threatened the stability of 
the Meiji government, and which drew comments by British diplomats.
One such incident was the uprising in Choshu in the winter of 1869-1870, 
which diplomats described as 'serious'121 and 'formidable.'122 Parkes attributed the 
uprising to the discontent felt by Choshu soldiers known as the Kiheitai with the 
insufficient government provisions for their sustenance following the disbandment of
117 FO 46/113, No. 184, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, October 1,1869.
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the han  armed bodies.123 Parkes added that as in other commotions in the country, the 
rebels in Choshu belonged to the anti-foreign party and thus also professed to have for 
their object the 'expulsion of the barbarians'.124
To Parkes, there were several reasons why the outbreak should be considered 
as a serious threat to the government. One was that Choshu was one of the 'most loyal' 
supporters of the restoration and of the new government.125 Furthermore, the 
insurgents were not only reported to have taken over several important places in 
Choshu, but to have sent emissaries to prevail upon the disaffected men of other 
domains, particularly in the south, to join their cause. Nor was this all. The Choshu 
rebels were also reported 'to be inciting the peasantry to join their movement' and 
could easily draw support from that class in view of the bad harvest.126
The insurrection in Choshu indicated, in Parkes's view, not only the existence 
of discontented elements, but, more importantly, the government's lack of power. For 
instance, in a dispatch of March 1870, Parkes commented that 'Until the central 
Government shall be provided with a strong executive of their own they will of course 
find it difficult to deal with provincial disturbances or any other attack on their 
authority,' adding that the government also needed 'a standing army' of its own for this 
purpose. Nevertheless, he did not deny the difficulties that faced the Japanese 
government, as he observed that 'To weld into one uniform power the numerous ill 
governed little States of which Japan has hitherto been composed is clearly a work of 
time even if the Mikado's Government were possessed of extensive material 
resources.'127 In another dispatch, Parkes observed that the Choshu uprising also 
showed the uncertainty of events in Japan. As he put it, 'In this inflammable and 
excitable country there is no saying when & where a trouble may break out or what it 
may lead to,' adding that 'They have no doubt a great deal of hard work to accomplish 
before Government in this country can become consolidated.'128 It was this 
uncertainty, Parkes asserted to Clarendon in March 1870, that made it undesirable to 
remove British military forces from Yokohama, which was 'the seat of our [British] 
interests in Japan.'129 Even though the troubles in Choshu had by March been 
suppressed, Parkes maintained that 'the Government must act with more energy than 
they have shown during the last few months if they are to maintain their authority 
effectively. '130
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The difficulty faced by the government was not seen as emanating from 
Choshu alone. In August 1870, Parkes noted a division in Japanese government, when 
some liberal members of the government were reported to have quit their posts. His 
response to the event showed some disappointment, as he observed to Hammond that 
Their absence from the Govt, would be a great loss as they are among the ablest of its 
members and are moreover friends of the English.' As to their identity, however, 
Parkes provided no details, nor did he elaborate on the causes for the dissension 
though he vaguely observed that the dissidents were 'very discontented and full of 
apprehensions as to the retrogression' of the government131 The friction which this 
episode revealed have been seen by historians as an important factor in the slowing in 
the pace of centralisation in 1870.132 At the time Parkes was uncertain of its 
significance, but he remained hopeful: 'I trust this explosion, like others, may be get 
over without serious injury either to the administration of its policy.'133
It was not long, however, before the Meiji government again faced a potential 
serious threat when Satsuma showed signs of discontent in 1870-71, Even though 
there was no rebellion, this attracted more attention from diplomats than the uprising 
in Choshu because it reflected a more widespread opposition within the domain to the 
new regime and because Satsuma was a potentially stronger threat. Parkes first noted 
the unsettled condition of Satsuma in early 1870 following a memorandum prepared 
by a Legation official, J.C. Hall, on the state of affairs of the han. In his 
memorandum, Hall noted the military activity in the han, which included the 
establishment of a powder mill and an arsenal making numbers of rifled cannon, 
brass-field pieces, and numbers of shot and shell, as Satsuma's calculated preparation 
for any possible collision with the central government.134 By early 1871, the situation 
in Satsuma was seen as such a cause for alarm to the central government that Parkes 
sent Francis Adams to Kagoshima in early that year to ascertain the condition in the 
han. Adams's report of February 1871 confirmed that there was 'much discontent in 
the clan with respect to the central Government.' Though various reasons for the 
discontent were offered to him by an influential Satsuma official, Adams's own 
conclusion was that the han was mainly dissatisfied with its share of political power
131 Ibid., Yedo, August 8, 1870; Ibid., Yokohama, August 22,1870. The dissension followed an attempt 
by Okubo and Iwakura to limit the influence of the progressive members o f the Finance Ministry, 
namely Okuma, Ito and their reforming colleagues, who advocated a pressing reform o f finance and 
commutation of stipends. See Beasley, 'Meiji Political Institutions', p. 633; Beasley, Meiji Restoration, 
pp. 342-343, 353.
132 E.g., Sims, R. L,, A Political History o f Modern Japan 1868-1952 (New Delhi: Vikas Pub. House), 
1991, p. 27.
133 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yedo, August 8, 1870.
134 See memorandum by J. C. Hall of March 26, 1870 in FO 46/125, No. 59, Parkes to Clarendon, 
Yedo, April 12, 1870.
41
in the government.135 Furthermore, Adams also observed the hem's tendency to 
maintain its feudal semi-independent status. Despite the surrender by the han  of its 
possessions and men to the Mikado, there was no radical change in the local 
government, and though the 'han prince' was styled Chiji, Adams maintained that it 
seemed to be little more than a change in the name since he and his relatives lived in 
the same seclusion as before. In fact, from his conversation with William Willis, 
another Legation official at Kagoshima, Adams noted that many Chiji in places other 
than Kyoto and Tokyo also kept themselves aloof from their people. All these 
prompted a skeptical comment by Adams about the consolidation of authority in 
Japan: 'It is evident that the great work of welding all the old principalities into one 
whole proceeds but slowly, and the old Feudal nobles retain their old position in their 
respective clans, meeting with the same signs of obeisance, and the same outward 
tokens of respect as of yore.'136
Parkes too maintained that the real reason for Satsuma's discontent was 
probably because they felt that 'they do not hold that position and influence in the 
Government, which they conceive to be their due.' While Adams's conclusion hinted 
at the general difficulty of consolidating the country, though, Parkes's report of March 
ended with a more specific caution that unless Satsuma was conciliated by the central 
government, the latter would find itself in grave difficulty, because, there were 
already disturbances in other parts of the country.137 Moreover, the government was 
also constrained by its lack of resources: ‘Being as yet comparatively unsupported by 
any material force of its own it has to trust chiefly to diplomatic action in guarding 
against political combinations on the part of the clans.’138 Given these circumstances, 
Parkes expressed hope that the government's attempt to effect calm in Satsuma 
through the dispatch of Iwakura to Kagoshima, would achieve success.139
By the end of March, Parkes was able to report, from a conversation with Date 
Munenari on March 23, that the Iwakura mission had been fruitful in persuading 
Satsuma to agree to join with Choshu and Tosa in supporting the Mikado's authority 
with all their available force and to furnish a garrison for the protection of the capital. 
Furthermore, the leading men of those three clans would also return to Tokyo to take 
up posts in the central government,140 Parkes further observed, from a memorandum 
by Hall of March 23, that apart from Iwakura's personal persuasion, the change in 
Satsuma's attitude was also due to the arguments by Itagaki Taisuke from Kochi and
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Sugi from Yamaguchi: they had led Saigo to agree to send back the han regiment 
which had been suddenly withdrawn from Tokyo some months before.141 Adams, 
who later took over the charge of the legation from Parkes, also found the proceedings 
and results of the Iwakura mission to Kagoshima significant, and noted, in particular, 
that an Imperial letter had been addressed to Shimazu Hisamitsu calling upon him to 
come to the aid of his Sovereign and country.142 From a meeting with Iwakura on 
June 4, Adams was able to report that the troops supplied from Satsuma, Choshu and 
Tosa would make a nucleus for the future Imperial army, and that other han  would 
also assist in supporting the Mikado.143
Though the problems in Choshu and Satsuma were successfully confronted by 
the government, the occurrence of such incidents led diplomats to appreciate the 
difficulties that the work of consolidation in Japan would encounter. In a private 
audience with the Mikado on May 18 before he left for England, Parkes maintained 
that he admired the efforts made by the leading men of Japan 'to unite the country into 
one film and compact state, governed by uniform and just laws.1 But he added that 
'Much, doubtless, remains to be done before this great work is accompanied.'144 For 
his part, Adams was so concerned about stirring up opposition that he urged the Meiji 
government not to adopt hasty reforms. In a meeting with Sanjo in June 1871, since 
Japan, he said, 'was divided into two great parties, - the one party composed of those 
who wished to adopt every modem art and invention at once, and to advance 
headlong in civilization; - the other who desired to sit down on the mats and do 
absolutely nothing,' the true path for Japan was 'to steer between these two extremes. 
She [Japan] should carry out what she had begun, - but whatever she did, she should 
do thoroughly, and not attempt too much at once. There would then be little fear of 
any real opposition to the path of steady progress.'145 In making this suggestion, it is 
worthy of note that his view was similar to, and may well have been based on, 
Iwakura's view. In an earlier meeting with Adams, Iwakura admitted that there were 
two parties in Japan, 'one which wished to adopt foreign inventions at once, and 
advance the country as it were at telegraphic speed, the other which was conservative 
and was opposed to making a number of changes suddenly and without much 
reflection, - which in fact wished to proceed at a slower rate, and to preserve the 
ancient institutions of the country.’ For his part, Iwakura observed that ’the true policy 
probably lay between these two extremes' especially in view of the existence of some
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disaffected people, mostly belonging to Aizu, Shizuoka, and other clans, who opposed 
the late revolution and who hovered between the two great parties, and were always 
ready to foster any intrigue, with a view to embarrass and even to overthrow the 
government.146
Two months later, a further great change towards the unification of Japan was 
undertaken by the Meiji government with the abolition of the han on August 29, 1871 
and the establishment of a system of prefectures with Chiji being replaced by officials 
from the central government In line with his advice for a slow and steady reform, 
Adams expressed a more cautious view than other British diplomats. While Satow 
described it as a great change that would be followed by other reforms,147 Adams 
commented that the measure was the 'most radical change,’148 which might lead to 
problems for the government. This followed a conversation in September with 
Iwakura, who asserted that
...the most difficult question which the Government had had to deal 
with since the restoration to the Mikado of the Governing power 
was that of the Daimios...Now in order that the Emperor's power 
should be consolidated, and that His Government should be strong, 
it was absolutely necessary that the power of these Daimios should 
be broken, and the work of centralization accomplished. The 
Daimios must in fact be abolished ...There would thus be a gradual 
concentration of the Government, and the power of each 
Department would extent throughout the Empire.149
While Iwakura expressed the government's confidence in carrying out the reform, 
which also included the appointment of men of talent to government offices and the 
redemption of local paper money issued by former han, Adams acknowledged that the 
'scheme was doubtless a most comprehensive one,' but also expressed concern that 
'the Government might not be able to carry it out without bloodshed.' As he saw it, 
there were two possible sources of danger, firstly the dissatisfaction felt by the heavily 
taxed peasants, which might be taken advantage of by low-class samurai who had lost 
both income and position by the reforms, and secondly popular opposition to the 
suppression of Buddhism. Despite Iwakura's further assurance that the government 
could avert the danger since the scheme 'had been gradually prepared and matured' 
and that 'the government was quite strong enough to grapple successfully and without 
the occurrence of any grave disturbance,' Adams continued to harbour doubts, arguing 
that 'although Japan and Europe differed essentially, in forms of thought and the mode
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of action, still there were certain universal laws to which all human beings were 
subject, and which made themselves felt in every country on the globe.'150 In a later 
meeting with the Japanese statesman, Adams expressed surprise when informed that 
none of the great ex-daimyo, particularly of Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa, would be 
appointed as Chihanji or governor of their former han\ and in response Iwakura 
sought to reassure him that not only had the policy been carefully considered by the 
government, but there was also 'such an inherent loyalty and devotion to the Throne1 
amongst the Japanese that 'the moment an Imperial Decree was published, the nation 
accepted it as a matter of course.'151 While he made no comment on Japanese loyalty 
to the Mikado, Adams did recognize that the reform had been adopted partly as a 
result of the memorials sent in to the government from Chiji of greater and lesser han, 
insisting on the consolidation of the country.152
Satow too was told by Kido Takayoshi that no opposition was to be expected 
from either the former daimyo or samurai class since the former had voluntarily 
conceded to the 1869 principle of surrendering their han, while the latter's rights were 
fully taken into consideration by the government. Kido's general language, Satow 
concluded, like 'that of all reformers of his class, is that of unlimited confidence in the 
future.'153 A somewhat different impression, however, was given in October by 
Iwakura, when the latter significantly admitted to Satow that 'the change of Han into 
Ken had not at first seemed possible for 500 years at least, but events had worked in 
such a way that the Govt, thought they had better take advantage of the tide at the 
flood. They had expected bloodshed, of course, but had been agreeably disappointed.' 
Iwakura further added that there had, in fact, been a little disturbance in Geishu and 
also some dissatisfaction in Satsuma.154 Iwakura's revelation is worthy of note 
because it not only indicates that at least one major leader had had some doubts about 
the success of the reform, but also illustrates Iwakura's frankness, towards Satow if 
not towards Adams.
That such a revelation was made by Iwakura also means that Adams's 
apprehension of possible troubles was not groundless. In fact, minor opposition in
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Matsuyama and other places in the country was reported in addition to the disturbance 
in Geishu, about which Adams was informed by Prime Minister Sanjo that some ill- 
disposed samurai had stirred up the lower classes with a view of preventing the father 
of the &x-Chiji from moving to Tokyo. While Adams did feel that in general the 
former daimyo were 'reconciled to their change of position, by the greater amount of 
liberty in their movements which they have thus acquired,' since they were not being 
confined to their residences in the capital, he still concluded pessimistically that 'a 
long time must elapse before the entire consolidation of the country is accomplished 
and in many of the old Hans for the present, the local Government must be carried on 
much as it was before the conversion of Han into Ken.'155
For his part, Parkes, who learned of the haihan chiken while on leave, 
observed that the reform, although implemented with unexpected speed, was not 
unanticipated, and that it marked the culmination of a gradual concentration of power 
by the government in Tokyo. He welcomed the measure as important for Japan, 'not 
only to ensure order among her own people, but also to enable her to take her position 
as Sovereign State among those Foreign Powers with whom she had concluded 
Treaties and contracted obligation.' Furthermore, he observed that the government 
could not depend on the administration of the han by their former daimyo. As he 
explained in November 1871,
The surrender of the Daimios in 1869 of their territories to the 
Mikado, and their appointment as Chijis or Governors of the same 
territories furnished a striking recognition on their part of the 
principle of Central Government, and also a distinct engagement to 
support it. But experience was needed to prove how far this 
surrender was real, and to what extent the new lieutenants were 
willing to abate their former independence as chiefs and to 
subordinate their action to that of the Central Government at Yedo.
It was also doubted whether the Chiefs who were often little better 
than automotons - even in their own clans - would become more 
efficient administrators when acting in the name of the Mikado.
Several of them voluntarily relinquished their new honors shortly 
after they were conferred, either because they found labour irksome 
or accountability unpleasant. ...We may conclude therefore that, in 
practice, the Government of Chiji has proved either too nominal to 
be useful, or inefficient. ...I look upon this step of openly relieving 
the Chiji of their executive function as another great advance in the 
work of consolidation.156
More optimistic than Adams, Parkes believed that the government had carefully 
planned the measure to avoid opposition: the former daimyo would be provided with a 
personal income, while those with the requisite knowledge and ability could hope for
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a career of honour as members of a consultative body. Moreover, Parkes added that 
the presence of the Qx-Chiji at the capital would also prevent disaffected retainers in 
the provinces from using them as instruments in their grievances against the
* • 1 S7authorities.
To carry forward the process of the haihan chiken, the central government 
underwent further reorganization in 1871 with the Dajokan being divided into three 
boards: the Central Board (Sei-iri), an executive body presided over by the Dajo 
Daijin, the Right Board (U-in\ which comprised the heads of the administrative 
departments, and the Left Board (Sa-in), a legislative branch that replaced the Shugi- 
in.{5& On these changes, Satow, in a memorandum to Adams, recorded some 
noteworthy comments by Kido, who argued that while the Shugi-in established in 
1868 was intended as 'an imitation of the representative institutions common in 
Europe,' it later proved to be a mistake since the assembly showed a tendency to 
oppose progressive government policy, and this, to Kido, showed that rit is by no 
means certain that the opinion of the majority is the right one.' He added that the 
conversion of the han into ken entailed the reorganization of the government in order 
'to avoid some of the errors they formerly fell into from over eagerness to accomplish 
in a short time what other nations had attained only after centuries of political life.' 
These changes, and the remarks by Kido, brought approbation from Adams. As he 
wrote to Clarendon, 'I must confess my satisfaction at the palpable evidence contained 
in the Memorandum of there being men in responsible positions in Japan who have 
become convinced that it is not by a mock imitation of European institutions, which 
are the growth of centuries, that the future consolidation of this empire is to be 
secured.'159 Adams's comment was perhaps the first expression of an attitude which 
was to characterize most later British diplomats when they confronted the prospect of 
the introduction in Japan of a Western-style political system. For his part, however, 
Satow was less explicit in his commendation when he described Kido as a moderate 
reformer who 'is only applying European institutions where they accord with the 
Japanese spirit and the point of progress attained.'160
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The Continuation of Anti-Foreign Sentiment
As far as the attitude of the Imperial government towards foreigners was 
concerned, British diplomats seemed to be reasonably satisfied. Satow, for instance, 
was pleased to report that a notification was issued in February 1868 to the effect that 
proper behaviour was to be shown towards foreigners as the Mikado attached great 
importance to the cultivation of friendly relations and the fulfilment of treaties with 
Western Powers.161 Diplomats further noted that in several cases of assaults on 
foreigners not only was capital punishment inflicted on the offenders to avoid similar 
incidents in the future, but Imperial decrees were also published by the government 
condemning the attacks.162 There were also personal assurances by Meiji leaders, 
including Iwakura, of the new friendly policy of the government,163 and the receptive 
and friendly disposition shown by the Meiji leaders towards foreign representatives, 
which had hitherto rarely been seen among officials of the Bakufu, may also have 
impressed and gratified British diplomats.164 Other probable factors may also have 
been the government's apparent policy of gradual toleration towards Christians and 
Christianity in Japan,165 and the satisfactory reception given to the Duke of Edinburgh 
in the summer of 1869, even though his visit was opposed by some conservatives.166 
Given these proofs of its desire for good relations, it is not surprising that Parkes felt 
able to report in early 1871 that
There can be no question that many Japanese, and particularly those 
who. have not yet come in contact with us, retain their old feelings 
against foreigners, but I see no reason yet to doubt that the Mikado's 
Government - although once the head and font of the hostility which 
we encountered in entering on our intercourse with Japan - are now 
among the converts to a liberal and friendly policy...the 
establishment of relations with the Mikado's Court has won over to 
one side many members of a most influential class, whose 
assistance is indispensible to us in the removal of old prejudices and 
the extinction of fanatical enmity.167
Nevertheless, British diplomats, particularly in 1868-1869, occasionally 
voiced the suspicion that some individuals ’ within the government continued to
161 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, February 9, 1868.
162 FO 46/92, No. 49, Parkes to Stanley, Hyogo, March 11, 1868; ibid., No. 61, March 18, 1868.
163 Iwakura's statement to Parkes in ibid., No. 64, Kyoto, March 25, 1868; Iwakura's statement to 
Adams in FO 46/139, No. 7, Most Conf,, Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, June 12, 1871.
164 For instance, Parkes described his interview with Iwakura on January 9, 1869, as a 'spontaneous 
mark o f good feeling' and 'a marked improvement upon the old relations, and gives promise of much 
greater intimacy in our intercourse than that which has hitherto existed.' FO 46/106, No. 5, Conf., 
Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, January 13, 1869.
165 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, March 2, 1869.
166 E.g., FO 46/110, No, 154, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, July 26, 1869; FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, 
Yedo, July 28, 1869.
167 FO 46/137, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, February 11, 1871.
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entertain a hostile feeling against foreigners. Satow, who befriended many Japanese 
leaders, noted in December 1868 that the old distrust of foreigners existed in Japan 
when he recorded the opinion of his Japanese friend, Nakai Shirokane, as to the true 
feeling of the new government. As Nakai put it,
The foreign Ministers are a necessary evil, to be endured but not 
taken to the heart. Nothing pleases the Mikado's government so 
much as to see the foreign RR [Representatives] living at 
Yokohama, and the idea of taking their advice upon any point is
never entertained for a moment. In fact, the RR are looked upon in
much the same light as the rusui [representatives] of the daimios; i.e, 
persons sent to Japan by their respective governments to receive the 
Mikado's orders, whenever occasion may arise.
In response, Satow significantly observed that part of the blame for the hostile feeling 
resided with the foreign ministers themselves: 'Fine houses, comfortable living & 
whole skins at Yokohama are preferable to makeshifts and dangers in Yedo; but for
all they know or can learn of diplomatic affairs they might just as well be at Hong
Kong.'168 The same suspicion was also voiced by Parkes. For instance, regarding the 
Mikado's advisers, he wrote in May 1869 that he 'had reason to believe that owing 
either to timidity or design a reactionary feeling was spreading in their ranks’ that 
some of these advisers were believed to have urged the Mikado, on coming to Tokyo 
in 1869, to show some regard for the feelings of the anti-foreign section, which had so 
greatly contributed to bring the new government into power.169 Such suspicions may 
have also derived from the fact that some anti-foreign agitators belonged to the group 
of Court nobles170 and samurai who composed the Emperor's Bodyguard {Shimpei)}11 
These were noted for their call for 'severe measures against Foreigners’ and for 
advocating strongly the persecution of native Christians, and it was believed that in 
carrying out their anti-foreign scheme they used the ’system of violence and 
assassination,' as they were 'endeavouring to promote a collision with Foreign Powers 
by murdering Foreigners.'172 In fact, various attacks on foreigners in Japan did occur 
during 1868-71 and even Parkes had to encounter a few himself. Yet, the anti-foreign 
movement did not affect foreigners alone. Diplomats observed that it also threatened 
the lives of many liberal members of the government as the xenophobes believed that
168 PRO 30/33/15/3, Satow's Diary, December 13, 1868.
569 FO 46/109, No. 114, Conf., Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 28, 1869.
170 FO 46/108, No. 95, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, April 29, 1869; FO 46/109, No. 108, Parkes to 
Clarendon, Yedo, May 13, 1869. Not all Japanese Court nobles were, however, regarded as anti- 
foreign, and there were certainly some Court nobles of liberal views in the Meiji government such as 
Iwakura Tomomi and Sanjo Sanetomi.
171 FO 46/109, No. 108, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 13, 1869.
172 Alexander Von Siebold's memorandum, May 10, 1869, in FO 46/109, No. 114, Parkes to 
Clarendon, Yedo, May 28, 1869.
'the Japanese who advocates friendship with the foreigner is a traitor to his country 
and an enemy to the national faith of which they consider themselves to be the special 
defenders.'173
As to the government's power and efficiency, Parkes observed several factors 
that contributed to its difficulty in controlling the anti-foreign movement, especially in 
1868-70, One, he maintained, was the lack of common purpose within the 
government. As he wrote to Hammond in May 1869 when the meeting of the general 
assembly at Tokyo offered hope that the surrender of the han would assist a united 
action by the government in matters of foreign affairs as well as internal policy:
I feel that I must do all I can to stimulate the Govt, to vigorous & 
healthy action, but the want of unity & cohesion is a great stumbling 
block to energetic or combined effort. They must however take 
some decision in respect both to their internal & foreign affairs.
...the presence of most of the Daimios & nearly every person of 
consequence at Yedo during the next two months will afford ample 
opportunity for general deliberation. A united scheme for the 
government of the country is the one thing needful & these offers of 
the Daimios to surrender their rights of Government, if made in 
earnest afford ground for hope that such a scheme may yet be 
accomplished.174
In another dispatch, he specifically noted that the concentration of the whole 
administration in Tokyo might also improve government restraints on the anti-foreign
1 7 5movement.
There was also, as he saw it, a problem of departmental cohesion within the 
government which hindered united and effective action. As early as April 1868, the 
inconsistency of the government's sentences upon the men who attacked him in 
March led Parkes to observe that the 'wavering action of the Government' was 
'attributable to differences between various departments of the administration on 
questions relating to its foreign policy.'176 In subsequent dispatches, Parkes explained 
that the problem partly rose from the difficulties experienced by the Japanese Foreign 
Minister with some illiberal members of the government. This was admitted to 
Algernon Mitford, an official of the Legation, by the daimyo of Uwajima, who 
maintained that the ‘illiberal party’ had succeeded in preventing the separate 
publication of a law or decree making known the sentences of offences against 
foreigners and deferred it for insertion in a new code which the Judicial Department
173 FO 46/109, No. 108, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 13, 1869. Japanese leaders who fell victim 
included Omura Masujiro and Yokoi Shonan in 1869, and Hirosawa Sanetomi in 1871.
174 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, May 14,1869.
175 FO 46/109, No, 108, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 13, 1869.
175 In the sentence passed upon his attackers, three out o f four men had been sentenced to perpetual 
exile instead of to death, which was the original sentence passed by the Japanese government. FO 
46/93, No. 79, Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, April 18,1868,
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was engaged in compiling.177 Furthermore, in carrying out necessary measures against 
the offenders, the Japanese Foreign Ministry was also seen as lacking sufficient power 
and influence. For instance, in the case of insults offered to foreigners on the Tokaido 
by the retainers of daimyo in 1869, Parkes reported to Lord Clarendon that despite the 
assurance given to him by Vice-Foreign Minister Higashi Kuze in May that the matter 
would be investigated and notifications issued, 'his conversation did not inspire me 
with much confidence in the capacity of his Department for this purpose.'178 In a later 
dispatch, he reiterated that The Government sadly wants compactness and cohesion - 
the Departments do not appear to work in unison with each other, nor does the 
Foreign Office seem to possess that influence to which it is entitled.’179 To further 
illustrate the problem, Parkes reported the visit to the Legation on May 14 by 
Tokudaiji Dainagon and the Prince of Awa, both Ministers of State but unconnected 
with the Foreign Department, to discuss the Tokaido case. Despite the Japanese 
visitors' claim that they had been sent by the Mikado to express the government's 
commitment to find the offenders, Parkes suspected that behind it lay the question of 
the Foreign Minister’s credibility among his own colleagues. As he wrote to 
Clarendon,
I had no information as to the object of this unusual visit, which 
appeared to have been paid without reference to the Foreign 
Department, It might be that other members of the govt, wished to 
judge for themselves of the accuracy of the representations made to 
them by the Foreign Minister, or to see whether I should be 
influenced by their arguments or by the use of the Mikado's name.180
Similarly, following the later outbreak of anti-foreign trouble at Nagasaki, Parkes 
observed that although he had no reason to question the good disposition of the 
Foreign Minister, he was doubtful whether the minister's advice 'was being given at 
this juncture of affairs with all the boldness that was desirable; or if so given, whether 
it received from the other members of the Government all the attention which it 
merited.'181 This was because, as he reported to Hammond in May 1869, following a 
formal interview with Iwakura and several other leading men of the government in 
which he urged the necessity of the Mikado loyally acting up the assurances he had
177 The illiberal party's endeavour was, however, overruled by the government, that the law was finally 
published in the manner agreed and satisfactory to foreigners. FO 46/93, Mo. 79, Parkes to Stanley, 
Yokohama, April 18,1868.
178 FO 46/109, No. 102, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 11, 1869.
179 Ibid., No. 108, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 13, 1869.
180 The visit took place after Parkes emphasized in an earlier meeting with the Japanese Foreign 
Minister that unless the Tokaido case was satisfactorily settled, he would not treat with the Mikado's 
government on any other subjects, except the matter of Shimonoseki indemnity. Ibid., No, 112, Parkes 
to Clarendon, Yedo, May 27, 1869.
181 Ibid., No. 114, Conf., Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 28, 1869.
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given to Foreign Powers to control the 'armed class', the Foreign Minister thanked 
him for holding the interview and expressing the sentiments which, he said, 'would
r o n
support him materially in his discussions with his colleagues.'
Parkes also attributed the government's difficulty to the samurai custom of 
wearing swords.183 The ending of this tradition, Parkes maintained, was thus 
necessary, as it would not only reduce the threat to foreigners, but also make the work 
of administering the country much easier.184 Furthermore, the measure would also 
help Japan to project a good image to the outside world, particularly to the Western 
nations with whom treaties had been signed. The present situation where the Foreign 
Powers had to protect their own people with ground and navy forces against the anti- 
foreign threat, he added, 'reflected little credit on Japan and should not exist with a 
government well ordered and well disposed.'
Nevertheless, Parkes admitted that the prohibition of wearing swords by 
samurai could not be undertaken without difficulty and would take time, especially as 
there was no effective police system in Japan. Reflecting on the assassination of two 
Japanese officials, Omura Masujiro and Ono Seigoro, in 1869, Parkes concluded to 
Clarendon:
The remedy for this state of things is I fear a work of time. In a 
country so imperfectly organized as Japan where the law has never 
been invested with much power and which possesses no institution 
worthy of the name of police - in our sense of the term - it is not 
easy to see how the designs of the assassin are to be guarded 
against. Strenous exertion on the part of the Government, by
discountenancing such designs, may in the end check them, but at
present members of the government are among those who are 
attacked.186
Having recognized the difficulty of the government, in response to the attack upon
two British subjects, Dallas and Ring, in January 1870, Parkes and other foreign
representatives recommended a gradual disarmament by the Meiji government, 
beginning with samurai of the lower rank.187 The suggestion was again proposed in 
March by all foreign representatives in a joint note, and although their 
recommendation was not implemented, the Japanese government's promise to punish 
offenders by taking away their swords and to publish a set of regulations with the 
object of maintaining better order in the cities, was considered by Parkes as 
reasonably sufficient at that time in view of the need for a gradual approach in
182 FO 391/15, Yedo, Hammond Papers, May 28, 1869.
183 FO 46/112, No. 178, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, September 28, 1869.
184 FO 46/113, No. 188, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, October 8,1869.
185 FO 46/109, No. 114, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, May 28, 1869.
186 FO 46/114, No. 222, Parkes to Clarendon, Yokohama, November 19, 1869.
187 FO 46/137, No. 5, Parkes to Clarendon, Yokohama, January 23, 1870.
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introducing the suggested reform.188 Although the anti-foreign movement did not end 
with the abolition of the han, diplomatic reports demonstrate that it was never again to 
be as strong and dangerous as it was during 1868-71.
Conclusion
The accelerated modernisation of Japan after 1868 attracted the attention of 
British diplomats in the country, and many views were expressed on various reforms 
undertaken by the Meiji government. Some of the reforms prompted positive 
comments by British diplomats, especially those aimed towards the modernisation 
and consolidation of Japan such as the creation of different departments of state, the 
establishment of a general consultative assembly, the abandonment of the practice of 
seclusion by the Mikado, the movement of the capital to Tokyo, and the surrender and 
abolition of the han. While British diplomats, with the exception of Satow, did not 
involve themselves directly in bringing about the Meiji Ishin, nevertheless, in 
welcoming the reforms, diplomats may have had in mind not only their importance to 
the creation of a modem nation state, but also their possible relevance to British 
interests. Parkes's attempt to discuss the British constitution with the ex-Shogun in 
Osaka, like his encouragement for the establishment of the general representative 
assembly, may be seen to indicate his desire to see the adoption by Japan of the 
British political system. Regarding the movement of the capital, diplomats may have 
well nurtured the idea that the measure would enhance the influence of foreign 
representatives on the Meiji government though this was not mentioned. Similarly, 
the surrender and abolition of the han promised to increase the effectiveness of the 
new government in carrying out the stipulations of the treaties between Japan and 
Western Powers and in establishing more control over the armed samurai who were 
hostile towards foreigners.
It is also worthy of note that not all of the reforms carried out in Japan 
between 1868 and 1871 received equal emphasis and attention from British diplomats. 
With regard to the political and administrative reorganization of the new Japanese 
government, while diplomats, particularly Parkes, showed a great interest in the 
Assembly of daimyo and leading samurai, they overlooked the June 1868 constitution 
or Seitaisho, and no comment whatsoever was made on the promulgation of the 
Charter Oath in April 1868 and the pre-feudal elements of the early Meiji 
reorganization of the governmental structure. Moreover, while British diplomats did 
observe the gradual exposure of the Mikado to the outer world to enhance his
188 FO 46/138, No. 33, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, March 11, 1871.
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sovereign position as the ruler of Japan, no mention was made of the elevation of the 
Mikado’s position through the establishment of the Jingikan and the Great Teaching 
Promulgation campaign. Regarding the weakening of the feudal system, British 
diplomats provided interesting comments on the surrender and abolition of the han 
and the opposition faced by the government, but they overlooked (perhaps because 
they were not rigorously enforced) a few other relevant measures such as the banning 
on the daimyo from forming marriage alliances, the limits on the han forces, the 
removal of daimyo judicial rights, and the order to samurai who accepted office in the 
central administration to abandon connections with their original han. Moreover, 
while diplomatic dispatches did contain information on daimyo rivalry, they indicate a 
limited understanding of internal government disputes and differences. While British 
diplomats enjoyed exceptional access to prominent Japanese, such as Iwakura, Sanjo, 
Terajima and Kido, on Japanese internal affairs, it seems likely that these leaders held 
back some information, especially where internal disputes and differences were 
concerned and the complexity of Japanese politics, as well as limited resources, made 
it far from easy for diplomats to gather inside information, even if they had sought to 
do so.
As to what extent diplomats' perceptions during 1868-1871 simply continued 
the previous diplomatic views of the pre-1868 period, one element of continuity can 
be seen in the diplomats' emphasis on the existence of daimyo rivalry and disunity. 
This was one factor which led diplomats to cast doubts about the future working of 
the new government in the early months of the Restoration. Another persisting 
diplomatic theme was the danger posed to foreigners' lives in Japan by the anti- 
foreign movement, and the need for the Japanese government to enforce a stricter 
control, particularly over the samurai. However, a significant difference existed in that 
diplomats recognized an improvement in the readiness of the new government to 
ensure the safety of the foreigners. At the same time they were aware of a new factor 
in the involvement of the samurai class in local anti-government uprisings such as that 
in Choshu.
As regards the question of 'Orientalist' attitude among British diplomats 
towards the modernising changes that took place following the Meiji Ishin, it can be 
said that some comments may suggest this, notably Parkes's pessimistic view of the 
ability of daimyo as members of the Japanese general assembly and also as Chiji of 
their han, Adams's warnings of the danger that might result from the abolition of the 
han, Parkes's unfavourable comparison of Japan with China a propos the problem 
resulting from the samurai right to wear two swords, and his criticisms of the lack of 
coordination within the government in controlling the anti-foreign movement, and
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also Satow's critical comments on the appearance of the Imperial and Tokugawa 
military forces. These are hardly clear-cut examples, however, and it is much easier to 
find comments that are free of'Orientalism' such as Parkes's positive comments on the 
Japanese assembly and the 1868 administrative reforms, Adams's encouraging 
response to the government reorganization in 1871, and the favourable reports by 
Satow and Parkes on the surrender and abolition of the han. Given such a range of 
views by the diplomats, it would be difficult to label any diplomats as ‘Orientalist’ in 
the sense that Edward Said uses the term. Besides, some Meiji leaders, particularly 
Iwakura, themselves admitted to uncertainty about Japan's ability to implement safely 
the changes carried out by the government, and recognized the inferiority of Japan to 
the West in some important aspects - thus implying that diplomats' images of Japan 
were far from being total misconceptions.
CHAPTER 2 
BRITISH DIPLOMATIC VIEWS OF THE DISMANTLING
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OF JAPANESE FEUDALISM, 1871-77
Although in 1871 the Meiji government had taken the crucial steps towards 
ending feudalism by abolishing the han, much more needed to be done before all the 
remnants o f feudalism were eradicated in Japan. In the next six years it proceeded to 
complete that task by undertaking various reforms, the repercussions of which were far- 
reaching. While the dismantling of feudalism inevitably exacerbated differences over the 
pace and extent o f the change and may have increased competition for political power 
among Japanese leaders, it equally provoked discontent among samurai and peasants as 
both classes were directly and adversely affected by the government reforms. Given their 
significant impacts on the consolidation and modernisation o f Japan, it is not surprising 
that these developments in 1871-1877 attracted the attention of British diplomats.
The Iwakura Mission
The Japanese mission which embarked on a tour of Europe and the United States 
for eighteen months (from the autumn of 1871 to the summer 1873), although not itself a 
direct means of dismantling feudalism, gave evidence of the desire on the part of the 
Japanese government to acquire new ideas and experience in order to modernise the 
country. The fact that several members o f the mission, notably Iwakura Tomomi, Kido 
Takayoshi, Okubo Toshimichi, Ito Hirobumi and Yamaguchi Naoyoshi, were abo 
prominent members of the government, implied that they would be able to influence the 
country's policy on their return from the West after investigating the measures and 
innovations which might help Japan to become a modem country.
Francis Adams, who took over the charge of the legation from Parkes in 
November 1871, was alive to the motives of the mission. Following a conversation with 
Iwakura in mid-November, Adams reported to Foreign Secretary Lord Granville that the 
purpose of the embassy was to establish better relations with foreign countries, to learn 
about their institutions, and especially to gain a more precise knowledge of their laws, 
their commerce and their educational, as well as their naval and military, systems.1 To 
Iwakura, Adams praised the mission as 'an admirable one' and advised that, as the new
1 FO 46/142, No, 116, Conf., Adams to Granville, Yedo, November 18, 1871; also see Ibid., No. 120, 
December 2, 1871. On the Iwakura mission see Nish. I. (ed.), The Iwakura Mission in America and 
Europe: A New> Assessment (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library), 1998; Cobbing, A., Ohta, A.,Checkland, 
O., and Breen, J., The Iwakura Mission in Britain, 1872, (London: STICERD, London School o f
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power in Japan, the Mikado's government should send a well chosen embassy abroad. 
Unlike the previous envoys sent several times during the Shogunate, the ambassador 
should be able to speak with authority in the name of the Mikado on all matters 
connected with Japan and should, therefore, be selected from amongst the men who 
possessed the highest influence in the government, and who had been mainly 
instrumental in bringing about the Restoration. He thus approved when Iwakura later 
announced that apart from himself as the head, Kido and Okubo, two of the prominent 
Restoration leaders, had been appointed as Councillors of the embassy.
Adams's comments did not, however, halt with the selection of the embassy 
members as he also advised on the object of the mission, particularly with regard to the 
reform of Japanese law. Just prior to the dispatch of the embassy, he emphasized to 
Iwakura the favourable opportunity which the members o f the embassy would have for 
examining the various systems of law in the different countries which they would visit, 
and on the need to effect legal change and abandon the element of torture in Japanese 
law. His observation was agreed with by Iwakura who replied that it was one of their 
aims to study the laws of various countries 'with a view of forming a code for Japan, and 
of constituting regular tribunals for the administration o f justice.' In contrast, Consul 
Russell Robertson at Yokohama emphasized the potential benefit to the economic 
development of the country. As he wrote in March 1873:
...the minds of the Ambassadors are likely to be influenced by an 
inquiry into the different manufactures for which each country they 
visit may be celebrated; and how it is hoped the experience acquired 
by the Embassy may prove to its members that commerce constitutes 
the greatness of a nation, and that while the Legislature provides such 
laws as expediency directs for the governance of trade, it wisely 
abstains from a direct or active interference in the business 
transactions of merchants.4
A more general evaluation was made by Parkes, who, upon the return of the 
embassy from Europe in the autumn of 1873, observed that Japan would now have a 
better prospect since the Japanese statesmen who had been on the mission admitted the 
need for Japan to achieve progress. This followed his meeting on October 4 with 
Iwakura, whose remarks, according to Parkes, showed wisdom and whose return to Japan
Economics), 1998.
2 FO 46/142, No. 116, Conf., Adams to Granville, Yedo, November 18, 1871; PRO 30/33/15/4, Satow's 
Diary, November 15 and 26, 1871.
3 FO 46/143, No. 130, Adams to Granville, Yedo, December 16, 1871.
4 Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, March 31, 1873, Commercial Reports, Patiiamentai-y Papers (PP),
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'will have a beneficial influence on the action of the Government' In response to Parkes’s 
query whether he had noted the changes in Japan that had taken place during his absence, 
Iwakura said:
The changes I notice are not to my mind satisfactory. Much is said 
about progress but I find that our progress is more superficial than 
real and that our recent administration is wanting in earnestness 
and permanence. Our measures must be more carefully considered 
and must be better adapted to the actual condition of our people. It 
is a mistake to think that Japan is at present fitted to take rank with 
the nations of England and America. We have not yet acquired the 
requisite wealth nor the necessary degree of knowledge. And even 
in domestic matters the Government though apparently successful 
in Yedo, has caused great discontent in the provinces, and it is 
there that the efficacy of the Government is chiefly tested.5
Parkes expressed his concurrence with Iwakura's statements and in doing so, he may be 
argued to reveal an ‘Orientalist5 view of a backward Japan. Yet the fact that Iwakura 
himself admitted die inferiority o f Japan to the West should be borne in mind in 
examining Parkes's view of Japan's progress. In fact, Iwakura again hinted at the 
inferiority o f Japan when, while conversing with Parkes two years later and after 
expressing his hope that a Korean mission would be sent to Japan to witness the latter5 s 
progress, he reflected on his experience of touring Europe and the United States: 'A 
single sight of such things is worth more than a hundred accounts of them. I may say that 
I had listened with attention to all that was told me of foreign countries before I went 
abroad in 1872. I found that my impressions were very imperfect, and that I had to 
modify most o f my previous conclusions.'6
In the light of the importance subsequently attributed to the Japanese mission by 
later historians, British diplomatic comments on its effects on the Meiji government's 
policy were conspicuously brief. While historians have emphasized its impact on the pace 
and extent of modernisation,7 British diplomats' reports concern mainly with its 
immediate effect on what they regarded as the anti-foreign attitude of the Japanese 
government. Rather than noting evidence of greater-enlightenment, diplomats 
complained of what they saw as the unconciliatory and disobliging spirit of the 
government, which included the rejection by the government of the proposal for 
foreigners to travel in the interior and the continued confinement of foreign excursions to
1873.
5 FO 46/168, No. 81, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, October 6, 1873,
6 FO 46/190, No. 24, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, Februaiy 8, 1875.
7 See e.g., Irokawa, D., The Culture o f  the Meiji Period  (Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press), 
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the limit of twenty-five miles around the treaty ports, the issuance of many vexatious 
rules, and the assumption by Custom House authorities of greater power over foreigners 
than the treaty sanctioned. There were also complaints that the Japanese Police exercised 
their authority in a harsh and arbitrary manner and in several cases grossly ill-treated 
foreigners, and that redress from injuries, whether of a criminal or a civil nature, became 
almost unobtainable by any proceedings in Japanese Courts. On the Japanese policy 
Parkes observed in a report of May 1874, that the only cause that could be assigned for 
this change in the tone and conduct of the Japanese authorities was
...the mistaken supposition that by making themselves unpleasant 
to foreigners, the Japanese Government may prevail upon the latter 
to submit more easily to Japanese views. The unfriendly attitude 
had appeared more marked since the return of the Japanese 
embassy from Europe, and I think there is little doubt that it may 
be mainly attributed to the disappointment felt by Iwakura, on 
finding that the Government of the Treaty Powers were not 
inclined to yield to the wishes of the Japanese Government on 
those important points, which the latter, acting upon unsound 
foreign advice had prematurely raised, namely jurisdiction over 
foreigners and the abrogation of the existing Tariff.8
Divisions and Problems Within the Government
In the period which followed haihan chiken in 1871, British diplomats noted 
several cases o f dissension among Japanese leaders, one being related to their 
disagreement over the speed and pace of reform. Several informed comments by Ernest 
Satow attested to the problem. For instance, in September 1871 Satow reported that 
though they agreed on the fundamentals, Saigo and Kido were said not to get on together, 
Kido 'wishing to proceed too fast.'9 This was also acknowledged by Iwakura who, in a 
meeting in November with Satow and Adams, maintained that the progressive party was 
moving too fast. Significantly, Satow and Adams expressed their concurrence with 
Iwakura's comment.10 Nevertheless, as to who were the progressive members and what 
sort of reforms Iwakura meant, Satow did not elaborate, though it is probable that 
Iwakura had in mind such progressive members of the Finance Ministry as Ito Hirobumi 
and Inoue Kaoru, whose proposals included drastic commutation of samurai stipends and 
measures towards centralisation of the government.
8 FO 46/179, No. 88, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 22, 1874.
9 PRO 30/33/15/1, Satow's Diary, September 26, 1871.
10 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, November 26, 1871.
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A clearer comment on the differences of the Meiji leaders may be found in 
Adams's report of January 1872. In contrast to Iwakura, of whom he wrote that 'His 
conservative turn of mind is a wholesome check upon the almost republican tendencies of 
some of the ultra-progressive members of the government,' Kido, he asserted, was one of 
'the most zealous members of the party of progress' having composed the memorial 
surrendering the han registers to the Mikado, and been more or less intimately connected 
with the subsequent reforms. Of the same group as Kido, he referred to Ito as 'one of the 
most advanced reformers' and as very intelligent, though he disapprovingly observed that 
Ito had perhaps listened much too easily to ‘Foreigners of not the best class - not an 
uncommon fault in this country’, referring to a report that Ito had engaged a few 
American advisers to serve in the Meiji government.11 The latter remark about Ito is not 
surprising in view of the fact that it was the desire of British diplomats in Japan to see an 
increase in British commercial and political influence through the engagement of British 
advisers and expertise by the Meiji government.
Another sign of friction noted by diplomats was the resignation in mid-1873 of 
Inoue Kaoru and Shibusawa Eiichi, who had been entrusted with the administration of the 
Finance Ministry during the absence with the Embassy in Europe of Okubo, the Minister 
of Finance. While later historians tend to examine it in relation to han rivalry within the 
government,12 British diplomats, particularly Parkes, focused mainly on the financial 
discrepancies disclosed by Inoue and Shibusawa's 1873 report (in direct contradiction of 
the previous accounts which had been made public by the Commissioners of the Japanese 
government in London in autumn 1872, and later in Vienna in spring 1873) and on the 
impact of such inconsistencies on Japan's image in the modem commercial world. 
Parkes's different emphasis may perhaps be argued to show that Parkes himself was not 
aware o f the nature of the contention that was taking place within the government. More 
probably, he was aware how financial discrepancies could damage Japan’s image, and 
thus regarded this as a grave matter. As he wrote in his reports, 'I fear [the discrepancies] 
will prove very damaging to Japanese credit in England and elsewhere,'13 as they 
'occasion much surprise and general distrust as to Japanese financial administration in the
11 Among the American advisers mentioned by Adams were the American Agricultural Mission o f  which 
General Capron was the head, and also Peshine Smith, who was to advise the government on points 
connected with the revision o f the Treaties. FO 46/151, Adams to Granville, Yedo, January 12, 1872.
12 Sims, for instance, concentrates on controversies related to the Finance Ministry including the problem o f  
budget allocation to various government ministries and attempts by other members o f  the government to 
block the power o f the Finance Ministry under Inoue by appointing new Sangi, op. cit., pp. 35, 37-38; also 
see Umegaki, op. cit., pp. 171-174
13 FO 46/166, No. 20, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, May 23, 1873.
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commercial world.'14 Despite the Japanese government's attempt to dismiss what they 
considered to be the miscalculations of Inoue and Shibusawa by publishing a counter­
statement, Parkes continued to express the pessimistic view that it was not an easy task as 
he believed that 'the Government themselves are ignorant o f the real state o f their 
finances.'15 His anticipation proved to be true as he later noted that while the counter­
statement published in June by the government succeeded in dismissing the deficit of 10 
million yen estimated by Inoue and Shibusawa, yet it continued to show some 
inconsistencies with the London and Vienna statements.16
Parkes did not fail completely to note the connection between the budgetary 
dispute and the difference of views within government circles over the pace and extent of 
reform in Japan, for he reported that Inoue and Shibusawa's memorial also criticised the 
government policy, charging it with 'hasty and ill-considered legislation, with permitting 
a general race for Office, with forcing on Japan before she is prepared for it, the 
civilization of foreign countries, and with burdening the country with many new taxes in 
order to meet the increased expenditure.’17 Instead of dwelling upon the charges against 
the government as claimed by Inoue and Shibusawa, though, Parkes concluded his report 
by noting that the fact that the memorial was allowed to be made public was astonishing 
and by suggesting that the fate o f Inoue and Shibusawa for doing so was uncertain. 
Surprisingly, he subsequently failed to note that Inoue soon returned to serve in the 
govermnent without being tried for producing the controversial statement.18
In the same year, a serious dispute broke out over policy regarding Korea - Seikan 
ron (subduing Korea). As a result, five Sangi (Councillors o f State) who favoured the 
idea of going to war with Korea resigned their office in the Supreme Council on October 
25 when their plan was opposed by Iwakura, Okubo and others who had returned from 
the mission to Europe. The resigning Sangi were Soejima Taneomi, Itagaki Taisuke, 
Goto Shojiro, Eto Shimpei and Saigo Takamori. The outcome of the conflict was 
welcomed by Parkes, who, like the anti-war party, took the view that Japan should avoid 
unnecessary war and concentrate on internal reforms. A war, as he put it two days after 
the resignation of the war party, could not be carried out 'without incurring an 
expenditure which in the present condition of her finances, would severely cripple her
34 FO 46/167, No. 25, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, June 6, 1873.
15 Ibid.
16 FO 46/167, No. 29, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, June 23, 1873.
17 FO 46/166, No. 20, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, May 23, 1873. See details in e.g., Beasley, Meiji 
Restoration, p. 372.
18 Inoue later served in the Japanese government in various capacities, notably as foreign minister. 
Shibusawa, however, devoted him self thereafter to entrepreneurial activities.
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resources and materially retard the progress of the country.'19
In commenting of the motives of the war party, Parkes maintained that apart from 
their desire to increase the prestige of Japan, the proposed expedition was also connected 
in part with the anti-feudal reforms undertaken by the new government, particularly the 
partial commutation o f stipends and the conscription law, that affected the samurai class. 
Following an interview with ox-Sangi Soejima on October 29, Parkes concluded that the 
true reason for the expedition to Korea was because Japan was suffering from financial 
pressure, that it found it difficult ‘to meet the cost of the regular army which is now being 
formed, and also to provide for the disbanded Samurai, whom the Government will not 
trust as regular troops, and who are cast adrift upon the country in a discontented 
condition.’ Moreover, Parkes also pointed to the personal ambitions of the resigning 
Councillors. He claimed that there were signs that Soejima aimed at a higher position in 
the government than that of Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he had lately formed a 
coalition with Saigo, the Commander in Chief, and if war with Korea was carried out, 
'the conduct of the Government...would in all probability have devolved upon these two 
men, and Iwakura might have found himself displaced.' In singling out only Soejima 
and Saigo, Parkes seems to have ignored or regarded as unimportant the roles o f Goto 
and Itagaki (who were from Tosa) and Eto (from Hizen), who favoured the expedition 10 
Korea partly out o f a desire to weaken the solidarity of Satsuma and Choshu in the 
government.21
As to the impact of the event on the future government, Parkes made no 
comments that indicate his understanding of the growing concentration of power o f the 
government in the hands o f leaders from a few han. Instead, he concluded that since 
government personnel changes occurred rapidly in Japan, the new government led by 
Iwakura (unlike many historians he did not see Okubo as the dominant figure) would 
probably see the inclusion of some of the QX-Sangi. This was possible, he claimed, as 
Soejima, Saigo, Eto and Itagaki appeared to have formed themselves into an opposition 
and to have gained the support o f Sanjo, who was still nominally Prime Minister, ard  
Shimazu Hisamitsu (Saburo), the old prince of Satsuma, whose influence would be 
valuable to any administration.22 While there is no clear account by later historians of 
Sanjo and Shimazu in late 1873 taking the ex-Sangi's side, the possibility that these high-
19 FO 46/168, No. 90, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, October 27, 1873.
20 Ibid., No. 91, Conf., November 3, 1873.
21 For the attempt to undermine Sat-Cho monopoly by government members who were not from the two 
leading former han, see Beasley, Modern History, p. 115.
22 FO 46/168, No. 102, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, December 8, 1873.
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ranking men may have sympathized with the opponents of the winning side is an 
intriguing one which cannot be discounted. The personnel changes as speculated by 
Parkes did take place in 1875 as Soejima, Goto and Itagaki briefly resumed government 
office. Saigo however, retired from politics and withdrew to Kagoshima, while Eto 
returned to Hizen.23
In 1874, when the Meiji government undertook a military expedition to Taiwan to 
punish the aboriginal tribes of that island for crimes against Ryukyuans, British diplomats 
again observed a division o f views in the Meiji government when two Japanese leaders, 
namely Kido and Katsu Awa tendered their resignations over a probable conflict with 
China over Taiwan. As in the case of Korea, Parkes attributed the expedition to the 
discontent felt among the samurai class following the anti-feudal reforms and to the fact 
that the government wished to avoid the problem at home by diverting samurai attention 
to Taiwan.24 Interestingly, Parkes also observed that it was an indirect result o f Iwakura1 s 
actions in the October 1873 crisis. As he put it in May 1874: 'The consequences of these 
highhanded proceedings [in 1873] were soon seen in the attempt made upon his life and 
in the Saga insurrection, the spread of which was only checked by the Government 
allowing the discontented samurai to engage in the profitless expedition against 
Formosa.'25 As with the Korean issue where he emphasized the importance of internal 
reforms and the fruitlessness of a war*, Parkes criticised the Japanese expedition on the 
grounds that it would involve the country in an unnecessary military conflict with China 
and injure the country's finances.26
Following the conclusion o f the Taiwan question, the Japanese government 
endeavoured to reconcile their political opponents and strengthen the administration. As 
Parkes saw it, they had reason to do so, for apart from the qx-Sangi who had resigned 
their office over the Korean war in October 1873, Kido's departure over the Taiwan 
question was an important loss to the government. In the hope of reconciling the 
disaffected Japanese statesmen, meetings were held in Osaka in January 1875 in which 
Okubo, Inoue, Ito and several other members of the government met Kido, Goto, Itagaki, 
and other leading men o f the opposition. The negotiations finally ended with a formal
compact between Okubo, Kido and Itagaki on February 11, in which they pledged
themselves to return to Tokyo to implement a mutually agreed reform program towards a 
gradual establishment of representative government. As far as Parkes was concerned, his
23 Sims, op. c i t , p. 39.
24 FO 46/178, No. 61, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 6, 1874.
25 FO 46/179, No. 88, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 22, 1874.
26 E.g., FO 46/178, No. 61, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 6, 1874.
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reports show only a limited understanding of this episode. He touched briefly on the 
results o f the reconciliation attempt, namely the return of Kido to Tokyo and the fact that 
Goto, Itagaki and Soejima had been won over to the government side and observed that 
'the Government appear to have obtained a measure o f success,' but his lack o f inside 
knowledge was shown by his admission that the 'precise character of the arrangements 
which have been effected, or the conditions upon which the support o f the late 
dissentients has been secured, are not yet known.'27 Another dispatch was no less vague, 
though written about one month later: 'Nothing has occurred since then to denote that any 
other result has been attained than that of composing in some degree those personal 
dissensions which had pi*eviously existed.'
In contrast, the resignation of Shimazu and Itagaki at the end o f 1875 attracted 
greater attention from British diplomats, particularly Parkes, who described it as a 
'serious dissension’ in the Japanese government. However, rather than seeing the
• 90resignations as part of the broader picture of 1875 politics, Parkes concentrated more 
narrowly on Shimazu's political maneuvering and position in the Japanese government. 
The event, in his view, occurred because Shimazu had attempted to form a party in order 
to oust the leading members of the government, who had rejected his proposal for the 
maintenance o f feudalism. Shimazu’s plan, as Parkes described it, was to place Prince 
Arisugawa, a near relation of the Mikado, at the nominal head of the movement, while 
among the Sangi, he looked for support from Itagaki. It was arranged that all three should 
present to the Emperor separate memorials denouncing the Prime Minister Sanjo and 
calling for his dismissal, and that Shimazu and Itagaki should proclaim that unless their 
memorials met with a favourable reception, they would resign their office.30 Parkes's 
assumption that Shimazu played a more active role than Itagaki in forming the coalition 
to oust Sanjo runs counter to more recent historical views,31 but in view of the complexity 
o f political relationships in this period, it arguably should not be dismissed too easily. It 
is also possible that Parkes's emphasis on Shimazu's maneuver was due to the renowned 
conservatism of the Satsuma prince. Such conservatism may be seen in Shimazu's 
memorial to the Mikado, on which Parkes commented unfavourably that it 'forcibly 
exhibits his impracticable character as well as his hostility to Foreigners and the advance 
of modem education.' He also dismissed the memorials by Itagaki and Arisugawa, noting
27 FO 46/191, No. 36, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, March 8, 1875.
28 Ibid., No. 57, April 13, 1875.
29 See Fraser, A., 'The Osaka Conference o f  1875', The Journal o f  Asian Studies, Vol. XXVI: No. 4, August 
1967, pp. 603, 606-609.
30 FO 46/194, No. 159, Parkes to Derby, Hyogo, November 23, 1875.
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that they did not add to their authors’ reputation.32
While the resignation of Shimazu and Itagaki may not have been fully understood 
by the British minister, it prompted some noteworthy reflections on the growing 
confidence of the Meiji government. Parkes commented that it 'may have occasioned 
them as well as the public some surprize to find that the Government at once accepted 
their resignations' and this, he added, 'appeal's to show that the latter are confident in their 
own strength and feel that they are able to cope with the waning influence of Shimadzu 
and the reactionary party he represents.' Parkes further maintained that the confidence 
shown by government was certainly a new development in contrast to the earlier period 
when 'the adhesion of Shimadzu Saburo ... at a time when everything depended upon the 
consolidation of its power was felt to be necessary in order to conciliate the Satsuma clan 
and the Samurai or aimed class which Shimadzu may be said to represent.' The fact that 
the re-publishing of the conscription law of 1872 was effected at the very moment when 
Shimazu and Itagaki resigned their office was, to Parkes, another proof of the increasing 
assurance felt by the government: it was meant ‘to re-affirm in unmistakeable terms the 
rejection by the Government of ... [Shimazu’s] proposal to maintain the military 
privileges of the Samurai’ as advocated in his memorial to the Mikado. Despite Parkes's 
conviction of the weakening influence of Shimazu, after his departure on leave Charge 
d’Affaires Francis Plunkett observed that 'although obliged to succumb to his opponents 
in the Cabinet, his influence was still so great,' that the government did not wish to breek 
with him entirely, and for this reason, he had been appointed to a high honorary post in 
the Emperor's household on November 25.34
The Emergence of the People's Rights Movement
Another significant development in 1871-1877 was the emergence of the People's 
Rights movement (Jiyu minken undo). While later historians show a great deal of interest 
in this subject, British diplomatic correspondence, however, gives little attention to its 
development.
In view of the prominent role in it played by Okuma Shigenobu in the 1880s, 
however, it is interesting that he was reported by Legation Secretary R. G. Watson in 
November 1872 as maintaining that 'it would be a long time ere education would be so
31 E.g., Fraser, op. cit., pp. 598-608.
32 FO 46/194, No. 159, Parkes to Derby, Hyogo, November 23, 1875. For details on Shimazu and Itagaki's 
memorials, see Beckmann, op. cit., p. 37.
33 FO 46/194, No. 159, Parkes to Derby, Hyogo, November 23, 1875.
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general throughout Japan as to make it safe to entrust the people with the power of 
electing representatives who should have a share in governing the country.'35 A similarly 
unfavourable view was also expressed by Iwakura to British diplomats. In a conversation 
with Parkes on April 3, 1875, he asserted that he did not think the cry for the creation of a 
parliament or a popular representative assembly, which had become so common, could 
yet be entertained, and that the most that could be done by the government was to 
promote the establishment of Ken (prefectural) and Ku (district) assemblies. Parkes did 
not disclose his personal views of the popular movement at that time, and his reference in 
the same dispatch to the broad debate on the formation of popular assemblies in the 
Japanese press also left his attitude unclear*: 'It would appear that the love of the Japanese 
for change and progress is now carrying them on to the discussion of such grave 
questions as popular representation and religious toleration, and if that of taxation - the 
pressure of which is now becoming felt - be added to the former, the attention of the 
Government may be seriously occupied for some time to come.'36 Earlier, when the five 
Sangi resigned from government in October 1873, Parkes noted that one of the causes 
was that 'they advocated reform in the present arbitrary constitution of the Government, 
the institution of a Parliament,'37 although he did not comment on this aim or elaborate as 
to whether all the ex-Sangi shared the ideal of a representative government. More 
surprisingly, neither Parkes nor other diplomats noted the memorial presented to the 
government on January 17, 1874 by the ex-Sangi Soejima, Eto, Goto and Itagaki, which 
called for the establishment of representative institutions as foreshadowed in the Imperial 
Oath of April 1868, and which is regarded by most historians as a landmark in the 
People's Rights movement.38
Following the implementation of the points agreed during the Osaka conference, 
Charge d'Affaires Plunkett did report on the establishment of the Genrd-in (Senate) and 
the Daishin-in (Assembly of Framing Laws) by an Imperial decree of April 14, 1875. 
Nevertheless, he gave no details of the duties or prerogatives of the two new assemblies 
or the manner in which their members were to be appointed or elected. The lack of 
information was evidently due largely to the reluctance on the part of Meiji leaders to 
provide relevant details, as Plunkett maintained that several attempts by foreign 
representatives to gain information from Japanese Ministers had been fruitless.
34 FO 4 6/195, No. 171, Plunkett to Derby, Yedo, December 13, 1875.
35 FO 46/156, No. 146, Watson to Granville, Yedo, November 11, 1872.
36 FO 46/191, No. 57, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 13, 1875.
37 Ibid., No. 36, March 8, 1875.
38 E.g., Sims, op. cit., pp. 50-51; Vlastos, S., 'Opposition Movement in Early Meiji, 1868-1885', in Jansen,
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Nevertheless, this did not stop him from critically suggesting that they would provide a 
further example of what he saw as the hasty and ill-considered adoption of Western 
systems by the Meiji government:
It is indeed very probable that they really have not come to any 
final conclusion as yet, and have, in their usual heedless way of 
adopting Foreign Institutions, promulgated these Decrees without 
precisely thinking of the numerous changes which must inevitably 
follow, if  the thing is to have any functional value. So far as we 
can judge at present, it appears the new assemblies are to consist 
entirely of Govt, nominees, and will therefore be only a larger kind 
of Privy Council without any representative character.39
He further observed that while foreigners in Japan were much excited over these changes, 
the ordinary Japanese themselves cared little about them, adding that 'the 4 governing 
clans [Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen and Tosa] will maintain in these new assemblies the same 
influence they have hitherto exercised directly on the Govt.'40 A negative comment was 
also made by Parkes on the Genro-in. Reporting in May, he observed that the interest 
attached by foreigners to the creation of the Genro-in was already dying away 'although 
the measure is still only in embryo.' This was because, as he wrote on May 23, 1875,
It [the Genro-in] appears to me to be simply a Council of State.
Foreigners often commit the mistake of applying the names of their 
own institutions to measures which may only faintly resemble the 
former in some respects but which as a whole will not bear the 
same appellation. Thus this new measure of the Japanese has been 
called a Senate and a Parliament, but it is certainly neither one nor 
the other. It is to be occupied with legislation, but only such 
legislation as the Govt, chooses to send to it, & it is composed as 
yet of men of no great note. I question whether the Government 
themselves know what the measure will lead to.41
As to the future influence of the newly established Genro-in on Japanese politics, Parkes 
could merely speculate, stating that it would either be an extension of the government's 
control or would be in conflict with the ruling authority if its members should seek to 
obtain independence for the body. In the latter case, 'it may grow into something, but at 
present it is simply an experiment, & one which I rather fear will increase rather than 
allay political divisions and disputes.'42 Nothing in his report suggests that he was aware
Cambridge History, p. 402.
39 FO 46/191, Private, Plunkett to Tenterden, Yedo, April 27, 1875.
40 Ibid. In line with Plunkett's view, McLaren maintains that the absolutist principle was retained in the 
establishment o f  the Genro-in . McLaren, op. cit., p. 119.
41 FO 46/191, Private, Parkes to Tenterden, Yedo, May 23, 1875.
42 Ibid.
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of either Itagaki's and his supporters' plan to strengthen the power of the Genro-in to 
check the proceedings of executive departments, or the government's response to their 
attempt, which resulted in the revision of the power of Genro-in.43
In contrast to his views on the Genro-in, Parkes was less skeptical about the 
Assembly of Local Officials, which he believed to have been planned by the government 
as a check to the demand for popular representation by Soejima and other ex-Ministers 
who resigned in 1873. On the subjects of debates, such as roads, police, poor relief, 
primary education and the institution of local assemblies, Parkes expressed the view in 
June 1875 that 'it is hoped that it will bring the Government into closer union with the 
people and will eventually lead to the establishment of such popular institutions as are 
suited to the condition and wants o f the country.'44 Parkes's mentioning o f Japanese need 
to consider the wants of the people and country is significant in view o f his post-1878 
comments, which were rather unsympathetic to the idea o f representative government in 
Japan.
In 1877, when the Satsuma rebellion was in progress, Parkes did note growing 
activity by the People's Rights movement in Tosa. In his report of May 10, Parkes 
observed that the situation 'is occasioning the Government fresh disquiet' as it was feared 
that a rising headed by Itagaki, one of the ex-Sangi, would take place in that province. He 
added that not only did Itagaki demand the establishment o f a representative assembly, 
but also declared his readiness to die in the cause of liberty if this measure were longer 
withheld 45
O f the early political associations formed under the influence o f the People's 
Rights movement, two, the Risshisha and Seikensha, are mentioned in diplomatic 
correspondence. Parkes observed that these associations were the most prominent as both 
presented memorials to the government on what Parkes called 'the subject of the defects 
in the Administration.' Of the two memorials, the one by the Risshisha, according to 
Parkes, 'possesses considerable merit,' and 'may be expected to have some effect on the 
Counsels of the Government.'46 And it was the soundness of the Risshisha's memorial 
that led Parkes to make the interesting comment that the moderate conduct of its leader, 
Itagaki, who ‘appears to be endeavouring to reform, by constitutional means, and in the 
interest o f the nation at large, the abuses o f which he thinks he has a right to complain
43 See Fraser, op. cit., pp. 603-605 for further details on the political struggle over the Genro-in.
44 FO 46/192, No. 80, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 23, 1875.
45 FO 46/218, No. 73, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 10, 1877.
46 Ibid., No. 95, June 28, 1877. The Risshisha and Seikensha were founded in 1874 to give support and
assistance to the samurai in the provinces who had lost much o f their traditional status and income.
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...entitles him to some consideration, and his arguments, if not listened to by the 
Government at the present date while they are so fully engaged in the suppression of the 
Satsuma rebellion, can scarcely fail to command attention at a later period.'47 However, 
diplomats seem to have been unaware of other political associations which played a 
significant role in the early stages of the People's Rights movement, such as the 
Aikokukoto, the first political society in Japan formed in Tokyo in January 1874, and a 
larger association, the Aikokusha, organized in February 1875 48
Effects of the Dismantling of Feudalism: Peasant Uprisings
Following haihan chiken in August 1871, a steady stream of ordinances was 
issued by the Council of State and the various administrative departments, regulating the 
habits and customs of the people, as well as announcing an elaborate programme of 
railway and telegraph construction. These reforming measures included the abolition of 
the rigid feudal caste system based upon occupation, military conscription, a series of 
land laws and new land tax system, the introduction of a universal public system of 
education, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, the commutation of samurai stipends 
and the prohibition of wearing swords by samurai.49
After the Meiji government announced haihan chiken in 1871, one diplomat 
expressed some apprehension. Following an interview with Iwakura in September 1871 
in which he was told of the changes in the ken and future plans for a gradual employment 
of men of talent in the public service, the extension of each department's power 
throughout the country, and the redemption of local paper money by official notes, 
Charge d'Affaires Adams commented that the government might not be able to carry out 
the extensive scheme ‘without some disturbances and even bloodshed.’ One future source 
of danger, in Adams's view, was the opposition of the peasantry whose discontent over 
the levy of heavy taxes by the central authority would be taken advantage of by low-class 
samurai, who had lost both income and position by the change in the government, and 
who consequently were always ready to stir up the peasantry to revolt.50
In marked contrast, some Meiji leaders expressed their confidence in the reforms *o 
British diplomats. Adams, for instance, noted that Kido treated redemption of local paper
47 FO 46/218, No. 95, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 28, 1877.
48 E.g., Sims, op. cit., pp. 51; Akita, G., Foundations o f  Constitutional Government in Modern Japan 1868- 
1900 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press), 1967, pp. 17-18.
49 E.g., see works by Gubbins, J. H., The Making o f  Modern Japan  (London: Seeley, Service & Co.) 1922 
and The Progress o f  Japan 1853-1871 (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1911.
50 FO 46/141, No. 63, Conf., Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, September 8, 1871.
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paper money and the future condition of the ex-daimyo as not involving any cause for 
alarm, and 'his general language, like that of all reformers of his class, is that of unlimited 
confidence in the future.'51 Similarly, Satow observed from his conversations with some 
Japanese leaders, that while it was estimated that the commutation of stipends and the 
redemption of local paper money would cost die government as much as thirty million 
ryo, or six million pounds, it did not excite any anxiety on the part of the government.52
Adams's apprehension appeared partly justified by the outbreak of a commotion 
in Hiroshima Ken (Geishiu) in October 1871, when the people did not allow their daimyo 
to go to Tokyo as ordered by the central government, and the government was forced to
t o
use military force to suppress the disturbance. A few months later, Adams reported an 
intrusion into the Court's compound by a band of priests who were opposed to the 
abolition of feudalism and the friendly policy to foreigners.54 It is probable that, because 
of these commotions, diplomats noted a slight change in the Meiji leadership's tone of 
confidence regarding the abolition of feudalism. For instance, in a meeting with Satow in 
October, Iwakura revealed how he had feared that the abolition of the han could not be 
effected without bloodshed.55 hi a conversation on May 16, 1872, Prime Minister Sanjo 
similarly admitted to Adams that it was at first not certain what would be the effect of the 
conversion of the han into ken, and that it was felt that some time might elapse before the 
change was peacefully acquiesced in by the nation. Nevertheless, while Sanjo added that 
the last few months had far exceeded the expectations of the government, and that the 
new order of things had been accepted by the people, Adams continued to be skeptical. 
As he observed to Lord Granville, 'I am inclined to think that it is too early to take it for 
granted that all anxiety with respect to the carrying out of the decree of the 29th August 
last is at an end. No serious troubles have broken out, but it is undeniable that there is 
much discontent in various parts o f the country'. He then added that it would probably 
take a year before the people of Japan could be seen to have really settled down to the 
new order o f things.
Parkes, though viewing the situation primarily in terms o f the security of 
foreigners in the country, was more optimistic about the future of Japan. Pointing to the 
growing power and strength of the Meiji government, he maintained in March 1872 that
51 Ibid., No. 80, Conf., September 18, 1871.
52 Satow's memorandum encl. in Ibid.
53 FO 46/143, No. 122, Adams to Granville, December 2, 1871; FO 46/151, No. 5, Adams to Granville, 
Yedo, January 6, 1872.
54 FO 46/153, No. 70, Adams to Granville, Yedo, April 16, 1872.
55 PRO 30/33/15/4, Satow's Diary, October 24, 1871.
56 FO 46/153, No. 92, Conf., Adams to Granville, Yedo, May 20, 1872.
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while Japan during the last ten years had been 'the theatre of revolution and change' and 
'all the other parts of the country were more or less convulsed,' the Japanese government 
was of opinion that it was strong enough to undertake the protection of foreigners 
unaided. Parkes apparently believed in the government's claim, since he concluded that it 
was to be hoped that circumstances would shortly permit the British and French 
government to favourably consider its request for the withdrawal of foreign forces from 
the country.57
A still more optimistic view was held by Watson. In commenting on some 
erroneous statements in English newspapers in 1872, which proclaimed that full religious 
toleration had been proclaimed throughout Japan, that the Mikado himself had embraced 
Christianity, and that Japan had achieved a surplus in its finance, he wrote to Granville 
that these misunderstandings should not be wondered at since the revolution which had
rt>
taken place m Japan 'has been so complete.' Similarly, on the question of the 
desirability of maintaining the presence o f a Battalion of the Royal Marines at Yokohama 
in case o f troubles in Japan, Watson obseived in December 1872:
I feel bound to state that I do not perceive any symptoms which 
might justify one in concluding that there is any reason to 
anticipate a counter-Revolution. The actual Government, which is 
conducted under the immediate authority of the Mikado, appears to 
possess all the elements of strength, being composed partly of 
Noblemen of high hereditary position, and partly of men of 
practical acquaintance with affairs, who have risen to their present 
positions by virtue of ability, and as a consequence of the services 
which they rendered in bringing about the Revolution. The people 
of Japan, who are docile and orderly, can scarcely fail to perceive 
in the Public Works which have been carried out under the 
auspices of the actual Government; in the Educational System 
which has been inaugurated by it; and in the Army and Navy 
which have sprung up under its hands; evidences o f a constant 
solicitude to advance the interests of the State; nor can the 
Government be accused by those who have fallen of ruling on 
behalf of a Class or of a Party, since they at the present moment 
support the whole body of the Samurai, and since posts o f high 
importance in all parts of the country are confided to officers who 
belonged to the interests of the Taikun. ...It therefore seems to me 
...there is every reason to hope that the established order of things 
in Japan will endure.59
Given such encouraging factors, Watson concluded that there was no reason for 
maintaining the British force in Japan any longer, especially when the presence of foreign
57 FO 46/152, Parkes's memorandum on 'British Troops in Japan', London, March 7, 1872.
58 FO 46/156, Mo. 146, Watson to Granville, Yedo, November 11, 1872.
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troops was also a 'continued eyesore to a liberal Government and to a sensitive people'.
Nevertheless, doubts were cast on the optimistic assumptions of Parkes and 
Watson when serious peasant uprisings broke out in such different parts of Japan as 
Echizen, Hojo, Fukuoka and other districts, particularly in 1873 and in 1876. Several 
causes were pointed out by diplomats for the revolts, one being the new Meiji land tax 
system of July 1873, which among its new features established a tax rate at a uniform 
three per cent, o f the monetary value and payment in cash directly to the state by each 
owner. In return, tax-payers were given title deeds that endowed full rights of ownership. 
In his report on the peasant insurrections which broke out in July 1873, Parkes explained,
The recent changes in the revenue system by which the farmer or 
peasant has to pay his taxes in money instead of in kind as hitherto, 
is probably the chief cause of the prevailing discontent. Poorly 
provided as the country is with roads, it is often difficult for the 
peasant to turn his com into coin in order to meet the demands of 
the Government, and the question of the rate at which the payment 
should be commuted from kind to money must vary according to 
the circumstances of each district and must occasion endless 
altercation between the people and the tax collectors.60
In addition, Parkes asserted that the people also objected to 'incessant enactments' by the 
central government on various subjects such as religion, education, conscription, 
clothing, mode of wearing the hair, the calendar, additional taxes on numerous articles of 
consumption, etc., that 'the annoyances resulting from this hasty and over legislation is at 
last producing resistance.' Furthermore, there were also different reasons for uprisings in 
different parts o f Japan such as the suppression of Buddhism in favour of Shintoism in 
Echizen, the demand of the people in Tottori ken to prohibit the passing of foreigners 
through their district, and the clamour of the people in some districts for 'a return to the 
former rules of administration.'61
At least one diplomat attached some importance to the role played by former 
retainers of Aizu in inciting the agrarian class to rise against the government in the early 
1870s. On the peasant insurrection which had been suppressed by the Japanese 
authorities in Niigata in 1872, Acting Consul James Enslie asserted that given the feeling 
of discontent among the people, 'another rising will probably take place which may
59 Ibid., No. 168, December 19, 1872.
60 FO 46/167, No. 39, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, July 8, 1873. Nevertheless, while the measure is generally 
accepted by later historians to be one o f the main causes for peasant uprisings during the Meiji period, no 
historian seems to have specifically ascribed the early uprisings to the new tax system, as Parkes did, since 
the implementation o f  the measure took some years to become effective and was not complete until 1881.
61 FO 46/167, No. 39, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, July 8, 1873. See the encl. memorandum by Aston, Yedo, 
July 7, 1871. For works on peasant uprisings see e.g., Bix, H. P., Peasant Protest in Japan, 1590-1884
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possibly be supported by the retainers of some of the old Northern Daimios, especially 
those of Aidzu who are dissatisfied with their present position.' This was based on the 
fact that the suppressed uprising in the district, according to Enslie, had been led by two 
Aizu samurai.63 Enslie's observation is of particular interest because it points to a factor 
which has mostly escaped historians' attention. By contrast, British diplomatic reports 
make no mention of what some recent historians view as other common causes for 
peasant uprisings in the 1870s, namely intra-village conflicts64 and new changes in the 
local administration that involved the continuous shifting and redefinition of 
administrative boundaries of prefectures and districts, and the appointment o f new 
officials who were normally outsiders - changes which affected traditional bonds to old 
lord and locality.65
On the question of the government’s handling of the peasant uprisings, Parkes in 
July 1873 asserted the need for a tactical approach, arguing that the authorities should 
exercise 'more care and less haste in the enforcement of their decrees relative to the all 
important question of taxation as well as in regal'd to the numerous social innovations 
which they have started without first preparing the minds of the people for such changes.' 
Interestingly, he reflected on the earlier memorial by Inoue and Shibusawa, published in 
1873, and suggested that these outbreaks confirmed the charges levelled by the two 
Japanese statesmen against the government's method of administration.66 The need to 
move cautiously was necessary, British diplomats maintained, because the early uprisings 
in 1872 and 1873 were serious enough to endanger the new and young Meiji 
administration. Enslie, for instance, reported that had it not been for the prompt action of 
the local authorities and a want of leadership on the part of the rebel leaders, the Niigata 
uprising in 1872 might have proved a very serious threat to the government.67 Similarly, 
Secretary of Legation Watson in Tokyo observed of the same event that 'in the present 
state of affairs in this country, even a temporary success over the Government troops
(New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press), 1986.
62 Enslie's report on 'Insurrection o f the Peasantry at Niigata', May 1872 encl. in FO 46/154, No. 48, 
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by the depravity o f  village headmen, landlord-tenant relations, hoarding o f  rice, foreclosure o f  loans, ar d 
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might be attended with the most serious consequence,' adding that the suppression of the 
uprising was not sufficient to deter men from organising similar attempts since 'the 
wrongs of which the peasantry complain are by no means imaginary.' In view of his 
earlier positive comment, deprecating the likelihood of counter-revolution in Japan, 
Watson's statement marks a significant change in his perception of the development in 
the country. Parkes's optimism also waned in 1873. In commenting on an article that 
appeared in Japan Mail in August 1873, in which thousands of insurgents were reported 
to have been involved in one uprising, in some instances attacking government offices 
and killing the officials, Parkes wrote that, 'though the object of the paper is to show that 
these troubles were o f a trivial character, and the claims of the insurgents unreasonable, it 
incidentally bears witness to the grave dimensions which some of these risings assumed,' 
and which to him, 'must have occasioned the government some concern.'69
Nevertheless, by 1876, in view of the government's success in suppressing the 
early insurrections, a growing confidence was felt in the government's ability to counter 
the peasant uprisings that broke out in that year. In a report to Derby of December 30, 
1876, Parkes observed that 'There is no immediate danger to be apprehended from the 
outbreaks. They are periodical in Japan and have always been easily suppressed by the 
authorities.' This was because, he explained, few, if any samurai joined the rioters, and 
the samurai in several places gave efficient help to the authorities. In support of this 
judgement, Parkes maintained that in the case of Ibaragi Ken, the local authorities' force 
which suppressed the insurgent peasants was formed from police and about one hundred 
samurai, while in Ise the insurgents had to face a small body of samurai, who killed some
* 70of them, before they were entirely repulsed by the garrison of Nagoya.
When the government announced in January 1877 its reduction of the land-tax 
from three percent on the assessed value of the land to two and a half percent, Parkes 
observed, 'there can be little doubt that such extensive concessions will be effective in 
allaying the widespread dissatisfaction which the present system of collecting the Land- 
tax had caused.' He also praised the government for making a heavy sacrifice in its land 
revenue by adopting such a policy, which 'renders necessary considerable curtailment in 
the expenditure of every department of the administration,' and observed that it would be
71 • »approved by the general population of Japan. His anticipation was more or less justified 
as serious uprisings no longer occurred following the government's concession.
68 FO 46/154, No. 48, Watson to Granville, Yedo, June 29, 1872.
69 FO 46/168, No. 81, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, October 6, 1873.
70 FO 46/209, No. 199, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, December 30, 1876.
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Samurai Uprisings
A still more serious repercussion of the dismantling of feudalism in Japan was a 
spate o f samurai uprisings. Throughout the years 1871-77, many such outbreaks 
occurred, the most serious being the revolt in Hizen in 1874, the uprisings which broke 
out simultaneously in the southern part of the country in 1876, notably in Kumamoto, 
Fukuoka and Choshu, and finally the Satsuma rebellion in 1877.
Like the peasant uprisings, these outbreaks were observed by British diplomats in 
Japan with great interest. In fact, it is worthy of note that uprisings involving samurai had 
already been anticipated by Adams in September 1871, though this may not be said of 
other diplomats. Parkes, for instance, upon his return to Japan in March 1873, voiced his 
satisfaction that 'the condition of political affairs appears to be undisturbed.' Not only did 
he assert that the rumours of disaffection in Satsuma were without foundation, but he 
noted that the outbreak that was reported in Echizen had been promptly suppressed.72
As to the causes of the uprisings, British diplomats pointed out the dissatisfaction 
felt by samurai class with the anti-feudal reforms by the Meiji government, one being the 
commutation of their stipends or allowances. This was confirmed by Japanese Foreign 
Minister Terajima, during a meeting with Parkes on October 30 regarding the 1876 
uprisings. Significantly, several British diplomats were somewhat critical of the 
government’s commutation of stipends and sympathized with the samurai. Parkes's 
sympathy, in particular, is astonishing considering that he had often been critical of the 
class for its conservative approach and fanatical character, and had once nearly lost his 
life at the hands some of its members. For instance, following the Hizen outbreak in early 
1874, Parkes's assessment was that the government 'with a strange want of foresight have 
devised no effective plan for utilizing the services of these men, nor for making adequate 
provision for their support.' He further added that though in 1874 the scheme was not yet 
put forward as compulsory, 'it denotes plainly enough the niggardly spirit in which the 
Government are disposed to deal with the question.'74 Consul John Quin at Nagasaki, 
who supplied Parkes with information on the Hizen insurrection, also held a similar 
opinion. As he put it in March 1874: 'When such men are injudiciously treated by the 
government, outbreak will naturally follow.'75 Two years later when the measure was
72 FO 46/166, No. 1, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, March 31, 1873.
73 FO 46/208, No. 172, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, October 30, 1876.
74 FO 46/177, No. 27, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, Februaiy 16, 1874.
75 Ibid., No. 43, March 9, 1874.
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made compulsory upon samurai, Parkes argued, in the wake of samurai outbreak at 
Kumamoto and other places, that 'In order, however, to preserve tranquility in the country 
it is incumbent on them to treat even the Samurai with justice, and it is doubtful whether 
they can be said to have done this in respect to the recent reduction of their incomes.'76 
Furthermore, he observed that the bulk of the samurai had also already declined to accept 
the commutation proposals of the government as their attempts to make a livelihood in 
trade or in other industrial callings using the small capital received from the government
* » 77seldom proved successful owing to their inexperience of business.
Another source of samurai grievance, as diplomats saw it, was the government 
measure to deprive them of their swords. This was also admitted to Parkes by Foreign 
Minister Terajima in their meeting of the October 30.78 The measure was so strongly 
opposed by Satsuma samurai that their objection was noted even before it was made 
compulsory in March 1876. As Vice-Consul John Hodges reported in January 1876, in 
contrast to samurai of other provinces in Japan who had gradually abandoned the 
practice, 'The wealing of swords is not yet discontinued in the Kagoshima Ken, and to
7Qjudge from appearances seems to rule rather than the exception.' Parkes himself noted 
Satsuma's reluctance when reporting in February 1877 that although observing outwardly 
to some extent the government decree, the samurai in Satsuma 'have never been 
disarmed, and under the name of establishing schools for this particular class, they have 
formed and maintained among themselves a formidable military organization.'80
Another reason for discontent among the samurai was the conscription law, which 
deprived the samurai of their monopoly of military service. Given their dislike of the 
feudal armed class, conscription was, unsurprisingly, welcomed by British diplomats. 
This may be seen in Satow's comment in 1871 when, supporting the replacing of the 
samurai with a new army raised and drilled in European fashion, he asserted that 'It is 
time for them to be reabsorbed and to become traders and agriculturalists.'81 Although not 
explicit in approving of the reform, Parkes noted that the object of the creation o f a large
regular army was not only for national defence, but also to keep the samurai under
82 • * control. However, unlike the commutation of stipends and prohibition of wearing
76 FO 46/209, No. 174, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, November 11, 1876.
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swords, the conscription law formally introduced in 1873 was less emphasized by British 
diplomats as a reason for samurai uprisings although Acting-Consul Joseph W. Longford 
did report that the origin of the Kumamoto uprising in 1876 lay in ‘the objections on the
o n
part of the Samurai to becoming farmers or traders.’
Another relevant factor was felt to be anti-foreign sentiment among samurai 
which, as noted by Parkes during the Hizen uprising, was used to appeal for popular 
support.84 While Parkes doubted its ability to generate a satisfactory response in 1874, he 
observed that the sentiment was also invoked by the insurgent samurai in the later
nr
uprisings in 1876 at Kumamoto. For his part, Vice-consul Longford unequivocally 
attributed the Kumamoto disturbance to 'a hatred of foreign customs,' the adoption of 
which was considered 'an outrage on the ancient spirit o f Japan.'86
The government's abandonment of the military expedition to Korea in 1873 was 
also considered to have partly contributed to the samurai uprisings. In the case of Hizen, 
Parkes mentioned to Granville that the samurai demanded the war as it 'would bring them 
employment, pay, plunder, and the other attractions o f a soldier's life.'87 The same view 
was also held by John Quin, British Consul at Nagasaki.88 The relevance, albeit indirect, 
of the Korean split to the Satsuma rebellion, was confirmed to Parkes by Saigo 
Tsugumichi in February 1877 when the latter stated that 'a war at that time would have 
been the best thing for Japan,' adding that if Eto and his brother, Saigo Takamori, had 
remained in Tokyo, the insurrections in Hizen and Satsuma would never have taken 
place. Parkes’s response, interestingly, was that it was perhaps better to have had this 
conflict at home than to have had a war with China.89
Despite this remark, British diplomats recognized the gravity of samurai 
uprisings. Parkes himself, for instance, upon hearing about the outbreak in Hizen in early 
1874, reported to Granville that 'the Government will find their energies seriously taxed 
before they succeed in restoring quiet and satisfying the claims of the malcontents.'90 In 
mid-February, he reported several indicators of increasing anxiety in Tokyo. These 
included an abortive attempt by Iwakura to quit his position as Deputy Prime Minister,
83 Longford’s memorandum, October 30, 1876, in FO 46/208, No. 172, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, October 30, 
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and an admission by the Japanese Foreign Minister to one foreign representative that the 
government might be induced to sanction war with Korea if that step were found 
necessary to avert civil strife.91 In a dispatch to Admiral Shadwell, Parkes expressed 
concern that tire movement 'appears a grave one because the insurgents are Samurai, or 
men of the armed class,' and it was believed that 'they are supported by persons of ranks 
who recently held prominent positions in the Government.'92 Furthermore, Parkes was 
skeptical whether the pacification of the insurgents would be achieved by sending Home 
Minister Okubo to Hizen. This was because, as he observed to Granville, Okubo, though 
a Satsuma man, was 'not in favor with the Samurai, who look upon him as faithless to 
their interests.' Moreover, Parkes was also concerned about the degree of reliance by the 
government on their newly formed regular army, which he claimed, was noted for 
'numerous desertions from their ranks.' He further worried that since the homes of the 
deserters were mostly in Kyushu or in the adjoining island of Shikoku, they might join
* no a #
the Hizen insurgents. Against these circumstances, Parkes pessimistically concluded 
that 'It is impossible at present to foresee the course or result of this movement, but 
disorder and insecurity of greater or less extent, may be looked for as a natural 
consequence,' so that it was uncertain 'whether this insurrection attains the dimensions of 
civil war, or culminates in hostilities with Corea.'94
So concerned were diplomats with the gravity of the problem that though there 
were reports by the late February that the movement was gradually being suppressed, 
Parkes maintained that the fact that such an insurrection had occurred, showed that 'much 
uncertainty attends the future course o f events in this country.'95 Even after the 
suppression of the rebellious Hizen samurai in March, Parkes stated that ’The want of 
discipline among this class may prove a source of trouble to the Government for some 
time to come.'96 One month later, Parkes further observed that the suppression of the 
insurrection 'cannot be said to be marked with the restoration of quiet or of public 
confidence in the Government' and, somewhat vaguely, that the ‘commercial class’ 
seemed to apprehend more trouble. He added that the government was also divided on 
the Formosan question, and that resignations had been sent in by Kido, the Minister of
91 Ibid., No. 27, Februaiy 16, 1874.
92 See the enclosed Parkes's dispatch to Shadwell, Yedo, Februaiy 16, 1874 in ibid., No. 28, February 16, 
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Education, and Okuma, the Minister of Finance.97 In June, he informed Lord Derby that
I feel, My Lord, that it is by no means easy to foretell the course of 
events in this country. The Government is far from being a strong 
one, their measures are those of the day only, and their duration of 
office appeal's uncertain. The Saga insurrection has been 
suppressed, and at present we hear of no fresh outbreak. But it is 
notorious that the Samurai, or armed class, who occasioned that 
insurrection, have only been quieted by being allowed to engage in 
the Formosan Expedition.98
Nevertheless, by 1875, diplomats1 perceptions were changing as they became 
more optimistic of Japan’s future. The absence o f further serious uprisings and the 
termination of the Formosan expedition may have contributed to this view. In response to 
Derby's question about the maintenance of British marines in Japan, Parkes replied,
Although I cannot attempt to forecast the future condition of this 
country it is satisfactoiy to me to be able to assure Your Lordship 
that I believe the Japanese Government are at present able to afford 
adequate protection to foreigners resident in their territory, and as I 
see no immediate prospect o f their losing their power either by 
internal disorder or other causes, I consider it unnecessary that Her 
Majesty's Government should be longer called on to maintain a 
force in shore in Japan in order to give security to British subjects 
and their property.9
Given this view, in Februaiy 1875 Parkes announced to the Meiji leadership the British 
government's decision to withdraw its detachments from Japan. Interestingly, Iwakura, 
while expressing his appreciation to Parkes, confessed that he was not surprised that the 
British government had delayed until now the removal of its troops since 'until lately he 
himself had been by no means confident as to the course of events,1 and he added that the 
attempt made in January 1874 upon his own life, and the internal and external troubles 
which had subsequently occurred, had created doubt as to the future of the country.100
The positive comments continued despite the subsequent uprisings in 1876, since 
diplomats observed the growing confidence of the Meiji government in its ability to quell 
samurai insurgents. On the outbreak in Kumamoto, Parkes reported that 'The general 
feeling appears to be that the Government will be able to cope with the difficulties it has 
to contend against, and suppress any riots that may take place.'101 The growing assurance
97 Parkes asserted that the former resigned because the Formosan expedition was undertaken, and the latter 
because it was temporarily postponed. Ibid., No. 72, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 25, 1874,
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felt by the government might perhaps be explained by the fact that by that time the 
regular army in Tokyo had increased in strength and discipline and could be better 
depended on to suppress any malcontents. Another possible reason was the increasing 
popular support for the government measures to end samurai privileges. As mentioned by 
Parkes in a report to Derby of November 1876 with regard to the compulsory 
commutation of samurai stipends, 'however unsatisfactory this arrangement for their 
future provision may be considered by the Samurai, it is regarded in a different light by 
the people, who hope to derive from it some relief from the present burden of taxation.' 
He also reported that when the decree for the enforced capitalization of the nobles' ar_d 
samurai incomes appeared, it was largely discussed in the Japanese press, and popular 
opinion was unanimous in favour o f the measure. The existence of such popular 
arguments, in Parkes's view, meant that 'the Samurai cannot look for sympathy from the
1 OJpeople in their question with the Government.'
The same confidence, however, was not evident during the Satsuma rebellion in 
1877. When the government and Satsuma appeared to be on the brink of collision in 
February 1877, Parkes observed that 'without wishing to exaggerate the importance of the 
crisis, I cannot but regard it as the most serious one which the Mikado's Government
ihave had to encounter since they came into power.' It was due to the seriousness of the 
imminent rebellion that Parkes sent Satow to Kagoshima to learn about feeling there. 
Satow confirmed the gravity of the problem by noting that it was due to Satsuma's 
staunchness alone that the government was able to quell the disturbances in Kumamoto 
and Choshu that broke out in 1876.104
While diplomats noted that the immediate cause of the rebellion was the 
government's attempt in early 1877 to remove arms and munitions from an arsenal at 
Kagoshima,105 the rebellion in Satsuma, like the previous samurai uprisings, was also 
seen as a result o f government measures to end the feudal privileges o f samurai. Other 
much less obvious factors though, were pointed to by British diplomats. Parkes, for 
instance, commented that the samurai in Satsuma had also protested against the transfer 
to Russia of the Japanese portion o f Sakhalin,106 while Satow maintained that the 
suppression o f the Hizen uprising by the government and the alleged ill-treatment of
Flowers to Parkes, Nagasaki, November 3, 1876.
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Satsuma samurai during the Formosan expedition were also contributory factors. He 
explained that not only had the Hizen uprising created uneasy feeling, as 'considerable 
sympathy was felt for them in Satsuma,' but that the execution of Eto Shimpei, when the 
insurrection was put down, was also 'looked upon as an act of unnecessary severity, and 
great indignation was felt against Okubo, who had signed the warrant.' Furthermore, it 
was also alleged by Satsuma men that when some of their samurai who went to join the 
Formosan expedition had to be invalided on account of fever, they were sent to Nagasaki 
and there turned adrift, and had to find their own way home while still suffering from 
fever.107 In view of his long-time contacts with Satsuma, Satow's observations merit the 
attention of historians.
As regards the suppression of the rebellion, Parkes showed a clear appreciation of 
the difficulty of the government’s task. As he explained to Lord Derby following the 
dispatch of Admiral Ito from Hyogo to Kagoshima with a fleet of three vessels of war in 
Februaiy, not only were the samurai of the Satsuma military schools said to number 
about twenty thousand men, they were known to be well-armed and well-drilled, and 
appeared to be well provided with munitions of war. Furthermore, the batteries of 
Kagoshima were a protection against attack from sea, and, on the land side, their territory 
could only be approached by mountain passes, which they were already said to have 
occupied. Moreover, Parkes also showed concern about the effect which the example of 
the Satsuma samurai might have upon those of other parts of the country: L. .if the revolt 
o f Kagoshima should be followed by risings in other places, the energies and resources of
■ 1 D Rthe Government will be severely tried.’ Furthermore, the fact that the rebellion was 
now headed by such an able military commander as Saigo, who was assisted by Kirino 
Toshiaki and Shinohara Kunimoto, both of whom were former commanders of the 
Imperial Guard, led Parkes to warn their presence 'adds considerable gravity to the 
insurrection, and will create a considerable sensation throughout the country.'109 Parkes's 
anticipation of the potential spread of the rebellion was partly justified: both Terajima 
and Iwakura in the following few months informed Satow that considerable number of 
shizoku from neighbouring areas had joined the Saigo party.110 In April, Parkes himself 
received a report that two other outbreaks had occurred at Fukuoka and Nakatsu in the 
north of Kyushu, which, in his view, showed that the Satsuma rebels had active
107 Satow’s memorandum, March 9, 1877 encl. in FO 46/217, No. 40, Parkes to Derby, March 12, 1877.
108 FO 46/216, No. 25, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, Februaiy 19, 1877.
109 Ibid., No. 32, February 27, 1877.
1,0 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, March 29, 1877; Ibid., April 15, 1877.
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sympathizers in other places in their vicinity.111 The impact of the Satsuma rebellion was 
also felt in Tosa where, Parkes maintained, it was owing to the influence of ex- 
Councillor, Itagaki, and others that the agitators in that quarter were kept under restraint, 
and their action eventually took the form of memorials to the government.112
Apart from the spread of samurai discontent, the difficulty o f the government was 
also seen as resulting from the ineffectiveness of the conscripted army against insurgent 
samurai. Diplomats noted that the new troops of the regular' army, who had been trained 
to the rifle and bayonet, were commonly reported to be unequally matched with the 
Satsuma samurai when the latter rushed upon them with their swords. This was admitted 
to Parkes by Japanese Foreign Minister Terajima, who added that consequently the 
government was forced to order the drafting of a large number of samurai under the name 
of police, and that the old guard of the Mikado, formed shortly after the revolution from 
the samurai of the three leading clans of that period, but disbanded on the formation of 
the new army, had also been appealed to, and those belonging to Satsuma’s old rival, 
Choshu, had already been called out.113 Nevertheless, while the large enrollment of 
samurai was necessary to defeat the insurgents in Satsuma, diplomats warned that such an 
undertaking was not without potential danger to the government. To Satow, it was 'a 
dangerous sign.'114 A similar view was expressed by Parkes in April:
Thus the Government are reviving the very class which they have 
been diligently endeavouring during the last six years to destroy, 
and, in trying to avoid one danger, are incurring another. Even if  
these Samurai should prove loyal to the Government, the latter will 
have to account with them after the present rebellion shall have 
been put down, but it is doubtful how far their loyalty may be 
relied on, even for the particular purpose for which they are now 
engaged. The temptation to defection will be strong, and many of 
them will lend, doubtless, their swords to that side which offers 
them the most attraction.115
Support for this view came from Satow, who stated that it was already reported that one 
body of five hundred samurai recently raised at Kokura in Kyushu had disbanded and 
disappeared, probably to join the insurgents or to riot on their own account. It is worthy 
of note that a few Meiji leaders also shared the diplomats' view. Iwakura for instance,
111 FO 46/217, No. 56, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 12, 1877.
112 FO 46/218, No. 83, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 5, 1877; FO 46/220, No. 125, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, 
August 30, 1877.
113 FO 46/217, No. 56, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 12, 1877; PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diaiy, March 19, 
1877; Ibid., April 11, 1877.
114 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow’s Diary, March 19, 1877.
115 FO 46/217, No. 56, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 12, 1877.
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expressed his wariness to Satow that the shizoku who had fought the battles of the 
government might wish to revert to the privilege of wearing swords.116
Interestingly, a few Japanese, though from the outer circle of the government, 
were noted to have sought British mediation in bringing the crisis to an end. On June 13, 
a Japanese named Miyamoto requested Satow to urge Parkes to persuade the Mikado's 
government to come to terms with Satsuma on account of his having resided so long in 
the country and being known to have given much help of various sorts to the Mikado's
* 117administration on previous occasions. In another instance, a Japanese named Kambara 
Seiji came to Satow suggesting the dispatch of the legation doctor, William Willis, to 
meet and encourage Saigo to surrender. Satow, however, rejected both requests, as he 
considered that any intervention or mediation should best involve Japanese themselves 
instead of foreigners. Satow himself approached Katsu Awa in July but only met with the 
latter's refusal on the grounds that he despised Okubo and refused 'to be used as a coolie 
to carry Okubo's messages' and also feared that such an undertaking, which might be seen 
as a sign of sympathy for Saigo, would endanger his own life. Similarly, when Kambara 
Seiji later put forward a new plan o f getting ex-Shogun Keiki, Shimazu Hisamitsu and 
Itagaki to work for a reconciliation, Satow pointed out its impracticability, since he 
suspected that neither o f them would dare to open their mouths for fear of being accused 
of as symphatizers of the Satsuma's cause.118
By August, it was clear that the government had gained the upper hand in the 
fighting against Satsuma and it finally ended in September with the death of Saigo by 
harakiri. The result was welcomed by British diplomats though Parkes noted that the 
event had only resulted in the impoverishment of the treasury and the loss of human life. 
The same point was made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, who admitted to Parkes that 
the total number of troops killed and wounded up to the June 30th alone was a third of the 
standing army of the country, while the cost of suppressing the rebellion amounted to 
thirty-five million yen, or considerably more than half the annual revenue of the
119country.
Conclusion
There were mixed responses by British diplomats to the dismantling of feudalism
116 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, April 15, 1877.
1,7 Ibid., June 13, 1877.
118 Ibid., July 13 and 17, 1877.
119 FO 46/220, No. 138, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, September 28, 1877.
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in Japan. Adams, for instance, was somewhat concerned about the possible repercussions 
of abolition of the han, arguing it could not be carried out without incurring bloodshed. In 
contrast, Parkes and Watson anticipated a better state of things and a stronger government 
in Japan. Similarly, diplomats in general welcomed both the conscription system, 
introduced to end the traditional samurai monopoly o f military service, and the 
prohibition of sword-wearing by the samurai. Even so, some of them were critical of the 
commutation of stipends, which they saw as insufficient and unjust to the samurai. A few 
diplomats also considered the incessant issuance of laws and regulations by the 
government on social and economic matters as hasty and ill-considered, and maintained 
that a more careful approach should be adopted by the Meiji administration. During the 
various peasant and samurai uprisings, diplomats' evaluations o f the gravity of the events 
and of the power of the government also varied from one insurrection to another, and a 
variety of reasons for their occurrence were offered by the diplomats.
Some diplomatic comments merit attention because they contain new information 
and interesting insights. Significant examples include the details of discrepancies in 
Japan's finances in 1873, the active and influential role of Shimazu as an opponent of the 
modernising government, Satow and Adams's concurrence in Iwakura's view that Japan 
was going too fast with domestic reforms, the apprehension of some Meiji leaders about 
the consequences of the abolition of feudalism, Parkes and Quin’s sympathy with the 
samurai class following the commutation of stipends, Iwakura’s acknowledgement of the 
inferior state o f Japan compared to the West as well as Okuma and Iwakura’s statements 
of how ill-prepared was Japan in the 1870s for a representative government. In addition, 
diplomats also made some suggestive observations in respect of the peasant and samurai 
uprisings by, for instance, pointing to the role played by former Aizu retainers in inciting 
peasants against the government, the connection between the Hizen uprising and 
Formosan expedition and Satsuma discontent, and the desire of some Japanese in seeking 
British mediation to effect a reconciliation between the central government and 
discontented Satsuma samurai.
Nevertheless, some aspects received shallow treatment in diplomatic reports, in 
particular the problem of han rivalry and the struggle for power among different 
ministries o f the government, notably between the Home and Finance Ministry in 1873, 
which resulted in the resignation of Inoue and Shibusawa. Similarly, although diplomats 
noted the personal ambitions of some Meiji leaders for higher positions during the 
Korean question, they showed no awareness of the hostility towards Sat-Cho dominance 
among some of the Qx-Sangi. Furthermore, diplomats also displayed only a limited
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understanding of the early People's Rights movement since they made no mention of the 
1874 memorial and of such significant political associations as the Aikokukoto and 
Aikokusha. Although diplomats did report on the Osaka Conference in 1875, they lacked 
information on either the views and manuevres of participating Japanese politicians, such 
as Itagaki, Okubo and Kido, or the ensuing debates over the implementation of the 
reforms which had been agreed in Osaka. Nor did the diplomats analyse the issues raised 
by the People's Rights movement, such as the question of the power of the Genrd-in, the 
idea of representative government among members of the Local Assembly, and the 
government responses to these demands.
One further deficiency in British diplomatic reports is the virtual absence of 
evaluations of the longer-run consequences of some important events and developments. 
Little attention, for instance, was paid to the modernising impact on Japan of the Iwakura 
mission or to the concentration of power into the hands o f Satsuma and Choshu 
politicians as a result o f the 1873 crisis over Korea. As to the results of the Satsuma 
rebellion, apart from limited comment on the financial costs inflicted on the country and 
the loss of human life, no consideration was given to the benefits acquired by the Meiji 
government, such as the smooth execution of further modem reforms, and the increased 
confidence, among both the Japanese people and the Foreign Powers, in the ability of the 
government to deal with hostile forces at home. Moreover, when discussing the peasant 
uprisings, British diplomats revealed very little awareness of the relevance of the 
reorganization of local government following the dismantling of the old han, including 
the reshaping of feudal administrative boundaries and the appointment of new governors 
and high-level local officials to ensure the execution of central government policy.
The limited understanding or awareness of diplomats on these issues was partly 
due to the inability of the diplomats to gain access to information, especially on 
differences of views within the government. This may be seen in Plunkett's complaint 
about the reluctance of Meiji leaders to disclose the details of the Osaka Conference 
despite persistent attempts by foreign representatives to persuade them to do so. Perhaps 
it may be argued that diplomats' own contacts were too limited; and it may also have 
been the case that their overriding interest in Japan's foreign policy played a part :n 
leading them to pay relatively little attention to the disagreements that were taking place 
in the Japanese government.
On the dismantling of feudalism in Japan, many diplomatic comments show little 
or no evidence of ‘Orientalist’ thinking. Perhaps the most outstanding of these was 
Watson’s overwhelmingly positive view of the effects of the abolition of feudalism in
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Japan. On the other hand, some diplomatic comments fit ‘Orientalist’ interpretations, 
among them Plunkett's criticisms of the Genrd-in and Daishin-in, Parkes's similarly 
dismissive view of the Genrd-in, and Adams’s skepticism following the abolition of han 
in 1871. Nevertheless, none of the diplomats can be said to have been ‘Orientalist’ in the 
sense of failing to acknowledge Japan’s capacity for progress. Parkes, for instance, did 
not deny Japan’s ability to implement a modem political system, while Plunkett generally 
regarded the political reforms adopted by the Meiji government in subsequent years as 
worthy of commendation. Adams, too, in pointing out the need both for choosing such 
influential individuals such as Kido and Okubo as ambassadors and for careful study of 
Western systems by the members of Iwakura embassy during their tour in Europe and the 
United States, indicated his expectation that Japan was capable of progressive modem 
reforms. It is unlikely that similar views were being expressed by British diplomats in 
other Asian countries at this time.
CHAPTER 3
BRITISH DIPLOMATS* PERCEPTIONS OF JAPANESE
86
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1878-90
Having withstood the most serious challenge to its power in the form of samurai 
and peasant uprisings during the crucial period of 1871-77, the Meiji government 
proceeded to modernise its political system by effecting far-reaching institutional and 
structural changes. The phase was finally completed in 1890 with the inauguration of an 
Imperial Diet. The modernising process naturally attracted British diplomatic attention, 
but the issues on which they commented most were not always those which historians 
have regarded as most important. In particular they reported more frequently on the 
influence of factionalism within the Meiji government than they did on the establishment 
of the 1889 Constitution.
The People1 s Rights Movement
One prominent feature of a modern nation was a representative or parliamentary 
system. In Japan, while government leaders admitted the necessity of such a system to 
create a modem country,1 the loudest demand for its establishment was voiced by the 
People's Rights {Jiyu minken) movement, which opposed the authoritarian tendency of 
the Meiji government and its domination by officials from a few south-western 
provinces, particularly Satsuma and Choshu.
British diplomats showed little sympathy for the Jiyu minken movement's 
aspiration for representative government, since they generally viewed Japan as being not 
yet ready to adopt and implement a representative system. One reason was the presumed 
ignorance of the Japanese public in matters of modem politics. This was evident in 
Parkes's dispatch to Lord Salisbury in 1878 following the murder of Okubo Toshimichi, 
in which Parkes observed that ‘the creation of constitutional checks among a people who 
have hitherto been entirely ignorant of them is a work of time and education.’ 
Furthermore, the government's promise in the Charter Oath of 1868 to establish a 
representative system, he maintained, had been made without proper foresight:
...although the present Government on coming into power put into the 
Mikado's mouth the promise that a Deliberative Assembly should be 
formed and that all measures for the Government of the country 
should be decided by public opinion, they committed themselves
1 See, e.g., Uyehara, G. E., The Political Development o f  Japan 1867-1909, (London: Constable & Co. 
Ltd.), 1910, p. 110.
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without due deliberation to too comprehensive a measure - the extent 
o f which they themselves probably did not see at the time and which 
they soon found impossible to carry into effect.2
The above statements may appear to be inconsistent with Parkes's pre-1868 advocacy of 
political reform as attested to by his remarks in 1867 that the Shogun should n fe  
constitutionally by admitting daimyo to have some voice in the administration of the 
country.3 At that time he also maintained that the Japanese assembly would protect the 
country not only ‘against the despotism of a faction of its nobles,’ referring to the anti- 
Shogun party (Satsuma, Tosa, Echizen and Uwajima), but also against ‘the exclusive 
bureaucracy5 which the Shogun had hitherto used to assume general control.4 Why did 
Parkes cease to be an advocate of constitutional reform? The answer may be that Parkes 
equated the proposed Japanese assembly in 1867 with the baronial council from which 
the English parliament had evolved in medieval times, thus implying that Japan needed to 
follow a similar path o f gradual evolution rather than leap ahead to the instant adoption of 
a modem representative system. This view is more or less confirmed by his critical 
observation that the proposed idea of a second chamber (for the samurai representatives 
or kerai o f the daimyo) o f the council should not be rushed into as the kerai would ‘make 
themselves ridiculous,’ while the idea of universal suffrage, he wrote, ‘will amuse Lord 
Stanley’ adding that ‘They [the daimyo] probably scarcely yet know what they propose to 
undertake.’5 His conclusion in 1867 was that ‘The contemplated changes are too vast to 
be speedily accomplished & it is to be hoped that all parties will agree to seeing them 
worked out gradually but thoroughly.’6
Although from a different angle, Charge d'Affaires J. G. Kennedy and Legation 
secretary John Gubbins also implied that the demand for a national assembly was 
premature. For instance, Kennedy reported in 1880 that ‘It is very possible that if  a 
plebiscite could be taken, a large majority of the people would be found either ignorant 
of, or indifferent to, the advantages of popular Government.’7 Gubbins argued that even 
though the Jiyu minken movement could claim to have a large number of supporters 
throughout the country, it was comprised chiefly of members of the samurai class, who 
absorbed democratic principles as uttered by political demagogues without any real 
understanding of them, and who mostly had economic grievances. The people's views on
2 FO 46/230, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, June 6, 1878.
3 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, October 31, 1866; ibid., Osaka, May 6, 1867.
4 FO 46/83, No. 205, Parkes to Stanley, Yedo, December 5, 1867.
5 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yedo, November 28, 1867.
6 Ibid., December 16, 1867.
7 FO 46/256, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, March 8, 1880.
the principles of parliamentarism and people's rights were, in Gubbins's words, ‘crude 
and ill-formed.’8
As to the origin of their views, one may argue that British diplomats were 
influenced by ‘Orientalism’. Yet, rather than seeing Japan as backward and incapable of 
following in the West's footsteps, which would be a more clear-cut example of 
‘Orientalism’, the diplomats can be seen to have perceived Japan as capable, in time, of 
establishing representative government. This can be seen in the previous suggestion by 
Parkes that a medieval European system was more suitable for Japan. Nevertheless, other 
factors also might have influenced British diplomats, one being the failure of Japan's first 
representative assembly, the Kogisho, which was established in 1869.9 Even at its outset, 
Parkes critically noted the lack of enthusiasm shown by the Kogisho members, 
particularly the daimyo ‘who in most cases have had but slight experience of the earnest 
business of life were not eager to devote themselves to the labours of an onerous and 
voluntary office.’10 Kennedy's later criticism, on the other hand, attributed the failure of 
the assembly to its strong conservative tendency since, as he saw it, the opposition of its 
members to the progressive policy o f the government led to its abandonment by the latter:
An attempt was made, to give effect to the idea thus started, as early as 
1869, but owing to the constitution of the first assemblies (which, in 
no degree representative, consisted solely of “samurai” nominated by 
the different clans) each in its turn endeavoured to hamper the 
progressive policy of the Government; and they were consequently 
dissolved afier a brief existence. It would evidently have been 
impossible to carry out the various reforms needed, in the face o f a 
parliament in which the “samurai” alone would have had a voice, 
whilst the political education of the people continued to remain in an 
undeveloped condition.11
More importantly, it is also probable that the views expressed by Japanese 
statesmen contributed to the British diplomats' pessimism. While admitting that it was the 
government's intention to adopt the modem representative system, Japanese leaders 
generally held that the country was not yet prepared, as the people had no real knowledge 
or experience of how the system worked. As early as 1872, Okuma Shigenobu expressed 
to Charge d'Affaires R. G. Watson the view that it would be a long time before educaticn 
could spread throughout Japan so ‘as to make it safe to entrust the people with the power
s Gubbins's memorandum o f November 7, 1884, encl. in FO 46/316, No. 215, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
November 18, 1884.
9 The assembly o f  Kogisho was renamed Shugi-in in August 1869. It was abandoned in 1870 and finally 
abolished in 1871.
10 FO 46/108, No. 86, Parkes to Clarendon, Yokohama, April 13, 1869.
11 FO 46/273, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, October 17, 1881.
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of electing representatives who should have a share in governing the country.’12 
Similarly, in April 1875, Parkes was informed by Iwakura Tomomi that the demand for a 
parliament could not yet be granted because Japan was not prepared, and that tie
• * r 3appropriate course of action was to establish prefectural and district assemblies. The 
same sentiment was expressed by Ito Hirobumi, then Minister of the Interior, in a 
conversation with Kennedy in March 1880. Ito said that the demand ‘was premature, that 
representative Government even in the smallest degree had been unknown in the history 
of Japan, and that the Government had decided to resist for the present this desire of the 
people to share in the conduct of public business for which they had not yet shown any 
capacity.’14 It is also significant that among Parkes's private letters, there is a copy 
marked in pencil by Parkes of an 1883 pamphlet written by Yoshida Kiyonari, then 
Japanese Minister at Washington, and entitled 'The Proposed National Assembly in 
Japan', which may well have strengthened Parkes’s perception of how ill-equipped Japan 
was for parliamentary government. In it Yoshida wrote:
When her people show that they have gone to the fountain-head of 
knowledge by manifesting even the slightest evidence of originality of 
thought and investigation in the wide field of literature, there will be 
proof of the fact that the spirit is abroad which leads to political 
advancement. Until then, and so long as Japan continues so far behind 
the rest o f the world in literary performance, there is a fair argument 
by analogy that her political condition is not much further advanced.15
Another Japanese leader, Inoue Kaoru, described the large number of politicians outside 
the government, in a conversation with Charge d'Affaires Le Poer Trench in April 1883, 
as ‘a lot of new and...ignorant mushroom politicians.’16 If the politicians were ignorant of 
real politics, what more could be expected from the large masses of Japan? Another 
probable reason, though difficult to substantiate, was that perhaps, British diplomats did 
not favour democracy in principle. Despite their modem or Western background, it is 
possible that they preferred a government ruled by a better class of the society.
Until the people were educated and able to share the burden of administration, 
Japan, in the British diplomats' view, had to adopt a gradual approach towards a 
representative administration. According to Parkes's report of June 1878 to Lord 
Salisbury, constitutional checks in Japan required time, and the appropriate course for
12 FO 46/156, No. 146, Watson to Granville, Yedo, November 11, 1872.
13 FO 46/191, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 13, 1875.
14 FO 46/256, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, March 8, 1880.
!5 Quoted in Dickins, F. V. and Lane-Poole, S., The Life o f  Sir Harry Parkes, Vol. II (London: Macmillan 
& Co.), 1894, pp. 315-16.
16 FO 46/380, No. 37, Conf., Trench to Salisbury, April 28, 1883.
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Japan, amidst the popular cry for representative government, was to gradually enlarge the 
basis of the administration.17 In another instance, on being asked by Basil Hall 
Chamberlain what would be the future of Japan, ‘Japan?’ said Parkes, ‘Japan will be a 
South American Republic.’18 The remark implies that though Japan could become a more 
politically advanced state, it would take a long time before she could imitate the 
achievements of the West. Kennedy also believed in a gradual concession to the public 
demand, though his concern was the stability of the country amidst the rise of agitation 
by the Jiyu minken movement. In view of the general discontent in the country, he 
perceived in 1880 that ‘it would be hazardous for the Government to refuse to make any 
concession in the direction demanded.’19 It should be noted that the diplomats' views 
were similar to those of the Meiji leaders who also maintained that the government 
should take gradual steps towards the establishment of a parliament.
An additional factor which may have affected the way in which British diplomats 
perceived the Japanese democratic movement was Japan's attempt to revise its unequal 
treaties. After its first tentative approaches to discuss this issue with foreign 
representatives in 1871, Japan relentlessly pursued its aim of treaty revision in the 1880s. 
British diplomats generally observed that the introduction into Japan of a representative 
government while the negotiations for treaty revision were in progress would only create 
complications and difficulties. A Japanese parliament that consisted of opposition parties, 
in the diplomats' view, was likely to be more hostile and difficult to deal with in 
negotiating points for new treaties, as the parties were generally critical of the 
government's proposals for treaty revision. Even without the problem emanating from the 
Diet, British diplomats had found Japan's proposals, particularly with regard to the 
questions o f extra-territoriality and consular jurisdiction for foreigners, difficult to accept, 
especially in the absence of a modem and perfect Japanese legal system. Parkes's 
reservations about them are illustrated in his farewell speech to foreign residents at 
Yokohama in August 1883:
But when the changes which have been so rapidly initiated affected 
the position and interests of foreigners in Japan, I then maintained, as 
it was both my right and my duty to do, that they should be proceeded
17 FO 46/230, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, June 6, 1878.
18 Quoted in Dickins and Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 395. The conversation between Chamberlain and Parkes 
took place during the former's visit, to Japan in the 1870s.
19 FO 46/256, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, March 8, 1880.
20 Beckmann, op. cit., pp. 49-50; Joseph Pittau, S. J., Political Thought in Early Meiji Japan 1868-1889 , 
(Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press), 1967, p. 50.
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with deliberately, and that each step should be based upon mature 
reflection.21
Similar reservations were spelled out even more clearly by Gubbins in a memorandum of 
January 1890:
It would be therefore idle to suppose that the Japanese Parliament
when it meets, will not at once endeavour to grapple with Treaty
Revision, should it still remain unsettled. And when the ignorant and
reckless views of the majority of the members of that Parliament,
drawn as they will be chiefly from the ranks of the Radical and
Progressist parties, are considered, it is not easy to forsee [sic] a limit
to the lengths to which national excitement working through
22Parliamentary channels may carry the Government.
As the negotiations for treaty revision entered the late 1880s, a sense of 
dissatisfaction and frustration prevailed among British diplomats. Not only did the 
negotiations often reach deadlock, but the Japanese increasingly opposed concessions to 
Foreign Powers. Against this background, it is possible that British diplomats' irritation 
towards the Japanese in regard to treaty revision, also contributed to their critical views 
on Japanese politics in general. Plunkett, for instance, perceived in March 1887 that the 
aggressive tone of Japan in negotiating the treaty ‘has been startling and one asks oneself 
whether she has not somehow amused herself into the illusion that she is a Seventh Great 
Power o f Europe.’23 In 1890, Hugh Fraser's dissatisfaction with a hostile article in a 
Japanese newspaper, the Choya Shimbun, led the British minister to express strong, albeit 
qualified, criticism of Japan:
...one can not rely very confidently upon the common sense of the 
Japanese. They are an attractive people on the whole, and have many 
good qualities; but they are eminently shortsighted, fierce, vain­
glorious, and excitable, and there is alwaiys danger of their committing 
a “coup de tete,” doing childish wrongs, or giving childish 
provocation, in serious affairs.24
Given their pessimistic views o f parliamentarianism in Japan, it is no surprise that 
most diplomats showed no condemnatory attitude towards the autocratic character of the 
Meiji government, i.e. the Sat-Cho domination of political power. With the exception of 
Consul John C. Hall, who critically observed in 1884 that ‘the favouritism of the present
21 Quoted from Dickins and Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 347.
22 Memorandum by Gubbins, January 1890 in FO 46/398, No. 20, Very Conf,, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
January 25, 1890.
23 FO 46/366, No. 60, Secret, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, March 8, 1887.
24 FO 46/398, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, January 13, 1890. The article, which was published on January 9, 
1890 advocated "Japan for Japanese" and claimed the superiority o f  Japan over other nations.
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Government is probably as incurable as it is notorious,’25 diplomats appeared to take the 
view that the alleged Sat-Cho “monopoly” was somewhat exaggerated by Jiyu minken 
agitators. In a memorandum of February 1884, Gubbins observed that while the 
composition of the Cabinet (Dajdkan) was clearly marked by the dominance of Satsuma 
and Choshu (where of the twelve Sangi, five were natives of Satsuma and four of 
Choshu, while Tosa claimed two and Hizen one), yet, if  one looked into the general 
official statistics of the countiy, ‘outside the Cabinet the ascendancy complained of is not
0 f\so marked as is generally assumed.’ Rather,
...the real foundation for the cry of “Satcho no Seifu” (A Satsuma and 
Choshiu Government) lies in the fact of the predominance of Satsuma 
and Choshiu men in the present Cabinet. The great power wielded by 
the members of the Cabinet, who are virtually in the position of 
irresponsible Ministers makes this predominance undoubtedly greater 
than it might otherwise be, and the practical significance o f the 
situation is accentuated by the fact that the policy of the Government 
is virtually dictated by an inner circle in the Cabinet.27
Le Poer Trench's remark also justified the position of the Sat-Cho leaders, as he observed 
in March 1884 that in spite of the monopoly by the Sat-Cho faction, no favouritism was 
shown towards the particular provinces, namely Satsuma and Choshu:
It should however be distinctly understood that the days of Clan 
supremacy have passed and that the influence possessed by Ministers 
in the present Government is exercised little if  at all in favor of their 
ex-clansmen or for local purposes, but almost solely in the interests of 
the conservative party which the Cabinet represents 28
One issue to consider, however, though it to some extent contradicts the previous 
argument that British diplomats approved of authoritarian rule, was that the government's 
concessions to the popular movement might have also contributed to the diplomats’ 
acquiescence of the Sat-Cho hanbatsu rule. Among such concessions noted by British 
diplomats were the establishment of the Genrd-in, the Assembly of Governors
25 Memorandum by Hall, Conf., November 5, 1884, in FO 46/316, No. 210, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, 
Tokyo, November 5, 1884.
26 Memorandum by Gubbins, February 26, 1884, "The Satsuma and Choshiu Party in the Government," in 
FO 46/311, Trench to Granville, Tokyo, March 5, 1884. The official statistics on which Gubbins based his 
statement was the "Kwan-in-roku'\ or list o f  officials, which gives the names o f  all persons in government 
employ arranged in the order o f  the Public Departments and Prefectures, and the Provinces and Prefectures 
to which they belonged. From these statistics, Gubbins maintained that Satsuma and Choshu men together 
held only one third o f the highest appointments in the government and only one ninth o f  the whole official 
class.
27 Ibid.
28 FO 46/311, Trench to Granville, Tokyo, March 5, 1884.
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('Chihdkan-kaigi), and elected assemblies in prefectures, cities, towns and villages.29 
While there was no diplomatic comment on the promulgation of the “Three Great Laws” 
of 1878, which among others brought about the establishment of a formal system of local 
assemblies, or on whether the composition of the assemblies reflected democratic 
principles of representation or whether their powers were constitutionally effective, 
Kennedy did note in a March 1880 report that the concessions had resulted in an 
increased demand for the creation of a national assembly, and he reported that a large 
number of Jiyu minken supporters, among whom were members o f the local assemblies, 
had recently gathered in the capital and presented a petition calling for an elected 
legislative assembly.30
An even greater concession to popular demand was the issuance of an Imperial 
decree on October 11, 1881, announcing the establishment o f the national assembly in
1890. On the same day, the government announced that the sale of the property of the
o  1
Hokkaido Colonisation Department would be abandoned, much to the delight of 
political agitators who had levelled the accusation that the sale by the government was a 
flagrant act of favouritism at the state's expense. These decrees, according to Kennedy, 
were proof of ‘the progress and power of the people...[and] the recognition by the
i  '5 ' )
Government of the necessity of taking account of public opinion. ’ In addition to popular 
pressure, Kennedy also rightly observed a connection between the concessions and the 
withdrawal of Okuma Shigenobu (Minister of Finance) from the government, though he 
did not explicitly suggest that the decrees were intended to counteract the effect of the 
resignation of Okuma, who was becoming increasingly associated with some sections of 
the People's Rights movement. Kennedy maintained that Okuma not only held more 
liberal views than the other Meiji leaders and advocated the establishment of popular 
government within two or three years, but that he also was directly involved in 
campaigning against the government's proposal to sell the Colonisation Department 
property to certain individuals connected with the Department.33 Interestingly, Kennedy 
overestimated the influence of the opposition movement when he anticipated that the
29 For further details o f  the organization and powers o f the assemblies see, e.g., McLaren, op. cit., pp. 134- 
38, 141-47.
30 FO 46/256, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, March 8, 1880.
See Uyehara, op. cit., p. 86, Beckmann, op. cit., p. 56.
32 FO 46/273, Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, November 21, 1881. Twenty-seven different associations from 
twenty-four prefectures with the total members o f 87,000 people were represented in the demonstration. 
The petition was presented to the government in the name o f  the "United Association for the Establishment 
o f  a National Assembly" (Kokkai Kisei Domeikai). Uyehara, op. cit., pp. 84-85.
33 FO 46/273, Kennedy to Granville, Tokyo, November 23, 1881. See a slightly different view on Okuma’s 
involvement in the campaign by Fraser, A., ‘The Expulsion o f  Okuma from the Government in 1881, 
Journal o f  Asian Studies, Vol. XXVI, 1966-67, pp. 225-226.
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government might be pressurized by impatient politicians to establish the assembly 
sooner than 1890, as had been promised.34
Though political agitators did not seek an earlier date for the establishment of the 
parliament, the popular movement so increased its agitation that it gave rise to the birth of 
Japan's political parties. However, most diplomats referred to the development of the 
parties only at a later date, the earliest mention being by Ernest Satow in 1882. 
Moreover, with the exception of the leading parties and societies, namely the Aikokusha 
or Patriotic Association (established in 1878) and the Jiyuto or Liberty Party (1881) 
under the leadership of Itagaki Taisuke and the Rikken Kaishinto or Constitutional 
Progressive Party (1882) led by Okuma, nothing whatsoever was recorded about other 
groups such as the Rikken Teiseito or Constitutional Imperial Party, a government- 
sponsored party established in March 1882.36
On the question of why the political parties had grown so rapidly, Gubbins 
dismissively asserted in 1884 and 1885 that the liberal parties consisted chiefly of young 
men of the samurai class who were either Ted by the sprinkling of modem learning they 
have obtained in the primary schools and minor colleges to...imbibe with avidity from the 
lips of radical demagogues high-sounding notions of liberty and the rights of men, which 
they are unable to assimilate,’ or were discontented with their economic situation and 
‘barely able to live on the pittances they receive as pensions from the Government.’37 
While samurai involvement increased the number of party supporters, Gubbins observed 
that they were also dangerous and unamenable to party control. In illustrating his view, 
Gubbins pointed to the dissolution o f the Jiyuto's branch society in Osaka, and the 
disintegration of the Jiyuto itself in October 1884. He explained that due to the extremist 
activities of some Jiyuto members, the government had accused the party of providing a 
sanctuary for radical agitators responsible for the Ibaraki and Saitama riots that occurred 
in September 1884, and so, in order to avoid these charges, the Jiyuto's leadership had
n o
dissolved the party. It should be noted, however, that Gubbins's emphasis on samurai 
numerical domination may not have been justified, at least regarding the People's Rights
34 Ibid., October 17, 1881.
35 PRO 30/33/15/7, Satow’s Diary, September 8, 1882.
36 For further details on the parties, see e.g., Uyehara, op. cit., pp. 89-93; Langdon, F., Politics in Japan, 
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co.), 1967, pp. 31-32; Sims, op. cit., pp. 57, 65, 69 71; Ike, N. 'Political 
Leadership and Political Parties', in Ward, R. E. and Rustow, D. A., Political Modernization in Japan and  
Turkey, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1968), pp. 397-398.
37 Gubbins's memorandum ofNovem ber 7,1884, encl. in FO 46/316, No. 215, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
November 18, 1884; Gubbins's memorandum o f  December 8, 1885, encl. in FO 46/335, No. 253, Conf., 
Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 11, 1885.
38 Gubbins's memorandum ofN ovem ber 7, 1884, encl. in FO 46/316, N o. 215, Plunkett to Salisbury, 
Tokyo, November 18, 1884. Other causes for its dissolution, according to Gubbins, were the restrictive 
measures placed by the government in respect to public meetings and the press, and the lack o f funds.
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movement as a whole after 1880. This is because the composition of the Jiyuto largely 
consisted of rural landlords and peasants, while the Kaishinto members included many 
urban intellectuals and wealthy merchants.
In response to the Jiyu minken movement, the Meiji government employed 
repressive measures as well as concessions. British diplomats' attitudes to these measures 
were ambiguous or non-committal. One instance is Parkes's comment on the severe 
punishment of soldiers of the Imperial Guard who were involved in a mutiny in August 
1878, which occurred because of both the influence of the Jiyu minken ideas and arrears 
in pay. Parkes observed that while the severity of the sentences demonstrated the 
government's confidence in its power, it might also be as harmful as misplaced 
clemency.40 As to the government's subsequent measures to avoid similar incidents of 
political subversion in the army, namely the establishment of military police (kempei) in 
January 1881 and the issuance of the Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (Gunjin Chokuyu) 
in January 1882, which prohibited the military from involvement in politics,41 neither 
Parkes nor other diplomats made any observation. However, when a series of regulations 
were issued in April 1880 to curtail the right to form political societies and to hold public 
discussion of political subjects, Kennedy observed that the government's reasons for 
enacting the regulations could not be easily justified as there were no reports in the press 
to support Inoue's claims. In his view, the real motive of the government was to suppress 
the political society, the Aikokusha, which was becoming increasingly popular at that 
time.42 As to other counter-measures by the government, such as the press law issued in 
1883 and revised in 1888,43 and the Peace Preservation Ordinance of 1887, which further 
strengthened the power of die police in monitoring political parties, there was a notable 
absence of condemnation from British diplomats44 One may argue that this further 
confirms their unsympathetic tendencies towards the Jiyu minken movement and its 
aspiration for representative government.
39 See the parties' membership in Beckmann, op, cit., pp. 61-62; Beasley, W.G., 'Meiji Political 
Institutions,' in Jansen, op. cit., p. 659; Lebra, J., 'The Kaishinto as a Political Elite', in Silbermann, B. S. 
and Harootunian, H. D. (eds), Modern Japanese Leadership:Transition and Change, (Tucson, Arizona: 
Univ. o f  Arizona Press), 1966, pp. 377-378.
40 FO 46/230, No. 110, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, October 25, 1878.
41 Tsuzuki, C., The Pursuit o f  Power in Modern Japan 1825-1995 , (New York: Oxford Univ. Press), 2000, 
p. 107.
42 FO 46/256, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, April 30, 1880. The reasons as claimed by Inoue Kaoru to 
Kennedy were that the agitators had been 'delivering lectures o f an inflammatory character in the rural 
districts, and obtaining money from ignorant peasants by promising to relieve them from the oppression o f  
the Government, and particularly from the conscription which is extremely unpopular' and trying 'to instil 
into the mind o f  the farming class that the land tax levied from them is unjustifiably high, and ought to be 
greatly reduced.'
43 FO 46/379, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 24, 1888.
44 FO 46/369, No. 252, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 28, 1887.
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After a brief decline in the mid-1880s, the Jiyu minken movement again revived 
in 1887 following Foreign Minister Inoue's failure to revise the unequal treaties. This was 
noted by British diplomats who reported on the increasingly hostile criticisms, the 
presentation of numerous memorials to the government from various parts of the country, 
the formation of political clubs and societies, and the increase in the frequency of 
political meetings.45 On this growing political movement, one trend that Le Poer Trench 
noted as ‘not unnatural’ in Japan was the shift in criticism from the question of foreign 
policy or treaty revision to the government's domestic policy. This was demonstrated, 
according to Le Poer Trench, first by Itagaki's 1887 memorial, in which the opposition 
leader protested against the over-centralization by the government and heavy taxation, 
and complained of the relative strengths of the army and navy to each other, and of the
• • 46creation of the new nobility, and second by the movement under Goto Shojiro that 
criticised the government for its extravagant expenditure and the large increase in recent 
years in the number of paid officials and of hired German workers while poverty was 
widespread in Tosa.47
As opposition mounted, Le Poer Trench and Gubbins noted that the government 
was forced to issue the Peace Preservation Ordinance on December 25, 1887, which 
reinforced the power of the police in suppressing secret societies and political 
associations.48 Yet, the agitation continued as proposals for treaty revision under new 
Foreign Minister Okuma were also rejected as undermining Japan's honour and 
sovereignty. In view of the heightened opposition, Fraser cautioned in August 1889 that 
the agitation might take an acute and dangerous form at any moment and lead to political 
assassination of individual statesmen.49 His apprehension soon proved to be correct as 
some extremists made an attempt on Okuma's life. The severely injured Okuma tendered 
his resignation and the government suspended the negotiations for treaty revision,50 and it 
was not until 1894 that the unequal treaties were finally ended.
45 Ibid., No. 238, Conf., Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, October 8, 1887. See also memorandum by Gubbins 
o f October 4, 1887, in ibid., No. 246, Conf., November 18, 1887.
46 FO 46/369, No, 246, Conf., Trench to Salisbury, November 18, 1887. See the enclosed memorandum by 
Gubbins ofNovem ber 12, 1887 for further details o f  the complaints put forward by Itagaki.
47 FO 46/379, No. 4, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, January 5, 1888, see the enclosed memorandum by 
Gubbins o f  December 28, 1887. Also see FO 46/369, No. 252, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 28, 
1887.
48 FO 46/369, No. 252, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 28, 1887; FO 46/379, No. 4, Trench to 
Salisbury, January 5, 1888, see memorandum by Gubbins, December 28, 1887. For details on other 
government measures that undermined the Jiyu minken movement see, e.g., Sims, op . cit., pp. 71-77.
49 FO 46/387, No. 97, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 16, 1889.
50 FO 46/397, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, October 21, 1889.
Structural Reforms
Apart from the popular demands for a modem representative system, 1878-90 
also saw some modernising changes in the government machinery. In December 1885, a 
Cabinet based on a Western model was established to replace the Dajokan system. The 
offices of Dajo Daijin (Chancellor of the Empire), Sadaijin (Minister of the Left), and 
Udaijin (Minister of the Right) were abolished, and nine departments instead of eight 
constituted the new Cabinet with Ito as Prime Minister. British diplomats, particularly 
Plunkett, favoured the changes and viewed them as signs of progress because they 
strengthened the government's effectiveness and replaced ‘the complicated administrative 
machinery’ of Japan.51 But more importantly, the change was favoured because it was 
seen as ‘Western’ and was carried out by ‘progressive’ politicians who had political 
knowledge of the West. Plunkett, for instance, evidently saw it in this light when he 
described the establishment of the Cabinet as an ‘important episode in the constitutional 
development of Japan’ and when he argued that foreigners should render their support 
to the new Cabinet due to its ‘progressive’ tendency: ‘die Cabinet is certainly one of 
progress, and it is in my opinion in the interest of all Foreigners that it should be 
supported and encouraged, in order that it may steer safely through the many difficulties 
which Japan has still to overcome.’53 In another, instance, Plunkett again pointed out the 
‘progressive’ composition o f the Cabinet when he observed in February 1886 that with 
the exception of one minister (Tani Kanjo, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce), all 
Cabinet members had either visited or stayed for some time in Europe or America, thus 
acquiring some advanced knowledge of the West.54 Gubbins also commented favourably 
on the ‘progressive’ make-up of the new Cabinet. Compared to the previous system, 
which reserved a number of high posts for Old Court Nobility, the new Cabinet, 
according to Gubbins, consisted solely of ‘new school politicians’ whose liberal tendency 
was opposed to the conservatism of the Old Court Party.55
Following the establishment of the new Cabinet, various administrative changes, 
most of which were initiated by Ito, were carried out in order to restructure Japan's 
political system. In addition to a retrenchment programme, other changes, as reported by 
Plunkett, included the new importance attached to the issuing of decrees as direct
51 FO 46/335, No. 17, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 28, 1885.
52 Ibid., No. 16, December 28, 1885.
53 Ibid., No. 17, November 28, 1885.
54 FO 46/343, No. 15, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 1, 1886.
55 Gubbins's memorandum o f December 28, 1885, encl. in FO 46/335, No. 16, Tokyo, December 28, 1885.
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imperial edicts (previously, the decrees were published in the name of the Dajo Daijin), 
the adoption of a new title for Ito, namely Sori Daijin (Minister President of State or 
Prime Minister), the reconstruction of the organization of the diplomatic and consular 
services of Japan,56 and the creation of the office of Naidaijin (Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal). To Plunkett, the reforms in general were ‘extensive5 and ‘radical557 and ‘amount to
c O
a Revolution,5 but they were still far from complete. Though the reforms have not been 
so regarded by historians, Plunkett's conclusion may have stemmed from the fact that, as 
he reported to Lord Rosebury in March 1886, important notifications altering some 
portion or other of the administrative organization of the country were published almost 
daily in the Japanese official gazette. Moreover, as he perceived it, there existed secret 
criticisms within Japan against the sweeping nature of Ito's reforms.59 Although he did 
not elaborate on the latter point, it is probable that one source of criticism concerned Ito's 
retrenchment policy, for there were different views within the government as to the 
manner in which the programme should be carried out,60
Given his view of the ‘extensive5 nature of the reforms, it was not surprising that 
Plunkett at first had some reservations regarding their successful execution. In December 
1885 Plunkett noted that while the changes established a direct relationship between the 
Cabinet and the Emperor (through the abolition of Dajo Daijin, Sadaijin and Udaijin, 
which had previously formed a barrier between the government and the Mikado) and 
bestowed power and independent responsibility upon Cabinet Ministers, the efficiency of 
the new arrangement had yet to be proved.61 On the retrenchment programme, which 
involved the reduction of government officials on a massive scale, Plunkett observed that 
while the authority and influence which Ito possessed as Prime Minister and at the same
time President of the Legislative Bureau62 would facilitate the execution of the reform,
still ‘it remains to be seen how far the government will be able to carry this out, without 
raising an amount of discontent.5
By April 1886, though Plunkett was still cautious, his statements were more 
positive, as no counter-productive effects of the reforms were apparent. He expressed the 
hope that though the changes were still incomplete and it was still too soon to rule out the
56 Japanese diplomatic officials were divided into three main classes, Chokimin, Sonin and Hannin, and all 
three classes were further divided into a number o f categories.
57 FO 46/344, No. 50, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, March 31, 1886.
58 Ibid., No. 52, AprilS, 1886.
59 FO 46/344, No. 50, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, March 31, 1886.
60 FO 46/368, No. 207, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 30, 1887.
61 FO 46/335, No. 16, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 28, 1885.
62 The Bureau was created in 1884 for the purpose o f studying and drafting the Constitution and 
supervising government departments.
63 FO 46/335, No. 17, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 28 ,1885.
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possibility of some discontent, ‘the prudence and energy which have marked Count Ito's 
proceedings since he assumed the Office of Minister President of State will not now 
desert him, and that His Excellency may thus finally succeed in the tremendous task he 
has now fairly undertaken of converting an Oriental autocratic administration into one 
based on European Constitutional principle.’64 In December 1886, reflecting on the 
reforms, Plunkett further praised the peaceful transformation of Japan's political systems: 
‘Everything passed off then so calmly that it must be difficult in Europe to realize exactly 
how great really was the change, and how enormous was the step thus gained towards the
* 65more complete Europeanization of Japan.’
In 1888, the Privy Council (Sumitsu-in), also based on a Western model, was 
established as the supreme advisory body to the Emperor. It is worthy of note that while 
Le Poer Trench himself noted that there existed two contradictory views in Japan; firstly, 
that the new Privy Council was meant to hold a weak or merely ornamental position in 
the machinery of government, and secondly, that the council's task was to deliberate on 
the new Constitution,66 - a view relatively close to that held by some later historians67 - 
Le Poer Trench, however, emphasized that the council was more a result of the rivalry 
between the Satsuma and Choshu factions in the government. In May 1888, following a 
struggle for power between the two factions, Ito, who was horn Choshu, resigned his 
office as Prime Minister. In his place, Kuroda Kiyotaka of Satsuma was appointed. This, 
to Le Poer Trench, marked the ascendancy of the Satsuma party and the defeat of its 
rival, and the establishment of the Privy Council was mainly to be understood in this 
context. As he put it in May 1888: ‘The creation of the new Privy Council is, I am of 
opinion, due more to a desire to conceal the real reason of Count Ito's retirement than to 
any recognized necessity for administrative reorganization.’ In marked contrast, a 
month later he saw it as resembling a political institution in England. As the Japanese 
council was engaged in considering the draft of the new Constitution, he observed that it 
'is assuming a character of great importance, and may already be regarded as the nucleus 
of a House of Lords.'69
64 FO 46/344, No. 52, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, April 5, 1886.
65 FO 46/349, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, December 21, 1886.
66 FO 46/380, No. 39, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, May 7, 1888.
67 Beasley, 'Meiji Political Institutions', in Jansen, op. cit,, p. 663; Akita, G., Foundations o f  Constitutional 
Government in Modern Japan 1868-1900, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press), 1967, p. 64; 
Uyehara, op, cit., p. 105. These historians maintain that the Privy Council was purposely created to 
deliberate on the draft Constitution and Ito's resignation was a voluntary m ove so that he might preside over 
the undertaking that was entrusted to the council.
68 FO 46/380, No. 39, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, May 9, 1888.
69 Ibid., No. 45, June 7, 1888.
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The Mein Constitution
The most important political reform after 1878 was the Meiji Constitution. 
Having already been promised by an Imperial decree in 1881, the Constitution was 
promulgated in February 1889, and in 1890 the Japanese Parliament or Diet was 
established, thus inaugurating an epoch-making political experiment. Nevertheless, 
British diplomats devoted surprisingly little attention to the Meiji Constitution.
One feature of the Meiji Constitution that British diplomats did note was the marked 
influence of Germany.70 Following Ito's return from a tour in Europe where he studied 
the constitutions of different Western nations, Gubbins wrote in early 1884: 'It is...an 
open secret that the constitution of the Parliament to be established in 1890 is to be 
founded on the model of that of the German Reichsrath.'71 Yet, no British diplomats 
showed any awareness of Ito's proceedings in Europe, particularly his meetings with 
German or Austrian constitutional experts, which confirmed Ito's prejudice against the 
idea of popular sovereignty and democratic government, and inclined him towards the 
adoption of the principle of social monarchy and a Prussian-style constitution.
Plunkett for one expressed disapproval o f the general pro-German tendency. 
Although his remark to Ito in February 1886 was not directly related to Japan's 
Constitution, Plunkett questioned Japan's policy as he saw her increasingly 'day by 
day...throw herself into the arms of Germany, and...shape things here more and more on 
[a] German model.' In reply, Ito maintained that Germany had won Japan's favour for two 
main reasons:
...the first cause for which England was herself responsible was the 
continuance, for years after it ceased to be appropriate, of the policy 
followed by Sir Harry Parkes. Germany had very cleverly taken 
advantage of this mistake. Was it in human nature that, while 
being...harshly and unfairly treated by the British Minister, they 
should not, to a certain extent, yield to the continued blandishments of 
the German Minister, who was as steadily inviting them to come to 
him for support and consolation, as the British Minister repelled them 
by his criticisms and advice. ...the policy of Her Majesty's 
Government had entirely changed for the past two years; but the seed 
previously sown had necessarily thrown out roots, and they could not
70 Drawn up with the assistance o f mainly German legal experts, such as Hermann Roesler and Albert 
Mosse, the Japanese Constitution showed a greater resemblance to the German model than to other 
Western models.
71 Memorandum by Gubbins, Februaty 26, 1884, "The Satsuma and Choshiu Party in the Government," in 
FO 46/311, Trench to Granville, Tokyo, March 5, 1884. Also see FO 46/311, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, 
Tokyo, April 9, 1884.
72 They included Rudolph von Gneist and Albert Mosse in Berlin, and Lorenz von Stein in Vienna. 
Beckmann, op . cit., pp. 70-72; Joseph Pittau, op, cit., pp. 141-145.
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be eradicated at once, however much Japan herself might now desire 
it. ...The second cause [was the government's decision] after much 
careful thought and examination...to form the new Constitution and 
Codes of Japan, on the model of the Constitution of Prussia, and of the 
German Code. The Constitution of England was abandoned as a model 
because it was a growth of centuries which could not be summarily 
transplanted to an Eastern soil, and it had no coiporate shape in which 
it could be studied, or altered so as to be made suitable to the totally 
different state of things in Japan. The same applies to the system of 
English Laws, which, however excellent for England, would be 
entirely inapplicable in a country of such different habits and 
traditions. It was therefore necessary to turn for a model to some 
existing Code such as that of France or Germany.73
Interestingly, Plunkett made no comments on either Parkes's allegedly irritable attitude 
towards Japan or the supposed unsuitability of the British constitution and legal system 
for Japan. Plunkett did not state explicitly whether or not he accepted the explanations 
given by Ito. Yet since less than two weeks later he observed that Japan tended to send its 
officials to Germany because of the better treatment they received in that country than in 
Britain or America,74 Plunkett can arguably bo said to have acknowledged the truth of 
Ito's statement. Recognition that Japan saw Germany as more friendly than Britain seems 
also to have influenced British diplomatic policy towards Japan, especially with regard to 
treaty revision where more concessions were offered to Japan by Britain in the late 1880s 
compared to the early years of negotiation. Yet it seems unlikely that Plunkett concurred 
with Ito that the Prussian constitution was a better model for Japan. Reporting to Lord 
Salisbury in July 1887 on the Japanese government's decision to engage a British 
constitutional lawyer to advise Ito in the drafting of the Japanese constitution, Plunkett 
wrote that such a step was 'a good symptom’ and 'another proof...that the Japanese are 
commencing to see the mistake they made in devoting themselves so entirely to 
Germany, and are seeking to free themselves from the dependence in which they were
n r
placing themselves at one time on that country.' Despite Plunkett's optimistic 
observation, however, it was soon proved that the hired British lawyer, Francis T. 
Piggott, had only a minor role to play.76
73 FO 46/343, No. 35, Conf., Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, March 1, 1886.
74 Ibid., No 41, Conf., March 12, 1886.
73 FO 46/368, No. 182, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 2, 1887.
76 As with other legal advisers to the government, Piggott’s task was to clarify theoretical questions 
concerning the constitution. Yet, it was Roesler's recommendations which were generally accepted by the 
government. Noboru, Umetani, 'Expectation o f a British-type Constitution and Piggott', in KBS Bulletin on 
Japanese Culture, April-May 1972, No. 113, (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai (Japan Cultural Society), 
1971, pp. 9, 13.
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Other statements made by Plunkett, though indicating a desire for Japan to turn 
away from Germany and look to Britain, are more general and make no specific reference 
to the adoption of British constitutional ideas by Japan and the abandonment of those of 
Germany. For example, in early February 1887, Plunkett criticised Japan's general 
fondness for everything German on the grounds that Britain held greater prestige and 
influence in the Far East.77 In a later dispatch Plunkett maintained that only by following 
British lines could Japan find foreign help and support in the future: 'Japan might coquet 
for a time with Germany, but for her legitimate helpmate, she must look either to England 
or America.’ In his view, one reason for Japan's general tendency towards Germany was 
because some leading Japanese, influenced by Doenhoff (former German Minister to 
Japan), had envisaged the adoption of everything German with the aim of pitting the two 
European Powers, i.e. Germany and Britain, against each other, so that Japan would reach
* 7 Rbetter terms in its treaty revision. To Plunkett, such a policy would not only alienate 
British support for Japan, but would also, as he stressed to Inoue in July, bring grave 
danger to the present Cabinet.79 Although he was not specific as to the potential danger to 
the government, as early as March 1887 he had already observed that the excessive 
German tendency of Ito's policy had caused differences of views within the 
administration.80 Subsequent events confirmed his observation, in that following the 
failure of treaty revision under Inoue, the criticism of the government's inclination 
towards Germany increased not only among members of the Cabinet but also among Jiyu
Q 1
minken leaders.
In criticising Japan's pro-German tendency, Plunkett was undoubtedly concerned 
with what he saw as the growing influence of Germany in Japan at the expense of British 
influence and interests. In one area, the Meiji government was employing a greater
number of Germans as foreign advisers and the number of German experts in Japan
Si*?reached its peak in 1887-88 with a total of between seventy and eighty. Since Britain, 
ever since the early years of the Meiji Restoration, had provided Japan with the largeJt 
number of foreign experts in various fields,83 Japan's new preference was unsurprisingly 
disliked by Plunkett and led him to complain to Salisbury in February 1887 that 'Japan
77 FO 46/365, No. 38, C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 1, 1887.
78 FO 46/343, No. 35, Conf., Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, March 1, 1886.
79 FO 46/368, C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 18, 1887.
80 FO 46/366, No. 60, Secret, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, March 8, 1887.
81 E.g., FO 46/369, No. 246, C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 18, 1887.
82 Martin, B., Japan and Germany in the Modern World, (Providence: Berghahn Books), 1995, p. 44.
83 British workers accounted for half o f  all foreign employees in the Meiji government in 1868-90. Jones, J. 
H., Live Machines: H ired Foreigners and Meiji Japan, (Tenterden, Kent: Paul Norbury Publications), 
1980, pp. 7 ,4 5 ,4 8 -4 9 .
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was placing herself too entirely in the hands of Germany by employing Germans almost 
exclusively in all the government offices, and giving them thus an influence over the 
Government in this country which was injurious to the interests of other nations.'84 
Furthermore, between 1886 and 1888 Plunkett also suspected Japan of granting more 
commercial favours to German firms to the detriment o f British companies, through 
pressures brought upon the Japanese Foreign Office and also through the manoeuvres of
or
the German Minister in Japan, von Holleben.
When the Meiji Constitution was promulgated on February 11, 1889, Plunkett had 
already left Japan. Le Poer Trench, who acted as Charge d'Affaires, made only a brief 
comment on the event. While he noted in his dispatch of February 12 the significance of 
the occasion, in that 'it conferred constitutional privileges' which were 'never before 
possessed by the people of this Eastern Empire,' he did not discuss or even outline the 
provisions of the Constitution.86 The only information on the contents of the Constitution 
was to be found in an article in the Japan Mail that Le Poer Trench enclosed, in which a 
few short comments were made by the newspaper's editor. Among the points made by the 
latter were that:
...while all financial matters are subjected to parliamentary scrutiny, 
they are removed from parliamentary control sufficiently to render the 
Government temporarily independent o f a hostile Diet. ... The 
unwritten but practically acknowledged responsibility of the British 
Cabinet to parliament may be developed in Japan, as it was gradually 
developed with us, but there is no recognition of it in the new Japanese
87system.
Le Poer Trench presumably enclosed the article because he considered it to have at least 
some significance. Still, considering the importance of the event and the autocratic 
character of the provisions, which some later historians believed contributed to the 
development of Japan's authoritarianism and subsequently Japan's militarism in later
84 FO 46/365, No. 54, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 22, 1887.
85 Among such case o f  favouritism claimed by Plunkett was the pressure brought upon the Railway
Department to draw its supplies in future from Germany instead o f  from England, the pressure on the 
Tokyo Gas Company to engage an engineer from Germany instead o f  the original plan o f employing one 
from England, and the order sent to the Prefect o f  Fukuoka Ken to prefer the tender o f  a German company 
to construct the proposed railway line in Kyushu. In FO 46/343, No. 35, Conf., Plunkett to Rosebury, 
Tokyo, March 1, 1886; ibid., No. 37, Secret, March 2, 1886; FO 46/365, No. 38, Conf., Plunkett to
Salisbury, Tokyo, February 1, 1887. For the role o f von Holleben see FO 46/365, Conf., Plunkett m
Salisbury, Tokyo, February 13, 1887; ibid., February 18, 1887. Although the alleged favouritism and 
commercial concessions did not actually take place, Plunkett remained adamant that Japan was showing 
commercial favours to Germany.
86 FO 46/389, No. 3, Treaty, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 12, 1889. For details o f provisions o f the 
Meiji Constitution, see McLaren, op. cit., pp. 147-48, 193-98.
87 Article entitled 'Constitution' in Japan Mail o f  February 12, 1889, encl. in FO 46/386, No. 20, Trench to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, February 12, 1889.
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decades,88 it is surprising that he made no judgements on any provisions of the 
Constitution. Hugh Fraser, who arrived as new British Minister in May, did mention in 
August 1889 Ito's “Commentaries on the Constitution”,89 but he confined himself to 
arguing that Ito's document strengthened the anti-foreign feeling in Japan with regard to 
treaty revision and furnished constitutional obstacles to the proposed appointment of 
foreign judges in the Japanese Supreme Court.90 The absence of diplomats' comments 
may partly be due to the stringent security measures undertaken by the government in 
drawing up the Constitution. Between 1886 and 1888, the drafting was carried out under 
conditions of great secrecy by a small group led by Ito in order to avoid potential 
opposition attacks from those inside and outside the government.91 Moreover, upon its 
completion in April 1888, its deliberation and ratification were entrusted to the Privy 
Council, which had been established that very month and was presided over by Ito 
himself, thus ensuring a smooth deliberation of the Constitution's draft.92 The fact that the 
Japanese themselves refrained from criticising the new Constitution also may have 
contributed to the lack of interest of British diplomats in passing judgements on the first 
Constitution of Japan.
The Government and the Approaching Piet
In view of the popularity of the Jiyu minken movement in Japan, British diplomats 
anticipated a hostile encounter between the government and the approaching Diet. Since 
it was likely to include radical politicians from opposition parties, the Diet was unlikely 
to endorse government policy without seriously scrutinizing it beforehand. Consequently, 
the government adopted several measures to counter the opposition forces within the 
Diet. One such measure noted by Plunkett was the creation in July 1884 of a new peerage
88 E.g., Maki, J. M., Government and Politics in Japan; The Road to Democracy>, (London: Thames & 
Hudson), 1962, pp. 18, 20-21. Such authoritarian principles include most notably the absolute sovereignty 
o f  the Emperor and the constitutional restriction on the Imperial Diet in that in the event the Diet refused to 
approve a new budget, the existing budget was automatically continued in force for a new fiscal year. Also 
significant in the light o f the later strength o f Japanese militarism was the article which laid down that the 
Emperor had the supreme command o f  the army and navy and which thus placed this power outside the 
control o f  the cabinet
89 This document was published to explain and enforce the intent and meaning o f  every provision o f  the 
Constitution as understood by its framers, and at the same time to produce reasons to justify their drawing 
up such a Constitution. See the details in Uyehara, op. cit., pp. 119-20,125-36.
90 FO 46/387, No. 97, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 16, 1889.
91 Maki, op. cit., p. 18, Akita, op. cit., pp. 63-65.
92 Beckmann, op. cit., p. 82.
93 Uyehara, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
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which was to provide the basis for a reliably conservative House of Peers in the coming 
Constitution. As noted by Plunkett in July 1884:
One of the chief preoccupations of the Japanese Government for some 
time past has been to create a Conservative element capable of 
balancing the Liberal element in the Constitution which...has been 
promised for the year 1890. ...The Government consider that the best 
means of forming this future Conservative element is to create an 
hereditary nobility.94
Another body for checking the unpredictable Diet was the Privy Council {Sumitsu-iri) 
established in 1888.95 However, although its establishment was reported, no reference 
was made to its having a similar purpose to that of the new peerage, i.e. to balance liberal 
influence in the Diet.
Another measure was the inclusion of prominent opposition leaders and former 
Cabinet members in the government. In February 1888 Okuma was invited into the 
Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs. This development, in Le Poer Trench's view, was 
effected because the government sought to strengthen itself before it faced the unfriendly 
Diet in 1890.96 He made the same observation when Inoue was appointed to become
07Minister of Agriculture and Commerce in July 1888. In March 1889, another opposition 
leader and former Cabinet member, Goto Shojiro, became Minister of Communications. 
As with Okuma and Inoue, his return to office was described by Charge d'Affaires 
William G. Napier, who briefly succeeded Le Poer Trench, as due to the government's 
desire to enhance its power and influence against the coming Diet. Yet Napier more 
skeptically observed that while Goto's acceptance of the post would doubtless strengthen 
the government, 'the appointment o f a Minister of pronounced radical tendencies may not
n O
be without danger to the ultimate existence of the present administration.1 His 
apprehension may have stemmed from the fact that, only a few months prior to his 
appointment, Goto and his Tosa followers had been involved in such a wide and hostile 
campaign against the government that the Peace Preservation Ordinance had to be issued 
to suppress their movement. Napier's statement proved not altogether groundless, as Goto
94 FO 46/313, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, July 9, 1884. It comprised five categories, namely, prince, 
marquis, count, viscount and baron. For details on Japanese leaders and their acquired titles see Beasley, 
M odem  History, p. 128.
95 See Ramseyer, J. M., Rosenbluth, F. M., The Politics o f  Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial 
Japan (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1995, pp. 32, 34.
96 FO 48/379, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 2, 1888; FO 46/380, No. 37, Conf., Trench to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, April 28, 1888.
97 FO 46/380, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 6, 1888.
98 FO 46/386, Napier to Salisbury, Tokyo, April 1, 1889.
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did later pose a problem to the government by objecting to Okuma1 s proposals for treaty 
revision, thus creating dissension in the Cabinet led by Kuroda.99
On January 24, 1889 the Meiji government also effected the removal of the 
prohibition on political utterances by government officials that had been issued in 1875 
and further enforced in 1879 in the wake of the People's Rights movement. To Le Poer 
Trench, this step was taken because the government realized that the old regulation 
deprived itself of the best means of educating the people with government views. By 
allowing public lectures by its officials, not only would the people acquire 'knowledge of 
die motives and principles by which the flamers of the Constitution were influenced,1 but 
they would 'afford support to the measures of the Government under the new regime.'100
Fraser was not optimistic about the future working of Japan's constitutional 
government. One problem, as he saw it, was the internal weakness and loose coalition of 
the existing Cabinet. As he put it in November 1890: 'The Cabinet is a coaliticn 
representing mere expediency, bound together by no common political principles, and 
supported by no party. Some of its members are, in addition, unpopular or out of 
sympathy with their countrymen in general.',101 Even earlier, in October 1889, in 
reflecting on the composition of the Cabinet under Kuroda and that under Sanjo, Fraser 
observed that 'The principle of its composition would seem to be the rather difficult one 
of universal conciliation.'102 This was due, according to Plunkett, to die jealousies and 
unceasing struggles for power between the Satsuma and Choshu factions within the 
government and the difficulty of achieving a united policy, especially since a few Cabinet 
members represented opposition parties. With these problems present, Fraser concluded 
that unless the Cabinet members settled their differences peacefully and reached a 
compromise, when it faced the Diet, the government would encounter major 
difficulties.103
Gubbins, on the other hand, was skeptical of the working of the Japanese Diet. He 
maintained that while the members of the future House of Representatives held 'ignorant 
and reckless views' and thus would be likely to hamper government policies, especially 
with regard to treaty revision,104 the composition of the House of Peers was also
problematic. Gubbins had undoubtedly reflected on the history of Japan, and he
99 Iddittie, J., The Life o f  Marquis Shigenobu Okuma: A Biographical Study in the Rise o f Democratic 
Japan (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press), 1956, pp. 263, 265.
100 FO 46/386, No. 15, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, January 30, 1889.
101 FO 46/399, No. 116, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 21, 1890.
102 FO 46/387, No. 140, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, October 30, 1889.
103 FO 46/399, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 21, 1890.
104 Memorandum by Gubbins, January 1890 in FO 46/398, No. 20, V eiy Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
January 25, 1890.
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maintained that it was difficult to foresee how, in view of the recent abandonment of 
feudalism, the House's members, who came from different backgrounds including not 
only the imperial family, the old Court aristocracy and the new rank of nobility, but also 
(under the categories of appointed members and elected highest taxpayers) shizoku, 
farmers and merchants, could effectively work together. As he put it in November 1890: 
'How in a country removed by so short an interval of years from feudal times the plan of 
associating peasants and nobles in the work of legislation will answer no one can ventuie 
to predict, but certainly to Western eyes the experiment appears to be more bold than 
wise.'105
On July 1, 1890, the first general election of the House of Representatives (Shugi- 
in) took place, with a major success for the opposition: of three hundred seats, the Daido 
Danketsu won sixty, the Jiyuto fifty and the Kaishinto fifty. Reporting on the outcome of 
the election in November 1890, Fraser wrote to Salisbury that the success of the 
opposition in the first general election of Japan had been anticipated.106 Although he did 
not elaborate, it is probable that the resurgence of the popular movement since 1887 after 
the failure of treaty revision contributed to this view. Furthermore, his reports in the 
previous year show that he considered die Meiji leadership to have been weakened by 
internal dissensions, one being the rivalry between Okuma and Ito, who was supported by 
Inoue. Having been informed by Gubbins that there existed opposition within the
1 fl7government against Okuma and his scheme for treaty revision, Fraser observed on 
October 28, 1889 that this opposition had been patronized and fostered by Ito and 
Inoue.108 The subsequent resignation of Okuma, after a nearly successful assassination 
attempt, further weakened the Cabinet.109 Apart from Ito and Okuma's rivalry, Fraser also 
perceived that the Cabinet was divided into Satsuma and Choshu camps, and there was 
'very little cohesion in the whole Administration.'110 With these divisions and rivalries 
within the government, Fraser predicted in November 1889 that 'the permanence of the
105 Memorandum by Gubbins, October 10, 1890, encl. in FO 46/399, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 
17, 1890.
106 FO 46/399, Fraser to Salisbury, November 17, 1890. See memorandum by Gubbins, October 10, 1890.
107 Gubbins's memorandum o f  October 21, 1889, encl. in 'FO 46/387, No. 134, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
October 21, 1889
108 FO 46/387, No. 138, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, October 28, 1889; also see FO 46/387, Private, Fraser 
to Sanderson, Tokyo, November 15, 1889. Ito opposed Okuma's proposal for the appointment o f foreign 
jurists in the Japanese Supreme Couit as against the principle o f  the new Constitution. Uyehara, op. cit., p. 
106.
109 FO 46/387, No. 147, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 22, 1889; FO 46/387, No. 149, Fraser 
to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 29, 1889.
110 FO 46/377, No. 144, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 14, 1889.
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Cabinet [then under Sanjo, who succeeded Kuroda] is uncertain.'111 As had been 
anticipated, it was soon replaced by the Cabinet under Yamagata Aritomo.
Factionalism
One feature of Japanese politics from 1878 to 1890 that frequently attracted the 
attention of British diplomats was factionalism, which was seen as a key factor affecting 
the balance o f power and the struggle for influence within the Japanese government. So 
concerned were British diplomats with Japanese factionalism that some of them, 
particularly Plunkett, Gubbins and Le Poer Trench, tended to interpret important 
government changes in this light and underestimated other factors.
The most prominent cause of factionalism perceived by British diplomats was the 
hostility between the Satsuma and Choshu factions within the government. One occasion 
when this friction particularly preoccupied the diplomats was the period leading to the 
establishment of the modem Cabinet in 1885, which they often described as the "1885 
crisis." Although the diplomats did share later historians' view112 that the Western-style 
Cabinet was intended to improve administrative efficiency and increase centralization of 
power, they attributed its creation largely to i the power struggle between the rival 
factions. In a lengthy memorandum of November 22, 1885, Gubbins maintained that the 
Sat-Cho hostility, which dated back to feudal times, was stimulated in 1885 by Satsuma 
resentment that their government colleagues from Choshu (particularly Ito and Inoue) 
held a greater influence in dictating the policy of the administration. This was despite
1 I Q
Satsuma's larger numbers in the Dajokan and popularity in the country. Moreover, the 
Sat-Cho rivalry, according to Gubbins, also underlay the differences on several major 
issues of government policy in 1885. Giving some instances, he explained that while Ito 
and Inoue had adopted a cautious policy with regard to the Korean question114 in order to 
avoid complications with China, a more vigorous policy was advocated by the Satsuma 
party, most notably Kuroda Kiyotaka. Furthermore, as to the proposals for treaty revision, 
Gubbins maintained that in contrast to Inoue's policy, Vice Minister Yoshida Kiyonari, 
who was a Satsuma man, favoured a bolder and less conciliatory attitude towards
111 FO 46/388, No. 32, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 14, 1889, Telegram.
112 Beckmann, op. cit., p. 75; Uyehara, op. cit., p. 101.
113 Memorandum by Gubbins, Conf., November 22, 1885 in FO 46/335, No. 244, C onf, Plunkett to
Salisbury, Tokyo, November 23, 1885.
1,4 In 1884, a quarrel involving two rival Korean factions led to a clash between Chinese and Japanese 
garrisons in Seoul. After a series o f  negotiations, a convention was signed at Tientsin in 1885 between 
China and Japan, by which the independence o f  Korea was recognized. With the exception o f  small 
garrisons to protect their Legations in Seoul, China and Japan agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea. 
See Gubbins's account in The Making o f  M odem  Japan , p. 216.
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foreigners, and in his opposition to his chief he had some backing from other members of 
the government. To resolve this problem, Gubbins reported, Yoshida was transferred to 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, where his chief, Saigo Tsugumichi, was also 
a Satsuma man, while Aoki Shuzo (Masashi) from Choshu filled the post left vacant by 
Yoshida."5
British diplomats were rather positive about the likely result o f the 1885 tension. 
In their view, the quarrels between the Satsuma and Choshu parties, though serious, 
would not escalate into a show of force between the two clans. Instead, the Japanese 
would settle their differences peacefully in order to avoid foreign interference. As 
Gubbins put it, 'every Cabinet Minister is thoroughly alive to the great danger, from a 
foreign point of view, to which Japan would expose herself were she again to be plunged 
into civil war, however short its duration might be.'116 Moreover, such a crisis was also 
seen as part of Japan's political modernisation. As Plunkett pointed out in November 
1885, the crisis was 'another of the acute moments of crisis which mark her progress from
117Eastern to Western ideas.'
As the diplomats had anticipated, a calm settlement of the dispute was effected in 
December 1885 with the establishment of a new Cabinet from which Kuroda, the 
Satsuma leader, was excluded. Unsurprisingly, the British diplomats saw this as a 
triumph for the Choshu party. As maintained by Plunkett and Gubbins, apart from 
replacing the previous complicated government system with one based on a European 
model, the object of the creation of the Cabinet was to oust Kuroda, who was most 
outspoken against the government, especially on Inoue's foreign policies. In Plunkett's 
words: 'the Cabinet, finding they could not come to any compromise with General 
Kuroda, (the hot-headed Satsuma leader with whom it seems to be as difficult to act, as it 
is dangerous to dispense) had decided on making the great change...and at once set about 
remodelling the Cabinet system itself.'118
Sat-Cho factionalism was again the focus of diplomatic attention in 1887 when 
the Cabinet was split over the question of treaty revision. Though the chief cause of 
dissension was the basic difference in opinion over the Jurisdiction Convention provision 
o f the treaty revision proposal, which led to Inoue's scheme being criticised by some 
members of the Cabinet as not only being humiliating to Japan, but also violating her
m  Memorandum by Gubbins, Conf., November 22, 1885 in FO 46/335, No. 244, Conf., Plunkett to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, November 23, 1885.
116 Ibid.
117 FO 46/335, No. 244, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 23, 1885.
118 Ibid., No. 17, December 28, 1885; Memorandum by Gubbins, December 27, 1885 in Ibid., No. 16, 
December 28, 1885.
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sovereign rights, British diplomats also suspected a Satsuma plot to remove Inoue from 
the government. Amidst the hostile attacks on Inoue, Plunkett reported in June 1887: 'We 
are in doubt whether some members of the Government may not be seeking an excuse for 
getting rid both of Treaty Revision and of Count Inouye at the same time.'119 In July, his 
suspicion seemed to be confirmed when Ito told him that 'Treaty Revision was little more
ionthan the stick that had been made use of to attack Count Inouye.' Plunkett's anticipation 
o f Inoue's fate soon proved to be true. Following the suspension of the negotiations by 
the Cabinet, Inoue was forced to tender his resignation in September 1887. Just as 
Kuroda's exclusion from the Cabinet in 1885 was seen to mark the victory of the Choshu 
party over the Satsuma, so the retirement of Inoue was taken by the British diplomats to 
signify 'a blow to the Choshiu Party' and the increasing influence of Satsuma.121
The subsequent resignation of Inoue from the post o f President of the Law 
Investigation Commission in October 1887 was further seen by British diplomats as sn 
indication of the declining power of the Choshu.122 Subsequently, British diplomats 
similarly tended to perceive the balance of power in the Japanese Cabinet in the light of 
the Sat-Cho rivalry. For instance, while many, later historians explain Ito's retirement 
from the office of Prime Minister and his acceptance of the Presidency of the Privy 
Council in April 1888 as being mainly because he wished to concentrate on his work to 
preside over the deliberations of the draft Constitution,123 Le Poer Trench maintained that 
the change which saw the appointment o f Kuroda as Prime Minister in Ito's place was a 
further indication of the strengthening power of Satsuma over Choshu.124
While mainly focusing on Sat-Cho rivalry, British diplomats also noted a struggle 
between a Court party and samurai politicians. One event which reflected this, according 
to Gubbins, was the promotion of Ito in March 1884 to the post of Minister of the 
Imperial Household Department. Gubbins maintained that while one reason for Ito's 
appointment was to facilitate Ito's communication with the Emperor in relation to the task 
entrusted to him for the drafting of Japan’s Constitution, his assumption of a post 
normally reserved for important Court nobles indicated the Cabinet's wish to undermine 
the jealous entourage of Court officials whose position surrounding the Emperor it had
119 FO 46/335, No. 171, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, June 20, 1887.
120 Ibid., No. 207, Conf., July 30, 1887.
121 FO 46/369, No. 232, Conf., Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, September 27, 1887.
122 Ibid., No. 21, Conf., October 28, 1887.
12j Uyehara, op. cit., p. 105.
124 FO 46/380, No. 40, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, May 9, 1888.
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long resented.125 Furthermore, the establishment of the modern Japanese Cabinet in 
December 1885 was also related to the same old rivalry. As put by Gubbins in December 
1885, its creation 'may be taken to signify the defeat of that party [Court nobles] and the 
final triumph of the new school of politicians in the long struggle for power which has 
been waged ever since the Restoration in 1868.' To Plunkett and Gubbins, the three 
highest posts held by Court nobles, namely the Dajo Daijin, Sadaijin and Udaijin, were 
seen by the Cabinet ministers as a barrier to establishing a direct relationship with the 
Mikado - a view which more or less is also held by some later historians.127 The abolition 
of these offices with the creation of the Western-style Cabinet, signified to the diplomats 
the government's success in severing once and for all the influence of the Court party on 
the Emperor.128
The Military
Another aspect that received British diplomats' comments was the problem caused 
to the government by the Japanese military. Though none of the British diplomats went 
so far as to warn of the danger of Japanese militarism, they did note the potential 
difficulty caused by the Japanese military to the government in foreign and domestic 
policy. Parkes, for instance, in reporting on the mutiny in the Imperial Guard on August 
23, 1878, observed that while the mutiny occurred because of arrears in pay and the 
spread of democratic thought, it was also due to the lack of discipline and general 
insubordination of the military to their superiors. To Parkes such a mutiny could not be 
regarded without concern, as 'the army constitutes the sole material support of the 
Government of Japan, which is...essentially absolute and autocrate [sic].' Interestingly, 
Parkes further maintained that foreigners in Japan had felt for some time past that trouble 
might be expected from this force 'whenever the men became sensible o f their power.' He 
expressed his hope that such an incident would never happen again, 'but', he wrote, 'I 
must admit that I should not be surprised if I have to report a different result at some 
future date.'129 Similarly, when there arose a difficulty a few months later between Korea 
and Japan following a Korean attempt to impose duties on imports of Japanese goods and
125 Memorandum by Gubbins, April 4, 1884, in FO 46/311, No. 52, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, 
April 9, 1884.
126 Memorandum by Gubbins, December 27, 1885 in FO 46/335, No. 16, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
December 28, 1885.
127 Tsuzuki, op. cit., p. 105; Pittau, op. cit., p. 162.
128 FO 46/335, No. 16, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 28, 1885. See also the enclosed 
memorandum by Gubbins.
129 FO 46/230, No. 83, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, August 31, 1878.
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exports to Japan, Parkes again expressed his caution about the possible reaction from tl e 
Japanese army. He maintained that although he believed that the Japanese government 
opposed the policy of the pro-war party in Japan, in case of unwanted incidents 
happening, the Japanese government might have difficulty in controlling an agitation for 
war by 'their excitable troops.'130 It is likely that Parkes's repeated mention of possible 
problems with the Japanese army was founded on his belief that the government had been 
forced into the Formosan expedition in 1874, since, as he wrote at the time, 'they have to
* * 1 *31try and please their own ill-disciplined soldiery.'
In the 1880s, problems emanating from the Japanese military were also noted by 
Plunkett and Gubbins, Reporting in 1885, they maintained that one source of 'constant 
difficulty' for the government was the insubordination and lack o f discipline shown by 
younger officers in the navy and army, who were educated in Western ideas and 
principles, whereas most of their superiors had not had the same educational 
advantages.132 Moreover, a problem also resulted from the fact that the Japanese military 
was markedly divided along han lines: while the high officers o f the army were mainly 
from Choshu, those of the navy came mainly from Satsuma. Consequently, according to 
Plunkett in 1885, this caused dissension within the government as its members (who 
themselves were mainly from Satsuma and Choshu) differed with regard to the expansion 
of the army and navy.133 In making such an observation, Plunkett's view was undoubtedly 
confirmed by Ito, who later stated that one cause of differences in the Cabinet in 1887 
was Kuroda's view that the budget for the navy should be expanded while that for the 
army should be reduced. This was rejected by Ito as he maintained that any suggestion 
which favoured the expansion of one service at the expense o f the other might lead to 
serious conflicts between the Satsuma and Choshu clans.134
Conclusion
During the period 1878-90, Japan's political system underwent many 
developments. On these various changes, British diplomats' views varied. While they 
generally expressed an unsympathetic attitude towards the Japanese desire for democratic 
representative government and had reservations about the future working of Japan's
130 FO 46/231, No. 125, Conf., Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, December 1878.
131 Parkes to Wade, Yedo, May 13, 1874, in FO 46/179, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 26, 1874.
132 FO 46/335, No, 244. Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 23, 1885. Also see memorandum 
by Gubbins, C onf, November 22, 1885.
133 FO 46/335, No. 244, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 23, 1885.
134 FO 46/368, No. 201, C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 30, 1887.
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constitutional government and the operation of the Diet, they favoured the structural 
reforms that introduced Westem-style institutions, notably the new Cabinet system and 
Privy Council. The Meiji Constitution, however, though it was also modelled on a 
Western basis, was not much favoured, mainly because of the marked influence of 
Germany.
The British diplomats' unfavourable attitude towards the Japanese aspiration for a 
representative government, and even more for democracy in general, can be attributed to 
several factors. The first was the supposed lack of knowledge by the Japanese people of 
modem politics. In the British diplomats' view, even the members of political parties 
were inappropriately educated with regard to the principles o f representation and issues 
of people's rights. Similarly, some members of the Japanese Diet, according to Gubbins, 
were ignorant or held crude views. Furthermore, Japan's earlier failed experiment with 
representative institutions in the form of the Kogisho was seen as an unfavourable omen. 
With membership limited to the samurai class, the assembly had had to be abandoned, it 
was argued by Kennedy, because of the overwhelming conservative tendency of its 
members. Yet, to include common people in the Kogisho would have been equally 
disastrous in his view, as non-samurai were generally uneducated and had no experience 
of administrative affairs. Therefore, until the general population was exposed to political 
knowledge, any attempt to establish a democratic representative institution was 
meaningless. The fact that some Japanese leaders admitted that the introduction into 
Japan of representative government was premature, at least until the early 1880s, lent 
support to the British diplomats' views. Moreover, British diplomatic views seem also to 
have been affected by the unwelcome prospect of a more difficult treaty revision process 
between Japan and Britain in the event of a representative government being established 
while the negotiations were in progress. The fact that the representatives of political 
parties were generally critical of the government's proposals for revision did not fail to 
suggest to the diplomats that the establishment of a hostile Japanese Diet would lead to 
an even more unsatisfactory treaty revision settlement than they anticipated already. 
Another possible reason, though difficult to, prove, was that perhaps, the British 
diplomats did not favour democracy in principle, even in their own country (where, in 
fact, there was not yet universal suffrage).
Even when arrangements had been made for the commencement of the Japanese 
parliamentary system, the promulgation of the Constitution and the general election for 
the Diet, British diplomats remained skeptical about the future success of the system in 
Japan. For instance, Fraser foresaw that it would be difficult for the government to
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maintain its position under the new constitutional set-up. With regard to the Diet, the 
Lower House's members were seen as not having sound views, and it was predicted that 
the Upper House would not be able to operate effectively due to its mixed membership of 
nobles and peasants. The fact that these skeptical observations were made on the eve of 
the opening of the Diet only emphasized the British diplomats' view of Japan as being 
unprepared for a representative or parliamentary system.
In view of this skepticism, one may argue that British diplomats were also 
influenced by ‘Orientalist5 preconceptions. Yet, if  so, theirs was mostly a mild form of 
‘Orientalism5. While British diplomats perceived the parliamentary system that had taken 
centuries to evolve in the West to be inappropriate for an Oriental nation such as Japan, 
which had only two decades earlier emerged from feudalism, they did not entirely 
dismiss Japan's capability to implement such a system. Even Parkes's particular views of 
Japan, that she was better fitted to emulate medieval England than to imitate the political 
system of nineteenth-century England, and that her future political development would 
resemble that of South American nations rather than that of the more politically advanced 
countries in Europe and America, do not distinctly imply that Japan was fated to remain 
politically backward and unchanged. Rather, the views denote that, given sufficient time, 
Japan might also be able to adopt a modem representative system with success.
It is significant, too, that in commenting on the various changes, British diplomats 
also show a tendency to favour the Westernization of Japan's political system, especial1y 
those involving Westem-style structural reforms. This is particularly evident with regard 
to the new Japanese Cabinet. Although the diplomats did note that the Cabinet had been 
established for the purpose of administrative centralization and efficiency, more 
appreciation was shown for the Cabinet's adoption of a ‘Western5 model and more 
attention was paid to the ‘Western5 political background of the Cabinet members whose 
policies were described as ‘progressive5. Yet, the diplomats' favourable views of the 
Western-based changes were not unequivocal, as they preferred Japan to imitate the 
English political system rather than those of other European states. This is particularly 
true with regard to tire Meiji Constitution where German influence was viewed with 
disapproval, especially by Plunkett. Equally noteworthy in respect to the general 
inclination towards Germany was Ito Hirobumi's allegation of the counter-productive 
effect of Parkes's critical attitude towards Japan. Although Plunkett did not elaborate on 
Ito's remark about Parkes, it may have influenced subsequent British diplomacy in Japan, 
in that more friendly and understanding attitudes were adopted by British diplomats, 
notably in negotiations for treaty revision in the late 1880s.
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Finally, another special interest among British diplomats with regard to Japanese 
politics was factionalism within the Meiji government, most notably the rivalry between 
the Satsuma and Choshu factions. This is hardly surprising. By the very nature of their 
work diplomats tended to monitor and report the changes and balance of power within the 
Japanese government. Nevertheless, while the numerous diplomatic reports 011 Japanese 
factionalism reflect the diplomats' interest in the subject, they also indicate an improved 
relationship between British diplomats and Japanese leaders. Instead of being cautious 
and secretive as in the past, Japanese leaders had become more open and informal in 
discussing the domestic politics of Japan. Admittedly, the diplomats showed themselves 
poorly informed or lacking in awareness with regal'd to a few issues such as the important 
provisions of the Meiji Constitution, the promulgation of the "Three Laws" of 1878 and 
the development of political parties in Japan. Nevertheless, as a result o f their privileged 
access to such key figures as Ito and Inoue, the reports of British diplomats contain 
information and insights which historians need to take seriously.
CHAPTER 4
BRITISH DIPLOMATS' VIEWS OF EARLY MEIJI
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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
1868 may have been less of a turning point in Japan's economic history than in i;s 
political history, but the years which followed it witnessed a sustained Japanese attempt 
to regain national economic independence, which the unequal treaties of 1858 had 
limited, and to develop the country's economic strength, notably by a policy of 
industrialisation. Japan's efforts proved fruitful. By 1890 it had, in the view of most 
historians, made the break-through to modem economic growth, thus paving the way for 
its rise as a military power and for its post-World War II emergence as an economic 
superpower. The reasons for Japan's exceptional economic success have been discussed 
exhaustively by historians. British diplomats, however, showed little interest in this 
question. Some of their reports stressed the patriotic motivation of some of Japan's 
economic policies, but no general assessment of Japan's economic performance was 
deemed appropriate in this period. In contrast, British diplomats wrote frequently about 
particular aspects of Japanese trade and industry, and their reports offer extensive 
evidence o f their views of Japanese commercial practice.
Conducting Foreign Trade in Japan
Throughout the whole period from 1868 to 1890, but particularly in the earlier 
part, British diplomats and consular officials expressed concern about Japanese 
commercial attitudes or practices, which were regarded as detrimental to foreign trade 
and the interests of foreign merchants. Given the fact that British subjects formed the 
largest foreign merchant or merchantile community in Japan, British diplomats were 
likely to protest against any unfavourable attitudes on the part of the Japanese. One basic 
complaint by British diplomats was Japanese ignorance of commerce and trade as 
practised by foreigners. This attitude underlay Parkes's comment o f April 1868 that 
though one might see from the new Meiji government a competent and responsible 
administration, ‘the Japanese may not at first give satisfaction in the matter of foreign 
trade.’1 Similar comments were also forthcoming from Consuls Russell Robertson and 
James Troup in 1870 who observed that Japanese local authorities at Hakodate and
1 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, April 18, 1868.
117
Niigata showed utter indifference to matters of foreign trade and appeared to have no idea
* *) « ■ «of the advantages that would result from it. Parkes's immediate reaction was to stress the
necessity of foreign instruction: ‘the new holders of office will show themselves ignorant 
and perhaps arrogant, & ...we shall have to educate them, as has been the case with the 
officers of the late Tycoon.’
One feature of which British diplomats were especially critical was the Japanese 
monopoly system known as 'kabu\ a term referring to shares in a business or corporation. 
Forming themselves into such a corporation or guild called a 'shosha', leading Japanese 
merchants created an effective monopoly of certain trades, most notably tea, silk and rice. 
Despite its nominal abolition by the government in 1868, the system continued to operate 
in different Japanese treaty ports.4 As with the general question of foreign trade, the 
diplomats attributed the preservation of the kabu system to Japanese lack of familiarity 
with Western economic practices. In 1870, when Japanese officers at Niigata were 
reported to have denied that the establishment of a shosha at that port in any way 
concerned foreign trade, Parkes critically concluded that ‘Freedom in trade, it may be 
observed, is an idea with which the Japanese mind is not conversant.’5 The unfamiliarity, 
in the view of William G, Aston, secretary of the Legation, was a result of Japanese being 
accustomed to only one commercial system. He maintained that the Japanese kabu 
system was originally a Chinese institution and Tong custom had so familiarized it to the 
mind of the Japanese merchant that he was unable to conceive of any other.’6
While unfamiliarity with Western practices was a cause for criticism, the fact that the 
shosha received support fi*om government officials might have intensified British 
diplomats' condemnation of the kabu system. Not only was a shosha allowed to issue its 
own notes but it was also able to obtain money loans from the government. With such 
support, a shosha could easily acquire an advantage over foreign traders in that it was 
able to make large advances to the Japanese dealers in tea and silk, thus outbidding 
foreign buyers. Unsurprisingly, Japanese officials who were involved with the shosha
2 Their views are enclosed in FO 46/126, Parkes to Japanese Foreign Ministers, Yedo, August 10, 1870. By 
addressing this letter to 'Japanese Foreign Ministers', presumably Parkes intended to draw the attention o f  
all the leading Japanese Foreign Office officials, not just its nominal head, to the problems referred to in the 
reports that he had received from the British consuls at the treaty ports.
3 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, May 13, 1868.
4 Sugiyama, Shinya, Japan's industrialization in the World Economy 1859-1899: Export Trade and 
Overseas Competition  (London: The Athlone Press), 1988, p. 73.
5 FO 46/126, Parkes to Sec. o f State for Foreign Affairs, Yedo, August 20, 1870.
6 Aston's memorandum on the commercial system o f Osaka, encl. in Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 29,
1871, Commercial Reports, Parliamentary Papers (PP), 1871,Vol, LXVII.
7 FO 46/166, No. 19, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, May 23, 1873; Review o f  the Import Trade o f Japan, and 
o f the Tea and Silk Season o f  1872-73, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, July 7, 1873, Consular Reports (CR),
1872.
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were criticised by Parkes for being mainly driven by a desire to make quick profits and
o
easy money. Parkes even went as far as to indicate that Japanese officials in general 
were untrustworthy, and that British consuls should keep a watchful eye over tie  
proceedings of local Japanese authorities in the matters of foreign trade.9 Similar views 
were expressed by Troup who cautioned that while the government notifications of 1871 
for the abolition of the shosha system at Niigata and Osaka indicated a hopeful sign of 
more liberal ideas on trade, ‘What will be the precise result of these changes, it would be 
premature as yet to attempt to state.’10 Judging from subsequent events, their reservations 
were not totally groundless, fn 1878 Legation Secretary Augustus H, Mounsey noted that 
there still existed rice guilds despite the prohibitive law,11 and in 1881, the formation of a 
silk guild at Yokohama caused a standstill in the silk trade at the port when foreign silk 
merchants protested against its monopolistic activity.12
Not all British diplomats, however, condemned the Japanese kabu system or 
emphasized the adverse effect of the system on the interests of foreign merchants at the 
treaty ports. British Minister Hugh Fraser, who succeeded Francis Plunkett in 1889, was 
neutral in his view of Japanese guilds. On being asked by Foreign Secretary Lord 
Salisbury in October 1889 his opinion on the issue of possible subjection o f British trade 
to the action of Japanese guilds, Fraser observed that the guilds were unlikely to be made 
illegal by the new Japanese law codes but that they were not in nature and principle open 
to grave objection. He added that British trade would hardly be much affected as the 
British merchants were perfectly aware of their existence and ‘their modes of action 
which are not necessarily unjust’ and it was unlikely that a dispute between the British 
merchants and the Japanese associations would occur because ‘It is not often that well- 
founded complaints are made against them [the guilds].’ If any serious difficulty should 
arise, Fraser maintained, a combined protest by the British merchants would be probably 
sufficient to set the matter right.13
Yet the practice of guilds was not the only cause o f difficulty between foreign and 
Japanese merchants. To many diplomats, the Japanese in general lacked the commercial 
morality of the West. As early as 1868, Parkes described the Japanese as ‘neither honest
8 FO 46/167, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, July 7, 1873.
9 FO 46/126, Parkes to Sec. o f  State for Foreign Affairs, Yokohama, August 22, 1870.
10 Troup to Parkes, Niigata, February 23, 1871, Commercial Reports in PP, 1871, Vol. LXVII. At Osaka, 
the notification was issued in January 1871, while at Niigata in February 1871.
n Report on ‘The Rice and Rice Trade o f  Japan’ by Mounsey, Yedo, April 12, 1878, CR> 1876.
12 FO 46/273, No. 143, Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, November 26, 1881,
13 FO 46/387, N o. 137, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, October 24, 1889.
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nor conciliatory’ in conducting business with foreigners.14 This image was inevitably 
reinforced by Japanese inclination to forge foreign labels and trademarks, especially in 
the 1880s. As Japanese manufacturers increased in number, complaints of forgeries of 
foreign registered trademarks and labels of various consumer goods by the Japanese 
became frequent. The image of Japanese merchants as 'unlawful imitators' thus became 
commonplace among the diplomats, who criticised the fraudulent imitations not only 
because they deprived foreign manufacturers and their agents in Japan of their profits but 
also because they injured the reputation of foreign goods since the imitated native-made 
goods with forged labels were of low quality.15 Nevertheless, the problem was not easy to 
suppress owing partly to the absence of a patent and trademark convention between 
Britain and Japan,16 and partly to the lack of awareness among the Japanese of the value 
of the trademark system. When trademark regulations (applicable only to Japanese) were 
issued in 1884 by the Japanese Commercial Department, Consul Robertson reported that 
the number of applications for registration of trademarks by the Japanese was 
unsatisfactory. This was because, as he explained, ‘the benefits to accrue from 
registration are not as yet thoroughly understood or appreciated throughout the
1 7country.’
Another cause of complaint among foreign merchants was the absence in Japan of 
a clearance date for taking delivery of goods ordered from abroad. British diplomats 
maintained that when the market was satisfactory and profits were available, Japanese 
dealers took delivery of their purchases from foreign importers with all punctuality, but 
when early clearances were associated with certain loss, foreign merchants were left with 
their imported goods on hand for a long time, sometimes extending over years, until 
storage and other charges consumed all possible profit.18 On this attitude Consul James J. 
Enslie was most critical:
The code of commercial honour among a certain section of Japanese 
merchants...is no better than it was when the Treaty ports were first 
opened to foreign trade. ...[the Japanese] conduct business on their own 
peculiar and irregular lines, unfortunately in too many instances devoid 
of those principles of honour which in the West are considered, 
acknowledged, and accepted as the true and genuine indications of
14 FO 46/97, No. 250, Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, October 13, 1868.
15 E.g., FO 46/208, No. 159, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, September 30, 1876; FO 46/366, No. 66, Plunkett to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, March 16, 1887.
16 FO 46/208, Parkes to Derby, No. 156, Yedo, September 30, 1876; FO 46/314, No. 157, Plunkett to 
Granville, Tokyo, September 13, 1884.
17 Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, June 13,1885, Commercial Reports, PP, 1884-85, Vol. LXXXI.
18 Aston to Kennedy, Hyogo, May 17, 1881, CR, 1880; Longford to Fraser, Hyogo, June 10, 1890, CR, 
1889.
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civilisation.19
In complaining of the supposedly deficient character of Japanese merchants, it is 
not improbable that the generally unfavourable view of the diplomats was also 
attributable to their frustrations with Meiji government policy with regard to foreign 
trade. For instance, it was no secret that the government's insistence on adhering to the 
treaties by restricting foreigners to treaty ports was seen by some British diplomats as a 
significant obstacle to the development of British import trade. In 1886, Acting-Consul 
Joseph Longford at Hyogo argued that the restriction not only made it quite impossible 
for foreign merchants to cultivate direct friendly relations with principal Japanese 
merchants in the interior, but also prevented the foreign traders from studying or 
inquiring into the wants and tastes of the Japanese people at large. Consequently, tbe 
foreign merchants had been obliged to conduct all business transactions with a class of 
brokers on whom a monopoly o f foreign business had been conferred.20 In addition, there 
was also a problem related to the Japanese commercial code (before it was fully reformed 
in 1890), which was generally described by British diplomats as ‘undeveloped’ and 
‘unsatisfactory’ and disadvantageous to British merchants. In 1876, when reporting on a 
breach of a contract between Japanese and British merchants, Parkes observed that the 
existing system illustrated the ‘unreasonable character of the Japanese law of guaranty’ 
which was ‘opposed to all the principles of sense and honesty.’21 In 1879, Charge 
d'Affaires J. G. Kennedy reported on great delays in Japanese courts in suits between 
foreigners and Japanese, and on ‘the unsatisfactory state o f the Bankcruptcy Law of 
Japan’22 and his view was shared by Consuls Marcus Flowers and James Troup and
9 TActing-Consul Martin Dohmen.
Problems of Japanese Trade and Industry
As a newcomer to the international scene, Japan was seen as lagging far behind in 
the field of trade and industry. This was illustrated, in Acting-Consul Joseph Longford's 
view, in the low per capita income of Japan compared to that o f countries like Brazil, 
Spain, Italy, not to mention commercial nations of high rank such as Britain, France and
19 Enslie to Fraser, Hyogo and Osaka, April 15, 1891, CR, 1890.
20 Memorandum by Longford on 'The Import Trade o f Great Britain with Japan', encl. in Plunkett to 
Rosebury, Nikko, July 26, 1886, Commercial Reports, PP, 1887, Vol. LXXXII.
21 FO 46/208, No 157, Parkes to Derby, September 30, 1876.
22 FO 46/248, No. 185, Conf., Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, October 22, 1879.
2j See consular reports by Flowers, Troup and Dohmen enclosed in Ibid.
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the United States.24 Also reflecting on Japan's per capita income, Plunkett in 1885 
inferred that the value of 1 pound sterling for each six persons in Japan ‘speaks but 
poorly either for the productive powers of the country or the industrial capacity of the 
people.’ In general, as the following passages will show, British diplomats were 
unanimous in the view that Japan's economy was undeveloped and that she had to 
increase her productive power and expand her commerce and national enterprise. In this, 
it is worthy of note that their view corresponded with the Meiji government's policy of 
'shokusan kogyo' (develop industry and promote enterprise).26
Yet any move to develop Japan's trade and industry, in British diplomats' view, 
was hindered by various obstacles. As observed by Parkes as late as 1883, only by the 
removal of those obstacles which ‘impede the development o f their national wealth and 
resources’ could ‘the well-being of the people...be materially advanced.’27 One such 
obstacle was the government's interference in commercial transactions. In fact, it was not 
uncommon for Parkes to insist that the Meiji leaders let the commerce of the country take 
its own natural course. On one occasion during the celebration of the Japanese New Year 
at Tokyo in 1871, Parkes addressed some Japanese ministers on the importance of 
allowing greater freedom to the enteiprise of the people and on the need of the 
government ‘to abstain from the cramping interference they are so prone to exercise.’28 
The same gist was also conveyed in his conversation with Iwakura on October 4, 1873 29 
In advising the Meiji government, Parkes was driven by the desire not only to help the 
economic development of Japan but also undoubtedly to obtain commercial benefits for
• T O  *Britain. The exercise of free trade in Japan would benefit not only the Japanese but also 
British merchants. Other diplomats too, were certainly concerned with British economic 
interests. Yet, unlike Parkes, they rarely gave direct advices to Meiji leaders.
No interference was more obvious to British diplomats, than the government's 
prohibition of the export of surplus rice by individual merchants as the government
24 General Report on the Trade o f  Japan for the Year 1884, Longford to Plunkett, Tokyo, June 30, 1885, in 
Plunkett to Salisbury, July 14, 1885, CR, 1884.
25 Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, July 16, 1886, Summary o f  the Trade o f  Japan for the Year 1885, CR,
1885.
26 For policies o f  ‘shokusan kogyo' in the 1870s to 1890s see e.g., Nakamura, T., Economic Growth in 
Prewar Japan  (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press), 1983, pp. 59-60.
27 Parkes's farewell speech to foreign residents o f  Yokohama, August 27, 1883, quoted from Dickins and 
Lane-Poole, op. cit., Vol. 11, p. 347. See obstacles to Japan’s industrial development as pointed out by 
Smith, T. C,, Political Change and Industrial Development in Japan: Government Enterprise, 1868-1880 
(California: Stanford Univ. Press), 1955, pp. 24-40.
28 FO 46/138, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, March 11, 1871. Parkes however, made no mention o f the names 
o f Japanese ministers whom he addressed.
29 FO 46/168, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, October 6, 1873.
30 Nish, I., Biographical Portraits: Britain & Japan (Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library), 1994, p. 13; 
Checkland, op. cit., p. 9.
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reduced the rice trade almost to a monopoly under its own control.31 Consequently, as 
perceived by Parkes and Mounsey, not only was the profit less than it would have been if 
open trade had been allowed, but the productive power of the country and the expansion 
of Japan's trade were restricted as Japanese farmers, having been forbidden to export the 
surplus of their harvests, had no inducement to grow more rice than could be consumed at 
home. No less significant were the government's restrictions in the mining industry 
whereby all mines and the rights to work them belonged by law to the government, and 
no foreigners were allowed to hold shares or invest capital in the mines. These 
restrictions, according to British diplomats, affected the output of the mines and quality 
of the processed minerals.33
Another factor which was seen as hampering Japan's trade and industry was 
Japan's monetary problems, notably the serious fluctuations in the value of the Japanese 
currency and the incessant drain on the country's gold and silver reserve. Following the 
establishment of the new government in 1868, a large number of paper notes were issued 
to pay for the increasing administrative expenses of the government, while the Japanese 
specie reserve was decreasing as a result of the need to finance the imbalance in trade and 
other government expenditures. Most diplomats observed that from 1868 to the mid- 
1880s, Japan's monetary problem not only increased prices of necessary commodities, but 
also rendered all business transactions uncertain and impeded the operation of Japanese 
industries which required time for development. Furthermore, the diminishing specie 
reserve of Japan, in the diplomats' view, limited the purchasing power of the country and, 
therefore, foreign trade.34 Despite the government's policy to redeem the inconvertible 
paper currency beginning from 1881, the diplomats also noted that the value of the 
currency, though improved, continued to fluctuate as no confidence was placed in it by 
foreign and Japanese merchants. In fact, it was not until 1886 that the depreciated paper 
money regained its silver value and became stable.
Equally detrimental to the development of Japan's trade and industry in the eyes 
of British diplomats was the lack o f foreign capital. In the whole 1868-90 period, only 
two foreign loans were contracted by the government, the first in 1870 and the second in
31 FO 46/114, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, October 28, 1869; Troup to Parkes, Niigata, January 25, 1871, 
CR, 1870-71; Gower to Parkes, Hyogo, April 4, 1873, CR , 1872.
j2 FO 46/166, No. 19, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, May 23, 1873; Report on T he Rice and Rice Trade o f  
Japan' by Mounsey, Yedo, April 12, 1878, CR, 1876,
See e.g., report on 'The Mines o f  Japan', Plunkett to Parkes, Yedo, April 22, 1875, CR, 1874.
34 See e.g., Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, July 31, 1882, Commercial Reports, PP, 1882, Vol. LXXII; FO 
46/272, No. 48, Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, May 14, 1881.
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1873.35 Parkes perceived that as Japan's revenue depended mainly on its land production, 
investment from outside the country was necessary to promote Japan's economy and 
enterprise.36 The results of the exclusion of foreign capital, in British diplomats' views, 
were firstly, the expensive internal transportation system and secondly, the limited 
number o f domestic steamship companies. In addition, the relatively slow increase in 
Japan's exports after 1868 was also seen as an effect. Once the country was opened to 
foreign capital, Plunkett claimed in 1886, ‘there can be little doubt that a large impetus 
will be straightway given to the whole export trade.5 He maintained that if  foreign capital 
were used, staple products could be processed and packed for export at the place of 
production at one-half the cost at which they were done at the open ports, and that 
immense unused tracts of land might be brought into the cultivation of staples for 
export.37 Moreover, to many diplomats, the absence of foreign capital had also resulted in
i n
the slow development of mines in Japan. On the motive for the prohibition of foreign 
capital, Charge d'Affaires R. G. Watson observed that not only did the Japanese 
government not wish to extend the extra-territorial jurisdiction which prevailed over 
foreigners within the Treaty limits, but they were also driven by a ‘jealous policy’ 
towards foreigners. The government, he maintained, feared that if  foreigners were 
admitted into the interior of Japan and allowed to take part in industrial operations, the 
gains of Japanese merchants would be curtailed.39
Poor communications also, it was held, affected the commercial development of 
Japan. British diplomats perceived that with very few navigable rivers, and with pack- 
horses and coolies as the main means of transport, it was difficult for Japanese merchants 
to convey heavy produce horn the interior and to sell them at a cheaper price to 
foreigners at the treaty ports due to the high cost of transportation. In their view, what 
Japan needed was the construction of ordinary roads suited to vehicles for the 
conveyance o f goods through its producing districts instead o f a policy of concentrating 
mainly on harbour improvements at the open ports.40 Moreover, Parkes noted that 
although Japan possessed marine transport along its coasts, the service was very
35 See Tiedemann, A.E., ’Japan's Economic Foreign Policies, 1868-1893', in Morley, J.W., (ed.), Japan's 
Foreign Policy 1868-194/(N ew  York: Columbia Univ. Press), 1974, p. 119.
36 FO 46/257, No. 157, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, September 11, 1879.
37 Summary o f  the Foreign Trade o f Japan for the Year 1885, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, July 16, 1886, 
CR, 1885.
38 See e.g. FO 46/257, No. 157, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, September 1879; Hall to Parkes, Nagasaki, May 
12, 1883, CR , 1882; Quin to Fraser, Nagasaki, May 23, 1889, CR, 1888; Longford to Fraser, Hakodate, 
April 30, 1891, CR, 1890.
39 Watson to Parkes, November 30, 1873, CR, 1873.
40 FO 46/181, No. 164, Parkes to Derby, Hakodate, August 30, 1873; Flowers to Parkes encl. in FO 46/191, 
No 55, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 13, 1875.
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expensive as it was limited in amount and mainly confined to two privileged companies, 
namely the Mitsubishi Company and Kyodo Unyu Company.41 Even in 1886, the 
problem of excessive dearness of transport, in Longford’s view, continued to exist. This 
was despite the construction of over 431 miles of railway tracks directly linking the 
Japanese richest silk, tea and rice-producing provinces with one or other seaport. That rail 
height charges were excessive was proved, according to Longford, by the average annual 
freight volume of less than 40,000 tons carried on the leading Tokyo-Yokohama line 
during the period of six years, 1880-85, and by the average receipts from the goods traffic 
during the same period, which were about 50,000 yen. By contrast, the average receipts 
of a Japanese shipping company were about 200,000 yen per annum.42
The operations of the shosha were also regarded as obstructing the growth of 
Japan's trade. British diplomats observed that as the shosha had the authority to 
determine the value of domestic produce and Japanese merchants had to report all their 
transactions with foreigners to the association, the merchants' ability to purchase foreign 
goods was thus checked by the guild 43 Parkes wrote in 1882: ‘While this state of things 
continues, and the Japanese retain their present economical opinions which deprive trade 
of the freedom that is essential to its vitality and run it into a narrow groove of 
monopolists and guilds, the commerce of the country must be expected to remain in a 
comparatively stationary condition.’44
On the future of Japan's mining industry, diplomats' views slightly varied. The 
most skeptical was Parkes’s. While some diplomats regarded Japan as having the 
potential to develop the production of its minerals, particularly coal, for export,45 Parkes 
maintained that the assumption that Japan possessed great mineral wealth was an 
exaggerated conjecture.46 Parkes's pessimistic view may have owed something to a report 
by Plunkett, who concluded that Japan was not yet likely to take a high rank among the 
mineral-producing countries of the world. In the report Plunkett also wrote:
The Japanese burrow for ore whenever they suspect its existence 
without system or forethought. A hole is dug in the side of a hill, and, if  
ore is found, the work goes on; if  not, it is soon abandoned, and a fresh 
hole is dug in some other spot which may seem to give promise o f
41 Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, July 31, 1882, Commercial Reports, PP, 1882, Vol. LXXII.
42 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f  Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, in Plunkett to Salisbury, 
Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1886.
43 FO 46/126, Parkes to Sec. o f  State, August 22, 1870; Troup to Parkes, Niigata, January 25, 1871, CR, 
1870-71.
44 Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, July, 31, 1882, Commercial Reports, PP, 1882, Vol. LXXII.
45 E.g., Flowers to Parkes, Nagasaki, March 26, 1875, CR, 1874.
46 FO 46/191, No. 62, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 25, 1875.
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better things. If unsuccessful, this also is abandoned, but the two 
openings thus made, although perhaps not half a Ton of ore has been 
extracted from either of them, are called mines, and help to swell the 
grand Lists of Mines which are so constantly palmed off upon 
Travellers in the Interior, and help to encourage the idea that Japan is a 
real El Dorado.’47
Yet the diplomats were of the same view that the problems of Japan's mining 
industry arose chiefly from the government's legislation forbidding the employment of 
foreign capital. Consequently, as they saw it, with the exception of a few mines worked 
with foreign methods, there were no facilities for increasing the output and for
• 48 • *transporting or shipping it. In addition, lack of foreign expertise was also regarded as a 
reason why complaints being sometimes made about the quality of the refining of various 
minerals such as coal and copper, especially from the smaller mines 49 Consul Adolphus 
Annesley's statement summed up the general view of British diplomats:
The blind policy so obstinately pursued by the Japanese Government in 
prohibiting (with but one or two exceptions) the working of their gold, 
silver, and copper, and other mines-fry foreigners is greatly to be 
deplored, and tends considerably to the impoverishment of this fine 
country.50
As with mining, Japan's agricultural industry was criticised for its lack of modem 
machinery. Plunkett recorded even in 1886 that ‘All agricultural implements used in 
Japan are still o f the most primitive nature, and the application of machinery to farming is 
as yet entirely unknown to the Japanese farmer.’51 This was mainly attributed by 
Longford to Japanese farmers being too conservative to use foreign devices. Giving one 
instance, he maintained that despite the effoit of the Department of Agriculture and 
Commerce to produce modem ploughs imitated from American models for sale to 
Japanese fanners, no success had yet been attained: ‘Only about one in 500 has yet even 
seen them, and farming being generally on a very small scale, few of those who have 
seen them can make up their minds to pay down 25 yen for implements to be employed
47 Plunkett's report on ’The Mines o f  Japan1, April 22, 1875 in FO 46/191, No. 62, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, 
May 25, 1875. Also see the report in CR, 1873.
48 Ibid., FO 46/166, No. 19, Parkes to Granville, May 23, 1873; Hall to Parkes, Nagasaki, May 12, 1883, 
CR, 1882; Quin to Fraser, Nagasaki, May 23, 1889, CR, 1888.
49 Enslie to Plunkett, Nagasaki, June 23, 1884, CR, 1883; Longford to Fraser, Hakodate, April 30, 1891, 
CR, 1890.
50 Annesley to Parkes, Hyogo, June 12, 1876, CR, 1875.
51 Report on the Import Trade o f  Britain and Japan, Plunkett to Salisbury, Nikko, July 26, 1886, 
Miscellaneous Series, CR, 1886.
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in work for which they have heretofore used spades costing only one yen.02
The Japanese were criticised for using primitive methods not only in ploughing 
their land, but also in preparing their produce for export. For instance, it was noted that 
the Japanese main staple export, silk, suffered horn deteriorating quality and irregularity
* c*5 ^
in size owing partly to hand-reeling method. Were foreign capital allowed and foreign 
machinery used, Parkes envisaged that improvement in silk quality would be seen:
Unaided, the Japanese people are too poor to achieve any large 
improvement in that direction; it can only be brought about by a liberal 
admission of foreigners into the interior, and by substantial guarantees 
being given to the capital required for the establishment of large 
factories. In the opinion of the best judges, there is in this country a 
tremendous waste of cocoons caused by defective modes of smothering, 
drying, storing, and reeling. Foreign skill would effect a great saving,5
A similar problem was observed in Japanese tea. Throughout 1868-1890, complaints 
were made about that Japanese tea was of poor quality partly due to the old method of 
firing tea leaves in pans or placing the leaf under the sun, and that modem machinery for 
firing purposes was hardly used by Japanese tea producers.55 The following statement by 
Plunkett provides one example:
As far as I am aware, no machinery has yet been imported for use in the 
preparation of tea for export, though machinery o f this kind is very 
largely and profitably used in the Indian plantations. If proper steps 
were taken for its introduction into Japan a fair sale might soon be 
found for it, and in addition, the tea industry of the country greatly 
benefited.56
Still related to agriculture was the production of rice. Although it was not until tfe  
mid-1880s that rice was exported from Japan in significant amounts, it is noteworthy that 
great emphasis had consistently been placed by British diplomats on Japan's development 
of its rice industry. Parkes for one considered that Japan had become too dependent on 
the export of tea and silk. As he wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Terajima Munenori 
in 1874, ‘It is unfortunate that the exports of Japan should be mainly confined to Tea and
52 Memorandum by Longford on 'Various Japanese Native Manufactures', in Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
April 13, 1887, Miscellaneous Series, CR, 1887.
53 See e.g., Lowder to Parkes, Kanagawa, March 10, 1870, CR, 1869-70; Enslie to Parkes, Kanagawa, July 
6, 1882, CR, 1883; Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, June 19, 1883, CR, 1883,
54 'Review o f  the Japan Silk Trade for 1874-77', Parkes to Derby, Yedo, July 31, 1877, CR, 1876.
55 Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, May 20, 1884, CR, 1883; Longford on the Trade and Commerce o f  
Japan for the Year 1886, in Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1886; Quin to Trench, 
Kanagawa, June 29, 1888, CR, 1887.
56 Report on the Import Trade o f  Britain and Japan, Plunkett to Salisbury, Nikko, July 26, 1886, 
Miscellaneous Series, CR, 1886.
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S ilk°7 for in these products Japan had to face strong competition from China. He added 
that though there were other commodities for export such as vegetable wax, camphor, 
tobacco and minerals, they were produced in insignificant quantities and an uncertain 
manner. Furthermore, rice could be abundantly produced for export without foreign 
assistance. As he put it, ‘the cultivation of rice is probably therefore the most promising 
field of industry that the country possesses. Every peasant in Japan has a perfect 
knowledge of its culture, and would need no foreign aid in bringing under cultivation the 
long tracts of rich land, which are now left untilled.’58 Parkes's emphasis on the rice 
industry was further shown in a. later dispatch where he noted that ‘[the rice export] 
would probably confer, by its free development, greater benefit on the agricultural class 
of Japan than the hade in any other production.'59 Other diplomats also favoured Japan's 
role as a producer of rice although they did note several factors that obstructed the 
expansion o f Japan's rice exports. Plunkett, for instance, while pointing at the high rate of 
rice freight charges owing to the absence of an immediate outlet for the main rice- 
producing centres of the country, observed that rice ‘ought to be looked upon as one of 
the chief, if not the chief, source of trade’ since ‘silk and tea...are produced only in a 
comparatively few districts, while rice is cultivated universally throughout the country.’60 
Other diplomats, such as Consul J. C. Hall and Acting-Consul J. T. Longford, 
while they did perceive some problems of the rice industry (e.g., the governments 
monopoly of the export of rice through its agent Mitsui Bussan Kaisha; the prohibition on 
foreigners on purchasing and shipping rice at ports adjacent to the chief rice-producing 
districts, apart from Hyogo and Niigata; and the power reserved by the Treaty to the 
government to entirely forbid the export of rice at any time), were optimistic about the 
future o f Japan's rice. They observed that not only was there a large and steady demand in 
Australia, New Zealand and Europe for the rich and palatable Japanese rice, but also that 
a larger market would readily be found for the product.61 By 1886, as new markets were 
found in the United States and Canada, more and more hopes were expressed by British 
diplomats for the future prosperity o f the rice export. As put by Consul John Quin, ‘There 
is every evidence that this staple will assume a very important role in the future exports
57 FO 46/182, Parkes to Terajima, Yedo, September 26, 1874, encl. in FO 46/182, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, 
October 26, 1874.
58 FO 46/181, No. 164, Parkes to Derby, Hakodate, August 30, 1874.
59 Summary o f  Japan's Foreign Trade for the Year 1878, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, September 11, 1879, 
CR, 1878-79.
60 Summary o f  Japan's Foreign Trade for the Year 1883, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, August 1, 1884, CR, 
1883.
51 Hall to Plunkett, Nagasaki, June 26, 1884, CR, 1883; General Report on the Trade o f  Japan for the Year 
1884 by Longford, June 30, 1885, in Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 14, 1885, CR, 1884.
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from this country.’ The fact that Japan's rice commanded a better price in the markets 
than most other national types, to Longford, further demonstrated the increasing
r ' l
recognition gained by Japan of the good quality of its rice.
Given the diplomats' strong encouragement for the development of the rice 
industry, one may argue that British diplomats viewed Japan mainly as an agricultural 
producer rather than a manufacturer of modem products. In fact, the attitude was most 
evident in Parkes. Not only did he stress the development of Japan's rice, but he also 
maintained in a private letter to Isabella Bird in 1880 that any Japanese attempt in 
manufacturing industry would be in vain. As he put it:
It is to her agricultural and mineral resources that Japan must look for 
advancement of wealth. Okuma estimates that less than a fourth of the 
area of Japan has yet been brought under cultivation, and while the soil 
therefore affords such a field for the industry o f her population - which 
is essentially an agricultural one - it is idle to waste time or money in 
stalling the manufacture of fabrics of a kind alien to the country, with 
the view of prematurely converting an agricultural people into a 
manufacturing one.64
Considering the prevailing view among foreigners in Japan at that time, such an 
‘Orientalist’ attitude among some British diplomats, namely their perception of Japan as 
mainly a primary producer, should perhaps not be surprising. In October 1874, the Japan 
Weekly Mail, one of the leading foreign newspapers in Japan also observed that Japan 
should concentrate on the development of rice and silk instead of endeavouring to 
produce manufactured goods.
In terms of modem industry, with the exception of a few remarks (which will be 
discussed later with regard to Japan's competitiveness), the prevalent view among British 
diplomats in general was that Japan had only a limited potential. Although they did note 
the establishment of various modem factories producing cotton manufactures, woollen 
cloth, matches, pharmarceutical medicines, chemicals, glassware, bricks, cement, etc., the 
goods produced were often described as restricted in volume and variety or poor in 
quality.66 Similarly, with regard to shipbuilding, though the diplomats did observe that
62 Quin to Fraser, Nagasaki, May 23, 1889, CR, 1888; also see Troup to Fraser, Hyogo, June 10, 1887, CR,
1886.
63 Report on the Trade o f  Hyogo and Osaka by Longford, encl. in Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, June 29, 
1889, CR, 1888.
64 Parkes to Bird, Seven Oaks, Aug, 19, 1880, quoted from Dickins and Lane-Poole, op. cit., p. 290.
65 See the article 'The Future' in the Japan Weekly Mail, 10. 10. 1874, in Fait, O. K., The Clash o f  Interests: 
The Transformation o f  Japan in 1861-1881 in the Eyes o f  the Local Anglo-Saxon Press (Oulu: The 
Historical Association o f Northern Finland), 1990, p. 163.
66 E.g., Aston to Kennedy, Hyogo, May 17, 1881, CR, 1880.
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there were dockyards owned by government and private companies at Hyogo, Osaka, 
Hakodate and Nagasaki, which were constantly employed for repairs, conversion of 
Japanese junks into modem vessels and construction of men-of-war and commercial 
steam vessels, they also noted that Japan continued to import foreign steamers and 
vessels.67 While there were some lengthy remarks on modem Japanese light industry, 
diplomatic reports on the shipbuilding industry are generally brief. It was probably due to 
the relatively undeveloped state of the Japanese industry that the diplomats disregarded 
its development. In fact, it was not until 1896 that the shipbuilding industry of Japan 
really took off following the first Sino-Japanese War.68 Although Le Poer Trench in one 
instance observed that a Japanese naval mission under Admiral Kabayama, Vice-Minister 
of Marine was being sent to Europe in 1887 to study naval construction and dockyards, 
he made no observation as to the effects of such a mission on the general development of 
shipbuilding industry in Japan.69 Furthermore, the scarcity of diplomatic comments may 
also a result o f the Japanese government being secretive in a matter which related to the 
naval security of Japan.70
As to whether the overall diplomats' views of the development o f trade and 
industry in Japan influenced the general British policy towards the country, one may 
briefly assess the issue of treaty revision, which involved in addition to the abolition of 
extraterritoriality, the granting to Japan of tariff autonomy in return for commercial
* * 7 1  * • . . ■access to the interior. While earlier British resistance to treaty revision was affected by 
trade and legal considerations, and by the opinions of British merchants at the treaty 
ports, namely to maintain tariff advantages as long as possible and to secure the privilege
77of extraterritoriality, British general attitudes by the mid 1880s, though showed a 
tendency to accommodate Japanese demands and was less influenced by the pressure of 
treaty port merchants,73 indicated a disinclination to consider revision based solely on the 
economic development o f Japan. Given the diplomats' observations o f the various 
problems surrounding the development of Japan's commerce, it is perhaps not surprising
67 E.g., Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, May 20, 1884, CR, 1883.
68 Nakamura, op. cit., p. 63.
69 FO 46/369, No. 230, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, September 27, 1887.
70 The indication o f the tendency on the part o f  the Japanese government is shown in Parkes's report o f  
1879 in which he mentioned that he did approach Japanese Foreign Minister on the object o f  a visit to 
Japan by Edward Reed (a British naval architect who had provided Japan with three vessels o f  war), but 
was refused any information. FO 46/244, No. 71, Conf., Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, April 7, 1879.
71 The new treaty between Britain and Japan was signed in 1894 though the extraterritoriality did not 
disappear until 1899 and a tariff autonomy was not achieved by Japan until 1911.
72 Hoare, J. E., Japan's Treaty Ports and Foreign Settlements: The Uninvited Guests 1858-1899 
(Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library), 1994, pp. 98, 100-101; Daniels, op. cit. pp. 184-185, 196-197.
73 Ibid. p. 101.
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that diplomats’ comments on treaty revision, even in the late 1880s, made no specific 
reference to the industrialisation of Japan. Instead, they allude to the development and 
progress of Japan in general. As recorded by Gubbins in 1887:
Her progress may not in all respects be uniform, but she is moving and 
moving fast, and in justice to her, and also in a measure to ourselves, 
lest we should be taken by surprise, it should be remembered that what 
we could not give to her a few years ago, might now be safely be 
conceded, and that what we are prepared to grant today is not 
necessarily the measure of what we may yield tomorrow.74
In fact, diplomats seem not to have taken Japanese industrialisation into account when 
considering their primary role: the protection of British interests. In 1883, Legation 
Secretary Ernest Satow observed that unless the Japanese endeavour's to achieve an equal 
footing with the West were encouraged, Japan would make common cause with China 
and Korea, and thus place the interests of Western Powers in a disadvantageous 
position. From a different angle, Plunkett, Fraser and Gubbins generally maintained in 
the late 1880s especially when other Foreign Powers began to initiate independent 
negotiations for revision of their treaties with Japan that the revision was necessary to 
safeguard British interests.76 Furthermore, they also perceived that by agreeing to treaty 
revision, Britain could avoid granting more concessions than necessary to the Japanese at
the expense of foreign interests especially in the matters of extraterritoriality and
• 11 jurisdiction.
Japan as a Competitor
As Japan opened itself to global trade,r-competition was inevitable. On Japan's 
competitiveness, British diplomats' views, though varied, manifest a similar' tendency to 
focus on difficulties and problems faced by Japan either in exporting its products to the 
international market or in establishing economic self-sufficiency in the home market.
74 Memorandum by Gubbins 'Treaty Revision', December 30, 1887, in FO 46/379, No. 10, Conf., Trench to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, January 17, 1888.
75 PRO 30/33/12, Satow Papers, Memorandum by Satow to Plunkett, September 24, 1883.
76 FO 46/387, No. 97, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 16, 1889. The countries which had by 
1889 signed provisional conventions with Japan included the United States, Russia and Germany.
77 FO 46/368, No. 188, Very C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 9, 1887; also see FO 46/398, No. 20, 
Fraser to Salisbury, January 25, 1890, Memorandum by Gubbins.
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On Japan's main staple export, raw silk, British diplomats and consular officials 
did not fail to note the existence of strong competition from China and Europe.78 It was 
reported in 1870 that as China, France and Italy produced silk in larger quantities, their 
prices were lower than those of Japan. Yet a greater disadvantage of Japan was seen to be 
the deteriorating quality of its silk owing to the careless manner in which it was were 
reeled and to the large export of silk-worm eggs of qood quality from Japan to Europe.79 
By the mid-1870s, owing to these disadvantages, Japan's silk had fallen into disfavour in 
the European market according to Robertson when reporting the Yokohama 1875 trade 
returns.80 Even though Japan's silks soon found a new and larger market in America, 
British diplomats observed that competition by European silks was by no means ended, 
as the latter gradually penetrated that market. Robertson, for instance, noted in 1884 that 
due to ‘the low prices and large quantities of Italian silk,’ they have ‘persistently passed 
for sale in Europe and in America, and have interfered with the sale of Japans.’81
In the late 1880s, some British consuls, notably John Quin and James Troup, 
noted an increase in the competitive power of Japan in the silk market. Not only weie 
large tracts o f land brought under mulberry cultivation, but re-reeling establishments 
were set up in various localities, instructors were engaged, the best models for preparing 
silk were studied, and official notifications were issued encouraging the people take 
greater care in reeling. In the light of this development, Quin concluded in 1888 that 
Japan's future as a silk producer was bright: ‘Under such auspices, Japan at no very 
distant date will rank among the most important of the silk-producing countries of the 
world, while climate, soil, and skill alike guarantee a quality second to none, and the 
cheapness of labour will defy competition as to price.’82 Troup perceived that the results 
o f the government’s efforts were that many Japanese filatures could ‘compare favourably 
with those of Europe’ and Japanese silk became ‘a great favourite with manufacturers in
83the United States.’ His favourable view of Japan’s competitiveness is further shown in 
his 1890 report that ‘The silks of Japan now occupy a very high place...first quality of
78 General Report on the Trade o f Japan for the Year 1884, Longford to Plunkett, Tokyo, June 30, 1885, 
encl. in Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 14, 1885, CR, 1884.
79 Lowder to Parkes, Kanagawa, March 10, 1870, CR, 1869-70; Summary o f  Japan's Foreign Trade for the 
Year 1869, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, March 31, 1870, CR, 1869-70; Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, 
June 19, 1883, CR, 1883.
80 Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, May 8, 1876, CR, 1875. The decline o f  Japan's silk import to the 
European market is also noted in Sugiyama, op. cit., p. 114.
81 Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, May 20, 1884, CR, 1883. On the increasing competition from 
European silks against those o f  Japan in the American market, see e.g., Sugiyama, op. cit., pp. 107-108.
82 Quin to Trench, Kanagawa, June 29, 1888, CR, 1887.
83 Troup to Napier, Yokohama, April 15, 1889, CR, 1888.
132
Japanese silk is considered equal to the extras of Italy, and the extras of Japan are inferior 
to none.’84
In regard to tea export, Japan's main rival in supplying green tea to American and 
Canadian consumers was China. While Japan's tea was noted to have largely displaced 
Chinese tea in the American market by the mid 1870s,85 British diplomats observed that 
it continually suffered from deteriorating quality due mainly to lack of care and attention
o / r
in preparing the tea. In dwelling on this problem, Enslie maintained that the lack of 
attention might be attributable to the high cost of labour in Japan resulting from the 
inflation o f the late 1870s. Consequently, tea growers resorted to the 'sun-drying' to 
process tea leaves instead of using a better method of firing in pans, in order to save
o*7
labour and the expense of charcoal. Hall, the consul at Nagasaki, also claimed that little 
attention was paid to the cultivation and preparation of the tea because Japanese labourers
on
could earn more money as coal-heavers. Longford, on the other hand, hinted at a 
deficiency in the character of Japanese growers. He maintained that whereas the first 
exports had been of good quality, the growers grew more and more careless in their 
pickings as they were driven by the desire for quicker and greater profits. Consequently, 
in order to hide the steadily-decreasing quality o f the tea, foreign shippers in Japan were 
compelled to have recourse to artificial methods of colouring and preparation.89 Referring 
to the government's attempts to encourage the better preparation o f the tea by establishing 
Tea Guilds in March 1885 in various tea-producing districts, Robertson maintained that 
Tt is unfortunate that there has been no improvement in the quality o f the leaf, where 
improvement was both desired and expected.’90 rThe remedy, in Longford's view, was the 
use of modem machinery not only for quality but to lower the cost of production. Yet to 
encourage the Japanese to opt for modem machinery, foreigners would first have to 
introduce the technology to the Japanese 91
84 Troup to Fraser, Yokohama, April 30, 1891, CR, 1890. Sugiyama noted Japan's competitiveness on the 
international market due to technological development in preparation and silk reeling. See Sugiyama, ov. 
cit., p. 124.
85 Quin to Trench, Kanagawa, June 29, 1888, CR, 1887. Sugiyama, op. cit., p. 149.
86 See e.g., Fletcher to Parkes, Yokohama, February 23, 1869, CR, 1868; Hall to Parkes, Nagasaki, May 12, 
1883, CR, 1883; Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, May 20, 1884, CR, 1883.
87 Enslie to Parkes, Kanagawa, July 6, 1882, CR, 1883.
88 Report on the Trade o f Nagasaki by Hall, encl. in Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, May 26, 1891, CR, 1890.
89 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, in Plunkett to Salisbury, 
Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1888.
90 Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, June 13, 1885, CR, 1884.
91 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, in Plunkett to Salisbury, 
Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1886.
133
The problem became more serious as a result of excessive exports by Japanese 
shippers.92 While annual consumption of tea in America was about 20,000,000 lbs. per 
annum,93 the volume of Japan's tea export very often exceeded the demand. For instance, 
Parkes noted that the quantities of Japan's tea exported in 1876 already amounted to 
34,000,000 lbs.94 The blame for this was laid at the door of Japanese merchants by Quin:
These shipments, having no legitimate outlet, and being thrown upon 
tire markets from unaccustomed channels, were recklessly sold in the 
central markets of New York and Chicago, and, as they served to 
increase the previous excessive supply, they produced a depression and 
low range of prices such as had never before been experienced in the 
United States and Canada.95
Besides green tea, there was a considerable effort by Japan from the mid-1870s to 
produce black tea for export to London and the American market. Yet competition from 
Indian black tea was viewed as too strong for Japan and the likelihood of Japanese 
success was seen as remote. As Enslie noted in an 1883 report, ‘The tea has on the whole, 
proved a failure, although the production continues on a limited scale. The climate and 
soil o f this country appear unfitted to the growth of plants producing a leaf of the quality 
necessary to make good black.’96 Not only did Japan fail to emulate the success of the 
Indian black tea in the London market, but the latter was also seen as a threat to Japan's 
green tea in the American market. In an 1886 report Longford observed that due to the 
unusually delicious aroma of the Indian black tea, it only required to be known in and 
appreciated in America to largely displace green tea from China and Japan.97
On the competitiveness of Japanese minerals such as coal, copper and sulphur, 
British diplomats concerned themselves mainly with problems faced by Japan in 
competing in the international market. As to coal, though the diplomats did observe that 
some coal mines in Japan produced good quality coal, such as the Takashima mines at 
Nagasaki, which produced the best steam coal in Asia (and better, even, than Australian 
coals),98 they failed to note that by 1880, Japanese coal had established a dominance over 
other coals (from Britain, Australia, Formosa and America) in the Shanghai coal market
92 Enslie to Parkes, Kanagawa, July 6, 1882, CR, 1883; Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, May 20, 1884, 
CR, 1883.
93 Sugiyama, op. cit., p. 150.
94 Summary o f  Japan's Foreign Trade for the Year 1876, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, July 31 ,1877 , CR, 1876.
95 Quin to Trench, Kanagawa, June 29, 1888, CR, 1887.
96 Enslie to Parkes, Kanagawa, July 6, 1882, CR, 1883; also see Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, June 23, 
1877, CR, 1876; Dohmen to Parkes, Kanagawa, June 15, 1879, CR, 1878.
97 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, in Plunkett to Salisbury, 
Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1886. For superiority o f Indian black tea, see Sugiyama, op. cit., p. 160.
98 See e.g., Hall to Parkes, Nagasaki, May 12, 1883, CR, 1882.
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due chiefly to cheap prices. Moreover, their accounts were also limited as they hardly 
mentioned Japan's coal in the Hong Kong and Singapore markets." One problem 
persistently pointed out by the diplomats was the limited penetration of the Shanghai 
market by Japanese coal. This was attributed mainly to a failure to increase output owing 
to the absence of foreign capital and machinery, a direct result of Japan's mining law of 
1873 prohibiting foreigners from holding any substantial interest in a mine. With the 
exception of the Takashima and Miike mines (which were modernised before the law was 
promulgated), other coal mines worked with primitive Japanese methods as the Japanese, 
according to Hall in 1883, ‘had not the capital nor skill to work.’ Hall observed that not 
only did the primitive methods produce only a limited amount of coal but they resulted in 
high prices because of their inefficiency.100 When a coal strike took place in Australia in 
1888 and a great demand was made for Japanese coal, Acting-Consul Bonar observed 
that the problem of limited stock continued to prevail. Nevertheless, he also perceived 
that the heavy demand had increased the value of Japan's coal up to 50 per cent, and this 
greatly benefited small mine owners, enabling them to use proper foreign machinery.101
As with coal, similar' problems were pointed out with regard to the production of 
copper and sulphur in Japan. Of the many copper mines in Japan only a few, such as the 
Ashio mines, worked with foreign machinery. The high price of the Japanese copper, 
which was a result of the limited use of modem machinery, consequently affected the 
competitiveness of the Japanese metal in the European market. As observed by Annesley, 
‘There is no doubt that if this valuable metal were properly worked it could be produced 
at a price that would admit of its being largely exported to London, where its superior 
quality gives it a higher value than the best Chili bars.’103 In addition, Troup observed 
that some complaints had also been made about the poor quality of the metal, which 
naturally affected its reputation in the European market.104 As to sulphur', Japan had 
Sicilian sulphur to compete with. Quin observed that despite the richness of Japanese 
sulphur produced at Atanasoburi mines in Hokkaido compared to that of Sicily, and the 
fact that the Atanasoburi deposit was concentrated at one spot, Japan was greatly 
surpassed by her rival due to the absence of facilities for increasing the sulphur output, 
and for transporting it. He added that as opposed to about 10,000 tons per annum of the
99 Sugiyama, op. cit., pp. 173, 182, 189, 195.
100 Hall to Parkes, Nagasaki, May 12, 1883, CR, 1882; Hall to Plunkett, Nagasaki, June 26, 1884, CR, 1883.
101 Bonar to Fraser, Hakodate, May 20, 1889, CR, 1888.
102 'Report on the Ashiwo Copper Mines' by R. De B. Layard, Tokyo, February 4, 1887, Miscellaneous 
Series, CR, 1887; also see report on 'The Mines o f  Japan', Plunkett to Parkes, Yedo, April 22, 1875, CR, 
■1874.
103 Annesley to Parkes, Hyogo, June 12, 1876, CR, 1875.
104 Troup to Fraser, Yokohama, April 30, 1891, CR, 1890.
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Hokkaido mines, the annual production of Sicilian sulphur amounted to about 400,000 
tons. Sicily also had an advantage in the lower freight costs to the Liverpool and New 
York markets. Notwithstanding this, Quin however, maintained that the Hokkaido 
sulphur could still be competitive, and that it should find a ready market in Australia, 
Britain and America if the price was lower than that fixed by Japanese producers.105
Apart from the articles for export, Japan's competitiveness may also be seen in her 
attempt to establish economic self-sufficiency and end the foreign dominance of Japan's 
trade by replacing goods manufactured in Japan for imports, competing with foreign 
banks in Japan and conducting direct shipments to America and Europe. It is noteworthy 
that diplomatic reporting o f the Japanese desire for economic independence was mainly a 
feature of the mid-1880s. This corresponded with the fact that there was a surge of 
nationalistic or patriotic feeling in Japan in the mid-1880s against Western elements in 
political, cultural and commercial aspects of Japan.106 If the political system indicated a 
tendency for an authoritarian administration, and the social system saw evidence of a 
revival o f Neo-Confucian values and rejection of Western culture, Japanese attitudes 
towards the economy reflected their desire for independence and self-sufficiency.
As to the import substitution, this was most evident in the manufacturing of cotton 
yarn and piece goods by Japanese producers to displace cotton manufactures from 
England and Bombay, which were traded chiefly by British merchants. In fact, the import 
substitution of cotton was important for Japan since the cotton trade not only had been 
marked by foreign domination of the Japanese market, but also greatly contributed to 
Japan’s imbalance of payments and endangered Japan's finances, as cotton manufactures 
formed the largest portion of Japan's imports in 1868-90.107 From 1880 onwards, as a 
result o f the Japanese efforts, the import of cotton yam and piece-goods showed a steady
• 1 A Q  '•
decline and a considerable amount of Japanese cotton goods began to be exported by 
the late 1880s and 1890s.109
Despite this evidence of industrial growth, James Troup and John Gubbins were 
pessimistic. Troup observed that the production of Japanese spinning mills at Hyogo in 
1890 could hardly compete with that of Bombay mills: ‘Whether these [Japanese cotton- 
spinning mills] are likely, in a fair field, to be able to compete with the Indian mills is,
105 Quin to Fraser, Nagasaki, May 23, 1889, CR, 1888.
106 Howe, C., The Origins o f  Japanese Trade Supremacy: Development and Technology in Asia from  1540 
to the Pacific War (London: Hurst & Co.), 1996, p. 158.
107 Ibid., p. 110.
108 Sugiyama, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
109 Howe, op. cit., p. 186.
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however, extremely doubtful.’110 Also skeptical, but to a lesser degree, was Gubbins, who 
observed in 1888 that ‘the danger to the English and Bombay cotton yam trade to be 
apprehended from the increasing competition of Japanese yam is materially lessened’ by 
the high cost of production of Japanese yam. This was because, he argued, most cotton- 
spinning factories in Japan were conducted on a small scale with a limited number of 
spindles.111 Consul Enslie was also skeptical of the future of the Japanese cotton-industry 
though his views were somewhat inconsistent. In an 1889 commercial report he noted 
that ‘Japanese-made yam is becoming a more or less formidable competitor’ and it might 
successfully compete with Indian and English yarn as labour costs were cheaper in 
Japan.112 Yet in an 1890 report he somehow changed his view, noting that though the 
competition posed by the Japanese mills was severe, it would not last and the imported
1 i o
yarn would soon resume its predominance.
Those with positive views included Longford, Le Poer Trench and Plunkett. In 
view of the steady decline of cotton goods import and the increase of the import of raw 
cotton for the use of Japanese mills, Longford wrote in an 1886 commercial report,
...it is not European or American, but purely native competition, that 
British manufacturers will have to struggle against, and if the stmggle is 
to be successful, it cannot be instituted too soon, nor with too much 
energy. Even now, when there is neither organisation of labour, nor the 
aid o f weaving machinery to help them, Japanese appear to be able to 
make cotton piece goods which advantageously compete with their 
correlative English imports. Will they not be able to do so to a still 
greater degree, when weaving factories, with the best mechanical 
appliances, are established throughout the country, as they most 
probably will in the course of a very few years?114
The future of the Japanese cotton industry, in Longford's view, was thus bright. Even in 
its relatively undeveloped state, it could produce competitive goods. He added that the 
decline o f cotton-goods import was not only a result of the increasing output of the 
Japanese mills: there were also other contributory factors, which included economic 
distress among the lower and middle classes (who were the principal consumers of the 
imported cotton goods), restricted circulation of money, foreign dealers' failure to consult 
Japanese tastes in respect of either patterns or dimensions, and the deteriorating quality of
1,0 Troup to Fraser, Yokohama, April 30, 1891, CR, 1890.
111 Summary o f  Japan's Foreign Trade for the Year 1887 by Gubbins, encl. in Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
August 7, 1888, CR, 1887.
112 Enslie to Salisbury, Yokohama, April 17, 1890, CR, 1889.
113 Enslie to Fraser, Hyogo and Osaka, April 15, 1891, CR, 1890.
114 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f  Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, encl. in Plunkett to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1886.
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the English cotton-piece goods.113 His awareness of Japan's potential is further shown in 
a statement that the Japanese cotton piece-goods would in time compete with English in 
the Chinese market. He maintained that already in Japan there existed some favourable 
elements such as the readiness shown by private Japanese investors, the existence of a 
fair supply of skilled spinners to act as instructors, the existence of both low and 
intelligent labour, the absence of strikes, and the low cost of land and building in Japan. 
And though Japanese production of raw cotton was insufficient to meet the wants of the 
cotton-spinning factories, an abundant supply could be obtained at cheaper cost from 
China. Given these circumstances, Japan, in his view, had only to adopt foreign 
machinery to be able to export cotton-goods to China.116
A positive view was also expressed by Charge d'Affaires Le Poer Trench. Noting 
a report on the rapid development of the Japanese cotton-spinning industry in the Japan 
Daily Mail of January 3, 1888, which recorded that there were about 22 factories at work 
with a total of 76,000 spindles by tire end of 1886, Le Poer Trench maintained that Japan 
would soon become an exporter of cotton goods. Le Poer Trench also portrayed a 
promising future for Japan by comparing the Japanese cotton-manufacturing industry 
with that of Britain:
Englishmen had comparatively few facilities for its prosecution, and 
had to struggle with the greatest difficulties as raw material was 
produced at an immense distance...the case is entirely different with 
Japan. The country is within comparatively easy reach o f the great 
centres of cotton supply; is itself a cotton-producing region; has 
command of probably the cheapest and most skillful labour' in the 
world, and enjoys the blessing of full security of life and property.
Under such circumstances there is every reason to regard the recent 
increase of cotton-spinning factories as a healthy earnest of that 
growth.117
While Plunkett also noted Japan's competitiveness, his statements were less 
direct. In 1886, for instance, instead o f pointing to the active operation o f the Japanese 
mills, he attributed the steady decline of British cotton-goods import mainly to the poor 
quality of English cotton manufacture, the general trade depression in Japan, the 
economic difficulties among the Japanese fanning class, and the restriction of foreigneis 
to the open ports, which prevented them from interacting freely with leading Japanese
115 Ibid.
116 Report on the 'Native Cotton Manufactures o f  Japan' by Longford, in Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, 
February 19, 1887, Miscellaneous Series, CR, 1887.
117 Report on Cotton Manufactures in Japan, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, January 5, 1888, Miscellaneous 
Series, CR, 1888.
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merchants and inquiring into the wants and tastes of the general population of Japan.118 In 
another instance, Plunkett argued to Lord Granville in 1885 that the 'temporary' 
occupation of Port Hamilton by Britain should not be given up, but maintained so that the 
port would serve as a depot for British trade in the Far East to counter the increasing 
competition from Japanese merchants. Although he did not specifically say so, it is likely 
that Plunkett had in mind Japanese competitiveness in the cotton industry when he stated:
I cannot help feeling that the days of “Foreign Settlements” and 
“enforced Tariffs” are rapidly passing away, and that the small profits 
on which Trade must now be carried on will make it eveiy day more 
and more difficult for the English merchant to compete on the spot with 
the native, whom education and the telegraph are every day placing 
more on a par with them.119
As with cotton manufactures, British diplomats’ views differed on manufactured 
Japanese silk goods. Consul Hall at Yokohama was dismissive in 1886 of Japan’s ability 
to compete with imported silk piece-goods from Britain and Germany. The reason, as he 
perceived, was the high cost of production in Japan,120 In contrast to Hall's view, Quin 
claimed that Japanese silk manufactures benefited from the low production cost due to 
cheap labour: ‘the excellence and cheapness of labour in this country enabling goods to 
be produced at marvellously cheap prices, and of very good taste and workmanship.’ 
Futhermore, Quin also perceived Japan as a potential exporter of manufactured silks. He 
maintained that in 1886, Japanese light cheap fabrics, such as handkerchiefs and neckties, 
were already in demand in the United States, while brocades and heavy dress materials, 
though they had not yet been exported, attracted a good deal of attention in the European 
market.121
As to woollen manufactures, a woollen factory was set up by the government at 
Senju near Tokyo with several Germans as instructors. A number of sheep farms with 
imported sheep from Australia and America were also established to supply the factory 
with cheaper wool. In 1879, Acting-Consul Martin Dohmen, though skeptical of the 
success of the sheep farms, acknowledged the potential o f the Japanese manufacture of 
woollen cloth, which, in his view, ‘would doubtless soon cease to be an article of
118 Report on the Import Trade o f Britain and Japan, Plunkett to Rosebury, Nikko, July 26, 1886, 
Miscellaneous Series, CR, 1886.
119 FO 46/330, No. 151, Very Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, May 25, 1885. Port Hamilton, which lies 
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120 Report on the Trade and Shipping o f  Kanagawa by Hall, encl. in Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 11, 
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importation’.122 Longford in 1886, however, maintained that neither the woollen 
manufactures produced at Senju nor the farms had achieved their targets. He explained 
that while Japanese woollen cloth and flannel were cheaper and superior to imported 
goods in wearing quality, both, however, contained defects, principally in roughness of 
surface. Japanese flannels were also limited in the number of designs and thus ‘quite 
unable to compete with those of flannels imported from Germany or England.’ Moreover, 
the Senju factory still had to be dependent upon imported wool due to the short supply of 
the Japanese sheep farms. Nevertheless, not all the results were disastrous. Longford 
observed that the factory's output reduced Japan's import of woollen goods as nearly all 
the cloth and a great portion of the flannel were used by the government for the Army 
and Navy. He added that it was likely that Japanese private companies would be tempted 
to imitate the Senju woollen factory in making profits by commencing similar 
undertakings.123
Japanese competition with Europeans in other manufacturing products, however, 
in the view o f British diplomats, was insignificant even in the late 1880s. Robertson, for 
instance, noted that though Japan was able to produce some chemicals, she could not 
compete successfully with Europe due to the high cost of production.124 In 1886 
Longford observed that Japan still had to be dependent upon imports of heavy chemicals 
from European countries and their volume was yearly increasing. He then concluded that 
‘British manufacturers...need fear no competition to any serious extent, if  they will only
' |* 1 o cadapt themselves to the requirements of the Japanese market.’ The Japanese metal 
industry was equally regarded by British diplomats as uncompetitive. For instance, while 
Japanese nails were seen as of excellent quality, their price greatly exceeded those of 
imported nails from Belgium. Furthermore, although Japanese-made utensils of foreign 
prototype were cheaper in price, they were regarded as primitive in shape.126 Thus, in 
both products, foreign imported goods, according to British diplomats, were much 
preferred by the Japanese at large to those manufactured by the local Japanese factories. 
Nevertheless, there were exceptions, however, in that Longford observed that in tvo  
industries, namely the match-making and the manufacture of foreign-shaped umbrellas, 
Japan might in future become a strong rival to European importers in the Japanese as well
i22 Dohmen to Kennedy, Kanagawa, May 10, 1880, CR, 1879.
!23 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f  Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, encl. in Plunkett to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1886.
124 Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, June 19, 1883, CR, 1883.
125 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f  Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, encl. in Plunkett to 
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as Chinese markets. ”
Japan's competitiveness was also considered in the field of banking where British 
diplomats noted that Japanese banks, notably the Yokohama Specie Bank, had strongly 
competed with foreign banks in securing large quantities o f foreign paper money drawn 
upon America and Europe. In doing so, the Specie Bank had offered merchants a lower 
rate of exchange by half to one per cent, under the quotations of the foreign banks.128 To 
Plunkett, the Japanese move was driven by their desire for economic independence. 
Despite the assertion by the Japanese banks that they could give favourable terms to then* 
customers because they could work at lower rates than the foreign banks, Plunkett 
observed that the concessions resulted from government support with the view of 
‘elbowing out the Foreign Banks altogether in time.’129 However, Plunkett added that 
though the nationalistic approach might ultimately reach its aim, it would adversely affect 
not only the local foreign banks, but the Japanese as well: ‘it is doubtful whether their 
policy in fighting the European local banks is not one which some day, at a moment of 
monetary crisis, may have a disastrous result for Japanese finance.’130 This was because, 
he maintained, as many foreign merchants preferred the attractive terms of the Japanese 
banks, the foreign banks were forced to make profits by shipping their stock of Japanese 
silver in large quantities to other countries, thus contributing to the drain of silver reserve 
o f the country.
Le Poer Trench too was critical, noting that the exchange practice of the Specie 
Bank was conducted on a basis that was ‘neither sound nor reasonable.’ Although he was 
uncertain o f the existence of government support in ‘elbowing out’ the foreign banks, he 
did share Plunkett's view of the adverse effect on Japan. So far*, he argued, the exchange 
operations had been profitable because the depression o f world silver had worked in 
Japan's favour, but the process of importing bullion and converting into silver yen for 
others to ship away was a costly operation and would result in a loss to the country.131 
Giving an example, he maintained that the total export of silver yen from Japan by the 
foreign banks in 1887 was over 10,000,000 yen, of which the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
Bank alone had exported close to 7,000,000 yen.132
527 Report on the Trade and Commerce o f  Japan for the Year 1886 by Longford, encl. in Plunkett to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, May 28, 1887, CR, 1886.
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The Japanese banks, especially the Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie Bank 
were also noted to have competed with the foreign banks in financing shippers of 
produce, particularly silk, to carry out direct exports to Europe. By doing so, Plunkett 
perceived that the Japanese banks could not only draw the bulk o f business out of the 
foreign banks' hands, but also encourage direct shipments by Japanese merchants to 
Europe without having to be dependent upon foreigners as middlemen. Again, Plunkett 
underlined Japan's desire for economic independence. He observed that by operating 
direct shipments, the Japanese not only could evade part of the heavy commissions to 
foreigners required for the maintenance of the foreign mercantile warehouses, but more 
importantly could ‘shake themselves free of the foreign middlemen.’ Interestingly, 
Plunkett added that Japan viewed the foreign residents as ‘the main obstacle to the 
realization of her hopes for the recognition of the autonomy of Japan as a nation’ since 
unlike their counterparts in Europe, the foreigners in Japan were seen by the Japanese as 
less liberal in ideas and not in favour of Japan’s progress. As he put it:
...until her object [Japan's commercial autonomy] is attained, she will 
address herself as far as possible to the producer in Europe, who, as a 
rule, is more liberal in his ideas than are the small clique o f Foreigners 
resident in the Settlements, some of whose immediate personal interests 
are not in favor of progress.
f.
To Plunkett, although the Japanese attempt might succeed on account of their persistence 
and perseverance, their ventures were dangerous and risky. Not only did the Japanese 
have to incur heavy expenses in financing the direct shipments as they had to hire foreign 
ships, but their dealings had not always been profitable.133 In the short tenn, at any rate, 
his prediction was confirmed by later diplomats. Both Consuls Enslie and Troup reported 
in their 1890 trade returns that the result had been so disastrous that the Japanese 
contemplated returning to the old system of buying from foreigners, and instead of 
actively financing direct shipments, the Japanese banks confined themselves to only 
buying foreign paper money from merchants.134
In shipping, while British diplomats noted an increasing effort from Japanese 
steamers to end foreign dominance of Japan's coasting trade, the possibility that Japan 
might become competitive in overseas shipping was ignored. On the coastal shipping, 
Consuls Frederick Gower, Adophus Annesley, Acting-Consuls Martin Dohmen and W.
133 FO 46/344, No. 46, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, March 21, 1886.
134 Enslie to Fraser, Hyogo and Osaka, April 15, 1891, CR, 1890; Troup to Fraser, Yokohama, April 30, 
1891, CR, 1890. On the failure o f  Japanese direct export o f silk and tea, see e.g., Sugiyama, op. c it, pp. 
132,156-57.
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A. Wooley testified to the increasing numbers and tonnage of the Japanese shipping,
particularly o f the Mitsubishi and Nippon Yusen Company, and noted that they gradually
monopolized the shipping traffic between different Japanese ports, which had previously
1been conducted by foreign companies. The lack of British diplomats' comments, 
however, on Japanese overseas shipping reveals their unspoken assumption that Japan 
was unable to challenge the monopoly of the foreign shipping companies. In fact, that 
assumption was justified up to 1890, as until then Japan's overseas trade was still largely
a 1carried in foreign vessels. E. A. Griffiths, Acting Vice-Consul in Tokyo, for instance, 
reported that over 90 per cent, of merchandise exported from and imported into Japan 
during 1889 was carried in foreign ships with more than half of the total conducted in
t  n n
British ships alone. Although his figures were slightly different, Legation Secretary de 
Bunsen observed that foreign shipping amounted to 6 1 per cent, o f the total number of 
ships entering Japan in 1890 with the tonnage of 2,416, 714. The total of Japanese 
vessels, though it showed an increase from 1889 with 986 ships and 892,291 tons, was
1 ’’15?surpassed by that o f foreign vessels in number and tonnage.
Japan’s Finances
In matters of finance, the Japanese were generally viewed by British diplomats as 
lacking the experience and knowledge that had developed into a science among the 
European nations, and thus required Western assistance o f some kind. One aspect which 
reflects this view was Japan's currency, which suffered continuous and serious 
depreciation of its value after the 1868 Restoration. The problem persisted, in Lowder's 
words in 1870, owing to the ‘inexperience and ignorance’ of Japanese rulers, who had 
decided to solve their financial problems by adopting a ‘simple but fatal way which more 
experienced Governments have long since abandoned as a remedy which brings on a 
worse disease than that it seems to cure.’ That fatal way was the tampering with the value
135 Gower to Parkes, Hyogo, June 30, 1874, CR, 1873; Annesley to Parkes, Hyogo, June 16, 1875, CR, 
1874; Dohmen to Parkes, Kanagawa, June 15, 1879, CR, 1878; W ooley to Kennedy, Niigata, October 8, 
1879, CR, 1878-79. Nakamura, op. cit., p. 61.
!36 Hyde, F. E., Far Eastern Trade 1860-1914 (London: Adams & Charles Black Ltd.), 1873, p. 157. 
Among foreign shipping companies were the Oriental and Occidental Company, Peninsular and Oriental 
Steam Navigation Company, Blue Funnel Line (all three were British companies), Messageries Maritimes 
(French), Pacific Mail Steam Ship Company (American), and Nord Deutsche (German). Sugiyama noted 
that it was not until 1910 that Japanese surpassed foreign merchants in direct shipping. Sugiyama, op. cit.,
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of the currency.139 In order to finance the increasing expenses of the administration, the 
government had issued an excessive amount of inconvertible paper notes. They also 
issued unrestricted quantities of coinage, which suffered from a debasement in value as 
the weight and purity of the coins were continuously altered. On top of that, spurious 
imitations of the government paper money had been produced in the territories of some 
daimyo. Not only did the problem cause prices of everyday goods to rise violently, but it 
also rendered commercial operations and transactions hazardous and uncertain. In 
remedying the problem, redemption of the currency was seen by British diplomats as 
necessary,140 Some diplomats also suggested Western assistance in the form of foreign 
loans. They observed that had the Japanese government borrowed money from abroad, 
the state of the Japanese currency would have probably improved.141 With regard to the 
counterfeit paper money, Flowers observed that the government should issue a new paper 
currency, based upon a Western model, where one value would be attached to the face of 
every note in a clear manner, intelligible to both foreigners and Japanese.142
When Matsukata Masayoshi, Japanese Finance Minister initiated a deflationary 
policy in 1881 to improve Japan's finances and currency, confidence was expressed by 
Kennedy in the ability o f the new Minister of Finance, whom he described as ‘an able 
man of business.’143 Yet, while noting Matsukata's sound policy, Charge d ’Affaires 
Kennedy maintained that several years must elapse before the government could hope to 
restore equilibrium in its finances.144 And indeed, it was not until 1886 that the value was 
finally restored with the resumption of specie payments by the government effective from 
January 1, 1886. Besides the slowness of the process, diplomats also attributed social 
hardships and economic depression in the mid-1880s to the deflationary policy as it 
caused a fall in the prices of commodities such as rice, which was the main source of 
income of the people of Japan.145 Although the situation finally improved, Gubbins 
perceived that the success of the redemption policy was not without foreign help. He 
reported that in summer 1885 a Japanese proppsal with regard to the gradual issue of
139 Lowder to Parkes, Kanagawa, March 10, 1870, encl. in Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, March 12, 1870, 
Commercial Reports, PP, 1870, Vol. LXV.
140 E.g., Fletcher to Parkes, Yokohama, February 23, 1869, CR, 1868; Flowers to Adams, Nagasaki, 
January, 3 1 ,1872 , CR, 1871. For more details on the problem o f Japanese currency, see Adams, T. F. M., A 
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convertible notes, as a prelude to complete resumption of specie payments, had been laid 
before an unnamed foreign assayer of the Osaka Mint. As the proposal was criticised as 
having the effect of still further depreciating the value of the currency, the proposal was 
consequently revised in line with a plan recommended by the foreign assayer.146
The desirability of foreign assistance was also pointed out in relation to Japanese 
public loans. In December 1883, in raising capital for the construction of the Nakasendo 
Railway, the government issued public loan bonds to the amount of 20,000,000 yen 
bearing interest at the rate of 7 per cent, per annum. Robertson was implicitly critical of 
this step: ‘Doubts have been expressed as to whether the Japanese Government would not 
have done better by obtaining the required capital by means of a foreign loan than by 
resorting to the issue of public loan bonds, the interest on which will in the long run 
amount to more than would have been payable on a foreign loan.’147 The same view was 
expressed by Le Poer Trench in commenting on both the Nakasendo Railway Loan 
Bonds and the Navy Public Loan Bonds issued in 1886. While he described the issuance 
o f the public bonds as possible because of ‘the marked improvement in the home- 
borrowing power of the Government’ and commented that they ‘will lead up to 
something quite new in Eastern finance - the conversion of the internal debt,’ he 
nevertheless held that foreign loans would help improve Japan's finance at a much faster 
rate. He explained that as capitalists had eagerly invested in bonds of all descriptions, this 
resulted in floating capital becoming more and more fixed capital in excess of the 
investing power of the country. Given the increasing stability of the Japanese currency, 
the reinvestment in trade of the capital which had been diverted into bonds would, 
according to Le Poer Trench, ‘manifestly be assisted and accelerated by the acquisition of 
foreign money for application to the existing internal debt, or for use in reproductive 
services.’148
As regards Japan’s system of taxation, it was viewed as not only complicated but 
as having been introduced in haste and with so little care about its effects on the people 
that it caused many inconveniences to taxpayers. This was due, according to Gubbins in 
1883, to successive changes and enactments issued by the government. He maintained 
that as with other branches of government administration, the successive laws passed by
146 Gubbins's memorandum, May 27, 1885, encl. in FO 46/331, No. 167, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, June 
17, 1885. In gradually issuing convertible notes as a preliminary to the resumption o f specie payments, the 
foreign adviser had recommended strongly the issue only o f notes o f  the denomination o f  10 yen instead o f  
1 yen and 5 yen as proposed by the government.
147 Robertson to Plunkett, Kanagawa, June 13, 1885, CR, 1884.
148 Report on the Finances o f  Japan, Trench to Plunkett, Tokyo, December 20, 1886, CR, 1886. The Navy 
Public Loan Bonds which was for naval purposes was first issued to the amount o f 17,000,000 yen and 
later about 175,000,000 yen bearing interest at 5 per cent.
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the government since 1868 were not only to a large extent experimental but had the effect 
of creating numerous and at times bewildering changes. He also argued that as taxation 
had been greatly expanded, government revenue was anything but elastic. On certain 
commodities such as sake or tobacco, he felt that taxation had been increased so much 
that it could not admit any further extension. Similarly, he feared that any attempt to 
expand the revenue from the land tax, the main source of government revenue, would 
inflict an insupportable burden on the people.149 His concern may have been founded on 
the fact that the great changes affecting the peasantry had not been readily accepted. 
Following the issuance o f the new revised land taxation in 1873, peasant riots broke out 
in various places throughout the country as the farmers were dissatisfied with the system 
of payment in money instead of in kind. Not only was it difficult in some areas for the 
peasants to turn their produce into coin due to poor roads and the absence of banking 
establishments, they also had to pay the money at a fixed rate regardless of poor harvests 
or drops in the market value of the crops. Furthermore, confusion often arose between the 
peasants and tax collectors as the rate of payment varied from one district to another 
based on the circumstances of a particular area.150 The government, in the view of British 
diplomats, had to take into account the effects of the taxation changes on the people. For 
instance, W. G. Aston, the Legation Secretary, maintained that though the government 
was quite right in wishing to abolish taxation in kind in order to stabilise its annual 
income in yen, a few adjustments which were acceptable to the peasants should have 
been made. Otherwise, the government would deprive itself of the support of the peasants 
as ‘the existing land taxation increased their burdens without giving them a better 
administration than they enjoyed under the Shogun and Daimios.’151
Diplomats also criticised Japan's financial and customs reports. The statements on 
Japan's finances published by the Finance Ministry, especially those published before the 
appointment of Matsukata in 1881, were generally regarded as doubtful and 
untrustworthy. This was reflected, for instance, in Kennedy's remark that Matsukata was 
more likely to prepare trustworthy financial statements than Okuma, ‘his clever and
» * » 1 S'? *imaginative predecessor.’ Parkes was also critical, indicating in 1877 that the ‘science
149 FO 46/302, Gubbins to Trench, Tokyo, September 8, 1883. See also the subject o f  land taxation in 
Gubbins, The Making o f  Japan , pp. 99-106; Smith also maintains that the Meiji land taxation was a 
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op. cit, pp. 82-85.
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of finance was new to the Japanese government,’ and so, the Japanese had a difficult task 
in linking present and past statistics. His view was, in some measure, influenced by a 
report by A. H. Mounsey, who maintained that all Japanese budgets were nothing more 
than estimates; the revenue was estimated by the Minister of Finance and the expenditure 
by the heads of the government Departments. The fact that there existed no parliamentary 
institutions to check the financial accounts, according to Mounsey, also contributed to the
1 cq
careless manner in which the reports were made. In fact, the diplomats could easily 
find a justification for their criticism in the budget crisis of 1873, since discrepancies 
between the 1873 financial reports published in London, Viemia and Tokyo had 
ultimately led to the resignation of Vice Finance Ministers Inoue Kaoru and Shibusawa 
Eiichi. Parkes, in reporting on the crisis o f 1873, observed that it caused surprise and 
general distrust among Europeans and despite the attempt of Okuma (after he was 
brought in to deal with the crisis) to explain that each report referred to a different time - 
that o f London to the year 1871, that of Vienna to 1872 and that o f Tokyo to 1873 - 
Parkes maintained that the government themselves were ignorant of the real state o f their 
finances.154
Similarly, the diplomats considered the custom house reports which dealt with 
statistics of Japan's import and export trade to be imperfect and unreliable, Parkes 
observed that not only did the Japanese custom house not publish full and accurate 
statistics of the trade o f the treaty ports, but the mode of compiling the reports was also 
below Western standards. The reports were not made half yearly, as done by the British 
consuls, and the Local Trade (trade between one Japanese port and another) was not kept 
distinct from the Foreign Trade (trade between Japan and foreign countries). On several 
occasions Parkes directly stressed to the Japanese the importance o f having accurate and 
reliable reports. In 1870, he pointed out to the Japanese Foreign Ministry that not only 
would an accurate report make the extent of the foreign commerce of Japan better known, 
but her importance in foreign estimation would increase according to the proof given by 
these statistics of the growth of her resources.155 Similar advice was also addressed to 
Japanese Foreign Minister Terajima Munenori in 1874,156 and copies of the British 
consuls' report on the trade of Japan were presented by Parkes to the Foreign Ministry in
153 Report on Japan’s Finances for the Year 1876-77 by Mounsey, Yedo, March 2, 1877, encl. in Parkes to 
Derby, Yedo, March 5, 1877, CR, 1876.
154 See FO 46/167, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, June 6, 1873; also see the details in ibid, June 23, 1873.
155 FO 46/126, Parkes to Foreign Ministers, Yedo, August 10, 1870; FO 46/182, No. 189, Parkes to Derby, 
Yedo, October 26, 1874,
156 FO 46/182, Parkes to Terajima, Yedo, September 26, 1874.
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the hope of inducing the Japanese government to take additional interest in the matter.157 
Gower went much further when he maintained that in order to secure accurate reports, the
government should resort to foreign assistance by adopting, for a few years at least, a
* 1 Foreign Inspectorate to inspect their commercial revenues.
However, it was acknowledged that the Japanese were not entirely unaware of the 
need to improve their custom house administration. Parkes himself noted a few initiatives 
which, in his view, indicated the Japanese spirit o f enquiry. One such instance was an 
application from the Hanji (Governor) of Yokohama to be furnished with a copy of the 
Annual Returns of the Trade of Britain for the year 1868.159 Another was the dispatch in 
1870 of a Japanese commission led by the Court noble and government official 
Yanagiwara Sakimitsu to Shanghai to enquire into the state of commerce and the custom 
house system at that port. Of the latter Parkes observed: T do not doubt that if  these 
officers will really devote their attention to these subjects they will gain some benefit 
from their mission, and will be able on their return to improve on their own lax Custom 
House System and on the present imperfect mode of compiling the statistics of the Japan 
Trade.’160
Conclusion
In conclusion, British diplomats' views of the early economic development of 
Meiji Japan in 1868-90 were generally negative. Whether in foreign trade, general 
commerce and industry or finances, the Japanese were seen as lacking knowledge of 
modem commercial practices. This accounted, as diplomats saw it, for instance, for the 
preservation of traditional systems and policies which were subversive of free trade, for 
the unsatisfactory commercial laws, the monetary problems, the complicated taxation 
system and the unreliable financial and trade reports. Equally negative was the emphasis 
by British diplomats on the inability of early Meiji Japan to do without foreign assistance.
Furthermore, the negative image persisted in that Japan was regarded as lacking 
the vital ingredients to expand its commercial capacity and industrial production. Various 
factors were viewed as obstacles to Japanese trade and national enterprise, such as the 
interventionist policies of the government, the existence of the shosha, the currency 
problem, the lack of capital, and the poor transportation system. Although British
157 FO 46/126, Parkes to Sec. o f  State for Foreign Affairs, Yokohama, August 22, 1870.
158 Gower to Adams, Hyogo, February 29, 1872, encl. in Adams to Granville, Yedo, April 30, CR, 1871.
159 FO 46/108, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, April 29, 1869.
160 FO 46/126, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, August 29, 1870.
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diplomats did note the establishment of modem manufacturing industries, many of them 
were either indifferent to or judgemental towards Japan, and were quick to point out that 
the various modem industries were still in an early stage of development, and that the 
products were limited in volume and variety, and were also of poor quality. British 
diplomats' views on the competitiveness of Japan in international and home market can 
also be said to be generally unfavourable towards Japan. There were exceptions, such as 
the statements by Troup and Quin on the competitiveness of Japanese raw silk in the 
American market, remarks by Longford, Le Poer Trench and Plunkett on the bright 
prospect of the Japanese cotton-manufacturing industry, and an observation by Quin on 
the Japanese ability to produce competitive silk-piece goods. Most diplomats, however, 
focused on the problems and disadvantages faced by Japan in promoting its exports or 
displacing the foreign domination of domestic trade. Similarly, in relation to the 
nationalistic aspirations of Japanese banks, many diplomats were also skeptical, 
predicting that the Japanese aims could not be smoothly fulfilled without incurring 
significant costs, such as loss of profit in direct Japanese shipments to American and 
Europe, and possible injury to Japan's finances resulting from competition with foreign 
banks.
As to the influence of the diplomats' overall views of the Meiji economy on 
British diplomatic policy towards Japan, while their views might have contributed to the 
signs of a moderation of British policy with regard to treaty revision with Japan in the 
late 1880's, the diplomats themselves scarcely deferred to the economic development or 
industrialisation of Japan. This was perhaps due to the existence, as they perceived it, of 
various problems that surrounded Japanese trade and industry. Rather, the protection of 
British interests was held to be of more paramount importance in supporting the treaty 
revision with Japan. Only Gubbins appeared to have referred to the economic 
development of Japan, though indirectly, as he chose to mention the general progress of 
the country in commenting on the issue of treaty revision.
In is worthy of note that as regards diplomatic advice and suggestions to the Meiii 
government, Parkes stood out for his direct approach. His addresses to Iwakura and other 
Japanese ministers on the significance of free trade in Japan, as well as his efforts to 
encourage the Japanese to adopt a better method in compiling the returns of Japan's trade 
are clear evidence of this. Parkes's overbearing manner and important rank may explain 
his unusually forthcoming approach. Although other diplomats and consuls were also 
promoters of British economic interests, their recommendations to improve the 
economic and financial state of Japan appear to have been confined to their reports.
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Moreover, with the exception of Parkes's report on the mission under Prince Arisugawa 
to study Shanghai's custom house system, neither he nor other diplomats seem to have 
stressed the importance of other overseas missions or the sending of Japanese abroad to 
acquire Western industrial skills and commercial knowledge and the implications of the 
missions on the industrialisation of Japan.
Of the numerous diplomatic views, some fit the ‘Orientalist’ interpretation in that 
they reflect assumptions of inherent Western superiority in contrast with Japanese 
backwardness. This was particularly so with the image of Japan as basically a primary or 
agricultural producer with limited ability to develop modem industry. All British 
diplomats were of the view that Japan's potential wealth lay in the production and 
exportation of its natural products, such as silk, tea and rice. O f the diplomats, Parkes 
gave the clearest evidence of an ‘Orientalist’ attitude. Not only did he emphasize that 
Japan should expand the production of agricultural products, particularly rice, but more 
importantly, he insisted that Japan's attempt to develop manufacturing industry was a 
waste o f money and energy. Another view of ‘Orientalist’ tendency was the perception of 
Japan as a nation of the East which could not compete with the superior West. Among the 
diplomats who reflect such a view can be included Troup, Gubbins and Enslie, who were 
not impressed by the development of the Japanese cotton industry and predicted instead 
that Japanese producers would not be able to challenge the dominant position o f Britain. 
Hall may also be included due to his skeptical comment on Japan's ability to manufacture 
silk goods.
Not all British diplomats can be categorised as ‘Orientalist’. For instanc;, 
Longford stands out for his favourable remarks on Japan's competitiveness in 
manufacturing cotton goods. Le Poer Trench and Plunkett also referred to Japan as a 
potential rival to British cotton manufactures in,Japan (though not going to the opposite 
extreme of seeing Japan as a threat), while Quin's favourable remark on Japan's silk 
manufacturing industry should also be noted. Moreover, Fraser's neutral and uncritical 
comment on the Japanese shosha system cannot be ignored either. While his predecessors 
were critical o f the Japanese monopolistic practice, Fraser appears to have dismissed their 
allegations that serious disadvantages stemmed from the traditional Japanese system.
British diplomats' views of the Japanese economy between 1868 and 1890 
changed in some respects but basically revealed a high degree of continuity. In the 1870s 
there was a strong emphasis on basic economic issues such as government interference 
policy, the absence of foreign capital, the poor communication system, the monopolistic 
tendency of the Japanese, etc. In the 1880s, concern with these issues tended to be
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subordinated to diplomatic awareness of the emergence of a nationalistic approach 
among the Japanese and a drive for self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, despite the fact that 
some problems came to be seen as less serious, and despite a growing appreciation of 
some of the economic changes that had taken place in Japan, most notably the 
development of some forms of modem industry, most British diplomats persisted in 
emphasizing the difficulties which Japan faced in its pursuit o f economic prosperity. 
Only a few of them even anticipated that in the not too-distant future Japan might become 
an important trade rival in East Asia.
CHAPTER 5
BRITISH DIPLOMATS1 VIEWS OF SOCIAL CHANGE
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IN EARLY MEIJI JAPAN
The most striking evidence of Japanese efforts towards modernisation and to 
some extent westernisation can be found in the social reforms introduced by the Meiji 
government in 1868-90. Not only did these reforms represent the assimilation of Western 
customs and culture, they also involved the adoption of other features which 
characterized a modem nation, such as development of public works, modem education, 
advanced legal codes, freedom of religion, etc. British diplomats’ comments on these 
reforms throw light on their basic attitudes towards ‘the progress of Japan.’ In assessing 
them, however, it is necessary to take into account also the possibility that diplomats 
were influenced by whether Japan turned to Britain or to other Western Powers in 
seeking models for reform.
Western Custom and Culture
To become a modern and advanced nation, the adoption of some elements of 
Western custom and culture was viewed as necessary by Meiji leaders. One such reform 
was the adoption of ceremonial practices based on those of European Courts, Imperial 
invitations to foreign ministers to celebrate the Mikado's birthday and New Year, and 
social gatherings at the palace. British diplomats' comments signified their appreciation 
of these changes as proofs of the Japanese government's desire to conform to Western 
usages.1 This is evident in a comment by Parkes in January 1869 with regard to the 
Mikado's review of the Imperial fleet at Tokyo Bay. Noting that such a public appearance 
was alien to a Sovereign who had previously been treated as a god and secluded from 
public eyes, Parkes wrote:
His Ministers seem to be trying hard to make a man of him, & are 
apparently making encouraging progress. Few Europeans however can 
appreciate the difficulties they have to encounter in modifying the 
practice and prejudices of centuries on such a touchy point as the acts 
and ceremonial of a Sovereign.2
1 E.g., FO 46/92, No. 66, Parkes to Stanley, Kyoto, March 26, 1868; FO 46/142, No. 93, Adams to 
Clarendon, Yedo, October 13, 1871; FO 46/271, No. 2, Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, January 13,1881.
2 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, January 16, 1869.
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In another instance, Parkes observed in 1873 that the informal manner in which his 
private audience with the Emperor was conducted, denoted 'a marked advance and a 
material improvement in the reception of Foreign Ministers.' In 1881, Charge d'Affaires 
R. G. Kennedy described the presence of the Empress and of the ladies, both of the 
Diplomatic corps and of the high government officials, during a New Year celebration as 
'great innovations' modelled on the ceremonial of the Court of St. James.4
The Court was not alone in undergoing changes for, British diplomats noted, 
society at large was reconstructed. Instead of distinctive four- classes of nobles, samurai, 
peasants and merchants or artisans, Parkes reported after the political reforms of mid- 
1869, the new system comprised only two sections, namely, the nobles (which included 
former daimyo and samurai) and common people.5 Moreover, the abolition of tie  
outcaste class (called eta or hinin) and their incorporation in the common people (heimin) 
was also recorded. Other related reforms which attracted diplomatic attention included 
the permission of marriage between nobles and commoners, the abolition of feudal 
restraints on choice of occupation, and the ending of samurai privileges through the 
introduction of a conscription system, the prohibition of wearing swords and the 
commutation of their stipends.
The changes, though appreciated by British diplomats, only elicited a small 
number of directly complimentary remarks. One such was Charge d'Affaires Adams’s 
comment that the abolition of the eta class in 1871 furnished a 'striking proof of social 
change in Japan;6 while in similar vein Consul Marcus Flowers at Nagasaki observed in 
1873 that the new opportunity for samurai to become merchants was an 'advantageous'
n
social change. Nevertheless, regarding the commutation of samurai stipends in 1876, 
Parkes while acknowledging the government's reasons for such a measure, indicated that 
the amalgamation of the samurai with the lower orders might lead to future trouble 
among the class.8 Other diplomats also expressed concern about the effects of some of 
the radical changes. For instance, Adams reported in 1872 that some disturbances had 
broken out because the common people disliked the abolition o f the separate identity of 
the eta? Similarly, the conscription system was more than once pointed to as one source
3FO 46/166, No. 11, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 29, 1873. On this particular occasion, Parkes was 
unaccompanied by any suite while the Emperor was attended by the Empress.
4 FO 46/271, No. 2, Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, January 13, 1881.
5 He ignored, however, the distinction between kozoku (nobles and daimyo) and shizoku (samurai).
6 FO 46/142, No. 93, Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, October 13, 1871.
7 Flowers to Watson, Nagasaki, February 26, 1873, Commercial Reports, Parliam entary Papers (PP), 
1873, Vol. LXV1.
8 FO 46/209, Parkes to Derby, November 13, 1876.
9 FO 46/151, No. 29, Adams to Granville, Yedo, January 29, 1872.
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of the discontent that contributed to peasant and samurai uprisings in the 1870s, while the 
prohibition of wealing swords and the commutation of samurai stipends were seen by 
diplomats as the main factors for the outbreak of samurai uprisings in the 1870s.
In contrast to the emphasis on the image of Japanese women in Western literature 
that resulted in Japan being romantically portrayed as a land of geisha and engendered a 
generally passive image of Japan,10 British diplomats concentrated mainly on social 
issues surrounding Japanese women, particularly the problem of prostitution which was 
prevalent at the treaty ports and which affected the health of British seamen. On the issue, 
Consul Russell Robertson and Parkes's comments were condemnatory, describing the 
practice of prostitution as 'low and degrading1, 'discreditable1 and 'evil', while Japanese 
brothel-keepers and pimps were criticised as 'degraded individuals who are willing to 
pander to the evil propensities of their countrymen.'11 Yet they also observed that the 
practice could not be easily suppressed, and that, despite a government measure in 1873 
to free prostitutes from contracts which bound them to brothel-keepers, some women 
were still pressurised to return to the old practice.12 In containing this problem, British 
diplomats maintained that the vigilance o f the Japanese police was important,13 for the 
imposition of legal restraints on Japanese brothels alone would not suffice to put an end 
to the practice.14 While Parkes did note in 1880 that in some places the government had 
sought to educate Japanese women involved in prostitution by teaching them to read and 
write and trained them in certain 'female industries with the object of enabling them to 
regain their living thereby in case they could be persuaded to forsake their discreditable 
trade,'15 he did not indicate whether he thought that the attempt had been successful.
In addition to changes in social status, other essential reforms effected by the 
Mikado's government included the adoption of Western holidays and the Western 
calendar. These were distinctly welcomed by British diplomats not only as further proof 
of Japan's desire to follow in the footsteps of advanced nations but, more importantly, 
because the changes facilitated communications and economic transactions between 
Japan and other countries. As Charge d'Affaires Watson noted in 1872, the traditional 
Japanese holidays of six days each month caused difficulties for both 'government
10 Lehmann, J. P., The Image o f  Japan: From Feudal Isolation to World Power, 1850-1905  (London: 
George Allen & Unwin), 1978, pp. 69-73, 81-93; Wilkinson, E., Japan versus the West: Image and Reality 
(London: Penguin Books), 1980, p. 108.
11 FO 46/299, N o. 73, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, May 1 1, 1883; Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, March 
31, 1873, Commercial Reports, PP, 1873, Vol. LXV1.
12 Robertson to Parkes, Kanagawa, March 31, 1873, Commercial Reports, PP, 1873, Vol. LXVI.
13 Memorandum by Parkes on 'Superintendance o f  Lock Hospitals in Japan’, September 9, 1881.
14 FO 46/299, N o. 73, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, May 11,1883.
15 FO 46/257, Memorandum by Parkes on 'The Memorial o f  National Association for the Repeal o f the 
Contagious Diseases Act', August 16, 1880.
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officials and persons engaged in commerce, owing to the circumstance that the Japanese
1 £
holidays do not coincide with those of Foreign communities.' When it was finally 
decreed that all government offices were to observe Sundays as a holiday and Saturday as 
a half-holiday from April 1, 1876, Charge d'Affaires Plunkett described the measure as a 
sign of progress on the part of Japan.17
Another reform towards Westernisation and facilitating communications with the 
West would have been the adoption of Roman letters in Japanese writing in place of 
Chinese characters, as proposed by an association called the Romajikai (Society for the 
romanisation of the written language). Plunkett observed that if  the idea proved 
successful, 'it will be, perhaps, the most important of the many wonderful changes which 
have already witnessed in this country' as 'it will do more to facilitate intercourse between 
Japanese and Foreigners than almost any other single step could accomplish,' but he was 
also aware of the difficulty of such a reform since it was 'most radical'.18 Nevertheless, as 
his comment in 1884 that 'time will be necessary to establish such a radical alteration of 
the habits of a nations'19 indicated, he did not discount the possibility that it might 
eventually succeed.
Not all assimilation of Western elements by Japanese prompted a positive 
response from British diplomats. Watson, for instance, did not advocate the adoption of 
Western costumes by the Mikado and government officials when he was consulted by a 
Japanese minister on the appropriate proceeding for the opening a railway (from
Yokohama to Tokyo) in October 1872 'in view of the evident difficulty of accustoming
*)()oneself suddenly to an unused costume.' A more forthright view was expressed by 
Consul Flowers at Nagasaki when he observed in 1873 that 'the almost compulsory 
adoption of European styles of dress and living' among Japanese at the treaty port was 
'something which cannot be too much regretted.'21 Acting-Consul Dohmen was equally 
 ^ critical. As he wrote in February 1872:
...the most remarkable change is the rapid adoption of foreign dress by 
all classes of the people. The fashions, however, that have hitherto been 
copied or invented by native tailors, are so varied, and in many 
instances so ridiculous, as to defy the keenest imagination. This is 
certainly to be regretted.
16 FO 46/156, No. 149, Watson to Granville, Yedo, November 12, 1872.
17 FO 46/204, No. 50, Plunkett to Derby, Yedo, March 13; 1876.
18 FO 46/317, No. 229, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, December 10, 1884.
19 Ibid.
20 FO 46/156, No. 124, Watson to Granville, Yedo, October 14, 1872.
21 Flowers to Watson, Nagasaki, February 26, 1873, Commercial Reports, PP, 1873, Vol. LXVI.
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Nevertheless, Dohmen perceived that such a craze was not without some productive 
results: firstly, the use of European garments made it difficult for the samurai to wear his 
long swords, and secondly, it would lead to the disappearance of offensive anti-foreign 
cries such as ke-tojin (‘hairy foreigner’) and tojin baka (‘foreign fool’), since the wearing
of European dress by distinguished Japanese would cause commoners to cease looking
22 . t 
upon foreigners as barbarians. Satow was also not impressed especially with Japanese
men in Western suits, as he recorded on an Imperial garden party in April 1881:
...the Japanese looked very shabby. Most of the men had rusty old black 
soft hats and black broad cloth coats & trousers; a more fearful set of 
badly dressed monkeys one never saw; the women mostly in native 
dress looked much better; those of them who wore European costume 
also looked well.23
In this context it is worth noting that the Rokumeikan, a modern building erected in 1883 
in which an international social club was formed, and which signified another distincth e 
symbol of the craze for Western civilization, prompted only a few casual remarks.24
As with the changes in social classes, British diplomats noted that the 
encouragement by the government of various Western customs such as the wearing of 
Western costumes, the adoption o f Western hair-styles, the new education system, the 
calendar, and so forth were partly responsible for some uprisings among Japanese 
peasants in the 1870s.25 No mention, however, was made by diplomats o f the subsequent 
conservative reaction among educated Japanese who questioned the advantage of 
indiscriminate adoption of Western ways and manners by Japan. They did, however, 
sometimes attribute the social hardships faced by Japanese peasants and merchants in the 
mid-1880s partly to the speed of modernisation, observing that while the primary cause 
was the Matsukata deflationary policy, the depression was also a result o f the great 
expenses entailed by the extensive reforms and the abolition of the feudal system, and 
'the extravagant habits induced by the repeal of the old sumptuary laws, which under the 
feudal system encouraged thrift by restricting the luxuries of the lower classes'. The
22 Dohmen to Adams, Yedo, February 15, 1872, encl. in Adams to Granville, Yedo, April 30, 1872, 
commercial Reports, PP, 1872, Vol. L1X.
23 PRO 33/ 33/15/6, Satow's Diary, April 28, 1881.
24 Satow reported a few occasions that took place at the Rokumeikan, including the celebration o f  the 
Mikado's birthday on November 3, 1884. In PRO 30/33/16/8, Satow's Diary, November 3, 1884; ibid., 
November 18, 1884. Satow in 1884 was Minister to Siam, and his comments were made during a visit to 
Japan in November-September that year. For more details on the Rokumeikan see e.g., Sansom, G. B., The 
Western W orld and Japan  (London: The Cresset Press), 1950, pp. 388-389.
25 E.g.,FO 46/167, No. 39, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, July 8, 1873. See Aston's memorandum, July 7, 
1873.
26 Sansom, op. cit., p. 405.
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hardships, they noted, affected Japanese of all classes, particularly small cultivators who 
were forced to sell their lands to become jinrikisha coolies, while some others were 
compelled to emigrate to Hawaii or commit crimes.27
Education and Military Training
Education also saw great assimilation of Western elements. Instead of 
concentrating mainly 011 classical Chinese learning and Confucian philosophy, tie  
government now placed emphasis on the study of ’utilitarian' subjects such as Western 
languages and sciences. In addition, with the creation of the Ministry of Education in 
1871 and the issuance o f an Education Code in 1872, a universal education system and 
compulsory attendance were introduced. The system centralized control over education 
and aimed at a high degree of standardization: plans for construction of elementary and 
secondary schools, training schools in medicine, engineering, commerce, etc, and 
universities were announced, and regulations over private schools were issued.28 Foreign 
teachers were engaged to teach various modern and technical subjects, and Japanese 
students went sent abroad to acquire Western knowledge.
To British diplomats, the modernising approach taken by the Japanese 
government and the enthusiasm shown by the general population for modem education 
were praiseworthy signs of progress. Many diplomatic reports substantiate this view. For 
instance, Acting-Consul Adolphus Annesley in 1871 observed that the establishment of 
government schools teaching Western languages and natural sciences, the dispatch 
overseas o f many sons and relatives o f daimyo and the construction of schools 
superintended by Europeans by many daimyo in their provinces, all represented a 
Japanese attempt 'to allow Western civilization to penetrate into all parts of their
9 0  *country.’ Vice-Consul Dohmen, too, commended Japanese readiness to learn. In 1872 
he wrote that 'there is among the Japanese of all classes, an universal desire for acquiring 
foreign languages, especially English, and other branches of learning.'30
At least one British diplomat, however, noted a problem caused by Japans 
acceptance of a centralized system of education. Following the decision of the Meiji 
government in August 1885 to transfer the control of education to local authorities,
27 E.g., Gubbins's memorandum, April 26, 1886 in FO 46/344, No, 67, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, May 
4, 1886.
28 Sansom, op. cit., p. 482.
29 Annesley to Parkes, February 20, 1871, Nagasaki, Commercial Reports, PP, 1871, Vol. LXVII,
30 Dohmen to Adams, Yedo, February, 15, 1872, encl. in Adams to Granville, Yedo, April 30, 1872, 
Commercial Reports, PP, 1872, Vol. L1X.
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Charge d'Affaires P. Le Poer Trench observed that this showed that the policy of 
centralization as embodied in the 1872 act, which had been drafted with the help of an 
American adviser and which he thought to be modelled on an American system,31 had 
failed to suit Japan's needs:
The wider discretion and powers of initiative conferred on the local 
authorities will have the tendency to correct the mistake and failures 
naturally incident to a rigidly centralized system of administration, such 
as has hitherto obtained...they [the government] have now had 
considerable experience of their own countrymen, and may be excused 
from aiming at a higher standard than public opinion will enable them 
to realize.32
Though difficult to prove, it is possible that this comment reflected Le Poer Trench’s 
hope of seeing Japan adopting a British model, especially in view of the increasing 
popularity in the early 1880s in Japan of Herbert Spencer's liberal principles in politics 
and education.
With regard to the dispatch of Japanese .students to America and Europe, British 
diplomats viewed this positively, as evidence of the Japanese relentless desire to acquire 
Western knowledge. As Parkes commented in 1870:
The Japanese are wonderfully given to missions & travelling. They of 
course waste their time & means occasionally - whether by going about 
things in their own way, or by leaning to unprofitable advice, but the 
end must be good as the Japanese mind is an impressive one and their 
eagerness to learn continues unabated. When they have satisfied 
themselves that learning involves steady & continuous labour, & that 
there is no royal road to gain it, & when they have advanced 
sufficiently to enable them to judge of their own small attainments they 
will be better scholars. This improvement will doubtless come, & will 
result I think in their shaking off their old attachment to Chinese 
Schools, & taking actively to European.34
Yet British diplomats also had their reservations. As early as June 1867 when 
Bakufu councillors (Roju) requested the British Legation to provide English teachers for 
the promotion of the study of the English language and Western sciences at a newly 
proposed college, Parkes wrote to Lord Stanley,
31 In contrast, later historians attribute the 1872 act to the French centralization policy. See e.g., Yoshida, 
Kumaji, 'European and American influences in Japanese Education, in Nitobe, Inazo, Western Influences in 
M odem  Japan  (Chicago: Univ. o f Chicago Press), 1931, p. 27. The American adviser referred to by I.e 
Poer Trench was David Murray, an American professor from New Jersey. His task as an adviser to the 
Education Department was to put the 1872 educational system into operation. Ibid ., p. 35.
32 FO 46/334, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 29, 1885.
3j Yoshida, op. cit., p. 38.
34 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yedo, December 22, 1870.
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I have always warmly encouraged the scheme as a cheaper and surer 
method of throwing open to Japan the knowledge of the West, than the 
mission to Europe for a limited period of a number of young students 
out of whose number but a small proportion could be expected to return 
to their country having made such progress as would be of real value to 
their government.35
Moreover, in a private letter to Edmund Hammond in 1872 Parkes observed that the 
Japanese students currently in England were 'picking up information as they best can, in 
many cases very imperfectly, and in a way which I feel is not worthy either of them or of 
England.'36 Thus, a proper education in England of the students was viewed as important, 
not only to the interest o f Japan but also the reputation of England: 'I should be sorry if 
we gave the Japanese reason to form less favourable impressions of us than of other 
countries, to some of which they are already sending their young men in larger numbers 
than they do to England.'37
A similar view was held by Adams. In a conversation with the Chief Minister 
Sanjo Sanetomi in June 1871, Adams observed that while the exodus of Japanese to the 
Western countries showed their evident desire to acquire some insight into the 
civilization and science of the West (in contrast to the 'extraordinary passiveness of the 
Chinese,' who merely went abroad to make money as shopkeepers, servants, and the 
like), some of the students returned to Japan having acquired only ’superficial knowledge' 
of modem civilization. Adams further added that Japan should be careful not to be 
misguided by people with such knowledge, especially as some o f them seemed to have 
got 'the ear of older and more experienced men in the Government.'38 He made the same 
point a few months later to Iwakura, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, and when Iwakura 
replied that, at all events, short visits to the West still produced a certain amount of good, 
Adams expressed his disagreement emphatically:
...but in most instances this can hardly be the case, and it is often 
painful to contrast the well-bred Japanese gentlemen, who has never left 
his native country, and is distinguished by his courtly manners, his 
exquisite politeness, and his picturesque dress, with the forward youths 
who return from their hurried tour abroad in badly-made European 
clothes, full of conceit, and giving themselves airs of superiority, 
because they fancy that in a few months they have gained an amount of
35 FO 46/81, No. 112, Parkes to Stanley, Yedo, June 27, 1867.
36 FO 46/152, Parkes to Hammond, March 26, 1872. This was written by Parkes in England.
37 Ibid.
38 FO 46/139, No. 16, Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, June 17, 1871.
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knowledge, which they are in fact far from possessing, and which it 
would take them many years of patient study to acquire.39
As regards Britain’s reputation and influence in Japanese education, Parkes's 
concern was shared by other British diplomats. Gubbins, for instance, deplored the 
ascendancy of German influence following the return o f Ito in 1884 from Europe, where 
Germans were engaged to serve in the Education Ministry: in various branches of 
Technical Science at the Imperial University such as Medicine, Geology, Mining, 
Meteorology, German professors were almost the only foreigners employed.40 In another 
instance, Plunkett when returning to Japan in 1884, voiced the somewhat exaggerated 
complaint that the use of English language was prohibited in the Imperial University at 
Tokyo and everything was German. Unsurprisingly, he welcomed an order issued in 
August 1884 by the Education Ministry for the general teaching of English in Japanese 
educational institutions41 Two years later, in a conversation with Ito, Plunkett 
emphasized the importance of learning the English language, arguing not only that 
’English was the language of the Far East,' but also that to teach other languages such as 
French and German whose usage were limited would merely delay Japan's own progress 
in more important studies. He then instanced the advantage Ito himself, Inoue and others 
had over those of their colleagues who did not speak English, even suggesting ’a good 
knowledge of [English], perhaps more than anything else, had made him what he [Ito] 
now was.'42
Also relevant to diplomats’ views of Japanese education was Japan’s new system 
of military training, in which the navy’s training was based on the British model and the 
army’s, at least until the 1880s, on the French system. In general, British diplomats took a 
favourable view: for instance, Consul Martin Dohmen observed in 1872 that 'rapid 
progress...has been made in the organization of the army and navy' and he contributed 
this to the French and British military instructions 43 Moreover, positive reports were also 
made by British military officials such as Naval Instructor Lieutenant Baillie and Chief 
Engineer Frederick Sutton, who, in 1878 noted the progress made by Japanese students in 
the Imperial Naval College.44 Furthermore, British diplomats45 as well as British military
39 FO 46/141, No. 73, Adams to Granville, Yedo, September 15, 1871.
40 Gubbins's memorandum, February 26, 1884, in FO 46/311, Trench to Granville, Tokyo, March 5, 1884.
41 FO 46/331, Private, Plunkett to Currie, Tokyo, June 19, 1885. For more details on German influence in 
Japanese education see Martin, op, cil., pp. 41-43.
42 FO 46/343, No. 35, Conf. Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, March 1, 1886.
43 Vice-Consul Dohmen to Adams, Yedo, February, 15, 1872, encl. in Adams to Granville, Yedo, April 30, 
1872, Commercial Reports, PP, 1872. Vol. U X .
44 FO 46/230, No, 100, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, September 30, 1878. See the enclosed report by Baillie, 
July 3 1 ,1878 , and by Sutton, August 22, 1878.
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officers46 were also impressed by military parades as showing Japanese progress in 
assimilating Western instruction in the organisation and movement of troops.
As with foreign languages, British diplomats were also concerned with the 
Japanese adoption of the British model. In fact, there had existed a rivalry for influence 
between Britain and France since the closing years of the Shogunate. This is shown in 
Parkes's comment in 1866 when the Bakufu government showed a desire for British 
instruction for its navy to match the planned French training for their army. Parkes wrote:
I have had a little trouble to arrange this point, for I thought I saw a 
disposition on the part of our French friends to monopolize 
arrangements that might minister to their influence, and their slight 
material interests in tins part o f the world prompt them to leave no 
stone unturned that will extend their position. Although rivalry in 
respect of assistance to be rendered to the Japanese is the last thing I 
wish to seek still I think England should have her fair share in such 
matters 47
Following a query by the Japanese Marine Minister in 1867 as to when the British naval 
instructors were likely to arrive, Parkes again expressed interest in British influence:
The Japanese are apparently beginning to take great interest in naval 
matters, & have frequently assured me that they are satisfied that the 
prosperity of Japan must depend greatly upon its Naval resources...If 
they continue in this mind, we shall have as fair an opportunity of 
exercising a legitimate influence on their action as the French with then 
military schemes 48
Interestingly, Satow was informed by the Bakufu naval leader, Katsu Awa, in 1868 that 
French Minister Roches had persuaded the Japanese to apply to the English for naval 
instruction since he feared that Parkes's jealousy of the French instruction o f the Japanese 
army would lead him to support the ‘Daimyo party’ in the struggle against the Bakufu 49 
Even after the fall o f the Bakufu Parkes continued to be concerned that French influence 
might prevent Britain from playing its proper role. For instance, in 1872, in response to a 
request by the Japanese government to engage a number of British officers as teachers of 
Naval Science and Seamanship at the Imperial Naval College, Parkes urged the British 
government to meet the Japanese request since 'The latter have already obtained from the
45 E.g., FO 46/190, No. 2, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, January 4, 1875; FO 46/314, No. 154, Plunkett to 
Granville, Tokyo, September 12, 1884.
46 One such report was by Lieutenant Sandwith to Colonel A. Richards, Yokohama, November 7, 1874 
encl. in FO 46/183, No, 201, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, November 16, 1874.
47 FO 46/68, Private, Parkes to Hammond, April 28, 1866.
48 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yedo, March 17, 1867.
49 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, August 18, 1868.
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French Government a numerous corps of Military officers for the instruction of their 
army, and if  we were to show any hesitation in furnishing them with Naval officers they 
would doubtless be able to obtain these without difficulty from other Powers.'50
Similarly, in 1886, on hearing of the dispatch o f a mission led by Saigo 
Tsugumichi to Europe to study naval education and administration, Plunkett sought an 
opportunity to recommend Saigo to devote the largest portion of his time in Britain, and 
to observe and adhere to the British system. This was because he believed that pressure 
was being brought to bear upon Saigo to seek instructors in France. He urged upon Saigo 
that not only was the British navy more powerful than that of any other country, but the 
English model should be adhered to, since, for the Japanese navy to be sound and 
efficient, 'a system must be uniform and continuous.' Besides efficiency, interestingly, 
Plunkett anticipated, as he wrote to Lord Rosebury, that the adoption of the British model 
would also facilitate cooperation between the Japanese and British navies in the event of 
Japan joining Britain in an Anglo-Russian conflict. This statement may partly be 
attributed to Saigo's remark to Plunkett that the interest o f Japan, in case of such a 
conflict, would be in alliance with Britain.51
Apart from British prestige and influence, Plunkett was also concerned with the 
British shipbuilding industry. Though he made no mention of the Japanese tendency in 
the mid-1880s to favour French warship design, as shown in the ordering of vessels from 
France and the engagement of a French naval engineer in 1885 by the Japanese
C*)
government, it is significant that Plunkett urged the British government to impress 
Saigo favourably with Britain: By doing so, he argued,
...we may secure the benefit o f the political impression on Count 
Saigo's mind by our courteous treatment, and by the sight o f our naval 
and mechanical resources ... our shipbuilders and others will derive the 
commercial benefit of being the first to obtain His Excellency's 
attention.53
British diplomatic awareness of the Japanese disposition towards the French-built 
warships was indicated more directly by Le Poer Trench in 1887. In reporting on the 
mission led by Admiral Kabayama to Europe to investigate naval construction and
50 FO 46/156, Parkes to Hammond, London, December 3, 1872.
51 FO 46/345, No. 112, Conf., Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, June 30, 1886; FO 46/346, No. 119, Conf., 
Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, July 10, 1886.
52 The designs o f  Frenchman Louis Emile Bertin attracted the Japanese attention in the mid-1880s and he 
was hired for a three year period from 1885 as adviser to the Naval Ministry and commissioned to build 
warships at Japanese ship-building dockyards. See. e.g., Sims, French Policy Towards the Bakufu and 
M eiji Japan 1854-95 (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library), 1998, pp. 224,249-252.
53 FO 46/ 345, No. 112, Conf., Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, June 30, 1886.
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dockyards, to purchase machinery for the use of the Japanese dockyards and to order 
armed cruisers, he stressed that
there can be no doubt that every influence will be exercised on Admiral 
Kabayama during his stay in France to induce him to continue the 
ordering of Japanese naval requirements in that country, and I venture 
therefore to submit that it would be highly in the interests o f British 
Trade that every attention should be shown him, and that the 
opportunity afforded by his initial stay in England should be utilized to 
the utmost in letting him see the outturn and machinery of the various 
British dockyards and shipbuilding centres.54
Apart from France, there were also other Powers to consider. When the Japanese 
government in 1870 requested that two young Japanese officers be allowed on board 
British ships and admitted to the British naval academy, Parkes urged the Admiralty to 
meet the request, unprecedented though it was for the British Navy. This was because he 
observed that a number of Japanese officers had already been received by the United 
States government into their Naval Academy and so, 'it would be both politic and 
friendly' on Britain’s part if  the Admiralty did the same.55 Moreover, there was also some 
concern about German influence. Plunkett, for instance, noted in April 1884 that certain 
Japanese statesmen were endeavouring to send the young Prince Yamashina Sadamaro to 
study in the German navy, but that the Admiral Kawamura the Minister of Marine was 
insisting that as the Japanese navy had always been modelled on the British, the young 
Prince must be sent to Britain, and 'not to a country whose navy as yet is only of
C £
secondary standing in Europe.' When Kawamura's argument prevailed, Plunkett offered 
to facilitate the dispatch of the Prince to study naval matters in Britain.57 As regards the 
Japanese decision in the mid-1880s to turn to a German model for its army, British 
diplomats, with the exception of Plunkett who expressed his regret that General Oyama 
on his return from Europe in 1885 showed a preference for Germany,58 adopted a neutral 
stance. Gubbins, for instance, noted without comment the engagement of a German army 
officer in 1885 to reorganize the Japanese army,59 while Le Poer Trench was equally 
reticent when reporting the sudden recall in 1889 of French military instructors in
54 FO 46/369, No. 230, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, September 27, 1887.
55 FO 46/126, Parkes to Secretary o f State for Foreign Affairs, Yokohama, August 22, 1870.
56 FO 46/311, No. 56, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 17, 1884.
57 Ibid , No. 55, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 17, 1884.
58 Plunkett to Parkes, Copy, Conf., Tokyo, Februaiy 16, 1885, encl. in FO 46/328, No. 54, Conf., Plunkett 
to Granville, Tokyo, February 16, 1885.
59 Gubbins's memorandum, Tokyo, February 9, 1885, in FO 46/328, No. 53, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, 
Tokyo, February 16, 1885.
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retaliation for the appointment of German officers to higher positions.60 They could 
afford to take a detached view because, despite the dismissal of the British naval mission 
in 1879, individual British experts continued to be engaged by the Japanese government 
as naval instructors.
Public Works and Communications
The modernisation of Japan would certainly not have been complete without the 
development of railway lines, telegraph, postal system, hospitals and lighthouses along 
Japan's coast. To British diplomats, Japan’s efforts in these areas were welcome signs of 
progress. The development most praised was the Japanese railway system, which, as 
Parkes wrote in December 1868, ‘will do more to promote the work o f progress in this 
country than any other measure.’61 Not only did railway tracks, diplomats observed, 
contribute to political unity as they served ‘to promote the stability of the government and 
secure a closer union between the several parts of the Empire,’62 but they also encouraged 
economic growth as they system ‘facilitated the distribution of produce’ especially in the 
absence of a perfect road system in Japan. Other actions by the Japanese government to 
modernise the infrastructure also prompted favourable remarks. For instance, in 1871 
Parkes described the introduction of a reformed postal system based on a Western model 
as ‘an improvement’,64 while Watson welcomed the construction in 1872 of the telegraph 
line from Tokyo to Nagasaki65 and observed in 1873 that the erection of lighthouses on 
the coast of Japan was 'evidence of the real progress in material civilization which has of 
late years been made in Japan.'66
British diplomats not only reported on Japan’s progress, but they also encouraged 
the Japanese government to adopt reforms and tendered advice on how to implement 
them. Parkes, for instance, claimed a share of the credit for the Japanese government’s 
decision to carry out the construction of railways. Commenting on the Japanese proposal 
in 1868 to connect Kyoto and Osaka, and Tokyo and Yokohama by a line of railway, he 
wrote, 'I must admit that I have instigated the adoption o f this resolution & have aided
60 FO 46/386, No. 22, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 14, 1889.
61 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yedo, December 18, 1868.
62 E.g., FO 46/114, No. 228, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, December 4, 1869.
63 E.g., Trench to Plunkett on ‘Railways o f  Japan’, Tokyo, April 10, 1885, encl. in FO 46/329, No. 103, 
Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 10, 1885.
64 FO 46/138, No. 58, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 29, 1871.
65 FO 46/154, No. 20, Watson to Granville, Yedo, June 5, 1872.
66 FO 46/165, No. 44, Watson to Granville, Yedo, February 19, 1873.
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them in suggesting ways & means for carrying it out.'67 In a later dispatch of 1869, 
Parkes noted that the building of railroads and their benefits was something which he had
* * f \ Roften urged on Japanese Foreign Minister. More generally, Charge d'Affaires Adams 
encouraged Chief Minister Sanjo in 1871 to undertake reform, although he also advised 
him to take into account the need to avoid opposition against such measures. Giving the 
examples of the telegraph and railroads, Adams advised that the government should not 
construct too many poles or lines 'until the people realized their convenience and 
favoured them.'69 While Adams made no specific mention of how ordinary Japanese were 
responding to the construction of railways and telegraph, it is likely that he was aware of 
the existence of popular resistance, particularly among peasants who opposed the 
measures out of ignorance and local superstitions, as a number of protests were reported 
in the Government Gazette70 and by Parkes in 1870.71 There is no evidence in their 
dispatches, however, that either Adams or Parkes realized that there was opposition also 
among some conservative members of the government who objected, particularly to 
railways, on both financial and military grounds.
In reporting Japan’s infrastructural reforms, British diplomats frequently 
emphasized the contribution of foreigners. As early as April 1866, Parkes pointed out that 
the employment o f foreigners 'would do much to develop the resources of the country as 
they greatly need engineers & mechanics in the construction of mines and other w orks.'3 
Given this view, the Japanese tendency towards the early dismissal o f foreign employees 
in their service often elicited negative comments by British diplomats. Not only did they 
express serious doubts about the ability of Japanese to handle modern machinery without 
foreign assistance, but they also argued that it was best for Japan to place trust in foreign 
employees who entered into the government's service. This formed the gist o f Parkes's 
speech in a private audience with the Emperor in May 1871,74 and of Adams’s remarks to
67 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yedo, December 18, 1868. Parkes not only recommended to the Japanese 
government to take up British loans but also to employ British engineers.
68 FO 46/11, No. 228, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, December 4, 1869.
69 FO 46/139, No. 16, Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, June 17, 1871.
70 The opposition to the construction o f telegraph lines was published in 'Daijokan Nisshi' (Government 
Gazette), No. 28, 1871 by the Japanese government. This was translated by Satow and enclosed in FO 
46/154, No. 20, Watson to Granville, Yedo, June 5, 1871.
7! FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, March 26, 1870.
72 The proposal for the construction o f a railway line between Tokyo and Yokohama was supported by 
officials o f  the Ministry o f Finance and Foreign Ministry, notably Okuma Shigenobu, Ito Hirobumi and 
Terajima Munenori, but was opposed by conservative officials such as Kaeda Nobuyoshi and Maebara Issei 
and Yoshii Tomozane. Beasley, Modern History, p. 357.
73 FO 46/68, Private, Parkes to Hammond, April 28, 1866.
74 See FO 46/139, Parkes to Granville, May 22, 1871.
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Sanjo in June 1871.75 Not only was the Japanese aspiration for self-sufficiency seen as 
premature, but also as a hindrance to Japan’s progress since their lack of experience
7  f toccasioned obstructions and delays m the construction of the various projects.
British diplomats had been made aware soon after the Meiji government 
consolidated its power of its desire for self-sufficiency. Adams, for instance, as early as 
August 1871, noted Okuma Shigenobu's statements that
...when the skilled men came out from England, it was understood that 
they were to train a body of Japanese to carry on the service under their 
supervision, with a view of eventually obtaining such knowledge o f 
their duties as to be able to perform them without such supervision.
...There was also the question of expense, which would be greatly 
increased if so many more Europeans were employed.77
For the most part, however, British diplomats thought that the Japanese were over- 
optimistic when it came to assessing whether they were ready to dispense with the 
services of their foreign employees. Notwithstanding Watson’s acknowledgement of the 
satisfactory working of the Tokyo-Yokohama railway under Japanese management in 
1872,78 most British diplomatic comments in the 1870s indicate skepticism about 
Japanese capacity to manage the various modernising projects and operations. On the 
efficiency of the postal service at different treaty ports, while some British consuls such 
as Consul Robertson at Kanagawa, Consul Eusden at Hakodate and Consul Flowers at 
Nagasaki observed that the service was well managed by the Japanese with a little help 
from foreign workers, others held the opposite view. Consul Troup at Niigata, for 
instance, in reporting on the postal system run by Japanese at that port wrote that, 
'Although the existing postal system is a great improvement...I can scarcely say, under 
these circumstances, that it has secured the entire confidence of the foreign community at 
this port.' A reservation which might be considered ‘Orientalist’ was expressed by Consul 
Annesley at Hyogo. As he put it,
The existing operation gives fair satisfaction. It is to be feared, 
however, that if  the working of the establishment were left entirely to 
natives, the results would prove very unsatisfactory and prejudicial to 
the interests o f the foreign community of Kobe.79
75 FO 46/139, No. 16, Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, June 17, 1871.
75 FO 46/166, No. 19, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, May 23, 1873; also see FO 46/181, No. 137, Parkes to
Derby, Yedo, August 1, 1874.
77 FO 46/140, No. 47, Adams to Granville, Yedo, August 21, 1871.
78 FO 46/156, No. 124, Watson to Granville, Yedo, October 14, 1872.
79 See the consuls’ letters encl. in FO 46/271, No. 61, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 24, 1877.
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Similar views were expressed about the functioning of Japan's lighthouses. 
Adams in 1871 and Parkes in 1875 both observed that despite its desire for self- 
sufficiency, the Meiji government had to depend on European employees since Japanese 
light-keepers lacked the experience and skills to ensure an effective working of the 
system.80 Parkes and Adams's comments were to a great extent influenced by reports 
written by Richard Brunton, the British Chief Engineer of Japanese Lighthouse
ni #
Department. However, it is noteworthy that while Brunton later modified his view in 
1876, Parkes's attitude remained unchanged. Though he agreed with Brunton that there 
was considerable improvement in the organization and management of the lighthouse 
service, he rejected the latter's view that only a few foreign light-keepers were needed. 
Instead, basing himself on a report by Brunton's successor, McRitchie, who emphasized 
the lack of discipline and experience of Japanese workers, Parkes maintained that more 
foreign light-keepers should be engaged by Japan.
Skepticism also prevailed in regard to the Lock Hospitals. On the question of the 
transfer of the entire management of the Lock Hospital system to the Japanese, Parkes 
observed in 1877-79 that since there were only a few Japanese doctors with sufficient 
experience or training, it would be some years before the plan could be effected. As with 
the lighthouse system, he drew upon unfavourable reports by British officials, notably 
those of two Superintendents of the Lock Hospitals, Dr. Bimie Hill and Dr. Lawrenson, 
and that of Vice-Admiral Alfred P. Ryder.83
In the 1880s, British diplomats gradually came to recognize the increasing skill 
and knowledge of the Japanese, In 1885 Le Poer Trench noted that though some parts for 
trains, such as the wheels, axles, buffers and engines, were still imported from Britain, 
the Japanese had managed to build carriages and wagons (which previously had to be 
imported), and to supervise the lines very well.84 Similarly, as regards the postal service, 
Kennedy observed in 1881 that while the report of the Postmaster General o f Japan for 
the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1880 showed a reduction in the number o f foreign
80 FO 46/140, No. 47, Adams, to Granville, Yedo, August 21, 1871; FO 46/193, No. 114, Parkes to Derby, 
Conf., Yedo, August 30, 1875.
81 See Brunton’s reports in FO 46/140, No. 47, Adams to Granville, Yedo, August 21, 1871 and FO 
46/193, No. 114, Parkes to Derby, C onf, Yedo, August 30, 1875. See also Brunton’s works, Building 
Japan 1868-1876  (Folkestone, Kent: Japan Library), 1991; Schoolmaster to an Empire: Richard Henry 
Brunton, 1868-1876  (New York: Greenwood Press), 1991.
82 FO 46/207, No. 120, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, July 18, 1876. See the enclosed reports by Brunton and 
McRitchie.
83 See the enclosed reports by Ryder and Hill in FO 46/217, No. 57, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 12, 1877, 
and by Dr. Lawrenson in FO 46/245, No. 88, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, April 25, 1879.
84 Trench to Plunkett on 'Railways o f Japan1, Tokyo, April 10, 1885, encl. in FO 46/329, No. 103, Plunkett 
to Granville, Tokyo, April 10, 1885
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employees, 'No complaints of irregularities in the foreign mail service have been 
received' and of 25,000 registered letters not one had been lost. Moreover, the report also 
indicated a large increase of revenue over expenditure, and increasing number of letters, 
mail routes and post offices.85 Following a similar report in 1883, even Parkes felt 
obliged to acknowledge the 'general efficiency of the management of the postal service in 
Japan,' though the service was conducted almost entirely by Japanese and there were only 
two foreign employees.86
As regards the Lock Hospitals too, by the early 1880s it was coming to be 
admitted that those under the charge of Japanese doctors were running smoothly. In April 
1881 Charge d’Affaires Kennedy reported to Granville that he was assured on 
trustworthy authority that the Japanese medical officers were fully qualified to discharge 
all duties connected with the Lock Hospital System and that all the Lock Hospitals of the 
treaty ports with the exception of Nagasaki were in excellent condition.87 In reporting in 
1883 on the role of the Lock Hospital in containing venereal disease caused by Japanese 
prostitution, Consul W. A. Wooley favourably noted that 'The Lock Hospital system is, I 
believe, carried out effectively by the native doctors.'88 In contrast, Parkes remained 
skeptical. In commenting on Kennedy's report he argued that not only had the Japanese 
medical officers only a few years earlier been reported by Dr. Lawrenson as having 
insufficient training and medical knowledge, but that Kennedy's failure to name his 
informant also rendered the report unreliable.89
When considering the British diplomats' emphasis on the need for foreign 
expertise and supervision, one should note their concern for British commercial interests. 
For instance, with regard to the construction of railways, Parkes introduced to the 
Japanese government a British subject, Horatiq N. Lay, who agreed to raise a loan of 
£1,000,000 for Japan. And when the understanding failed to achieved the promised result, 
Parkes expressed his satisfaction that the Japanese turned to another British firm, the 
Oriental Bank, for finance and expertise.90 Satow also noted in his diary that Parkes's 
endeavour to persuade Okuma in 1878 to give concessions to foreigners to build railways 
in Japan's interior was partly due to his desire to assist a British subject named J. G.
85 FO 46/271, No. 27, Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, March 5, 1881.
86 FO 46/300, No. 83, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, May 25, 1883, Parkes based on the report o f  the 
Postmaster General o f  Japan for the fiscal year ended on June 30, 1882.
87 FO 46/271, No. 33, Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, April 1, 1881.
88 Wooley, Hyogo, April 17, 1883, encl. in FO 46/299, No. 73, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, May 11, 1883.
89 FO 46/272, Parkes's memorandum, London, May 20, 1881.
90 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yedo, July 4, 1870.
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Dunn.91 Given the British interests in the railways, it is not surprising that Plunkett in 
1886-1887 remonstrated with the Japanese government when there were reports of a 
German attempt to take away contracts for railway materials and construction of new 
railways from the hands of British firms.
British diplomats’ attitudes towards both Japanese modernisation and the 
desirability of foreign assistance was not unconnected with the fact that they also wished 
to secure British influence in Japan through the appointment of British subjects to the 
government's service. This was indirectly admitted by Adams when he explained to Sanjo 
in June 1871 that one reason for his interest in seeing the retention by Japan of foreign 
workers in such projects as railroads, telegraphs, the mint, etc., was ‘because the 
foreigners employed were my own countrymen, and I consequently felt a pride in their 
conducting these works successfully.’ In another instance, in response to a bill passed in 
the United States in 1874, which enabled American Ministers to recommend their 
countrymen to foreign governments for employment, Parkes maintained that this was 
partly because Americans in Japan were annoyed that 'they are unable to obtain more of 
the offices in the gift o f the Japanese Government, or altogether to prevent the English 
from sharing in them.'94 Whenever the Meiji government requested British engineers or 
experts, British diplomats readily assisted by urging the Foreign Office to provide the 
required workers.
British diplomats also noted the increasing number of German employees in the 
1880s. Yet Gubbins in 1885 observed that the growing employment of the Germans 'has 
not as yet assumed very large proportions, nor does it appear to have affected 
unfavourably the interests of other nationalities.' He maintained that in the Department of 
Public Works, notably in the branches of railways, telegraphs and minting, the foreign 
employees were almost without exception English, while the professors in the Imperial 
College of Engineering were drawn exclusively from Britain. Moreover, in the Japanese 
Admiralty and the Marine Department of the Ministry of Commerce, none but English 
were employed, and there were no Germans engaged either by Japanese private 
companies or in other places but Tokyo. Moreover, he observed that the increase of 
German influence was also generally opposed by the Japanese press.95 Plunkett, however,
91 PRO 30/33/15/5, Satow's Diary, February 5, 1878.
92 FO 46/343, No. 37, Secret, Plunkett to Rosebury, March 2, 1886; FO 46/365, No. 38, Conf., Plunkett to 
Salisbury, Tokyo, February 1, 1887.
93 FO 46/139, No. 16, Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, June 17, 1871.
94 FO 46/182, No, 173, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, September 15, 1874.
95 Gubbins's memorandum, Tokyo, February 9, 1885 in FO 46/328, No. 53, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, 
Tokyo, Februaiy 16, 1885. For more details on foreign employees in various government services based on
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while doubting whether German influence would rival British in the long term,96 
admitted that they had threatened 'to become again more powerful than they have been of 
late,' and he particularly noted that General Oyama, who returned from Europe in 
September 1885, was much impressed with the power of Germany.97 Unsurprisingly, 
there were numerous allegations by Plunkett to the Foreign Office, as the number of 
Germans grew in 1886-87, that German Minister Von Holleben had attempted to have 
Germans selected whenever foreigners were appointed to government posts through
* gopressure on the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
Legal Reform
Another significant aspect of early Meiji social modernisation which British 
diplomats encouraged was legal reform. Indeed, from the early years o f the Restoration, 
British diplomats urged Japan to bring its judicial system in line with Western practice. 
Prior to the 1871 mission to America and Europe, for instance, Adams advised Iwakura 
that 'as Japan had now really entered into the path o f progress and modern civilization,1 
the mission should examine the various systems of law in the different countries which 
they would visit; and he drew attention particularly to the existence of torture in the 
Japanese system of justice and the bad state of Japanese prisons.99
Even so, the Meiji laws drafted after the Iwakura mission were not received 
uncritically. Regarding the criminal code published in 1873, Parkes complained of the 
severity of some of the penalties and of the lack of clarity of the provisions relating to 
manslaughter.100 On the commercial side, he described the Japanese law of guaranty in 
1876 as 'unreasonable' and against 'all the principles of sense and honesty,'101 while 
Charge d'Affaires Kennedy observed in 1879 that the Japanese law of bankruptcy was in
nationalities, see e.g., Jones, H. J., The Griffis Thesis and Meiji Policy Toward Hired Foreigners', in Burks, 
A. W. (ed.), The Modernizers: Overseas Students, Foreign Employees, and Meiji Japan  (Boulder: 
W estview Press), 1985, pp. 210-212.
96 FO 46/328, No. 53, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, February 16, 1885. Among the Germans noted 
by Plunkett included Hermann H. Techow and Hermann H. Roesler who were legal adviser to the Japanese 
government. For details on the increasing number o f  German's employees in the 1880s, see Jones, op. cit., 
pp. 9, 114; Martin, op. cit., pp. 43-46.
Plunkett to Parkes, Copy, Conf., Tokyo, February 16, 1885 in FO 46/328, No. 54, Conf., Plunkett to 
Granville, Tokyo, February 18, 1885.
98 FO 46/365, No. 49, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo,' February 18, 1887.
99 FO 46/143, No. 130, Adams to Granville, Yedo, December 16, 1871.
100 FO 46/183, No. 212, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, December 14, 1874. Parkes's comment followed the 
imprisonment for life o f  a Chinese worker in the employ o f  a British firm for having unintentionally caused 
the death o f  a Japanese coolie in 1874.
101 FO 46/208, No. 157, Parkes to Derby, September 30, 1876.
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an 'unsatisfactory state.'102 Similar criticism was made by Consul Flowers at Hyogo, 
Consul Troup at Nagasaki and Acting-Consul Dohmen at Kanagawa with regard to the 
general commercial law of Japan.103
The working of Japanese courts in the 1870s was also, in the view of British 
diplomats, unsatisfactory. Complaints of delays were frequent and Parkes for one showed 
no hesitation to bring the problem to the attention of the Japanese Foreign Minister.104 
Moreover, British diplomats also condemned the use of torture as 'inhuman'105 and 
described the condition of Japanese prisons as deplorable.106 As with public works, the 
British diplomats' views were substantiated by reports of British officials such as British 
legal expert Nicholas J. Hannen, who concluded in 1874 that ’a Japanese judicial record
107is untrustworthy.'
At the beginning of the 1880s, British diplomats' views still showed only a slight 
change. For instance, in drawing attention to a court case in 1880 where the offender hed 
been wrongly arrested and tried, and then denied compensation, Kennedy observed that it 
did not 'inspire confidence in the system of the administration of justice in Japan.1 
Kennedy's view may have been influenced by, a Japanese newspaper, the Nichi Nichi 
Shimbun, which cited the case as indicating that 'the criminal codes of Japan do not 
afford one protection to the lives, liberties and property of the inhabitants, and require 
very considerable reforms to be instituted before they meet with general approbation 
throughout the Empire.'108
Even the new Japanese penal code and the code of criminal procedure drafted in 
1882 did not meet with full approval. Parkes maintained that though the codes had only 
been introduced on January 1, 1882, many alterations had been made, and he critically 
concluded:
This incident shows how difficult it is to ascertain the real state of the 
Japanese law. It appears to be changed from day to day by Imperial
102 FO 46/248, No. 185, Kennedy to Salisbury, Conf., Yedo, October 22, 1879.
t03 See consular reports enclosed in ibid.
104 FO 46/180, No. 105, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 9, 1874; FO 46/180, Private, Parkes to Tenterden,
Yedo, July 21, 1874.
105 E.g., FO 46/183, No. 212, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, December 14, 1874.
106 Parkes's memorandum, Yokohama, July 24, 1873 in FO 46/167, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, July 29, 
1873; FO 46/176, No. 4, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, January 12, 1874, see the enclosed reports by Consul 
Marcus Flowers at Nagasaki; FO 46/177, No. 24, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, February 9, 1874, see the
enclosed report by McClatchie, assistant o f  legation at Hyogo.
107 Hannen's report followed his involvement in the mixed commission to investigate claims brought by 
British subjects against the Japanese government, as representing the late han, in 1874. FO 46/182, No. 
186, C onf, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, October 19, 1874.
108 The case was the arrest, imprisonment and acquittal o f a well-known Japanese merchant named Fujita 
Denzaburo. FO 46/256, No. 33, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, February 24, 1880.
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Decrees and Administrative Notifications which are probably only 
known within the Departments which issue them.109
Apart from the press, British diplomats' views may have also been influenced by a report 
by the British Chamber of Commerce at Yokohama which argued in 1884 that the new 
Japanese laws based on those of European nations were not ready or satisfactory, and that 
the new Japanese criminal code was designed ’to suit the requirements of a despotic 
Government' and was subject to frequent alterations. It also stressed that civil and 
commercial codes had not yet been drawn up.110
The emergence of widespread opposition in Japan to some aspects of the legal 
reform undertaken by the Meiji government may have also contributed to the fact that 
even in the late 1880s British diplomats retained doubts about the Japanese government’s 
legal changes. In 1889 Fraser and Gubbins reported the publication of a manifesto by the 
'Hogakushi-Kwai'{Society o f Graduates in Law) of Tokyo University, protesting 'against 
any undue haste in the task o f codifying Japanese law' and advocating gradual 
development and observance of precedent and custom.111 Moreover, it was also noted 
that objections were coming from the Japanese press. In a dispatch of April 1890, Fraser 
observed that the publication of some portions of the civil code (which included the law 
of property, law of succession to property, law of duties and rights, law of evidence, law 
of civil procedure) in that year had been criticised in the Japanese press in two respects: 
firstly that they had been 'copied too closely from Western models, and were not 
sufficiently in accordance with Japanese custom,' and secondly that 'their wording and 
style...are...clumsy and unintelligible even to educated people.'112 While Fraser made no 
personal comments either on the Hogctkushi-kwai's protest or the objection in the 
Japanese press, Gubbins maintained that the fact that the Hogakushi-kwai consisted of 
Japanese lawyers, who 'represent the most enlightened opinion of the country,' rendered 
the protest significant,113 and argued that the postponement of the date o f operation of 
some of the laws published in 1890 'seems to show that the country is not yet ready for 
them.'114
109 FO 46/290, No. 179, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, December 30, 1882.
1,0 See the dispatch by W. B. Walter, Chairman o f  Yokohama General Chamber o f Commerce to Chairman 
o f  London Chamber o f  Commerce to Plunkett, March 27, 1884, encl. in FO 46/311, No. 48, Plunkett to 
Granville, Tokyo, April 3, 1884.
111 FO 46/386, No. 68, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, June 5, 1889. See also the enclosed memorandum by 
Gubbins.
112 FO 46/399, No. 48, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, April 26, 1890.
113 See Gubbins's memorandum on the resolution o f  the Hogakushi-kwai encl. in FO 46/386, No. 68, Fraser 
to Salisbury, Tokyo, June 5, 1889.
114 Gubbins's memorandum, May 19, 1890, encl. in FO 46/399, Fraser to Salisbury, No. 52, Tokyo, May 
19, 1890. Gubbins observed that with the exception o f  the new commercial code and civil procedure, which
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While there were unfavourable comments about some of the new Japanese laws 
and doubts as to how they would operate in practice, the fact that the Meiji government 
perceived the necessity of embarking on general legal reform prompted positive 
comments from a number of diplomats. For instance, Japan's willingness to change its 
legal system was one of the examples used by Gubbins in 1885 when he contrasted China 
and Japan's attitudes towards progress in modem civilization:
Geographical position renders it convenient to regard China and Japan 
as belonging to the same category, but it is not a necessary inference 
that the policy to be pursued in the two countries must be identical. The 
Chinese have hitherto manifested but little disposition to enter into 
intimate and sincere relations with Europe and would probably prefer to 
revert to their ancient condition of isolation, if  it were feasible. With the 
Japanese it is altogether different. Their history shows that they have 
always been eager to adopt the ideas and institutions of superior 
civilisations with which they have been brought in contact. As long as 
their knowledge of the outer world was confined to China and her 
satellite kingdoms, it was from her that they took their learning, religion 
and political institutions. That lasted until the Govts, of America and 
Europe broke in upon their seclusion thirty years ago. The same result 
has followed the introduction of the Japanese to a civilisation superior 
to what they possessed. They have completely abandoned the worn-out 
ideas to which the Chinese adhere with so much pertinacity, and are 
diligently engaged in reshaping their institutions with whatever material 
they find in the West most adaptable to their needs. The European 
creeds of personal and political liberty have been accepted as the 
necessary conditions of national existence and these are gradually 
bearing their national fruit in the enactment of well-considered codes of 
law and in the creation of local assemblies endowed with the right of 
self-taxation to be followed in 1890 by a system of general national 
representation. In short, Japan desires to be received into the European 
brotherhood of nations, and spares no effort in making good her claim 
to the rank she is ambitious of having apcorded to her.115
Appreciation of Japan's difference from other Asian countries was also shown by 
Plunkett. Following a conversation with French Minister Sienkiewicz on the question of 
treaty revision in 1884, Plunkett recorded his own belief that Sienkiewicz was wrong in 
reasoning that since Turks and Japanese were both Asiatics, they 'therefore must be 
treated, to a certain extent, alike.' Plunkett argued that the radical changes in Japan 
testified to the country's progress and its distinction from Turkey.116 When Sienkiewicz 
changed his tone in 1885, saying that 'experience acquired in the Levant is of little use in
would come into effect on January 1, 1891, the rest o f  the new laws would only come into operation on 
January 1, 1893.
115 PRO 30/33/1/2, Satow Papers, Satow's memorandum to Plunkett, September 24, 1883.
116 FO 46/317, No. 230, C onf, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, December 11, 1884.
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Japan, and that what holds good for Turkey and Egypt does not suit the different 
circumstances in which Japan's progress is placing her', Plunkett naturally concurred, 
noting that the French Minister's statement was 'a sounder view of the case.'117
Another diplomat, Charge d’Affaires Le Poer Trench, similarly contrasted Japan 
with Egypt and China. Following an interview with Okuma in December 1888 in which 
they discussed the drafting of the new code of law in the context of treaty revision, he 
wrote to Lord Salisbury that the
Western Powers could not but admit that the progress, both moral and 
material, which Japan had made during the thirty years which had 
elapsed since the conclusion of the existing treaties was great. Her 
railways and telegraphs, her educational measures and administrative 
and social reforms placed her in a position quite different to that of 
countries like Egypt and China, and the development of her trade when 
compared with that of the latter country showed that at the present rate 
o f progress her foreign trade would, before long exceed in amount the 
total foreign trade of China. Simultaneously with this material progress 
a concurrent growth of public opinion had taken place, and the course 
o f affairs, both foreign and domestic, was being watched by the 
Japanese public with an ever-increasing interest.118
Such views by Gubbins, Plunkett and Le Poer Trench may well have contributed to the 
British government's policy in concluding a new1 treaty with Japan in 1894.
As with other reforms, British diplomats were concerned with the growth of 
influence of other Western Powers. In 1886 this was reflected in Plunkett’s questioning 
of Ito on why Japan had adopted German legal principles in some of its new codes.119 His 
desire to see Japan adopt a British-style legal system may be seen in his encouragement 
of the learning o f English law in Japan. Writing in 1887 to request the British government 
to assist the Tokyo English Law School, Plunkett noted:
I consider it the duty of Her Majesty's Minister to give every proper 
assistance he can to this Institution, and it was very gratifying to know 
that, at the moment when the Japanese Cabinet is unfortunately 
endeavouring to bend everything Japanese into a German groove, as 
many as 1200 young men should still be found donating time and 
money to the study of English and American Law.120
Another issue which prompted rivalry for influence was over which foreign 
language or languages would have official status in future Japanese courts and in which
117 FO 46/328, No. 60, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, February 18, 1885.
m  FO 46/380, No. 99, Conf., Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 29, 1888.
119 FO 46/343, No. 35, C onf, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, March 1, 1886. See Chapter 3, p. 95.
120 FO 46/365, No. 46, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 10, 1887.
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language the codes would be communicated to the Foreign Powers. A proposal in 1886 
that English should be the sole official foreign language was strongly opposed by French 
Minister Sienkiewicz, who demanded that German and French should also be admitted as 
official languages since the Japanese civil and commercial codes were based on French 
and German laws respectively.121 In response, Plunkett threatened Inoue that if 
Sienkiewicz's demands were adopted by the Japanese government, he would withdraw 
from the conference, and he argued that English was not only the second language of 
Japan, but also contributed to the country's progress. In the event of other languages 
being substituted for English, he said to Inoue, 'Its growth might be checked, but only at 
the price of checking in equal proportion the civilization and progress of Japan.'122
Plunkett reasoned that Sienkiewicz's opposition was 'founded on nothing
1 9^whatever but jealousy of British preponderance' since the latter assumed that the 
exclusive admission of the English language 'would imply the employment of a 
preponderant number of English and American Judges.' Against this, Plunkett argued that 
the adoption of English language in no way prejudiced the question of the nomination of 
future judges and he reminded Sienkiewicz that English judges had successfully 
administered in various British colonies laws drawn up in French on French models.124 
To Plunkett's satisfaction, Sienkiewicz finally accepted English as the sole foreign 
judicial language in Japan.
Religious Freedom
The early years of Meiji rule were marked by the revival of Shinto as state 
religion, harsh criticism of Buddhism, and suppression of Christianity. Unsurprisingly, 
British diplomats were very attentive to the policy of the Meiji government towards 
Christians and Christianity in Japan. Not only was an old decree against Christianity re­
issued by the government in the spring of 1868 while public notice-boards describing 
Christianity as an 'evil sect' were erected throughout the country, but the persecution of 
native Christians at Nagasaki which had begun in 1867 was continued, with more than 
four thousand people being arrested and banished to other provinces.126 In 1873, the anti-
121 FO 46/348, No. 179, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, T ok yo , November 6, 1886.
122 Ibid,, No. 180, Conf., Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, November 10, 1886.
123 Ibid., No. 182. Conf., Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, November 11,1886.
124 Ibid., No. 181, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, November 10, 1886.
125 Ibid., No. 189, Conf., Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, November 28, 1886.
126 For more details on government policy toward Christianity, see e.g., Breen, J., Williams, M. (ed.), Japan  
and Christianity: Impacts and Responses (London: Macmillan Press Ltd.), 1996, pp. 75-90; Ohata, K.,
175
Christian placards were withdrawn (though the prohibition remained nominally in force) 
and in 1889 the principle of freedom of religion was finally embodied in the Meiji 
constitution.
Given their concern at the treatment of Christianity and Christians in Japan, 
British diplomats welcomed any signs of toleration by the Meiji government. For 
instance, when a promise was made by the gpvernment in January 1869 to omit the 
epithet 'evil' when referring to Christianity, Parkes observed that the measure signified 'a 
courageous advance' and the susceptibility of the Meiji government to reason.127 Later, in 
March 1869, following the halt to the persecution of Japanese Christians at Nagasaki, 
Parkes wrote, 'This action on the part of the Japanese government would appear to show 
that they are able to control even religious excitement, & that they really intend to give
1 9Seffect to those professions o f moderation.' While no British diplomats reported on the
major dispute in the Sei-in over the pros and cons of ending the Christian prohibition in
September 1871,129 Adams noted that prior to the dispatch of the Iwakura mission, some
Japanese leaders including Kido Koin, Ito Hirobumi and Yamaguchi Naoyoshi had
privately stated their conviction that the prohibition against Christianity must be removed
at no distant period. This, to Adams, showed that the government 'might well see their
way to removing, without foreign pressure, the prohibition against Christianity.'130 When
the anti-Christian placards were removed in 1873, Watson remarked that it signified
'religious toleration which has dawned upon Japan' and indicated a 'perfect good faith' on
the part o f the Japanese government in the matter of Christianity since to effect such a
1 1radical change was no easy task. Parkes’s opinion on the 1873 measure was that it was 
'the greatest innovation they have yet effected and removes the principal obstacle to
I O'}
cordial relations with all Christian Powers.1
As to the adoption of gradual tacit tolerance by the Meiji government, several 
points should be noted. Some British diplomats attributed the 1873 measure partly to the
Ikado, F., ‘Christianity’, in Kishimoto, Hideo (ed,), Japanese Religion in the M eiji Era (Tokyo: Obunsha), 
1956, pp. 188-192.
127 FO 46/106, No. 20, Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, January 26, 1869.
128 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, March 2, 1869.
129 In the 1871 debate, Goto Shojiro and Yamagata Aritomo thought the time for the withdrawal o f  the 
banning o f  Christianity had come, while Iwakura and Eto Shimpei did not. Breen, J.s 'Earnest Desires: The 
Iwakura Embassy and Meiji Religious Policy', in Japan Forum, Vol. 10, No. 2., 1998, pp. 153; Breen, 
Williams, op. c i t p. 89.
130 FO 46/143, No. 139, Conf., Adams to Granville, Yedo, December 29, 1871. Breen, however, maintains
that while Ito favoured the toleration towards Christianity for the purpose o f  increasing the prestige o f
Japan, Kido was to some extent reluctant and believed that Christianity should be contained not through 
anti-Christian edicts, but through the propagation o f Shinto or the 'Great Way o f  the Gods.' Breen, 
Williams, op. cit., pp. 80-81; Breen, 'Earnest Desires', pp. 155-160.
135 FO 46/165, No. 47, Watson to Granville, Yedo, February 22, 1873.
132 FO 46/166, No. 2, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 7, 1873.
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experience acquired from the dispatch of the Iwakura mission to America and Europe in 
1871-73. Soon after the mission’s departure, Adams noted after a conversation with 
Sanjo in January 1872 that the latter was alive to the effect which the prosecution of 
Christians at Nagasaki would have upon its reception in America and Europe.133 In a 
dispatch of February 1873, Watson observed that Granville's direct and explicit 
statements on the subject of Christianity to Iwakura in London had added weight to the 
representation made by foreign ministers in Japan for toleration towards Christianity.134 
Parkes's dispatch of April 7, 1873 went further in relating the liberal policy of the Meiji 
government to Japan's desire to revise the unequal treaties. The withdrawal of the 
placards, according to Parkes, was effected because the government had come 'to satisfy 
themselves through their own Ambassadors of the feeling existing in America and 
Europe on the subject [of Christianity] and on the incompatibility of their past intoleranc e 
with that position among Christian nations to which they now aspire.'135
British diplomats also believed that the general modernisation of Japan was 
encouraging a better treatment of Christianity. For instance, in 1870 Parkes wrote about 
the issue: 'I am not without hope that in the end it will settle itself. Japan must become 
liberal on that subject as well as on others.'136 In making such comment, Parkes may have 
been reflecting on the debate on Christianity in the Japanese assembly, the Kogisho, in 
1869, which, according to the British Minister, showed some moderate and creditable 
thinking by some members. He noted that not only was the proposal for the use of capital 
punishment rejected by an overwhelming majority of the house, but it was also 
maintained that ‘it was by education and not by persecution that the great end of the 
religious instruction of the people was to be secured’ and that ‘the persecution of the faith 
professed by foreigners was inconsistent with the maintenance of friendly relations with 
foreign powers.’137
British diplomats also were generally ready to believe that the persecution of 
Christians in Japan was by no means due to prejudice on the part of the Meiji leaders 
themselves. Rather, the anti-Christianity policy was driven by popular antipathy towards
133 FO 46/151 No. 16, Adams to Granville, Yedo, January 15, 1872.
134 FO 46/165, No. 30, Watson to Granville, Yedo, February 4, 1873.
135 FO 46/166, No. 2, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 7, 1873. Jansen observes that the radical change in 
1873 was a result o f  the embassy's encounters in the US and Europe. Jansen, M., Japan and its World: Two 
Centuries o f  Change (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press), pp. 60-61; Breen, however, maintains 
that the impact o f the encounter was less compared to effect o f the policy o f  accommodating Christianity 
by the Meiji government. Breen, 'Earnest Desires', pp. 161-162; Breen and Williams, op. cit., p.90.
136 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, February 26, 1870.
137 FO 46/113, No. 188, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, October 8, 1869.
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Christianity dating back to the seventeenth century. British diplomats were abo 
prepared to believe that the anti-Christianity policy was a reaction particularly to
■ noproselytism by Roman Catholic missionaries. In the wake of persecution against 
Christians at Nagasaki in 1867, Parkes even recorded that 'If propagandism [by Roman 
Catholic missionaries] could be kept away from Japan a little longer, Japan,...I am 
confident would soon liberalize its opinions in this respect as well as its commerce.'140 
Moreover, they also accepted the explanation of the government being constrained by 
political expediency, in that it had to take into account the existence of widespread 
discontent in the country and the relatively weak state of the new administration. Against 
this background, Parkes and Adams observed that toleration of Christianity would 
involve a cautious and slow process, since excessive concession would allow hostile 
elements, such as the adherents of the Tokugawa cause and conservative parties, to stir up 
the people and overthrow the new government.141 Following a conversation with Iwakura 
on November 11, 1871, Charge d'Affaires Adams concluded that
The very existence of the government was at stake...Japan has not yet 
arrived at that point when the Government could with safety permit the 
free exercise of the Christian religion. ...To attempt to force such a 
measure now upon Japan would, I think, be hazardous.142
Whether foreign representatives' influence did have an effect on Japan's liberal 
policy towards Christianity cannot be proved but British diplomats themselves believed 
that it was worth trying to persuade the Meiji leaders that the persecution o f Japanese 
Christians would 'injure their national reputation among foreign states' and 'ill accord 
with the profession of friendship made by the Mikado's Government to the treaty 
powers.'143 Parkes for one was convinced that foreign representatives might be able to 
exercise influence on the Meiji government policy. As he wrote to Lord Stanley in July 
1868 with regard the persecution of Christians at Nagasaki, 'I still trust that the opinions 
o f the Western Powers will be allowed to influence the proceedings of the Japanese
138 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, June 27, 1868; FO 46/95, No. 202, Parkes to Stanley, Conf., 
August 21, 1868.
139 FO 391/14, Hammond Papers, Yokohama, June 27, 1868.
140 Ibid., Yedo, July 22, 1867.
141 FO 46/95, No. 202, Conf., Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, August 21, 1868; FO 46/143, No. 143, Conf., 
Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, November 12, 1871.
142 FO 46/143, No. 143, C onf, Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, November 12, 1871.
143 E.g., FO 46/93, Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, May 30, 1868; FO 46/151, No. 16, Adams to Granville, 
Yedo, January 15, 1872. Breen and Williams point out that while British diplomats' pressure particularly 
Parkes's, did have an effect on the removal in 1869 o f the adjective 'evil' in the anti-Christian decree, the 
1873 measure was more a result o f  a practical necessity by the government to counteract Christianity in 
Japan. In doing so, the government encouraged the propagation o f  Shinto or the 'Great Ways o f  the Gods' 
and later Honganji Buddhism. Breen, Williams, op. cit., pp. 76, 86.
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Government in this matter.' Yet Parkes added that foreign diplomats should be tactful in 
presenting their views since Christianity was a sensitive issue for the government and the 
people of Japan,144 and he feared that a joint formal protest by foreign representatives 
might bring an adverse effect.145
Satow and Watson shared Parkes's view that more could be achieved through 
friendly arguments with Japanese leaders and persuasion. In his diary, Satow recorded in 
August 1868 that he was shown by Nakai Kozo of Tosa a draft o f a letter to Kyoto, 
advocating milder measures towards Christians and embodying Parkes's statements, 
expressed during a meeting on May 18 with a Japanese official, for toleration towards 
Christianity.146 Furthermore, Satow observed that following Parkes's strong arguments in 
a meeting with other Japanese leaders on January 15, 1869, the latter finally promised to 
write letters to foreign representatives declaring the Mikado's intentions of clemency 
towards Japanese Christians.147 As promised, later in mid-1869 the government erased 
the description of Christianity as an 'evil' sect and (temporarily) halted the persecution of 
Japanese Christians at Nagasaki. As regards the withdrawal of anti-Christian placards in 
1873, Watson maintained that the measure was mainly due to the strenuous efforts of 
French Minister Turenne, Italian Minister Fed'Ostiani and Vice-Consul Martin Dohmen
14Sto influence members of the Meiji government.
As to the future of Christianity in Japan, Adams in 1871 felt that there were 
grounds to hope that it would flourish in Japan. He observed that not only were there 
some government members who believed that the time would come when the free 
exercise of Christianity would be practicable, but also that Japanese students who went 
abroad, especially those who spent many years in the West, would in time effect a change 
in the feeling towards Christianity in Japan.149 In contrast, his successor, Charge 
d'Affaires Kennedy, had a fairly skeptical view a decade later. Despite the reports of an 
increasing number o f Christian converts at Kyoto in the Japanese newspapers, Osaba 
Nippo and Hiogo News, Kennedy expressed doubts about these claims. Not only were 
authentic facts difficult to obtain, but also many of the new Japanese converts were not 
earnest Christians: ‘the Japanese as a race do ,not possess strong religious feelings or 
convictions and...with very many Christianity is adopted [as] a new fashion or for the
144 FO 46/95, No. 183, Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, July 25, 1868.
145 Ibid., No. 202, Conf., Parkes to Stanley, Yokohama, August 21, 1868.
146 PRO 30/33/15/2, Satow's Diary, August 21, 1868.
147 PRO 30/33/15/3, Satow's Diary, January 15, 1869. The Japanese leaders included Date Munenari, 
Higashi-Kuze, Komatsu, Kido, Machida and Ikebe Goi.
148 FO 46/165, No. 47, Watson to Granville, Yedo, February 22, 1873.
149 FO 46/143, No, 143, Conf., Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, November 12, 1871.
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sake of material advantage to be discarded more or less speedily in proportion to its 
material benefits.’150 Kennedy offered no evidence to support his view, but it may be 
significant that he made the observation at a time when there was still many signs of the 
craze among Japanese for everything Western which had marked the 1870s. Furthermore, 
he might have also noted the eclecticism of Japanese in the matter of religion, with many 
adhering to more than one religion, mixing Buddhism and Shinto and Confucianism.
In the 1880s, British diplomats observed further signs of religious toleration. For 
instance, Plunkett reported in June 1884 that a government decree by which the Christian 
religion should be officially recognised was under discussion in the Cabinet and that 
there was good prospect of its being issued in order to provide a legal basis for the 
toleration implied in the 1873 edict.151 His anticipation proved to be premature as it was 
not until 1889 that the principle o f religious freedom was proclaimed in the Meiji 
constitution. Nevertheless, Plunkett continued' to make positive comments, as when 
reporting on the actions of Japanese police in preventing attacks on Christians by 
conservatives, especially Buddhist followers, and when describing as satisfactory an 
address by the Governor of Kyoto enjoining the Buddhist community to tolerate 
Christianity and halt the attacks to avoid complications between Japan and Western
1 ^ 9  • * •Powers. Another event which he saw as indicating Japan's progress followed the 
official reception by the Emperor of a Papal Legate in 1885, bearing a letter thanking the 
former for the protection extended to Christian missionaries in Japan and urging him to 
continue in the same good and wise course. To Plunkett, this ‘is a step of the utmost 
importance in the history of Japan, and marks another stage in her progress towards 
Christianity' and showed the Pope's readiness to, treat Japan on the same footing as other 
great nations;153 but when Ito and Inoue then informed him of their proposal to allow the 
exercise and extension of Christianity and proclaim the freedom of all religions in Japan, 
r he expressed his disapproval and advised them to be cautious since 'the question is one of
extreme delicacy and any premature effort to go too fast might endanger the success of 
the whole scheme.'154 It is likely that the conservative response to Christianity, as 
reflected in the attacks by some Buddhists on the Christians, prompted this surprising 
divergence by Plunkett from previous diplomatic views.
150 FO 46/272, No. 88, Kennedy to Granville, Teakone, August 8, 1881.
151 FO 46/313, No. 97, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, June 24, 1884.
 ^ 152 FO 46/315, No. 176, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, October 9, 1884. The address appeared in the Japan
Daily M ail o f  September 29, 1884.
153 FO 46/334, No. 203, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, September 15, 1885.
154 Ibid., No. 204, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, September 15, 1885.
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Other religious developments attracted far less attention from British diplomats.
The restoration of Shinto entailed a direct assault on Buddhism in the early years of the
Meiji period and many Buddhist temples were destroyed, while tens of thousands of
Buddhist priests and nuns were forced to return to lay life, and a large number of the
landholdings of Buddhist temples were confiscated by the government.155 While British
diplomats did show some awareness of the attack on Buddhism156 and while they noted
the presentation of petitions to the government demanding the return of Buddhism to its
previous position157 and the occurrence of religiously motivated uprisings among
1peasants in Niigata in 1872 and Echizen in 1873, there was a notable lack of comment 
on the subject. However, in a dispatch of June 1869 Parkes did conclude that despite the 
prevailing suppression of Buddhism, 'there are grounds to hope that in Japan as elsewhere 
liberality in politics will be followed by liberality in religion.’159 For his part Adams 
reported in 1871 that the government's attempt to elevate Shinto and repress Buddhism 
had not been wholly effective, as he had heard that many people in Satsuma still practised 
their old ritual secretly in their houses after the destruction of Buddhist temples in the 
province.160 The subsequent decline of Shinto and re-emergence of Buddhism was not, 
however, recorded by British diplomats.
Development of the Japanese Press
One other feature of the early Meiji period which attracted British diplomats' 
attention was the development of an indigenous press. They observed the growth in the 
number of newspapers from almost none in 1868 to hundreds by 1890 and noted that 
some were affiliated with the government and some with its critics, including political 
parties. Such an increase, as Adams saw it, was partly due to government's aim of 
supplying the people through semi-official papers with early information respecting the
155 For details on government policy toward Buddhism, see e.g., Hori, I., and Toda, Y., ‘Shinto’, in 
Kishimoto, Hideo, op. cit., pp. 47-50; Also Collcutt, ML, 'Buddhism: The Threat o f  Eradication', in Jansen, 
M. and Rozman, G. (eds.), Japan in Transition From Tokugcrwa to M eiji (Princeton, N ew  Jersey: Princeton 
Univ. Press), 1986, pp. 156-163; Ketelaar, J. E,, O f Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and its 
Persecution  (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press), 1990, pp. 43-135.
156 FO 46/110, No. 137, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, June 26, 1869; FO 46/ 141, No. 63, Conf., Adams to 
Clarendon, September 8, 1871.
157 FO 46/110, No. 137, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, June 26, 1869; FO 46/153, No. 63, Adams to 
Granville, Yedo, April 1, 1872.
158 FO 46/154, No. 48, Watson to Granville, Yedo, June 29, 1872; FO 46/167, No. 39, Parkes to Granville, 
Yedo, July 8, 1873. See Aston's memorandum, Yedo, July 7, 1873.
159 FO 46/110, No. 137, Parkes to Clarendon, Yedo, June 26, 1869.
160 FO 46/141, No. 63, Conf., Adams to Clarendon, Yedo, September 8, 1871.
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changes which were in progress in the country.161 Its origins, however, were also traced 
by British diplomats in part to the influence of newspapers published by Westerners at 
treaty ports. Reporting in 1876, Legation Secretary W. G. Aston maintained that one 
publication of particular influence was the Nisshin Shinjishi (Reliable Daily News), first 
published in 1871 by Scottish journalist, J. R. Black.162 A somewhat different view was 
taken by Gubbins nine years later. Instead of pointing to a particular' newspaper, Gubbins 
attributed the development of the Japanese press to English-language newspapers at the 
treaty ports such as the Japan Herald, the Japan Gazette, the Japan Mail, and the Echo 
du Japon published in Yokohama, the Hiogo News at Kobe and the Rising Sun and 
Nagasaki Express at Nagasaki. Not only were the columns of Japanese papers filled up in 
a manner similar to those of foreign papers, the former also drew information, especially 
on foreign countries, from portions of the foreign newspapers.163 Whether the foreign 
press influenced the Meiji leadership to adopt modem reforms and Western civilization, 
British diplomats made no attempt to assess, but Gubbins was emphatic that it 
encouraged the growth of political consciousness in Japan.164
Compared to the Western-operated press, the Japanese press in general was 
deemed to be inferior in standard and quality. For instance, in a memorandum to Plunkett 
in 1885, Gubbins noted that of the numerous newspapers published in the country, 'there 
are only a few which have any real importance.'165 The few which he saw as exceptions 
seem to have been the prominent political papers in major Japanese cities which 
discussed political questions. Of these he mentioned the Kwampo (Official Gazette), the 
Tokio Nichi Nichi Shimbun (Tokio Daily News), and the Meiji Nippo (Meiji Daily 
Chronicle) which were known as government newspapers, and the Jiji Shimpo, the Choya 
Shimbun, the Yubin Hochi Shimbun, the Tokio-Yokohama Mainichi Shimbun and the Jiyu 
no Tomoshibi published by other political groups. The less significant part of the press in
161 Ibid., No. 83, Adams to Granville, Yedo, September 27, 1871. For more information o f  the early press 
before 1868, see Jung Bock Lee, The Political Character o f  the Japanese Press (Seoul: Seoul National 
Univ. Press), 1985, pp. 10-11. For more details on the measures by the Meiji government to stimulate the 
circulation o f  the newspapers, ibid., p. 13.
162 Memorandum by Aston, 'The Press in Japan', Feb. 7, 1876, encl. in FO 46/203, No. 24, Parkes to Derby, 
Yedo, February 7, 1876. Black's considerable influence on Japanese journalism is also noted in Sansom, 
op. cit, p. 445.
163 Gubbins's memorandum on the 'Press in Japan', April 4, 1885, Conf., encl. in FO 46/329, No. 102, 
Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 9, 1885. For more details on the foreign press in Japan and their 
influence on the Japanese press, see e.g., Hoare, op. cit., pp. 142-151.
164 Gubbins's memorandum on the 'Press in Japan1, April 4, 1885, Conf., encl. in FO 46/329, No. 102, 
Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 9, 1885. Fait observes that while it is difficult to assess the influence o f  
the foreign press on the Japanese authorities, the former claimed to have such an impact in Japan. Op. cit., 
pp. 98-100.
1 5 Gubbins's memorandum on the 'Press in Japan', April 4, 1885, Conf., encl. in FO 46/329, No, 102, 
Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 9, 1885.
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his view seemed to be popular journals which had no discussions on political issues and 
which, he noted, 'are embellished with rough woodcuts, and being written in a popular 
and easy style1 had 'a large circulation among the middle classes and less educated 
portion of the population.' An even lower estimation was made of local newspapers or 
magazines published by various prefectures in Japan.166
As the Japanese press assumed a strongly political character and was prone to 
criticise government policy, govemment-press hostility was inevitable in Japan, 
particularly in the wake of the People Rights' movement. For the purpose of suppressing 
the newspapers, Press Laws were issued by the government, first in 1873, then in 1875 
and again in 1883. To the 1875 law, a Libel Law was attached to suppress press 
criticisms of the government As a result many Japanese newspapers were suspended or 
fined and their editors imprisoned. To Aston, the hostility which prevailed between those 
in authority and the press in Japan was exceptional. Since the publication of the 1875 
law, he observed, ‘the exasperation of the Yedo journals and the severity of the sentences 
on editors and contributors have gone on continually increasing, and have at present 
reached a pitch which would be highly dangerous in any other country.’ Aston concluded 
that such persistent hostility might in future lead to serious instability in the country. In 
justifying such a warning, Aston maintained that while the press was 'a new institution in 
Japan,1 the people would in time identify their interests with those of the press. In 
addition, the writers for the press and the readers of the better journals belonged chiefly 
to the samurai class, 'the only section of the Japanese people which possesses much
i fnpolitical weight.' Given these circumstances, the Japanese press could become an 
instrument for opposition criticism of the government or influence the people at large 
against government policies.
Conclusion
In general, British diplomats viewed the social reforms undertaken by the Meiji 
government as signs of Japan's progress. Compared to diplomats' views on Japanese 
political and economic reforms, more appreciation and admiration were shown by British 
diplomats of the social changes in Meiji Japan. Among the changes which were most 
welcomed were the adoption of Western holidays and calendar, the introduction of a
166 Ibid.
167 Memorandum by Aston, 'The Press in Japan', February 7, 1876 encl. in FO 46/203, No. 24, Parkes to 
Derby, Yedo, February 7, 1876.
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modern education system, the construction of public works and the adoption of a liberal 
policy in the matter of religion. Some changes which were also praised, albeit with less 
vigour, were the adoption by the Mikado's Court of European ceremonial style, the 
construction of a more modem social class system and the Japanese legal reforms. Yet, as 
shown in their general negative response to the Japanese craze for Western dress, not all 
changes were viewed as satisfactory.
One aspect of the reforms which British diplomats often focused on was the 
contribution o f the West. Emphasis was placed on the vital role of the European 
engineers and workers in the employment of Japanese government who provided the 
technical skills and expertise necessary to various modern undertakings in Japan; on how 
the Japanese were incapable in handling technical establishments and systems without 
foreign aid; and also on the contribution of foreign editors and foreign-language 
newspapers to the development of Japanese press. It is worthy of note that in 
emphasizing and recommending foreign assistance, British diplomats were concerned 
with the protection of British interests and influence in Japan. This was due to the rivalry 
for influence between Britain and other Western Powers in Japan, as may be seen in the 
British diplomats' insistence on the Japanese navy’s adherence to the British model, m 
their emphasis on the learning and use of the English language in Japanese educational 
institutions and in Japanese future courts, in their readiness to assist in the engagement by 
Japan of British firms and individuals, and also'in the remonstrances against the alleged 
attempts by Germany to take over Japanese railway contracts from British firms.
In some cases British diplomats stressed their own encouragement of reform and 
claimed some of the credit for changes made by the Meiji government. Examples of this 
were Parkes’s advocacy of the construction of railways, British diplomats’ suggestion for 
the adoption of Western legal systems, and foreign pressure on Japan to adopt a policy of 
toleration towards Christianity. It should, however, be noted that by no means all 
assistance and advice were results of diplomats' initiatives. There are times when 
Japanese leaders made the first moves in seeking and requesting foreign assistance. Such 
an instance was a request by the Japanese Foreign Minister to Watson for advice on the 
opening of a railway line. There were also requests by Japanese government to the British 
Legation to provide them with British naval instructors, engineers, teachers and other 
skilled workers.
In reporting on Japanese social change, one area which was scarcely covered by 
British diplomats was the traditionalist or conservative response to the adoption of 
Western civilization in Japan. The opposition to the new social class system, to the
184
educational reforms, to the suppression of Buddhism, to the spread of Christianity in the 
1880s, and to the new Japanese legal codes was noted, but no mention was made of some 
conservative reactions, such as the re-emphasis on moral teaching based on Confucian 
principles in the education system, which became relatively strong in the mid-1880s arid 
which culminated in the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on Education o f 1890 that 
insisted on moral and ethical values, filial piety, patriotism and veneration for the 
Emperor. Nor did the diplomats report on the existence of some traditional groups within 
government circles which opposed some of the social reforms, such as the construction of 
railways. The lack o f such information may be said to indicate that British diplomats 
were more interested in the obvious social reforms which signified Japan's progress and 
the adoption of Western systems and models by Japan and perhaps that their sources of 
information were too limited for them to be aware of other developments.
As to whether British diplomats were influenced by the 
‘Orientalist5 idea of innate Western superiority, it is arguable that some of their 
comments did indicate such an attitude. Examples of this would be their reservations 
about the Japanese ability to operate modem establishments, such as the postal service, 
hospitals and lighthouses, without assistance from Europeans, and also their criticisms of 
Japanese legal codes and Japanese courts. Parkes's comments were perhaps the most 
‘Orientalist* as he remained skeptical of Japanese efficiency in operating lighthouses and 
the Lock Hospitals despite the moderate and fairly favourable reports by the British Chief 
Engineer on Japanese light-keepers and by Kennedy on the Japanese management of the 
treaty port hospitals. Yet, despite his criticisms, Parkes cannot be said to have been 
wholly ‘Orientalist’ for he also praised other reforms, such as the modern Court etiquette, 
Japanese railways, and the Japanese desire for learning and religious toleration, as signs 
of Japan's progress and proofs of Japan's desire to adopt the advanced practices and 
systems of the West. In other words, the critical comments did not stigmatize the 
Japanese as a backward race who could never progress. Rather, his skepticism was more 
due to his perhaps exaggerated perception of Japanese inexperience; he took the view that 
given time and sufficient knowledge, the Japanese would be able to manage the systems 
effectively on their own. However, in making such comments, especially in regard to the 
importance of foreign employees in the public works, Parkes and also other British 
diplomats were probably partly influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by their 
concern with British commercial interests, since the termination of the contracts of 
British workers in the Meiji government's service would result in economic loss and 
diminished prestige. In justification of Parkes it should be noted that the Meiji
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government itself sometimes acknowledged, explicitly of implicitly, that it had been too 
eager to dispense with the services of foreign experts. This was shown, for instance, in 
their hiring of foreigners again, after they had tried and failed to do without foreign help 
in the military as well as the public works department. Equally important was the 
recognition, which can be argued to show the least ‘Orientalist’ attitude, by some British 
diplomats such as Gubbins, Plunkett and Le Poer Trench of Japan's progress in 
comparison with the other so-called Oriental countries such as China, Egypt, Syria and 
Turkey. Interestingly, this also indicates that in some British diplomats' view, Japan was 
not characteristically Oriental or Asiatic like China, Egypt, Syria and Turkey, and that 
among non-European countries, Japan stood apart.
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CHAPTER 6
BRITISH DIPLOMATS* VIEWS OF JAPAN AS AN EAST ASIAN POWER
By the early twentieth century, Japan's image as an East Asian Power, in the view 
of many historians, was truly established. This was proved by her victory over China in 
the 1894-95 war and later over Russia in 1904-05. Though such proofs were beyond the 
observation of British diplomats who served in 1868-90, their comments throw light on 
the development o f Japan's foreign policy, especially in relation to China, Korea and 
Russia, and they also sometimes speculated on Japan's future as an East Asian Power. In 
examining their comments it is of particular relevance to consider whether they felt that 
Japan was orientating itself towards the West or whether they saw it as seeking a 
distinctive role by emphasizing (or at least keeping open the option of) pan-Asianism 
since British diplomats' attitudes towards these questions could have had a bearing both 
on how progressive the Meiji state was perceived to be and on the future development of 
Anglo-Japanese relations. In addition, attention is given to the extent to which British 
diplomats gave advice to Japanese leaders regarding foreign policy during these period 
since this may have influenced Japanese decision-making.
Japan1 s Policy Towards China and Korea
One of the earliest moves made by the Meiji government on coming into power 
was to establish formal relations with China, indicating its interest in Eastern cooperation. 
This is shown in the dispatch by the Meiji government of a mission led by Finance 
Minister Date Munenari to Peking in 1871. On hearing of the proposed mission, Parkes in 
August 1870 commented favourably on the Japan's initiative as it would establish a 
formal basis for commercial relations with China.1
Nevertheless, upon the return o f Date after having concluded the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty in September 1871, a strong objection was made by British Charge d’Affaires, 
Francis Adams, especially with regard to the second article of the treaty, which stipulated 
that China and Japan would assist each other in the event o f either one becoming 
involved in a war with a third Power. To Adams, while that article might not be construed 
to mean assistance with arms, it implied an offensive and defensive alliance against 
Western Powers and was thus 'objectionable and obnoxious'2 and he did not hesitate to 
make his objections known to the Meiji government. He told Iwakura Tomomi in
’ FO 46/126, No. 152, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, August 26, 1870.
2 FO 46/143, No. 132, Conf., Adams to Granville, December 16, 1871; also see FO 46/151, Private, Adams 
to Hammond, Yedo, January 29, 1872.
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December 1871 that it was a very serious matter, and if Japan were to ratify such an 
article, it would be viewed with grave suspicion by all the governments of the Treaty 
Powers. He also warned that in view of the Tientsin massacre, the article might cause 
problems for Japan: 'A war between China and some other Power or Powers may break 
out, and Japan may then find herself all at once called upon, if this Treaty is ratified in its 
present form, to assist China in a war in which she has no interest, and which could only 
be disastrous to her.*3 Adams repeated this warning to Dajo Daijin Sanjo Sanetomi on 
January 9, 1872. He also argued that although the treaty was modelled on a Western 
treaty, namely the Sino-American treaty of 1858, the first article o f the 1858 treaty was 
limited to the United States exerting its good offices to bringing about an amicable 
arrangement between China and any other nation which might act unjustly or 
oppressively towards China. In contrast, the second article of the 1871 treaty went further 
by referring to armed assistance to each other. The best course o f action for Japan, 
Adams told Sanjo, would be to omit the objectionable article altogether.4
So aroused was Adams over the issue that he was soon using extravagant 
language to criticise the delay taken by Japan to eliminate the article. Realizing that his 
remark to Sanjo still had not resulted in a change, he wrote at the end of January 1872 
that the Japanese seemed 'to cling to this Treaty like a play thing or a baby, and must 
have it - that is just what it is, a new play thing like pegs, or modem clothes, or any 
imitation of European customs.'5 In contrast, Ernest Satow took a more relaxed view, 
suggesting in November 1871 that Japan would not put herself in danger by becoming 
involved in an offensive and defensive alliance with China.6 He further maintained in 
December that although the treaty stipulated mutual assistance, he did not think that it 
could ever be conceived to mean material aid with men or ships.7 Satow's view was
shared by Parkes who was on leave in England, as he believed that both Japan and China
* 8 were far too weak to involve themselves in any large scale war. As Japan indicated an
intention in March 1872 to omit the article from the treaty, Adams expressed his
satisfaction that Japan had finally acted upon his advice.9 This proved premature,
3 FO 46/143, No. 126, Conf, Adams to Granville, Yedo, December 7, 1871. In that year at Tientsin, French 
missionaries had been massacred by the Chinese.
4 FO 46/151, No. 12, Conf., Adams to Granville, January 12, 1872.
5 Ibid., Private, Adams to Hammond, Yedo, January 29, 1872,
6 PRO 30/33/15/4, Satow's Diaiy, November 26, 1871.
7 Ibid., December 12, 1871.
8 FO 46/152, Adams to Hammond, March 16, 1872.
k 9 FO 46/152, No. 58, Adams to Granville, Yedo, March 11, 1872. Despite repeated attempts by Japan to
revise the treaty, the treaty remained in force until the close o f the Sino-Japanese war in 1894. Akagi, Roy 
Hidemichi, Japan's Foreign Relations 1542-1936: A Short History (Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press), 1936,
p. 68.
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however, since due to Chinese insistence Japan finally ratified the treaty as originally 
agreed in 1871.
Another notable change in Japanese foreign policy commented on by British 
diplomats was the adoption of a forceful policy towards Korea and Taiwan. British 
diplomats' response in general was critical, arguing that such a policy would only lead to 
more troubles for Japan. The first such response came from Adams in December 1871, 
following reports that Japan might invade Korea. His reaction was to remind Iwakura that 
such an expedition was 'most dangerous in the present transition state o f Japan, whilst 
vast reforms were still only in process of accomplishment, and at a moment when her 
whole attention should be devoted to internal affairs.' Despite Iwakura's assurance of the 
peaceful nature of the government’s policy, Adams remained skeptical. As he put it to 
Lord Granville, 'Although there would seem to be no immediate fear of Japan declaring 
war against Corea, still it is a cherished idea with many Japanese.' Among the latter he 
included some members of the Japanese Cabinet.10
Adams's apprehension later proved to be justified, when, after some debate in the
cabinet on the Seikan ron policy,11 a decision was made in 1873 by the government, then
headed by Sanjo, to send an expedition to Korea. Parkes, who had returned from leave,
held an unfavourable view of such a policy. On being informed by Foreign Minister
Soejima of the possible expedition, he wrote on August 25, 1873:
I doubt however whether they would hastily undertake the latter more 
serious enterprise unless they receive foreign encouragement and I also 
question their ability, if they are left to'themselves, to place in the field 
a force that would prove adequate to the task of forcing terms upon the 
Coreans. It is hoped therefore that the wiser advisers o f the Government 
will continue to keep in check the aspirations of the war party which are 
not likely to prove advantageous to the true interests o f their country.12
In making this comment, Parkes suspected encouragement to Japan from Russia. In a 
somewhat strained argument he claimed that such encouragement was proved by the 
marked desire shown by Russian representatives in Japan to improve their relations with 
the Japanese government, by the Russian acceptance of the role of arbitrator in the M ara 
Luz case and by Russia's endeavour not to allow the disturbance which had occurred
10 FO 46/143, No. 121, Conf., Adams to Granville, Yedo, December 2, 1871.
11 On the seikan ron see e.g., Conroy, H., The Japanese Seizure o f  Korea: 1868-1910. A Study o f  Realism 
and Idealism in International Relations (Philadelphia: Univ. o f  Pennsylvania Press), 1960, pp. 17-77; 
Dims, P., The Abacus and the Sword  (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: Univ. o f  California Press), 1995, pp. 
29-43.
!2 FO 46/167, No. 67, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Hakodate, August 25, 1873.
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between Russian and Japanese subjects in Sakhalin to become serious.13 Apart from 
foreign encouragement, Parkes also noted a financial motive behind the expedition, in 
that the government found it difficult 'to meet the cost of the regular army which is now 
being formed, and also to provide for the disbanded Samurai, whom the Government will 
not trust as regular troops, and who are cast adrift upon the country in a discontented 
condition.' This followed his conversation on October 29, 1873 with Soejima, one of the 
advocates of invasion of Korea, in which the latter maintained that Japan would derive 
material wealth from the war since Korea was rich in mines and silk, and that although 
Japan also possessed these materials, the revenues of Korea would be able to support 
about one hundred thousand Japanese soldiers.14 In addition, Parkes also anticipated the 
view o f many later historians of the Japanese desire to achieve a foreign conquest,15 as he 
reported that Japan desired 'to increase her prestige, and to do something to show that she 
is really, as her flatterers have told her, the rising empire of the East.'16
Given his disapproval of the 1873 expedition, Parkes received with satisfaction 
the news of the abandonment of the plan upon Iwakura's return from Europe, even though 
this also resulted in the resignation of some Japanese leaders of the war party. In his 
view, 'Only an enemy...would wish to see Japan entering such a war' since 'She has not 
the necessary army or fleet, nor sufficient organization.'17 It is possible that the 
abandonment of the expedition was partly attributed to his advice. Iwakura himself stated 
on October 28, 1873, that he had always been mindful of the advice Parkes had given him 
several years before, namely that Japan should not go to war with Korea without good 
cause, that such a war would prove unprofitable to Japan, and that it would not be 
regarded by Russia with indifference.18
Despite the abandonment of the 1873 plan, it was not long before Japan sent 
about three thousand Japanese soldiers to Taiwan (Formosa). The Japanese action in
13 Ibid., No. 62, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, August 18, 1873. The Maria Luz incident o f 1872, which 
involved a dispute between Japan and Peru when Japan decided to save more than two hundred distressed 
Chinese coolies from a Peruvian ship, the Maria Luz, was finally settled in 1875 through the mediation o f  
the Czar o f Russia, Alexander II.
14 FO 46/168, No. 91, C onf, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, November 3, 1873.
15 Parkes's view is close to that o f Oka Yoshitake who argues that the Japanese expansionism was a result 
o f Japan attempted to behave like a great power in order to prevent Western interference and preserve the 
independence o f  Japan. In Mayo, M. J., Problems in Asian Civilisations: The Emergence o f  Imperial 
Japan, Self-Defense or Calculated Aggression? (Boston, Massachusetts, D.C. Heath and Co.), 1970, pp. 1- 
3, 7; Sansom maintains that most Meiji leaders did harbour expansionist designs and such an urge to 
expand can be seen in previous Japanese history and that this was strongest among the western clans, op. 
cit., pp. 348-49; J. M. Maki argues that Japan was led by militarists and Japan’s military tradition justified  
their aggressive actions, see 'Traditional Mililtarism,' in Mayo, op. cit., p. 31.
16 FO 46/168, No. 91, C onf, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, November 3, 1873.
17 Ibid., Private, Parkes to Currie, Yokohama, November 2, 1873.
18 Ibid., No. 91, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, November 3, 1873.
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1874 was criticised by Parkes, especially since he had earlier been assured by Iwakura on 
November 28, 1873 that the government had no desire to send such an expedition. The 
expedition, he wrote, was 'a striking example of the want o f wisdom in the counsels of 
the present Government,'19 and 'their conduct in this matter cannot be said to be guided
Of)either by principle or rule.' As with the Korean expedition, Parkes found one cause in 
the problem of the discontented samurai class. As he observed in dispatches of May ard 
June 1874, 'the real object [of the expedition] is not to punish an outrage committed by 
savages on Japanese subjects but to gratify a class, - who would otherwise have proved
9 1 *troublesome at home,' or in other words, 'to give vent abroad to the excitement of the 
Samurai.'22 What had triggered such an enterprise, he added, was the outbreak of the Saga 
insurrection in early 1874, which was contained by the government only by allowing the 
discontented samurai to engage in the expedition against Taiwan.23
If the Korean expedition was connected by British diplomats in part to Russian 
support, the Taiwan expedition was attributed to the encouragement given to Japan by 
American advisers. Such advisers in Parkes's view included General Charles W. Le 
Gendre, sometime United States Acting-Consul at Amoy and Taiwan, who was employed 
in the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs24 and the previous American Minister to Japan, Charles 
De Long, whose encouragement might be seen in the employment of two American 
military officers, Lieutenant Cassel and Major Wasson, in the Japanese expedition.25 
Further proofs, according to Parkes, might be found in the extracts of the United States 
Diplomatic Correspondence that appeared in the Japan Weekly Mail o f May 30, 1874, 
between De Long, Hamilton Fish, Secretary of State in Washington, and Frederick F. 
Low, American Minister at Peking, which showed that the expedition was under 
American auspices with Le Gendre assuming the main role in instigating the Japanese 
against Taiwan.26
19 FO 46/179, Private, Parkes to Tenterden, May 12, 1874,
20 FO 46/180, No. 113, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 19, 1874.
21 FO 46/179, No. 95, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 26, 1874.
22 FO 46/180, No. 113, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 19, 1$74.
23 FO 46/179, No. 88, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 22, 1874; ibid., No. 95, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 26, 
1874.
24 FO 46/167, No. 62, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, August 18, 1873.
25 FO 46/178, No. 61, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 6, 1874.
26 FO 46/179, Private, Parkes to Tenterden, Yokohama, May 30, 1874. Kamikawa and Kimura maintain 
that Parkes was not pleased at the close relations developing between the United States and Japan. 
Kamikawa, H., Kimura, M. (eds), Japcm-American Diplomatic Relations in the Meiji-Taisho Era (Tokyo: 
Pan-Pacific Press), 1958, p. 94.
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Again Parkes pointed out the expansionist desire of Japan.27 This he noted earlier 
in August 1873 following a conversation with Foreign Minister Soejima Taneomi, who 
claimed that Japan used to rule the island. From the interview Parkes concluded: 'in their 
desire to establish a military reputation and to add to their prestige in the East the 
Japanese government may be induced to embark in an enterprise which at first sight 
appeal's profitless, but which may afford opportunity for the development of some 
ulterior plan.’28 Despite an explanation by Soejima's successor, Terajima Munenari in 
April 1874 that the object of the Taiwan expedition was to punish the savages who had 
murdered some Ryukyuans, and to provide for the future security of Japanese navigation, 
Parkes observed, ’I think there can be little doubt that the Japanese government aim at the 
establishment of a Colony in Formosa.1 The fact that a Taiwan Affairs Commission had 
already been created in Tokyo, in Parkes's view also showed Japan's design over the 
island.29 In a subsequent dispatch Parkes further observed to Lord Granville that the 
Japanese government had been 'anxious to extend the reputation of their country by 
conquest of some kind' and that in order to satisfy this aspiration they had looked in three 
directions, to Sakhalin, Korea and Taiwan, but since a collision with Russia and Korea 
had been considered too serious, they eventually seized the opportunity offered them by 
the savages of Taiwan.
Parkes advised against the Taiwan expedition because if  the enterprise failed, 
Japan would either have to face samurai discontent at home or sanction a war against 
Korea to avert samurai trouble.31 Even if  a war was waged, Parkes maintained that the 
samurai class might still create a problem for the government. This view was later 
confirmed by Iwakura's statement that 'war would unfortunately bring again to the front 
the Samurai or hereditary aimed class which the Government wish to set aside and 10 
replace by a regular army.' In response, Parkes concurred and added that 'the re-arming or 
embodying of these men must be attended with danger to Japan herself. The Samurai 
were doubtless brave men but each wanted to be his own Commander; they might be 
sufficient for purposes of defence but they could not be easily employed on distant 
operations.'32 Parkes's anticipation later proved to be true, as the samurai discontent did
27 FO 46/179, No. 59, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 26, 1874; FO 46/180, No. 113, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, 
June 19, 1874,
28 FO 46/167, No. 62, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, August 18, 1873.
29 FO 46/178, No. 62, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 13, 1874.
30 Ibid., No. 66, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 14, 1874.
31 FO 46/180, No. 112, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 16, 1874; also see FO 46/179, Private, Parkes to 
Tenterden, Yedo, May 22, 1874.
32 Parkes to Wade, Copy, Conf., Yedo, September 24, 1874 encl. in FO 46/182, No. 176, Conf., Parkes to 
Derby, Yedo, September 28, 1874.
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not abate with the successful expedition to Taiwan. Following the abolition of their social 
status in 1876, samurai uprisings increased and culminated in the Satsuma rebellion in 
1877.
Regarding other difficulties, Parkes also observed as early as 1873 that there was 
a problem of subduing the savage tribes because they were not easily reached in the 
jungles and mountain paths. This was proved, according to Parkes, by the arduous 
experience of an American Admiral when he attempted to punish them several years 
earlier for the murder of the crew of an American ship.33 More important was the 
objection that China might raise against the occupation by Japan especially when there 
were already Chinese settlements in the island.34 In response to Terajima's remark in 
April 1874 that the Japanese government was free to act against these aborigines as the 
Chinese had not acknowledged authority over the island, Parkes warned that 'I think the 
Japanese Government will be taking a false step if they enter on this expedition with the 
view of permanently occupying some portion of Formosa. I can scarcely suppose that 
such a step will not be displeasing to the Chinese.'35
Parkes's anticipation of war with China was not totally groundless. China later 
maintained that not only had it no knowledge of the Japanese expedition, but also that the 
country inhabited by the savage tribes of Taiwan did belong to her. By June 1874, the 
chances of war with China seemed to Parkes to be rapidly increasing. The tone adopted 
by newspapers such as the Japan Weekly Mail and the Rising Sun, according to Parkes, 
showed that ‘the Japanese are elated with their success and are not disposed to relinquish 
the territory of which they have possessed themselves.’36 Furthermore, Parkes observed 
that although the active war preparations being made by China and Japan might be 
intended as demonstrations only, they appeared to increase irritation rather than to 
intimidate the other country.37 And in the event of war, Japan would be likely to suffer a 
defeat as he considered China to be militarily superior to Japan. In a dispatch o f April 
1874 he maintained that Japan’s naval forces were inferior and that the government knew 
that it could not depend upon its own resources for the conveyance of their men and 
material to the island.38
33 FO 46/167, No. 62, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, August 18, 1873.
34 Ibid.
35 FO 46/178, No. 61, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 6, 1874.
36 FO 46/180, N o .l 17, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 25, 1874.
37 FO 46/179, Private, Parkes to Tenterden, Yedo, May 22, 1874.
38 Parkes to Wade, Yedo, April 13, 1874 encl. in FO 46/178, No. 62, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, April 13, 
1874.
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Despite the efforts made by Japan to settle the problem peacefully with China, 
Parkes was skeptical, as illustrated by his dispatch reporting on the mission of Japanese 
Minister Hanabusa Yoshitomo to Peking on May 19, 1874: 'It remains to be 
seen...whether these two Asiatic Powers will succeed in reconciling their respective
•>Q
proceedings which may prove to be equally tortuous and inconsistent.' Similarly, when 
a mission led by Okubo Toshimichi was sent in September 1874 following the failure of 
Hanabusa, Parkes maintained that unless the settlement was 'flattering to Japanese pride,' 
Japan might anticipate internal troubles or a war with China.40 Even if  a satisfactory 
adjustment was obtained with China, Parkes considered in August 1874 that Japan would 
still have difficulty in arranging the withdrawal o f her forces from Taiwan:
The principal difficulty in the way of withdrawal o f the Japanese force 
from Formosa is the danger that would result therefrom to the present 
administration: attack on the government by its political opponents 
which might result in the overthrow of the administration; the 
Government think that a war with China might prove for them the least 
o f two evils as it is supposed that all parties would be obliged to unite 
to oppose the common enemy; yet war means increased taxation and 
this might led to internal revolt41
Though the war with China was avoided with the conclusion of a peaceful 
settlement on October 31, 1874, Parkes's comments continued to be critical. As he 
observed to Lord Derby in February 1875, Japan, having obtained the concessions from 
China, might be led to undertake other similar unwise enterprises:
The sense of triumph in which the Japanese can indulge is also not 
likely to diminish their estimate of their own importance, or to weaken 
the opinion they have been led to form that Japan has now become the 
leading power of the Far East. It is to be hoped that this feeling will not 
lead them into another inconsiderate enterprise.42
This, according to Parkes, was substantiated by the boastful tone assumed by Okuma 
Shigenobu in his address to Mikado on the accomplishments of the Taiwan expedition. 
Okuma, who presided over the Taiwan Commission, not only claimed that Japan had 
succeeded in a task which Britain and the United States both failed to accomplish, 
namely to remove the dangers to which navigation was exposed by the island's savages,
39 FO 46/179, No. 92, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, May 22, 1874.
40 Parkes to Wade, Copy, Conf., Yokohama, September 11, 1874 encl. in FO 46/182, No. 168, Conf., 
Parkes to Wade, Yedo, September 12, 1874.
41 Parkes's memorandum, Hakodate, August 26, 1874; FO 46/182, No. 167, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, 
September 12, 1874.
42 FO 46/190, No. 32, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, February 22, 1875.
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but also urged the Mikado not to stop at the chastisement of the savages of Taiwan. The 
latter remark, Parkes maintained, indicated Japan's desire to annex Korea 'which is 
regarded by the warlike spirits of Japan as another field for the exhibition o f Japanese 
prowess and glory.'43 Moreover, given the uncertain situation in Japan, he added, there 
was no guarantee that Japan would never undertake any expedition to a neighbouring 
country like Korea. Parkes was unconvinced by remarks by Japanese leaders that the 
government had no such an intention. As he put it in February 1875:
...as we have seen in the case of the Formosan expedition, they are 
liable to be swayed by the circumstances o f the day, and may again be 
persuaded to give their sanction to a foreign enterprise in order to divert 
attention from home agitation 44
The fact that Katsu Awa had previously remarked to Satow in December 1874 that the 
success obtained by Japan at Peking over the Taiwan affair might result in the 
government becoming arrogant and unreasonable might have also contributed to Parkes's 
view.45
In the years that followed, there were a number of other issues which caused 
friction between Japan and her neighbours, China and Korea, and on occasion led to 
rumours of war. Whenever a problem arose, British diplomats anticipated a possible 
collision between Japan and the two countries. This was because they discerned the 
existence of a ‘war party’ in Japan which advocated strong measures against China and 
Korea and whose increasing strength was deduced by British diplomats from the tone of 
the Japanese press46 as well as from statements by Japanese leaders.47
The persistent problem of China which was intensified by the pressure of the war 
party may have led to a consideration by Inoue to see the country being defeated by a 
Western Power. This can be seen in an interesting statement to Plunkett by Inoue in 
November 1880 that 'the best thing which could happen to China would be to fight and to
43 Ibid., No. 31, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, February 22 ,1875,
44 Ibid., No. 33, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, February 22, 1875; also see Parkes to Wade, Copy, February 
16, 1875 encl. in ibid., No. 32, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, February 22, 1875.
45 Memorandum o f  Satow, November 30, 1875 in FO 46/183, No. 204, Conf., Parkes to Derby, November 
30, 1874.
45 E.g., FO 46/327, No. 3, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, January 3, 1885; FO 46/347, No. 161, Very Conf., 
Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, October 11, 1886. In the latter dispatch, Plunkett noted there was an increase 
o f  about thirty per cent, in the circulation o f  the Jiji Shimpo, which printed the most hostile articles, while 
moderate papers that advocated a cautious policy towards China showed no increase whatsoever.
47 Such statements were by Ito and Inoue to Plunkett in FO 46/327, No. 32, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, 
Tokyo, January 24, 1885; FO 46/349, No. 25, C onf, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, December 9, 1886; 
ibid., No. 228, Conf., Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, December 21, 1886. For more details on the elements 
which constituted the war party see e.g., Iriye, A., 'Japan's Drive to Great-Power Status,' in Jansen, op. cit., 
p. 751.
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suffer a crushing defeat by Russia1 since China 'would never become a great nation until 
she had been thoroughly crushed and humbled by a European Power. The result of such a 
defeat would be to effect a concentration of all power at Peking, a thorough reform in the 
organization of the army and the awakening of a martial spirit in the population.' 
Predictably Kennedy disagreed, arguing that 'China might effect reforms without the 
humiliation of defeat and that peace at any price would be preferred by the rest of the 
world however much China might benefit by salutary chastisement.'48 Though he made 
no direct reference, in making the comment Inoue might have perceived that the 
modernisation of China which would follow the country’s defeat would not only 
strengthen China but more importantly it would also help to maintain Japanese national 
independence against Western imperialism since a weak China would likely invhe 
interference from Foreign Powers. In this, it is probable that Inoue was influenced by 
some arguments advocated by certain groups in Japan at that time of the necessity of 
reforms in China.49
Nevertheless, in spite of the pressure of the war party, no war broke out between 
Japan and her neighbours. The peaceful and cautious policy of Japan towards China and 
Korea that continued into the 1880s was welcomed by British diplomats, and to the Meiji 
leaders they insisted that Japan should do all she could to maintain friendly relations and 
avoid war. For instance, amidst strong arguments from the war party during the Sino- 
French conflict over Annam in 1884-85 that it would be wiser for Japan to attack China 
before she developed her enormous latent resources and while she was so conveniently
harassed by France, Plunkett advised 'extreme prudence and a continuation of the policy
* *>0 of doing nothing as long as possible.' 'Japan,' he said to Foreign Minister Inoue, 'should
not be in a hurry to take any independent line of her own,' but should follow the conduct
adopted by other Western Powers, particularly Britain.51 Nor should Japan align itself
* • 52with France against China. Plunkett was aware that France had made some overtures to 
the Japanese government,53 and although the government maintained that they had no 
wish to join France against China, Plunkett in later dispatches to London questioned the 
visit by two Japanese officers, Rear-Admiral Kabayama and Lieutenant-General
48 FO 46/258, No. 175, Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, November 8 ,1880.
49 See details o f the arguments in Yoshitake, op. cit., in Mayo, op. cit, pp. 4-6.
50 FO 46/315, No. 180, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, October 16, 1884.
51 Ibid., No. 187, V eiy Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, October 21, 1884.
52 FO 46/327, No. 32, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, January 24, 1885.
53 FO 46/317, No. 251 A, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, December 24, 1884. Not only did he hear 
from Vice-Foreign Minister Yoshida Kiyonari that the French Ambassador at Berlin had proposed the 
Japanese Minister there to join France in an alliance against China, but also that indirect proposals had 
persistently been made by a French officer in the Japanese service. The same proposal had also been made 
by Jules Patenotre, the French Minister in China to Ando Taro, the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai.
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Takashima, to Shanghai while the French Minister who had made the advance to Japan 
was there.54 Despite his apprehensions, however, no alliance was formed between France 
and Japan against China.
In explaining the policy of Japan, British diplomats noted several factors. 
Financially, the Meiji leaders admitted that Japan could ill afford a large-scale war. For 
instance, Iwakura told Parkes on September 11, 1874, that war with China over Taiwan, 
'although it might gratify certain classes in Japan...would be disapproved [of] by all 
sensible men, and that the finances of the country would not admit of a protracted 
contest.'55 Katsu Awa, who resigned as Naval Minister in protest against the risking of 
war with China, also confessed to Satow on November 26, 1874 that 'Japan had no 
treasure to pay for the expenses o f a war, and it would be impossible to raise money 
except by forced loans from the people, or fresh issues of paper money, which would be 
an injury to the country.'56 Similarly, in 1885, Plunkett reported to Granville that the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry acknowledged that Japan was in no position to incur the 
expenditure o f a war.57 In Japan's relations with Korea Parkes, for instance, noted ;n 
October 1875 regarding the Unyokan incident: 'the Japanese Govermnent are not 
disposed to engage in war with Corea, if  this can be reasonably avoided. They dread the 
heavy expenditure which it would entail'58 and in 1878, he reiterated that 'financial 
considerations' had materially influenced the Japanese government 'in pursuing an 
amicable policy with Corea.'59
Just as they recognised the financial restraints on Japan in waging a war against 
China, the Meiji leaders, according to British diplomats, also respected Chinese strength. 
For instance, Le Poer Trench, noting a statement in a semi-official newspaper in 1883 on 
the growing strength of China and the comparative weakness of Japan, stated that 'The 
admission of Japan's inability to cope successfully with her powerful neighbour is not a 
new idea' in the country.60 In February 1884, when Ito said that Japan would send only
54 FO 46/327, No. 11, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, January 16, 1885; FO 46/327, No. 12, Secret, Plunkett 
to Granville, Tokyo, January 16, 1885. For more details on the possible Franco-Japanese alliance in 1883- 
85, see Sims, French Policy, pp. 119-142.
55 FO 46/182, No. 169, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, September 12, 1874.
55 Memorandum o f  Satow, November 30, 1875 in FO 46/183, No. 204, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, 
November 30, 1874. Katsu Awa added that there was also a proposal to economize by diminishing the 
number o f  government officials in order to finance the war, which he opposed as a contemptible 
proceeding.
57 FO 46/327, No. 22, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, January 19, 1885.
58 FO 46/194, No. 139, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, October 11, 1875.
59 FO 46/231, No, 139, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, December 18, 1878.
60 FO 46/302, No. 138, Trench to Granville, Tokyo, September 25, 1883. It was an article in the Meiji 
Nippo  o f  September 23, 1883, which was subsidised by the Japanese government.
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one warship to Shanghai for the purpose of protecting foreign subjects in the city amidst 
the ongoing conflict between China and France, Le Poer Trench wrote:
I could see, however, that the Government were disinclined to take any 
step likely to give offence to their powerful neighbour, and no doubt the 
report which comes from Peking that China means, when she has her 
hands free, to assert her claim to sovereignty over the Likiu (Loochoo)
Islands, accounts to a great extent for the hesitation shown by Japan to 
do anything which might give China a pretext for re-opening a question 
so fraught with danger to the friendly relations now existing between 
the two countries.61
Such a perception corresponded with British diplomats' views of the superior military 
strength of China. In February 1881, Kennedy observed that 'China was rich and 
powerful as compared with Japan,'62 and Plunkett, in commenting on the possible conflict 
with China over Korea in 1884 wrote:
...how very unwise I consider them for allowing the War Party to drag 
them into a conflict with the Big neighbor [sic], who, however weak 
she may be now, and however much she may temporarily be hampered 
by France, will one day be a great Power, who will then pay Japan off 
with interest for any victory which the latter may now get over her.63
When Parkes observed in a telegram from Peking in January 1885 that Japan had no 
ground for making war against China and was incapable of maintaining a large force in 
the field for a lengthy period, and warned that France was making China a military 
nation, Plunkett readily agreed: 'how utterly foolish it would be of Japan to provoke the 
hostility of her powerful neighbour.,64
British diplomats also noted other factors which influenced the foreign policy of 
Japan, particularly in the 1880s. In March 1880 Kennedy was informed by Inoue that 
Japan would not get involved in a war with China because she had to deal with the 
question of treaty revision and also the agitation for representative institutions, which 
gave 'no little trouble to the present government.' The latter question alone, Inoue 
explained, 'would suffice to prevent Japan going to war. As soon as this country became 
involved in difficulties, or in war with another country the agitators for representative 
government would avail themselves of the opportunity to press their demand.'65
61 FO 46/310, No. 15, Conf., Trench to Granville, Tokyo, February 8, 1884. Japan, however, later decided 
to send a few ships to Shanghai some time after the meeting between Ito and Le Poer Trench.
62 FO 46/271, No. 21, Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, February 23, 1881.
63 FO 46/317, No. 258, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, December 31, 1884.
64 FO 46/327, No. 22, Conf,, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, January 19, 1885.
65 FO 46/256, No. 55, Conf, Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo, March 25, 1880.
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Equally important, according to British diplomats, was the influence exerted by 
Ito and Inoue. Known as the peace or anti-war party, Ito and Inoue advocated a peaceful 
settlement o f various differences that arose between Japan and China. Ito told Kennedy in 
1881 that despite the unceasing difficulty over the Ryukyus, Japan's earnest desire was to 
obtain and keep the friendship of China.66 Following the dispute over Korea, Parkes 
reported in 1883 that Inoue strongly deprecated collision with China and invariably 
endeavoured to suppress such an idea whenever it found expression either among 
Japanese officials or the people.67 Perhaps a more obvious statement was by Plunkett in 
1885 with regard to die peaceful settlement of a dispute over Korea: 'The feelings [of the 
war party] if  not for the prudence and energy of Inoue and Ito would have certainly have 
led to a war with China.' Looking back in 1886 at the speculation about a French- 
Japanese alliance, Plunkett observed that Inoue and Ito had done all they could to 
maintain a peaceful policy towards China and both had no desire to join France against 
China.69
British diplomats noted that the Meiji leaders also realised that Russia had long 
sought a good open harbour on the Pacific, and that they felt that conflict with China or 
Korea would inevitably lead to an intervention from Russia. In 1882 Inoue told Parkes 
that in view o f the increasing strength of Russia at Vladivostok on the Korean border, she 
would probably take possession of the Korean ports of Gensan and Fusan if  war broke 
out between China and Japan.70 In October 1886 Ito emphasized to Plunkett his strong 
desire to maintain friendly relations with China; he was anxious about the Chinese 
designs in Korea and preferred to see Korea continue independent, 'but that of the two 
evils he would sooner see her belong to China than fall a prey to Russia.'71 Two months 
later, Inoue confessed to Plunkett his anxiety that a war between Japan and China would 
not only afford a pretext for Russia to enter Korea, but also force Britain to take up the 
cause of China in response to the move by Russia. This would lead only to disadvantages 
for Japan.72 Of course such a view of possible Russian intervention was recognised by 
British diplomats and they often used it in reminding the Meiji leaders to avoid war with 
China or Korea. Besides, as expressed by Plunkett, possession of an area on either the
66 FO 46/272, No. 49, Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, May 14, 1881.
67 FO 46/297, No. 26, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, February 17, 1883.
68 FO 46/331, No. 155, C onf, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, June 3, 1885.
69 FO 46/347, No. 161, Very C onf, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, October 11, 1886.
70 FO 46/288, No. 128, Secret, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, September 12, 1882.
71 FO 46/347, No. 161, Conf, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, October 11, 1886.
72 FO 46/349, No. 212, C onf, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, December 10, 1886.
73 E.g., FO 46/192, No. 94, Conf, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, July 24, 1875; FO 46/349, No. 25, C onf, 
Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, December 9, 1886.
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Korean or the Chinese frontier by Russia, which would give the Power 'a position in the 
Japan and China seas’ would not only be dangerous to the conflicting parties, but also 
’very disadvantageous to our [British] interests.'74
In fact, it was the threat of Russia that in the view of British diplomats explained 
the Japanese assistance to Korea in becoming a modem independent nation. They 
observed that Japan had not only encouraged Korea to adopt modem reforms by inviting 
Korean missions to observe Japan's progress,75 but more importantly, persuaded Korea o^ 
establish relations with Western Powers. They also based their opinion on statements by 
Japanese leaders, such as Iwakura to Parkes in 1875 and Inoue to Kennedy in 1880, that 
only by ensuring Korean independence through new relations with other Powers, could 
Russian designs be thwarted.76 Such a policy was supported by British diplomats since 
they were also concerned about the Russian threat in East Asia. In 1876, Parkes 
impressed upon Foreign Minister Terajima Munenari that he and the Japanese 
government were at one in their belief in the desirability of Korea maintaining her 
independence, and that in order to ensure this, Japan should persuade Korea to enter into 
relations with Western Powers.77 Similarly, when a conflict loomed between China and 
Russia in 1880 over the Ili region, Kennedy perceived that 'unless Corea be permanently 
opened to foreign trade within a short time by the conclusion of Treaties of Commerce 
with Europe and with America, she is destined to be annexed to the Russian Asiatic 
possession.'78 In a later dispatch Kennedy observed that although Korea would not be of 
much importance to Britain economically, in view of probable Sino-Russo conflict 'it has 
acquired a political importance for all nations trading in the Far East.'79
By the mid-1880s, British diplomats were noting that while Japan's foreign policy 
aimed to maintain friendly relations with the West, it also showed a gradual tendency 
towards pan-Asianism, or an Eastern alliance between Japan and China or between Japan, 
China and Korea. As with the earlier Japanese interest in Eastern cooperation with 
China in the Sino-Japanese Treaty o f 1871, such an idea was generally opposed by
74 FO 46/329, No. 87, Very Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, March 31, 1885.
75 Kennedy and Satow reported that the Korean mission to Japan in 1881 had chiefly been occupied in 
visiting the various government establishments, such as administrative departments, arsenals, factories, and 
schools. FO 46/272, No. 61, Very Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, June 8, 1881. See memorandum by 
Satow, May 11, 1881.
76 FO 46/191, No. 49, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 5, 1875; FO 46/258, No. 146, Kennedy to 
Granville, Yedo, September 3 ,1880 .
77 FO 46/206, No. 102, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 9, 1876.
78 FO 46/257, No. 113, Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, June 29, 1880.
79 FO 46/258, No. 179, Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, November 21, 1880.
80 See Oka in Mayo, op. cit., pp. 4-6 for debates in Japan on Eastern cooperation; Sims maintains that 
French legal adviser in the government service, Boissonade de Fontarabie, was partly responsible for 
promoting a Japanese-Chinese-Korean alliance to the Meiji leadership, Sims, French Policy , p. 267.
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British diplomats for it posed a threat to Western interests in East Asia. One of the 
earliest comments in this connection was by Satow in September 1883. In recommending 
a more conciliatory attitude by Britain towards Japan in relation to treaty revision, he 
wrote:
The formation of an Eastern Asiatic League between China, Japan and 
Korea has been more than once suggested, and is regarded with a 
certain degree of favour by Japanese statesmen who have begun to 
despair of obtaining what they consider due recognition of their claims 
from European powers. The idea may seem chimerical and incapable of 
practical realization, but if such a policy were to be seriously pursued 
by Japan, it is evident that the effect would be the reverse of 
advantageous to the interests of European commerce in the extreme 
East.81
In alluding to alliance between China, Korea and Japan, it is probable that Satow was 
prompted by Iwakura's reported statement in 1880 to a Korean visitor, that he had long 
desired to induce Korea into an alliance of the three eastern Powers, but that the anti- 
foreign feeling there was so great that he thought it would not be successful. In the 
following year Plunkett recorded that while Inoue expressed his desire to follow the 
conduct of other Western Powers, especially Britain, in relation to the Sino-French 
conflict, 'the slow and unsatisfactory manner in which the French were carrying on their 
operations against China, threatened to have the effect of developing a lurking sympathy 
in favour of China.'83 He added that though he thought the feeling was not yet shared by 
Inoue, 'who recognized that Japan having broken with the East, had most to hope from an 
open profession of friendship with the West,' there were symptoms of such a feeling 
increasing in other quarters. Plunkett's position indicated some apprehension of possible 
Sino-Japanese cooperation as he stated that such sympathy might 'unfortunately acquire 
strength, if  France delays much longer striking some decidedly successful blow.'84
Apart from the Japanese frustration with treaty revision and France’s 
unimpressive performance in China, the general renewed drive for colonial expansion 
and imperialist rivalries among European nations in the mid-1880s, in British diplomats'
81 PRO 30/33/1/2, Satow Papers, memorandum by Satow to Plunkett, September 24, 1883.
82 PRO 30/33/15/6, Satow’s Diary, November 17, 1880; Oka notes that Iwakura's position towards a closer 
cooperation between Japan and China can be seen in his memorandum o f  October 1882, in which he 
argued that unless the two countries acted together, it would be impossible to prevent the 'eastern advance 
o f  Western power' and that Japan should not risk war with China over Korea since it would bring no benefit 
to Japan and result only in more advantages to European traders. Quoted in Oka Yoshitake, in Mayo, op. 
cit. pp. 4, 6.
83 FO 46/315, No. 187, V eiy Conf., Plunkett to Granville, .Tokyo, October 21, 1884.
84 Ibid., No. 188, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, October 21, 1884.
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view, also contributed to the idea of pan-Asianism in Japan.85 This development, it was 
observed in 1885, counterbalanced or at least held in check the hostility to China which 
was growing in some quarters and led the Meiji government to attach more value to 
friendly relations with China. Confirmation of this view came from Inoue's 
acknowledgement to Plunkett in June 1885 of Japanese anxiety that a race for colonies 
among the Western Powers in order to divert the attention o f their people from issues in 
Europe might result in great troubles for Asiatic countries, and that a war with China 
would weaken Japan and might even lead to Japan's annexation by Western Powers. 
Plunkett consequently concluded that the presence of Ito at that time at Tientsin to settle 
the Korean problem was intended to 'lay a foundation for a tolerably good understanding 
between China and Japan for mutual protection from the aggressive Powers o f the West.' 
The first visible result of this, he predicted, would be the withdrawal of Japan from 
Korea, and 'the return of that country, with the consent, and even perhaps the connivance 
of Japan, more and more under the dominating influence of China.'86 Apart from 
Plunkett, Gubbins also reported in February 1885 the emergence in Japan of what he 
called an 'Eastern Coalition', noting that the idea had weight in some influential quarters. 
Yet he added that the idea was generally opposed by Japanese press, which argued that 
'the helpless condition of China and Corea leave her [Japan] no alternative but to throw in 
her lot on the side of Western Nations and so realize her ambition to be the leading power 
in Eastern Asia.'87 Unlike Plunkett who indicated some apprehension at the prospect of an 
Eastern alliance between Japan and China, Gubbins's own position in the memorandum 
was neutral in that he merely repeated some reasons given by its opponents for rejecting 
such an alliance with China.
It is clear that by 1887 some form of East Asian cooperation was being seriously 
considered by the Meiji government, as Inoue put to Plunkett in March of that year a 
suggestion for a tripartite alliance between China, Japan and Britain. Such an alliance, 
according to Inoue, would not only place the relations of China and Japan upon a friendly 
and permanent understanding but also constitute a united front against the 
aggrandisement of Russia. Plunkett's response was to reject the idea by replying that 'the 
results might be obtained by means far simpler than a tripartite secret arrangement,' and
85 In 1881 France established a protectorate over Tunis; in 1882 Britain occupied Egypt; in 1883 Germany 
colonized South-western Africa; in 1884-85 France extended her protectorate over Indochina and Britain 
took Burma; in 1885 France and Britain occupied Taiwan and Port Hamilton respectively. See Iriye, in 
Jansen, Cam bridge History, p. 747.
86 FO 46/331, No. 155, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, June 3, 1885.
87 Gubbins's memorandum, 'Public Opinion in regard to Japan's Future Policy,' February 17, 1885 encl. in 
FO 46/328, No. 55, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, February 18, 1885.
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he proposed instead that the controversial issues between China and Japan be settled by 
compromise.88 Though he was not explicit, Plunkett may have considered that even with 
the association of Britain, close cooperation between the two Eastern countries was 
undesirable as it portended a united resistance against Western Powers. As to whether the 
idea of a Eastern coalition was seen as non-progressive on the part of Japan, no such view 
was expressed by British diplomats, though Satow and Plunkett did indicate their 
apprehension. Gubbins also made no personal statement on the issue, although he did 
restate in his memorandum of February 1885 the argument of some Japanese that the 
country might be dragged backward and become degenerate if  it entered into an allianc e 
with a non-progressive country like China.
One Westernising aspect which British diplomats noted in Japan's relations with 
China and Korea was the adoption o f Western diplomatic practice. The Meiji leaders at 
the beginning were seen as following an approach to diplomacy which could be 
characterised as “Oriental”. This is illustrated in Parkes's dispatch on the Okubo mission 
to Peking to negotiate the settlement of the Taiwan affair, as he wrote, 'He [Okubo] will 
doubtless feel his way with all the dilatoriness and tortuousness common to Orientals.'89 
Similarly, when reporting apparent Japanese indecision in the Taiwan affair in 1874, 
Parkes wrote: 'Wavering and uncertainty are such common features of Japanese action 
that it is not surprising these should mark their proceedings in a question of this 
importance.'90 In contrast, in 1882 Parkes noted that in negotiating with the Koreans 
following the disturbance at Seoul, Japanese envoy Hanabusa displayed an energy similar 
to Western diplomats in overcoming the duplicity and evasions of the Koreans.91 A 
similar comment was also forthcoming from Plunkett in reporting on the settlement of the 
Nagasaki affair in 1886 between Japan and China. He observed that unlike the Japanese, 
who wished to arrive at a speedy settlement, the Chinese Minister at Tokyo and the 
Chinese consul in Nagasaki procrastinated by engaging foreign legal experts to 
investigate the incident, and this delayed and complicated what ought to have been a very
92simple matter.
88 FO 46/366, No. 178, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, March 27, 1887.
89 Parkes's memorandum, Hakodate, August 26, 1874 in FO 46/182, No. 167, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, 
September 12, 1874.
90 FO 46/182, No. 176, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, September 28, 1874. This followed a statement by 
Iwakura that in the event o f war with China, Japan would not be the first to declare war if  negotiations 
failed, which was opposed to his earlier remark that Japan would take the initiative in the hostility with 
China.
91 FO 46/288, No. 126, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, September 11, 1882.
92 Plunkett noted that as the Chinese government had engaged Drummond, an English barrister and legal 
adviser to the Chinese Customs, to take part in the enquiiy on the clash between some 300 Chinese sailors 
and local Japanese police at Nagasaki in August 1886, this forced the Japanese to employ Kirkwood,
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Japan was also seen as attempting to imitate the West in other ways. Kennedy, for 
instance, noted Japanese efforts to persuade the Chinese government to revise the Sino- 
Japanese treaty of 1871 by granting extra-territorial jurisdiction to Japan over its subjects 
in China as being due to Japan’s wish to secure rights similar to those enjoyed by 
foreigners in Japan. Kennedy, however, doubted that China would accept the proposal 
since the Japanese argued that treaty revision would soon took place between Japan and 
European Powers and the latter would soon give up the right of extraterritoriality to 
Japan.93 Similarly, Parkes noted that the 1876 Treaty and the Supplementary Treaty and 
Trade Regulations with Korea showed a close resemblance to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty 
of 1858, even going beyond the latter in some respects. This elicited the censorious 
comment by Parkes that the Japanese applied 'a different mode of reasoning to their 
dealings with the Coreans'94 in that while they complained of the extra-territorial clauses 
which had earlier been imposed by Western countries on Japan, they had been careful to 
stipulate their right of jurisdiction over their own subjects in Korea.95 Furthermore, while 
the Japanese government remonstrated against the imposition of low tariffs on Japan by 
the West, Japanese trade in Korea was free from any import or export duties. The 
Japanese were similarly criticised for obtaining for themselves other larger concessions 
which they opposed or refused to grant to foreigners in Japan, such as the exceedingly 
low rate of tonnage dues on Japanese shipping entering Korean ports, the unrestricted 
exportation of rice and other grain, the opening of Korean coastal trade to Japanese 
merchant-vessels, and the liberty granted to Japanese subjects to obtain land at the open 
ports in Korea by direct agreement with Koreans instead of only with the Korean 
government.96
The Northern Frontier Problem
In addition to China and Korea, Japan also had a problematic relationship with 
Russia. One source of dispute was Sakhalin, which was claimed by both countries. After 
several years o f negotiations, the difficulty was peacefully solved through the Treaty of 
St. Petersburg of May 1875, which effected the transfer of Sakhalin to Russia and the 
Kurile Islands to Japan. This diplomatic solution of the problem was welcomed by
British legal adviser o f  the Judicial Department, FO 46/347, No. 143, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo,
September 10, 1886; Ibid., No. 148, Conf., Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, September 22, 1886.
93 FO 46/152, No. 58, Adams to Granville, Yedo, March 11, 1872.
94 FO 46/208, No. 61, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, October 2, 1876.
95 FO 46/201, No. 58, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, March 27, 1876.
96 FO 46/208, No. 171, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, October 26, 1876.
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Parkes97 for he had long recommended that Japan should avoid a direct contest with her 
northern neighbour. As he stated to Under Secretary Edmund Hammond on September 
18, 1869, 'I have worked hard to persuade the Japanese Govt....and we may succeed in 
avoiding collision.'98 In his view, a collision would only provide a pretext for Russia to 
seize Yezo (Ezo), which mainly comprised Hokkaido, which was more valuable than 
Sakhalin.99 Furthermore, he argued that given the firm hold acquired by the Russians on 
the south of Sakhalin, as reported by a British naval officer, Captain Denison,100 and tie  
weak military presence o f Japan in the island, as discerned by Vice-Admiral Sir Charles 
Shadwell in 1873 from his cruise in the Sea of Tartary, it was impossible for Japan to 
dislodge the Russians.101 The best course for Japan, in Parkes's view, was some sort of 
exchange with Russia without loss of time. He advised Iwakura in September 1870 that it 
was better to accept the Russian offer for exchange and avoid delays which would 
strengthen the position of the Russians in Sakhalin. He added that since the Kurile islands 
offered by the Russians appeared to be nearly equal in extent to that part of Sakhalin 
under Japanese control, the country's national honour would not suffer by the transfer.102 
Besides, as he expressed to Soejima in November 1873, in view of the relatively harsh 
conditions in Sakhalin, ‘Japan would do well to make the best bargain she could for her 
portion of Saghalin, which it appeared to me she would never be able to turn to material
+  ;  103account.
Japanese plans to develop Hokkaido through the emigration o f Japanese settlers to 
the northern island were regarded as sound by British diplomats as they felt that Russia 
also desired Hokkaido since, unlike Sakhalin, it was free from ice all year round. Charge 
d'Affaires R. G. Watson in reporting the dispatch by the Japanese government o f a large 
number of labourers to Hokkaido in 1872, observed that while such an undertaking 
enabled Japan to protect 'against the possibility o f Russian encroachment on Yezo as on 
Saghalin, to which latter island Russia obtains access the more readily from its being so
97 FO 46/194, No. 156, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, November 10, 1875.
98FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yedo, September 18, ,1869. Hosoya Chihiro attributed the diplomatic 
solution o f  the Sakhalin problem to the influence o f  British Minister Parkes on the Japanese government. 
See his work 'Japan's Policies Towards Russia,' in Morley, J. W., Japan's Foreign Policy 1868-1941: A 
Research Guide (New York: Columbia University Press), 1974, p. 343.
99 FO 391/15, Hammond Papers, Yedo, September 18, 1869.
100 Ibid., Yokohama, November 19, 1869.
101 FO 46/168, No. 79, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, October 6, 1873.
102 p o  46/127, No. 134, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, September 5, 1870.
103 FO 46/168, N o. 93, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, November 3, 1873.
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scantily peopled,'104 it also prevented Russia from posing a threat to British interests in 
the region:
Hakodate affords, at all seasons, an excellent anchorage, it would 
present a highly advantageous marine position for Russian 
vessels...should circumstances ever place Hakodate, which might be 
made a very strong fortress, in the hands of Russia, its possession by 
that Power would, I fear, constitute a formidable menace to Her 
Majesty's possession in the Pacific Ocean.105
One possible development in Japanese-Russian relations over which British 
diplomats showed some concern was the prospect of an alliance between the two 
countries in the 1870s and 1880s. For Parkes, the concern first emerged when he heard a 
report in April 1874 that General Enomoto, the Japanese Minister to Russia, had been 
authorized to surrender the Japanese rights in Sakhalin on condition either o f alliance, or 
at least o f neutrality on the part of Russia in the event o f Japan invading Korea.106 
Though no such arrangement was made, in 1876 Parkes expressed the same suspicion 
when he observed the bestowal of decorations between Russia and Japan.107 In the same 
vein, when a collision occurred in 1882 between Japan and Korea, Parkes wrote:
Russia...undoubtedly wishes to draw Japan into an alliance with herself 
for any political object that would make such an alliance desirable, and 
in any question that might arise with Korea she would, I think, 
endeavour to identify her action with that of Japan, if  an opportunity 
were afforded her doing so.108
Kennedy, though less convinced than Parkes of the possibility of a real alliance between 
Japan and Russia, also suspected a Russian attempt to win Japan to her side when the 
Mikado and two Japanese ministers were invested with high Russian decorations in 
March 1880, at a time when the relations of both Russia and Japan with China were 
strained over the Russian encroachment o f the Chinese territory in Sinkiang and the 
dispute over the Ryukyus between China and Japan.109
104 FO 46/154, No. 12, Watson to Granville, Yedo, June 1, 1872. For more details on the reclamation 
program in Hokkaido by the Meiji government, see Harootunian, H. D., 'The Economic Rehabilitation o f  
the Samurai in the Early Meiji Period' in The Journal o f  Asian Studies, Vol. XIX, No. 4, August 1960, pp. 
437-438.
105 FO 46/155, No. 87, Watson to Granville, Yedo, September 3, 1872.
106 FO 46/178, No. 175, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, April 28, 1874.
107 FO 46/207, No. 123, Conf., Parkes to Derby, Yedo, July 25, 1876; FO 46/208, No. 145, Parkes to 
Derby, August 29, 1876. Those decorated included de Struve Russian Minister at Yedo by the Japanese 
government and to Vice-Admiral Enomoto, Japanese Envoy Extraordinary at St. Petersburg by the Russian 
government.
108 FO 46/284, No. 41, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, March 25, 1882.
109 FO 46/256, No. 47, Conf., Kennedy to Salisbury, Yedo', March 8, 1880.
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Even if  alliance with Russia became less of a concern, British diplomats 
emphasized that Japanese leaders remained wary of involvement in any conflict with 
Russia. In 1884, for instance, Plunkett maintained that while Inoue's own tendency was to 
throw the lot o f Japan in with Britain and the United States, he was likely to side with the 
Continental Trio of France, Germany and Russia, in view of the latter* s close proximity, 
and also the small probability that Britain would go to the expense o f protecting Japan if 
she were to offend her Russian neighbour.110
Nevertheless, Japanese interest in closer understanding with another Western 
Power also began to be noted, and Plunkett hinted in particular at a possible 
understanding between Japan and Britain. As he reported at a time of high Anglo-Russian 
tension in April 1885, Japan 'will no doubt give us her moral support unless Russia bids 
very high indeed for her friendship,' though she 'will probably be afraid to show too open 
sympathy with us' for fear of possible revenge by Russia.111 This orientation towards the 
West particularly Britain was undoubtedly welcomed by British diplomats. As Plunkett 
wrote in February 1885:
Our interest must be that Japan should be strong enough to resist any 
encroachments by Russia, and prosperous and rich enough to take large 
quantities of our manufactures. It must be our object that none of the 
fine Harbours of Japan should fall a prey to any Foreign Power, and 
thus become a base for future hostile action against our Ships...A good 
understanding between Japan and Great Britain is so evidently 
advantageous to both parties, that I can hardly conceive its not being 
soon firmly established, unless indeed the opportunity should be lost 
and Japan should in the meanwhile have thrown in her fate with that of 
Russia.112
Despite the warning by British Charge d1 Affaires O'Conor at Peking o f Japan's very 
critical attitude towards the occupation of Port Hamilton, which took place in mid-April 
1885, Plunkett maintained that Japan desired friendly relations with Britain. Not only had 
Inoue made no official objection to their presence at Port Hamilton, but also the general 
position expressed to him by the Tokyo government was that 'Russia is the Power against
1 i q
which Japan has especially to be on her guard.' -■ Nevertheless, despite such assurances, 
he never ruled out a possible Japanese alliance with Russia. In relation to the Anglo- 
Russian tensions, he recorded in May 1885 that 'if she cannot see her way to joining
1,0 FO 46/315, No. 187, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, October 21, 1884; FO 46/317, No. 249, 
Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, December 22, 1884; FO 46/329, No. 87, Very Conf., Plunkett to 
Granville, Tokyo, March 31, 1885.
111 FO 46/329, No. 97, V eiy Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 2, 1885.
112 FO 46/328, N o .53, C onf, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, February 16, 1885.
1,3 FO 46/330, No. 138, C onf, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, May 11, 1885.
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England, [Japan] would be strongly tempted to prefer an alliance with Russia to a 
neutrality which would probably draw her into difficulties with both belligerents.' Such a 
possibility, according to Plunkett, might be seen in the pro-Russian sentiment expressed 
in the Japan Mail, which sometimes contained the views of leading Japanese ministers, 
as well as in the bestowal of decorations on high Japanese officials by Russia and in the 
pressure of the war party in Japan.114 Moreover, in February 1885 Plunkett had reported 
that he had heard that Russia had made some secret proposals to the Japanese
i i c
government, presumably directed against Britain.
By June 1885, Plunkett felt able to state that Inoue considered Russia, France and 
Germany to be the aggressive and dangerous Powers, and that in spite of the shock given 
to him by British temporary occupation of Port Hamilton, 'Inoue continued to group 
England and the United States as the natural friends and protectors of Japan,' and wished 
to side with the Anglo-Saxons, as against the Continental Races. This was because the 
Foreign Minister believed that 'the interests of the latter in Japan were almost exclusively 
political, and were governed mainly by considerations of European policy; whereas 
England and the United States have large material and commercial interests on the spot 
which would benefit by Japanese development and progress.'116
It may have been partly because of the general encouraging reports by Plunkett, 
and perhaps also the fear that Japan might incline towards Russia, that Lord Granville 
raised with the British Minister in June 1885 the possibility of an alliance with Japan.1 7 
In response to Granville's enquiry regarding what steps might be taken with a view to 
secure such an alliance, Plunkett replied that Britain should help Japan out of the 
deadlock in treaty revision by taking the lead in negotiating on ‘more generous
1 t o  , # t
principles.’ While British general policy with regard to treaty revision did indicate a 
gradual acceptance of compromise towards Japan, as shown in the Anglo-German draft 
of 1886, Plunkett's own attitude was to promote the desired close understanding with 
Japan by persistently urging Japanese leaders to look towards Britain. In December 1885 
Plunkett impressed upon Ito and Inoue that the British government attached great 
importance to the establishment of good relations with Japan, and urged them 'to look to 
England sooner than to any of the Continental Powers, for sympathy or support.'119 A few 
months later, he maintained to Ito that while there were three Western Powers of which
1,4 Ibid.
115 FO 46/328, No. 53, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, February 16, 1885.
116 FO 46/331, No. 155, C onf, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, June 3, 1885.
117 FO 45, No. 64, Granville to Plunkett, June 8, 1885.
118 FO 46/332, N o. 193, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 29, 1885.
119 FO 46/335, N o. 263, C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, December 18, 1885.
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Japan would always have to take account, viz. Britain, Russia, and the United States, 
'Japan had more to expect, and less to fear, from Great Britain.1 While the United States 
was pre-occupied with her own affairs due to the great extent of her territory and was 
unlikely to waste time or treasure on extensive undertakings abroad in affording 
protection to Japan, Russia had covetous designs upon Japan. In contrast, Britain, he 
assured Ito, desired to 'to see Japan strong, flourishing and independent.'120 To his 
satisfaction, there were positive signs in Japan of interest in an alliance with Britain. In 
October 1886 Plunkett noted the appearance of some articles in the Hochi Shimbun, 
which maintained that it was in the interest o f Japan to have a good understanding with
191Britain. By December 1886 Plunkett was able to write to Lord Iddesleigh that he 
believed that Japan was fully alive to the paramount necessity o f maintaining good 
relations with Britain ‘because she is likely of all the European Powers to be most useful
1 99as a friend, or most dangerous as an enemy.' Perhaps stronger evidence of a Japanese 
inclination towards an alliance with Britain can be found in Inoue's suggestion in 1887 of 
a tripartite alliance between Japan, China and Britain to check Russia.123 Although 
Plunkett did not encourage this overture, probably because the inclusion of China raised 
the bogey of a future alliance between the two East Asian countries alone, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that such indications of pro-British feeling on the part of Inoue and 
the consistent advocacy of a close relationship by British diplomats helped to lay the 
foundations for the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902.
The Revision of the Unequal Treaties
Ever since it came into power, the Meiji government had tirelessly striven for an 
equal footing with the West through the revision of the unequal treaties, which were seen 
as an infringement on the sovereignty of Japan with provisions such as extraterritoriality, 
the most favoured nation clause and tariff restrictions on Japan. In view of the importance 
of British interests in Japan, the subject of revision preoccupied British diplomats for 
many years. Only in 1894 did the long drawn-out negotiations result in a revised treaty.124
Prior to 1894, British diplomats generally regarded Japan as being unprepared for 
treaty revision and did not accord her equal status with the West. One of the earliest
120 Ibid., No. 71, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, March 1, 1886.
121 FO 46/347, No. 163, Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, October 12, 1886.
122 FO 46/349, No. 212, Conf., Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, December 10, 1886.
123 FO 46/366, No. 178, Secret, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, March 27, 1887.
124 Following the revised treaty with Britain in July 1894, other powers followed suit. The 1894 treaty 
abolished extraterritoriality, subject to the implementation o f  new Japanese legal codes. This was to take 
effect from 1899, while the controlled tariffs continued until 1911.
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comments in this connection was made by Charge d'Affaires Adams following his 
conversation with Chief Minister Sanjo on May 16, 1872 on the object of the Iwakura 
mission to discuss treaty revision in Europe. As he put it:
The great aim of the Japanese rulers is to make it appear that their 
country is the equal of all other nations, and they are even prone to 
assume to their own people a superiority over those nations, which in 
their hearts they feel to be visionary. As is natural in a country which 
has been long isolated from the rest of the world, the Japanese are 
inordinately vain, and nothing would flatter their vanity more than to 
have a great conference in Europe, which would be attended by 
Plenipotentiaries of all the Treaty Powers, assembled as it were at the 
bidding of Japan, and this is the light in which it would be represented 
here. The Ambassadors, too, would naturally be elated with the idea of 
this European congress when the affairs of their country would be 
discussed by them in the eyes of the whole civilized world.125
On why Japan was not ready, Adams pointed to the unsettled condition in Japan in the 
early 1870s. Despite Sanjo's remark that one reason for the government to undertake the 
revision was because the conversion of the han  into ken  which had begun in 1871 had 
been peacefully accepted by the people of Japan, Adams was skeptical, for he observed 
that there was much discontent in various parts of the country. Furthermore, he observed 
that Japan had yet to settle the problem of the persecution of Christianity and the 
admission of foreigners into the interior of Japan. Unless these issues were first solved, 
serious negotiations for treaty revision could not be carried out.126
Other British diplomats pointed to the unpreparedness o f the Japanese legal 
system to allow for the abolition of extraterritoriality in Japan. Parkes, for instance, in 
July 1873 maintained that in spite of Japanese proposals to assimilate Western practices, 
it would be many years before the Japanese could be expected to successfully establish a 
satisfactory judicial system. Consequently he observed that it would be a long time before 
the treaties could be revised.127 In January 1874 he again emphasized not only that 'Japan 
possessed no Courts or system of law adapted to Western ideas and practice,' but also that
19 Sthe Japanese would find it difficult to discharge their responsibility over foreigners. \  
more lengthy comment by Parkes on this problem is in a memorandum of 1882, 
following a conference in Tokyo on treaty revision, in which his view of the premature 
condition of Japanese legal systems was supported by English legal experts, including
125 FO 46/153, No. 92, Conf., Adams to Granville, Yedo, May 20, 1872.
526 Ibid.
127 Parkes's memorandum, Yokohama, July 24, 1873, in FO 46/167, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, July 29, 
1873.
128 FO 46/176, No. 5, Parkes to Granville, Yedo, January 18, 1874.
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Kirkwood and R. Rennie. The Japanese, Parkes wrote, should proceed in a gradual way 
and consider a test or probationary period since their proposal for jurisdiction over 
foreigners was one 'of great magnitude and of great difficulty.'129
Plunkett, who succeeded Parkes in 1883, held a similar view. In an April 1884 
dispatch he wrote:
To give jurisdiction...to Japan over foreigners, before she is capable of 
exercising it properly, would be a fatal gift, which would necessarily 
lead to serious trouble, and probably before long to international 
complications ... We are prepared to give up jurisdiction whenever we 
consider it safe; but when that will be depends on the progress Japan 
will have made in the ideas and habits of modem jurisprudence, and we 
must reserve to ourselves to be the judges o f when that moment will be 
arrived.130
Interestingly, even Satow, who befriended many Meiji leaders, maintained in 1876 that 
concessions should not be given without something being secured in exchange. To him, 
'Sentimental foreign policy is a dead loss' and 'What is required in Japan is not that we 
should give up to the Japanese whatever speculators on abstract justice may choose to 
attribute to them as their due, but that we should treat them with courtesy in all our
i n i
relations with them.'
Of the many Treaty Powers, Britain was arguably the most reluctant Power to 
concede to Japan, and historians have mostly seen it as the greatest obstacle in the path of
1 q n
treaty revision. Nevertheless, while it was not until 1893 that negotiations with Britain 
began to make progress, it should be noted that there was a gradual change in British 
diplomats' attitudes. Unlike in the 1870s, British diplomats in the 1880s, though still 
opposing the entire abolition of the treaties, were prepared to make more concessions to 
Japan. Satow, for instance, told Plunkett during his visit to the British Embassy in Paris 
on September 10, 1883 of'the  desirability of being able to offer her [Japan] some little
129 Parkes Papers, 6/6, Draft, No. 164, Parkes to Granville, Tokyo, November 20, 1882, see the enclosed 
memorandum on Jurisdiction. Parkes noted that only the simplest portion o f the new laws, namely the 
Criminal Code had yet been completed by 1882 while the Civil and Commercial Codes had yet to be 
drafted and completed. Kirkwood among others maintained that Japanese judges as a body were 
incompetent and without qualifications, that there was a lack o f qualified interpreters, and that the judges 
had no idea o f the relative position o f Bench and Bar. Rennie observed that though the new Japanese penal 
code might be a fair compilation, no native judge was capable o f administering it.
130 FO 46/311, No. 59, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 21, 1884.
131 PRO 30/33/15/5, Satow's Diary, April 24, 1876.
132 See e.g., Nish, I. H., ’Japan's Policies Toward Britain,1 in Morley, op. c i t ,  p. 186; Beasley, W. G., 
Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1987, p. 33; Treat, P. J., Diplomatic Relations 
Between the United States and Japan 1853-1895 (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press), Vol. I, 
1932, p. 498.
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1 ^encouragement' in treaty revision. Satow reiterated his view three days later at the 
Foreign Office in London.134
Such a change may have been partly due to what diplomats saw as Japan's 
progress in Western civilization and also to a desire to prevent Japan from establishing a 
close relationship with other Powers which might in turn affect British interests in the Far 
Eastern region. This may be seen in Satow's comments in September 1883 regarding 
various social, economic and political reforms in Japan:
In short, Japan desires to be received into the European brotherhood of 
nations, and spares no effort in making good her claim to the rank she is 
ambitious o f having accorded to her. Should it not be the policy of 
Western states to encourage her aspirations and favour her endeavours, 
rather than to turn the cold shoulder to her, and force her to make 
common cause with China [?]135
Satow's change of attitude in favour of Japan was even more evident when, during a 
dinner with some leading Japanese statesmen in 1884, he said it was his belief that 'Japan 
was destined to achieve a leading place among the nations of Asia' and that he 'had never 
had any doubts about her future since 1868.'136 A clear statement on Japan's progress was 
also made by Gubbins. In response to the argument by Vice-Foreign Minister Yoshida in 
April 1884 that the degeneration of Turkey was because of the imposition o f extra­
territoriality and other treaty constraints by Western Powers, Gubbins replied that 'I did 
not think any just parallel could be drawn between Turkey and Japan; that the former 
might, as he said, be retrogressing, but that in Japan progress was an established fact.'137
Plunkett also, although he felt that major revision was premature, was readier than 
Parkes to effect some compromise with Japan and admitted Japan's vigorous attempt to 
achieve progress towards the revision of the treaties. In response to French Minister 
Sienkiewicz's criticisms of Japanese proceedings and refusal to meet the wishes of the 
Japanese government, Plunkett wrote in December 1884:
[Sienkiewicz] makes the not uncommon mistake of looking at Japan 
exclusively through the Suez Canal, whereas it is now-adays more 
through San Francisco, Vladivostock and Berlin that the future political 
development of Japan is being influenced. Monsieur Sienkiewicz's 
reasoning that Turks, and Japanese are both Asiatics, and therefore
133 PRO 30/33/15/7, Satow's Diary, September 10, 1883,
534 Ibid., September 13, 1883.
135 PRO 30/33/1/2, Satow Papers, memorandun by Satow to Plunkett, September 24, 1883.
136 PRO 30/33/15/8, Satow Diary, November 3, 1884. This particular occasion took place during Satow's 
visit to Japan from September 27 to November 22, 1884. He was then appointed British Minister to Siam.
137 Gubbins's report to Plunkett, April 18, 1884 enclosed in FO 46/311, No. 57, Conf., Plunkett to 
Granville, Tokyo, April 19, 1884.
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must be treated, to a certain extent, alike, is erroneous in view of the 
radical differences both of fact and of tendency between the ruling 
Powers of this country and those who still reign on the Bosphorus; and 
the less certain Foreign Powers will admit the logic of facts which is 
every day becoming more potent, the more inevitably is Japan thrown 
into the hands of other nations, with whom naturally she would have 
but little sympathy.138
In explaining his attitude, Plunkett may be said to have reflected a changing trend in the 
thinking of British diplomats in general. As mentioned earlier, Satow held a conciliatory 
attitude towards Japan. The fact that Satow had made his view known to Plunkett in 
September 1883 may have also swayed the latter towards a more favourable view of 
Japan. Furthermore, although British residents of the Japanese treaty ports mostly
| Q Q
opposed concessions to Japan, representations by certain foreign residents, such as a 
memorandum which he received in May 1884 from a Committee of Protestant 
Missionaries in Japan may have also contributed to Plunkett’s view. Among other things, 
the memorandum suggested that while exceptional arrangements were necessary to 
secure foreign interests, they should not stand in the way of a speedy revision of the 
treaties 'such as shall be both just in principle, and the generous acknowledgement on the 
part of Foreign Nations of the real progress which Japan has made since the present 
Treaties were formed.'140
The position of Germany on treaty revision may have also been a factor. As the 
negotiations continued in the 1880s, Plunkett noted the increasing influence of Germany, 
and in a dispatch of February 1885 he observed that one reason for Japan to look up to 
Germany was because 'Germany was the first European Power who showed a disposition 
to relax the excessive rigour of the existing Conventions.'141 While his statement was not 
condemnatory towards Germany, he gradually ..came to suspect that Germany's motive 
was to extract concessions in return for treaty revision. The first sign of such an attempt, 
according to Plunkett, was in 1887 when German Minister Von Holleben took advantage 
o f Germany's involvement in the settlement of the Nagasaki affair between China and 
Japan to secretly secure China's cooperation with Japan with regard to Japanese treaty 
revision.142 In return, he alleged, Germany would receive more commercial concessions 
than other Powers through a secret treaty with Japan. Unsurprisingly, this was objected to
138 FO 46/317, No. 230, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, December 11, 1884.
139 Hoare, op . c/7., pp. 100-101.
* 140 FO 46/312, No. 70, Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, May 10, 1884.
141 FO 46/328, No. 53, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, February 16, 1885.
142 FO 46/365, No. 41, C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 10, 1887; ibid., No. 44, Secret, 
Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 10, 1887.
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by Plunkett as injurious to British interests in the country.143 Soon afterwards Plunkett 
also came to suspect Von Holleben of having sought commercial benefits from the 
Japanese in return for helping to secure the concessions made by the British government 
in the Anglo-German draft of June 1886.144 Although Plunkett was assured by the 
German Minister in March 1887 that Germany desired to work in concert with Britain 
towards treaty revision,145 the fact that the Japanese government exhibited a pro-German 
tendency in their internal reforms and employed a growing number of Germans did 
indicate the increased strength of German influence and this may have contributed to the 
accommodating attitude of Plunkett towards Japan. Moreover, Plunkett desired a close 
understanding between Japan and Britain, and one way of achieving this, in his view, was 
through more concessions to Japan in treaty revision. This may be seen in his response to 
Granville’s enquiry in 1885 about a possible alliance with Japan.
By 1887, Plunkett was expressing his preference for a speedy revision, for he 
perceived the problem of securing compensation from the Japanese in return for British 
concessions if the negotiations were allowed to drag on. On hearing in July 1887 of 
serious objections in Japan to Inoue's proposals for the jurisdiction convention, Plunkett 
observed that 'it is a case of the Sibylline books; every month we lose, the more exacting 
will be the demands of the Japanese, and the smaller the counter-concessions we 
obtain.'146 Hugh Fraser, who succeeded Plunkett, shared his predecessor's view, though 
he was even more conscious that the government would be reluctant to give any new 
guarantees of concessions to Treaty Powers for fear of increasing the already serious 
agitation in the country for treaty revision. As he put it in August 1889:
It was not to be expected, perhaps, that the sort of patriotic movement 
which led to the repudiation of the work of the Treaty Revision 
Conferences in 1887 would at once cease, and the country become 
reasonable upon the subject. The success obtained then served rather to 
inspire Japanese politicians with a yet warmer goal for the nation's 
honour, and a keener impatience for the immediate attainment o f all the 
independence which they thought to be due to her.147
143 Ibid., No. 46, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 13, 1887.
144 FO 46/365, No. 49, C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, February 18, 1887. The concessions by Britain 
were in respect to the tariff, whereby Japan was allowed to increase her import duties up to twenty-five per 
cent, instead o f  the averaged fixed tariff o f  five per cent., and in the reduction o f  the number o f  foreign 
judges in future Japanese courts.
145 FO 46/366, No. 71, Conf., Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, March 18, 1887.
146 FO 46/368, No. 188, V eiy C onf, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, July 9, 1887.
147 FO 46/387, No. 97, C onf, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 16, 1889. Nish observes that one reason 
for foreigners to become more amenable to the revision in the 1880s was the fear that the attacks by the 
anti-foreign party on Japanese statesmen might be turned against foreigners. Nish, I., Japanese Foreign 
Policy 1869-1942  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul), 1977, p. 30.
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So hostile was the agitation that Fraser observed that concession might lead to 
assassination. Even Okuma's project for treaty revision, he added, which at first was 
generally approved, had come to be considered 'too far subservient to foreign 
pretensions.'148
There was also the issue of British commercial interests in Japan. While the 
British merchant community in Japan wished to maintain the old treaty in order to secure 
the more important privileges of extraterritoriality and high tariffs,149 British diplomats 
such as Plunkett and Fraser favoured the revision because they believed that greater 
advantage would be obtained for general British trade. To Plunkett, as he reported in 
April 1884, the old treaties not only confined foreign trade to five open ports but also 
'exposed it to all sorts of inconveniences which prevent its natural development.'150 In 
1889 Fraser noted that the situation might become more serious since some other Powers 
had accepted or planned to accept the Japanese offer of commercial advantages in return 
for placing their subjects under Japanese jurisdiction.151 This, to Fraser, would result in 
practical disadvantages to Britain and pressure on the British government by their 
mercantile community.152 Apart from commercial advantages, Fraser also maintained 
that revision would also benefit British missionaries and travellers as they would no 
longer be confined to treaty ports and would be able to go into the interior of Japan.153 In 
short, Fraser took a view that 'the old treaties are wearing out, and becoming daily 
inapplicable in some respect or other to circumstances.'154
Interestingly, Fraser perceived that the slow revision was also partly due to the 
excessive demands o f Britain, particularly regarding jurisdiction. As he stated in August 
1889:
Amongst the causes of our present weakness must be reckoned, I fear, a 
fault o f requiring too much. ...a principal degree of blame [for the 
breaking up of the 1887 conferences] must be borne by the demands in 
regard to jurisdiction and guarantees o f justice. ...the Jurisdiction 
Convention was too rigid for practical service as an international 
compact. I cannot help confessing that I have regretted very much to 
find inserted into the counter draft of Her Majesty's Government, even
148 FO 46/387, No. 188, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 16, 1889.
149 Hoare, op. cit. pp. 98, 100,
150 FO 46/311, No. 58, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, April 19,1884.
151 By November 1889, the United States, Germany and Russia had already signed treaties with Japan, 
while France had embarked upon independent negotiations.
152 FO 46/387, No. 97, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, November 15, 1889.
153 Ibid. Fraser did receive some memorandums by different missionary associations in Japan urging the 
revision o f  the treaty since it would enable them to spread their missionary activities in the interior. See the 
memorandums in e.g., FO 46/ 399, No. 95, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, October 3, 1890; ibid., No. 106, 
Tokyo, October 27, 1890.
154 FO 46/387, Private, Fraser to Sanderson, Tokyo, November 15, 1889.
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at this eleventh hour, stipulations, taken from that scheme, of a 
character that it is difficult to avoid qualifying as obviously vexatious 
and unacceptable, such as that which requires the Disciplinary Court, to 
which the Foreign Judges are subject, to be composed exclusively of 
Foreigners, and that which requires these Foreign Judges to be excluded 
from re-employment after one term of service (lest they should become 
too Japanese in sympathy), and...a demand...that the foreign plaintiff 
shall have advantages of "forum" over the native defendant.155
Fraser further maintained that while it did not seem expedient to denounce the old treaty 
altogether since this would set a fatal example to other Oriental nations, Britain should 
'conclude such a convention as Her Majesty's Government may approve as sufficient, 
discarding all that may be discarded and standing fast by all that is absolutely 
necessary.'156 Arguments such as these must have contributed to the decision by the 
British government to conclude the commercial treaty with Japan in 1894 which opened 
the way to the eventual abolition of the unequal treaties.
Japan as a Military Power
In their reports, British diplomats referred to Japan, like China, as an Asiatic or 
Eastern Power. But the diplomats generally felt that despite the modernisation of the 
Japanese army and navy under the Meiji government, Japan still ranked below China and 
was not well-prepared or equipped to enter into military conflict with other Powers. The 
post-1895 concept of the yellow peril, which signifies Western alarm at Japan's rise as a
1 S 7formidable military power and as a threat to Western civilization, was far from British 
diplomats' perceptions of Japan in 1868-90.
The only country which was seen as inferior to Japan was Korea, though in 1873 
Parkes was skeptical of Soejima's expectation of quick success in a war with Korea.158 In 
comparison with China, Parkes was particularly dismissive of Japan's military strength. 
This is shown in his comments on Japan during the Taiwan affair, when he observed that 
the 'vessels constructed in one only of the Chinese arsenals are superior in force and 
number to the whole Japanese navy.' He similarly regarded as inferior the Japanese land 
forces.159 Given this view, it is not surprising that Parkes expressed his disappointment
155 Ibid., No. 97, Conf., Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, August 16, 1889. By "forum" it means that foreign 
judges were to be in the majority in future Japanese courts.
156 Ibid.
157 Lehmann, op. cit., pp. 149-50.
158 FO 46/168, No. 91, Conf., Parkes to Granville, Yedo, November 3, 1873.
159 FO 46/180, No. 103, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, June 9, 1874; also see FO 46/180, No. 121, Parkes to 
Derby, Yedo, July 6, 1874.
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with China in conceding to Japan over Taiwan in the 1874 settlement.160 Despite its 
success in exacting reparation from China, the perception of a weak Japan continued. In 
1880, when there were rumours of Japanese war preparations during the dispute over the 
Ryukyu islands, Parkes maintained that 'though the patriotism of the people would enable 
them to resist invasion [by China], they must be aware of their inability to make offensive 
war upon a country possessed of resources so much greater than their own.’161
A number of factors may have contributed to Parkes's view. For example, in 1874 
he questioned whether the conscription system introduced in the previous year would 
actually allow Japan to maintain a large force in the field in the event of a prolonged war. 
His doubts appear to have been aroused by the admission of a Japanese minister that the 
agricultural and artisan classes objected to the conscription system while the samurai only 
cared to be enrolled in bodies of clansmen, to which the government were strongly 
opposed. He also observed that foreign training officers employed by the Chinese in the 
Pescadores were said to have no high opinion of the Japanese ships, that the Chinese on 
that station manoeuvred their ships better, had their ships and engines in better order, 
were good gunners and had good guns.162 Moreover, Parkes may have also reflected on a 
report by Plunkett on the unauthorized firing of weapons by soldiers in two different 
regiments stationed at Kumamoto in 1875. On why this incident occurred, Charge 
d'Affaires Plunkett reported that although the soldiers were armed and drilled on the 
French system, ‘their discipline is wretched, and they have maintained far too much of 
the independence of the old 'Samurai' for it to be possible for their officers to keep them 
in order.5163 In August 1878 when a mutiny broke out among the Imperial Guard, Parkes 
also noted that it was partly due to the general lack of discipline, stressing that the 
officers exercised only a slight control over their men. As he saw it, the handling of the 
mutiny revealed the inefficiency of Japanese military organization, and he was not 
convinced that this would be rectified.164
As to Japan's military power in the 1880s, some diplomats shared Parkes's view. 
For instance, in a report of 1881, Charge d'Affaires Kennedy wrote,
In the event of complications in the extreme East, the alliance or 
hostility of Japan could not form an important factor for some years to 
come. ...There is always a possibility, although, I believe, a remote one,
160 Parkes to Wade, Copy, Yedo, February 16, 1875 enclosed in FO 46/ 190, No. 32, Parkes to Derby, 
Yedo, February 22, 1875.
561 FO 46/256, Parkes's memorandum, January 30, 1880.
162 FO 46/182, No. 184, Parkes to Derby, Yedo, October 13, 1874.
163 FO 46/191, Private, Plunkett to Tenterden, Yedo, April 27, 1875.
lf54 FO 46/230, No. 83, Parkes to Salisbury, Yedo, August 31, 1878.
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of an attack upon Japan by China but in view of the present military 
weakness of Japan and of her financial embarrassments which preclude 
the purchase of more ships, it is clearly the policy of Japan to 
endeavour to remove all causes of complaint on the part of China and 
thus obviate the humiliation of defeat.16
This critical comment was based on an unfavourable report by Lieutenant Thomas James, 
Instructor to the Japanese Naval Cadets, which concluded that 'the present state of the 
Navy of Japan is in all respects unsatisfactory.' Among others, James's criticisms 
included the over-representation of Satsuma men in the navy, the lack of discipline in the 
service, the insufficiency of funds for the navy, and the holding back of those officers and 
men who had studied abroad from the promotion they deserved by inferior and jealous 
senior officers.165 In addition to James's report, Kennedy was also assured by the French 
Military Attache that the efficiency of the Japanese army had greatly deteriorated since 
the departure in 1879 of the French military mission.167
Plunkett too, though he noted some improvements in the Japanese forces in the 
1880s, remained skeptical of Japanese success in the event of war with China. In 1884 he 
observed that although Japan might win an initial victory in a conflict with China over 
Korea, he advised the Japanese government to avoid such a conflict because China would 
some day become a great Power capable of exacting revenge upon Japan.168 Similarly, in 
January 1885 Plunkett again observed that Japan would be making a mistake if she 
decided to provoke her powerful neighbour China.169 The British Minister repeated his 
view in June 1886 to Inoue,
...however nice the 50,000 or 60,000 men o f the Japanese army might 
look on the Parade Ground, it would be folly for such a force to attempt 
an expedition to a foreign country which would tax the energies and 
resources o f even one of the Great European Powers. Had His 
Excellency forgotten the difficulties which France met with in 
Tonquin? I did not wish to depreciate the progress of the Japanese 
army. I considered that they were amply sufficient for self defence, and 
would be able to made a stubborn resistance against any troops which 
should attack this country, but His Excellency must remember that a 
war of defence, and a war of aggression were two totally different 
things, and for Japan to attack China would in my opinion lead 
unnecessarily to the military and financial collapse of the Empire.170
165 FO 46/273, No. 110, Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, September 17, 1881.
166 Thomas H. James's report, Yedo, September 1881, encl. in FO 46/273, No. 110, Conf., Kennedy to 
Granville, Yedo, September 17, 1881.
167 FO 46/273, No. 110, Conf., Kennedy to Granville, Yedo, September 17, 1881.
168 FO 46/317, No. 258, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, December 31, 1884.
169 FO 46/327, No. 22, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, Tokyo, January 19, 1885.
170 FO 46/344, No. 85, Secret, Plunkett to Rosebury, Tokyo, June 2, 1886.
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That Japan would remain inferior to China even in the future was clearly anticipated by 
Plunkett when he warned in December 1886: 'The comparative weakness o f Japan is less 
now than it will be a few years hence, when China has had more time to develop her
* * 1V ]army and navy on European principles.'
In general, Japanese military development in the 1880s attracted relatively little 
attention from British diplomats. Gubbins did report in 1885 on the engagement of a 
German military instructor, Major Clemens Meckel, to reorganise the Imperial Japanese 
army on German lines, but this was not seen as particularly important.172 In 1887 Plunkett 
recorded a government appeal for public donations for the purpose of strengthening the 
naval defence along the Japanese coast,173 while Charge d'Affaires P. Le Poer Trench 
observed an increase in the naval expenditure following the entry of Kuroda, who 
favoured the expansion of the navy, into the Cabinet.174 Nevertheless, in reporting these 
developments no British diplomat referred to Japan as having the potential to become a 
significant military power in East Asia. More surprising is the absence of diplomatic 
comment on the grand manoeuvres of Japanese troops in early 1890, which prompted a 
fairly positive view by other foreign diplomats in Tokyo of the capability of Imperial
• • » * 17^Japanese forces against foreign invasion.
The fact that British diplomats overlooked Japan's military potential may be 
contrasted with the more favourable views of British naval officers of China Station and 
Admiralty in the 1880s. For instance, the negative 1881 report, by Kennedy was disputed 
by Admiral Willis, Commander-in-Chief of the China Station. Across a copy of the 
Charge d'Affaires' report he wrote: 'I regret that Mr. Kennedy should have considered it 
necessary to write his dispatch to Earl Granville. I entirely dissent from his view, and 
have a very high opinion of the Japanese Navy. I should myself feel indisposed to pay 
such attention to Mr. James' story, who is in the pay of the Japanese government.'176 
Similarly, Captain S. Long who was asked by the Admiralty to make a report on the 
naval and military resources of Japan observed in 1883 that although naval discipline was 
defective, other aspects of the Japanese military were satisfactory and praiseworthy. His 
conclusion was that 'in their own waters and in proportion to their strength, they would be
171 FO 46/349, No. 212, Conf., Plunkett to Iddesleigh, Tokyo, December 10,1886.
172 Gubbins's memorandum, Tokyo, February 9, 185, in FO 46/328, No. 53, Conf., Plunkett to Granville, 
Tokyo, February 16, 1885.
173 FO 46/366, No. 107, Plunkett to Salisbury, Tokyo, April 23, 1887.
* 174 FO 46/369, No. 230, Trench to Salisbury, Tokyo, September 27, 1887.
175 One such foreign diplomat was French Minister Sienkiewicz. See Sims, French Policy, pp. 181-182.
176 Adm. 1. 6,575. Piece 239, September 29, 1881 quoted in Carter. B. J., Great Britain and the Meiji Navy 
1868-1895, M.A. in Area Studies (Far East), University o f  London, 1970, p. 24.
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found obstinate enemies.'177 More positive still was a suggestion in 1888 of some sort of 
alliance between Britain and Japan by the Commander-in-Chief o f the China Station, 
Vice-Admiral R. Vessey-Hamilton: 'An alliance with China as suggested might be useful, 
but we must be prepared or the obloquy we should incur from the barbarities which the y 
could undoubtedly perpetrate. The Japanese would be far more useful allies and their 
statesmen, naval and military officials and their naval and military systems, are far more
* 178in unison with our own than are the Chinese.'
By 1890, however, even British diplomats were becoming less sure that Japan 
could be ignored as a military power. In that year, in response to an anti-foreign article in 
a leading Japanese newspaper, the Choya Shimbun, which proclaimed that Japan had 
become a great Power, Hugh Fraser presented a much less dismissive assessment of its 
comparative strength than his predecessors would have thought realistic, even if it was 
ultimately equivocal:
It is true that Japan is a very strong country, although it may not be 
necessary to accept her own estimate of her strength to its fullest extent; 
that she is protected by the sea on all sides, is divided by thousands of 
miles of ocean from the stronger Powers, and contains a population of 
from thirty to forty millions of people of a distinctly warlike character.
The Japanese military and naval resources have been concentrated since 
the deposition of the Shogun and astonishingly well organized under 
European instruction. But whether the country would bear the brunt of a 
foreign war, or dissolve itself once more into anarchy under such a trial, 
is a question very difficult to answer.179
Conclusion
British diplomats' comments on Japan's foreign policy in 1868-90 covered various 
issues but focused on Japan's relations with China, Korea and Russia, and treaty revision. 
Their reports are significant because their assessments of the political, financial and 
military factors which shaped Japanese foreign policy were often based on statements by 
Meiji leaders such as Ito, Inoue, Iwakura and Soejima. Their reports on Japan's relations 
with her neighbours have an added interest as they throw light on British diplomatic 
perceptions o f Japanese current and potential military strength, even if there is no hint in 
them of Japan's later victories over China and Russia.
177 See the encl. Long’s report in FO 46/308, Conf., Admiralty to Sec. o f  State, August 9, 1883.
178 Foreign Intelligence Committee, Vol. XI, No. 129-146 quoted in Carter, op. cit., p. 28.
179 FO 46/398, No. 10, Fraser to Salisbury, Tokyo, January 13, 1890. The article was in the Choya Shimbun 
o f January 9, 1890.
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On Japanese relations with China and Korea, several points should be noted. The 
first is that British diplomats give a picture of Japanese policy as fluctuating, beginning 
with the pursuit of Eastern cooperation at the beginning of the period, as signified in the 
Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1871, then of Japanese expansionism in the early to mid-1870s, 
but then reverting to the idea of a friendly relationship and possibly alliance with China 
and Korea in the late 1870s and 1880s. British diplomats regarded a Far Eastern alliance 
as essentially anti-Western and, therefore, to be prevented. Satow, for instance, had this 
objective in mind in 1883 when encouraging the British government to give more 
concessions on treaty revision to Japan, while earlier in 1871 Adams objected to the 
article of the Sino-Japanese Treaty which he misinterpreted as establishing a defensive 
and offensive alliance. Although there was a suggestion from Inoue in 1887 that Britain 
might join an alliance of Japan and China, this was dismissed out o f hand by Plunkett. 
The diplomats’ opposition to a Sino-Japanese alliance is not surprising for such a 
coalition could have threatened Britain’s very extensive interests in the region. However, 
it should be noted that they did not portray an Eastern alliance between Japan, China and 
Korea, as an unprogressive or anti-modern move on the part of Japan, whereas, they did 
approve the adoption by Meiji leaders o f Western diplomatic practice in carrying out 
negotiations with China and Korea.
Japanese-Russian relations in the Meiji period offered one example of 
modernisation in that the treaty signed by the two countries ended the anomalous joint 
control of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands by giving Russia clear sovereign rights over 
the former and Japan similar control over the latter. This arrangement was welcomed by 
Parkes, who was anxious to that Russia might find otherwise find a pretext for war and 
thus extend its power in East Asia. It was for similar reasons that he and other British 
diplomats sought to discourage Japan from entering into armed conflict with China or 
Korea. They were also concerned that Japan and Russia might enter into an 
understanding which might weaken Britain’s position not only in East Asia but also in 
Central Asia. By the mid-1880s, however, they were detecting signs that Japan, though 
still as yet fearful o f Russia, was more inclined to side with Britain, and these indications 
of a pro-British orientation, together with the support given to them by British diplomats, 
especially Plunkett, may have helped to prepare the way for the later Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. It should be noted, though, that British diplomats did not explicitly describe 
Japanese policy as progressive.
As to treaty revision, one may find different responses by British diplomats with 
regard to such developments as the introduction into Japan of a modem legal system and
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also to the general social, economic and political reforms in Japan. Yet while the reforms 
encouraged Satow, Plunkett and Fraser to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards 
Japan, others were less easily influenced, as was indicated by Parkes's persisting 
objection to revision. The more conciliatory attitude of British diplomats after Parkes’s 
departure in 1883, however, owed something to other factors, notably concern about the 
increasing influence o f Germany and the threat to British economic interests in Japan, 
acknowledgement o f greater advantages to British merchants and missionaries from the 
opening o f Japanese interior, and awareness that the more treaty revision was delayed, 
the less likely it was that Japan would make the legal concessions Britain sought.
On various occasions, British diplomats tendered their advice to the Meiji 
government, generally urging it to adopt friendly relations with other countries such as 
China, Korea and Russia and settle difficulties that arose with her neighbours through 
diplomatic and peaceful means. In doing so, British diplomats not only desired to see 
Japan avoid plunging into a profitless war which would expose her to foreign annexation, 
seriously injure the country's finances and affect her internal reforms, but they were also 
driven by their concern to maintain British commercial interests in Japan. Yet it is 
impossible to assess just how important British diplomats' advice was in shaping Meiji 
foreign policy, since at least some of the attitudes expressed by diplomats would have 
been shared by Japanese leaders. Moreover, it is not easy to find examples of Japanese 
policy being changed in response to British representations, except where reciprocal 
concessions were being sought from Britain over treaty revision.
To what extent did British diplomats see Japanese foreign policy through 
‘Orientalist’ eyes? It can be argued that some attitudes which can be categorised as 
‘Orientalist’ were expressed, a prime example being Parkes's tendency to lump the 
Japanese together with the Chinese in terms of their inconsistency and tortuous behaviour 
in their early diplomatic negotiations. Moreover, British diplomats were for many years 
reluctant to recognise Japan’s progress by agreeing to treaty revision on terms which 
would give her status equal to the Western countries. Nevertheless, British diplomats in 
general often acknowledged Japan’s difference from other Asian countries, as when 
Parkes pointed to the Japanese adoption of Western-style diplomacy; and even if British 
diplomats regarded Japan as having not yet attained sufficient progress to justify the 
abrogation of the unequal treaties and place her on an equal footing with the West, they 
did not ignore the fact that Japan was developing the attributes of a modem state. 
Moreover, it is clear that some British diplomats, such as Satow, Plunkett and Fraser, 
were more conciliatory towards Japan in regard to treaty revision and cannot be easily be
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accused of ‘Orientalism5. Satow, in fact, in view of his belief that Japan would emerge as 
a leading Power in East Asia, and also the early date at which he came to support treaty 
revision, may be said to be among the least ‘Orientalist5 of all British diplomats.
In considering the question of ‘Orientalism5 it is also important to consider how 
Japan was rated militarily. Most British diplomats saw her not only as inferior to Western 
Powers but also as unequal to China. In support of such a view, they pointed to the lack 
of discipline among Japanese soldiers, to their poor equipment and to the inefficiency of 
the Japanese military organization, and they claimed that the conscription system could 
not guarantee a large enough reserve of soldiers to fight a protracted war with other 
Powers. Despite their apparently logical arguments, however, it is clear from the 
Japanese successes in the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars that British diplomats 
failed to see how fast Japan was building itself into an effective modem military power, 
and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that this blindness was essentially due to 
‘Orientalist5 assumptions.
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CONCLUSION
Early Victorian perceptions of Japan were often quasi-fantasies created by a 
narrow elite for a middle-class readership. In fact, elements of exotic fantasy were seen as 
aids to a publication’s commercial success. By contrast, diplomatic views and images 
were to a considerable extent the results of direct experience that brought new ideas to 
British interpretations of Meiji Japan and allowed at least some of them to rise above the 
level of stereotypes. Consequently, diplomatic images of Japan were closer to reality. 
Nevertheless, they were far from uniform and this was due to several factors. These 
included the substantial number o f British officials who were in diplomatic service in 
Japan, diplomats’ personal working experience before coming to Japan, periods of 
service in Japan, differences in diplomatic rank, different access to Japanese statesmen, 
Japanese language skill, involvement in scholarly research on Japan, exposure to written 
works or documents on Japan and diplomats’ own personalities.
That British diplomats’ views varied, and cannot be categorized simply, has been 
an important theme of this thesis. For instance, it has been shown that while the
' r.
modernization, and to some extent Westernisation of Japan in the early Meiji period 
attracted a good deal of attention from British diplomats, not all modernising or 
Westernising reforms prompted favourable comments. Although they favoured the 
structural reforms that introduced Western-style institutions, notably the new cabinet 
system and Privy Council, the attempt by the radical wing of the People’s Rights 
movement to establish a democratic representative government provoked skeptical 
remarks, and. so did the future working of Japan's constitutional government and the 
operation of the Diet. These political aims and innovations were considered — or at least 
asserted - to be inappropriate principally because of Japanese lack of experience and 
education, although the Meiji Constitution was also regarded with some disfavour 
because o f the marked influence on it of Germany. Similarly as regards social change, 
while the introduction of Western etiquette in the Japanese Court and the adoption of the 
Western calendar and holidays were hailed as signs of progress, the same can not be said 
with regard the adoption of Western costumes by the Japanese as this was seen by the 
diplomats as ridiculous. Their views on the social, economic and political issues of Meiji 
Japan, therefore, ranged from critical to commendatory. In addition, one may also note
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that while critical comments were generally abundant with regard to Meiji economic 
development and Japan’s future as a military power, more appreciation and admiration 
were shown by British diplomats of the social reforms effected by the Meiji government.
Apart from highlighting what diplomats saw with favour or, alternatively, 
disapprovingly, the study of British diplomatic perceptions of the modernisation of Meiji 
Japan is also interesting for the light it throws on what diplomats considered important or 
tended to ignore. Particularly high on their list of concerns, not surprisingly, were the 
security o f foreigners in Japan and the persecution of Japanese Christians, especially in 
the early years of the Meiji period. This is understandable given their concern for foreign 
interests and Christianity in general. Less predictably, they also showed great interest in 
the issue of Sat-Cho factionalism in the 1880s, partly perhaps because it was different 
from British practice, though perhaps more because the question of who was in power 
was thought to have a direct bearing on the direction and character of Japanese policy, 
especially towards foreigners. Such instances where the Sat-Cho rivalry was emphasized 
to the exclusion of other motives were the establishment of a modern cabinet system in 
1885, the government dissension in 1887, and the appointment o f Ito Hirobumi in 1888 
as the President of the Privy Council. In contrast, some developments which historians 
have emphasized were overlooked or attracted little attention from British diplomats: 
examples are the Meiji Constitution and its provisions; the details of the Seitaisho, the 
first major Meiji administrative reform, in June 1868; the suppression of Buddhism; the 
establishment of the early political associations, the Aikokukoto and Aikokusha; and also 
the 1890 election process and its results. There were also issues which the diplomats 
appear to have totally ignored, such as the Charter Oath of 1868, the launching of the 
Great Doctrine Promulgation Campaign and the elevation of the Emperor through the 
creation of the Jingikan in 1868-71, the Three Great Laws of 1878, the introduction of 
suppressive measures to check the growth of the People's Rights movement (notably the 
establishment of military police (kempei) in 1881 and the issuance of the Rescript to 
Soldiers and Sailors in 1882), the traditionalist response to Westernisation in education as 
embodied in the Imperial Rescript o f 1890, and the influence of Western elements on 
Japanese popular art and literary trends.
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In addition to the difference in emphasis, the thesis also demonstrates that in 
commenting on modernisation in 1868-90, the diplomats sometimes held different and 
sometimes similar views. In general, however, British diplomats generally agreed with 
each other more than they differed. They were at one in their unsympathetic attitude 
towards popular aspirations for a representative government in the late 1870s and 1880s, 
in their generally negative view of the development of internal trade and industry in 
Japan, in their general appraisal of the introduction of modern education, in their 
appreciation o f the adoption of Western etiquette by the Emperor's Court, and in their 
commendation of the construction of public works and modem communications systems, 
particularly railways, telegraphs and lighthouses. On the other hand, they differed on 
such issues as the technical skills of Japanese workers and, more importantly, the 
appropriateness of treaty revision, with Parkes remaining skeptical that Japan had made 
sufficient progress for this even though other diplomats acknowledged the reality of 
change. Similarly, regarding the future of Japan as a competitive commercial rival, 
particularly in the silk and cotton industries, in contrast to Quin and Troup’s favourable 
comments on Japanese raw silk, Robertson (like them a consul) was skeptical of Japanese 
ability to compete particularly with silk produced in Europe. Moreover, whereas Troup, 
Gubbins, and Enslie were dismissive of Japan’s competitiveness, especially against 
imported cotton goods from Britain and India, Longford, Le Poer Trench and Plunkett 
pointed out various advantages that would assist the rapid growth of the Japanese 
industry. Similarly, while Hall observed that Japanese silk goods could hardly compete 
with imported silk goods from Britain and Germany, Quin saw Japan as a potential 
exporter of manufactured silks to European and American market.
As to whether British diplomats' views and attitudes changed over time as a direct 
result o f developments in Japan, the evidence shows that in some aspects this did happen. 
For instance, regarding the question of treaty revision and legal refonn, a more 
favourable attitude was shown by British diplomats in the second half of the 1880s as 
they recognised the progress made by Japan. This may be seen in the positive comments 
of a number of diplomats such as Satow, Gubbins, Plunkett, Le Poer Trench and Fraser. 
Similarly, regarding Christianity, British diplomats increasingly expressed their 
satisfaction with the Meiji government's policy as the latter gradually changed its policy
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from persecution in the early years of the Restoration to an accommodating attitude in the 
1870s and 1880s. Moreover, British diplomats also gradually came to recognise the 
increasing skill and knowledge of the Japanese by the 1880s, though Parkes for one 
continued to make skeptical comments on their working o f the Lock hospitals and 
lighthouses. On the military development of Japan, British diplomatic reports emphasized 
the inferiority o f Japan’s military forces in the 1870s but came to see them, albeit only 
vaguely and sporadically, as posing a possible threat to China in the late 1880s. With 
regard to the establishment of representative institutions, however, there was, at least 
superficially, a reverse tendency from a positive to a negative view: in contrast to 
Parkes's earlier encouragement of a general assembly in the closing years of the Bakufu 
and early 1868, his later comments, as well as those of his successors in the late 1870s 
and 1880s, showed a general skepticism about the future success of such a modem 
institution in Japan. This may have been more apparent than real, however, since the 
earlier proposal was for an essentially aristocratic baronial council, not for the kind of 
genuinely elected chamber provided for in the Meiji constitution.
One notable aspect where British diplomats' perceptions hardly evolved with time 
is with regard to the development of the Japanese economy. A number of positive 
comments were made by British diplomats, the most notable being Quin and Troup’s on 
Japanese raw silk industry, Longford, Le Poer Trench and Plunkett’s on the 
competitiveness of Japanese cotton manufactures, Quin’s favourable view of Japanese 
silk goods, Dohmen’s statement on Japanese woollen manufactures and Longford’s 
positive assessments of the prospects of some Japanese modem light industries, but these 
were atypical. Most diplomatic comments showed a high degree o f continuity, habitually 
emphasizing the weaknesses, which were seen as making it difficult, if  not impossible, 
for Japan to develop into a modem industrialised country.
As to the speed of modernisation in Japan British diplomats observed that in some 
respects Japan had acted in a hasty or ill-considered manner. These included the issuance 
of numerous rules and regulations governing the social conduct of the people, the 
frequent changes in taxation and the early dismissal of foreign workers in the government 
service. The diplomatic disapproval of some political changes was also partly due to the 
speed with which they were introduced. Such a concern may have been a factor in their
generally unsympathetic attitude towards the aspirations of the People’s Rights 
movement and in Parkes and Plunkett’s dismissive comments in 1875 on the 
establishment of a Genrd-in or Senate; and it was clearly apparent in Adams’s suggestion 
to Sanjo in 1871 that the government should gradually introduce modem systems rather 
than implement them all at once, as well as in his concurrence with Kido’s comment that 
Japan should not indiscriminately adopt political institutions which had taken centuries to 
develop in the West. That some Japanese leaders also favoured a gradual policy lent 
support to British diplomats’ arguments. Kido, for example, admitted in 1871 the 
government’s mistake in establishing the Shugi-in, an assembly in which the feudal 
domains had been represented, and Iwakura stated to Adams that the best course o f action 
for Japan was to steer between the two extremes, namely the conservatives and 
progressives. Furthermore, there was also an acknowledgement by the Meiji leadership 
that the Japanese population at large was not yet ready for some Western political 
institutions.
As to whether the attitudes expressed by diplomats contributed to British general 
policy towards Japan, it may be argued that they did have some effect as the Foreign 
Office tended to depend on information from its representatives in Japan. There were 
various instances where British diplomats in Tokyo were asked to provide their opinions 
on the state of affairs in Japan, and there were also detailed annual reports by British 
consuls at the treaty ports. The fact that Britain had larger political and commercial 
interests than any other Western Power in Japan also meant that the Foreign Office w? s 
likely to give weight to the information obtained by the diplomats on Japan. Moreover, 
given the limited means of communication at that time and the lack of information from 
other sources, the Foreign Office would have to,rely on diplomatic reports for up-to-date 
information on Japan. Among those which may well have contributed to British policy 
were the favourable reports by Satow, Plunkett, Fraser, Le Poer Trench and Gubbins in 
relation to treaty revision. Given the various points put forward by the diplomats, such as 
the possible alliance between Japan and China, as observed by Satow, and the threat of 
losing commercial privileges to other Western Powers who were more ready to 
accommodate Japan's demands, as asserted by Plunkett and Fraser, and also the general 
progress made by Japan, as maintained by Satow, Plunkett, Gubbins and Le Poer Trench,
it is possible that these helped to induce the British government to agree to a new treaty 
in 1894. Similarly, Plunkett's favourable comments on the Japanese inclination to 
establish closer relations with Britain in order to check the expansionist designs of Russia 
may have partly led to Granville's suggestion of a possible alliance with Japan in 1885, 
and even contributed to the eventual formation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902,
In view of the widespread acceptance of the concept of ‘Orientalism’, as 
popularised by Said, it is relevant to see British diplomats in Japan as a test case of the 
idea, at least in the universal way that Said and others have implied ‘Orientalism’, and in 
particular' to ask whether Japan's assimilation o f material and practical features of 
Occidental life were regarded as doomed to failure because of an innate feeling of 
Western superiority as against Eastern backwardness. Given the various views by British 
diplomats covering different issues, generalisation is clearly not easy. Some comments by 
diplomats may indicate an ‘Orientalist’ attitude. They tended, for instance, to see Japan as 
mainly a primary producer of agricultural products rather than as an emerging industrial 
state and to underestimate Japan’s potential as an economic competitor. They similarly 
emphasized the inferiority of Japanese military forces and for at least a decade treated 
Japan’s attempts to achieve treaty revision as premature or even misguided. On the other 
hand, some British diplomatic comments were unaffected by ‘Orientalism’. In this 
category one might place their praise for the Japanese enthusiasm for learning, the 
favourable views by Longford, Le Poer Trench and Plunkett on Japan's competitiveness 
in the cotton industry, Quin's positive appraisal of Japan's silk manufactures, Fraser's 
dismissal o f the supposed serious disadvantages of the traditional Japanese shosha 
system, and, above all, the favourable comments by Gubbins, Plunkett and Le Poer 
Trench on Japan's general progress in comparison with other Oriental countries.
Among British diplomats, one may also note different degrees of ‘Orientalism’. 
Perhaps the most clearly ‘Orientalist’ was Parkes, who persisted in seeing Japan's future 
as that of a primary producer, as shown in his 1880 comment that Japan should 
concentrate on developing her agricultural and mineral resources rather than wasting time 
and money in manufacturing industry. Nor was this all, as he held the view that Japan 
needed foreign advice in matters of foreign trade and required foreign engineers and 
skilled workers. On Japan's foreign policy, his negative views far exceeded other
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diplomats’ as he lumped Japan and China together as Oriental states, which shared a 
tortuous and inconsistent approach to diplomacy, and stressed Japan's inferiority in 
military strength to China.
As to other diplomats, they may be categorised as mildly ‘Orientalist’ as their 
negative comments on Japan were less condemnatory and less consistent than Parkes. 
Plunkett, for instance, though skeptical o f some changes in Japan, saw with favour the 
adoption of the modem cabinet system and Japan's treaty revision. His successor, Fraser, 
was also favourable towards Japan's desire for treaty revision and in another instance, 
discounted the adverse effects of the shosha system on foreign trade. Le Poer Trench ah o 
admitted Japan's progress in the 1880s and praised the Japanese Privy Council or 
Sumitsu-in as resembling the House of Lords in Britain. Gubbins, for his part, perceived 
Japanese Diet members as holding ignorant andr.reckless views, and saw the inclusion of 
nobles and peasants in the membership of the House of Peers or Upper House as bold 
rather than wise. Nevertheless, unlike Parkes, he was prepared to recognise Japan's 
general progress when considering her readiness for treaty revision. A similar 
categorisation may perhaps be applied to the consuls and acting-consuls in the treaty 
ports, as their comments, particularly on the social and economic development o f Japan, 
included both negative and positive views. As to the least ‘Orientalist’ o f British 
diplomats, Satow’s name stands out as his views were at times either slightly ‘Orientalist’ 
or not ‘Orientalist’ at all. One instance of the former is Iris view on the establishment of a 
representative government in Japan whereby he at first expressed some skepticisms but 
later advised Japanese leaders to experiment with the idea anyway. Similarly, with regard 
to the issue of treaty revision, although he was initially pessimistic about Japanese 
preparedness to exercise modem jurisprudence, he then voiced the desirability of the 
revision in view of the progress in Japan. As to his ‘non-Orientalist’ views, Satow for 
example had once clearly expressed his belief that Japan would become a future leading 
East Asian Power.
Among the factors, which arguably contributed to ‘Orientalist’ views among 
British diplomats were their personal temperament and personality, their period of service 
in Japan and also their previous working experience before coming to Japan. As to 
personal temperament, a few examples may be mentioned. To begin with, Parkes's
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notoriously domineering and very quick-tempered personality1 may partly explain his 
tendency to express forthright and critical comments on Japan. In contrast, Fraser, as 
described by his wife, Mary Crawford Fraser, 'was of philosophic temperament and he 
never wasted time and effort in complaint, when complaint was useless,'2 and this may 
partly explain his more moderate comments on Japan. Regarding Satow, he is known to 
have had a natural liking for Japanese ways of life like drinking sake and even to have 
had a Japanese as his (unofficial) wife. As to the diplomats' period of service in Japan, 
only Parkes and Fraser had previously served for a long period in China. During his 
twenty years of residence in that country, Parkes witnessed great reluctance on the part of 
the Chinese to modernise. Against this background, there may have been a tendency to 
discount Japan's proclaimed progressive ambitions. On the other hand, the lack of a 
substantial background in China or other Asian countries did not prevent other British 
diplomats from displaying an ‘Orientalist’ attitude, nor can Fraser's nine years’ service in 
China explain his positive view or Gower's three years’ experience in China justify his 
moderate attitude towards Japan. Fraser’s seven year's’ working experience in several 
countries in Central and South America may have led him to view developments in Japan 
as more encouraging though the same can not be said about Gower since the only country 
where he served before coming to Japan was China.
Furthermore, the period during which Parkes served in Japan (1865-1883) was 
one when only limited progress was evident in Japan's economy, legal and political 
systems, and when mistakes were being made by the Meiji government, may have also 
exacerbated his negative view on Japan. In contrast, many of the other diplomats either 
arrived at a later period when there were more clear-cut signs o f improvement or had had 
experience o f seeing the results o f change in the 1880s, and this may have contributed to 
their milder or more favourable views. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions since this 
factor would not explain the less ‘Orientalist’ attitude of some diplomats like Troup, 
Robertson, Lowder, Gower, Flowers, Fletcher, Dohmen, and Aston or the least
‘Orientalist’ attitude of Satow, who had arrived in Japan even earlier than Parkes.
Furthermore, looking at the diplomats’ duration of service in Japan, it also appeared that
1 Nish, Britain and Japan, p. 6.
2Cortazzi, H. (ed.), A Diplomat's Wife in Japan, Sketches at the Turn o f  the Centiuy (Tokyo: Weatherhill), 
1982, p. xxvii.
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the longer a diplomat worked in the country, the less critical he was towards the 
modernisation of Japan. Satow, Longford, Aston, Gubbins, Euslie, Hail, Quin and Troup 
were among those whose service in Japan exceeded twenty years. Again, generalization 
is not always that simple since it did not justify Parkes’ attitude despite having to stay and 
work in Japan for nearly twenty years. Finally, another factor that may well have 
influenced British diplomats towards ‘Orientalist’ views was the fact that in seeking 
modernisation and international equality, Japanese leaders were aiming at targets which 
no other Oriental government had sought or yet achieved.
Despite what may be seen as ‘Orientalist’ comments, it would be erroneous to see 
British diplomats as exemplifying ‘Orientalism’, in its most straightforward guise, that is 
as Westerners who regarded Meiji Japan as a politically, socially and economically 
backward state, which had no hope of progress. Even Parkes may not be regarded as a 
crude ‘Orientalist’ as he recognised Japan's ability to develop a modem political system, 
though only through a gradual process. Similarly, though he was critical of Japan’s 
current capacity to operate lighthouses and hospitals, he did indicate that, given sufficient 
time and experience, the Japanese could dispense with their foreign workers and rely on 
their own countrymen. Despite his tendency to criticise, he also made a number of 
appreciative comments on some Japanese qualities, such as the Japanese anxious desire 
to leam and acquire knowledge, and on such material achievements as the construction of 
railways and telegraphs. Moreover, the fact that the Meiji leaders themselves sometimes 
admitted the underdeveloped state of their country's political, economic and social 
system, as well as the weakness of their military forces, makes it difficult to regard 
diplomatic feelings of Western superiority as being based purely on prejudice and wholly 
unjustified. Such instances included the insistence by Iwakura, Ito and Okuma on the lack 
of sufficient education and experience among their own people to allow the establishment 
of a parliamentary system in the 1870s and 1880s, Iwakura’s statement acknowledging 
the inferiority of Japanese to Western civilization following his return from the tour to 
Europe and the United States, and also remarks by Ito, Inoue and Katsu Awa hinting at 
the unpreparedness of Japan for a foreign war. The fact that the Meiji government made 
requests to the British Legation for assistance in providing teachers, engineers, advisers 
and military instructors, as well as places for Japanese students and military cadets in
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Britain, also indicated the Japanese recognition of the underdeveloped state of Japen 
compared to the modem Western countries.
Apart from revealing the ways in which they perceived Japan’s modernisation, the 
reports of British diplomats are also significant in that they provide first-hand information 
on the social, economic, and political development of Japan. As observers who were in 
some respects in a privileged position, as a result of their conversations with Japanese 
leaders such as Iwakura, Ito, Inoue, Terajima, Sanjo and Soejima, they were particularly 
well placed to assess the motives and aims of the principal Meiji statesmen in 1868-1890. 
In addition to the views which the latter expressed about internal developments and 
problems, they also made various statements about the political, financial and military 
factors which shaped the country's foreign policy. Diplomats’ reports of these 
conversations sometimes provide insights into the ideas and opinions of policy-makers 
and are worthy of attention by historians. One instance is Iwakura’s remarkable, albeit 
questionable, assertion to Adams in 1871 that the main cause of the Meiji Ishin was the 
Dai Nihon Shi, the multi-volume history of Japan compiled by scholars of the Mito 
domain. Even more significant, arguably, is Iwakura’s admission to Satow in late 1871 
that the Meiji government had been so apprehensive that the abolition of the han would 
lead to bloodshed that it had at first seemed that it would take 500 years before the 
measure could be effected. Also in this category is Kido’s previously mentioned 
confession to Satow in 1871 that in establishing the Shugi-in, Japan had adopted Western 
institutions over-hastily. Worthy of note, too, is Ito and Inoue’s suggestion to Plunkett 
that the government might possibly favour the promotion of Christianity in Japan 
following the visit of the papal legate in 1885, as they wished to project Japan as a 
modem and liberal country.
British diplomatic dispatches also contain some extremely interesting comments 
by Meiji leaders relating to Japanese foreign policy. One such is Satow’s 1880 report o f 
Iwakura’s support of the idea of an Eastern cooperation when the Japanese statesman 
stated to a Korean visitor that he had long desired to induce Korea into an alliance of 
China, Japan and Korea. Another fascinating insight into the thinking of Meiji leaders is 
to be found in Kennedy’s report in 1880 of a conversation with Inoue in which the latter 
suggested that it might be better for China to be defeated by a Western Power; the
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country might then begin, the Japanese foreign minister speculated, to adopt modem 
reforms, thus not only helping to strengthen China against future attacks but also to 
safeguard Japan from foreign threats. Although this was atypical in that Inoue generally 
regarded war* between China and Western Powers as potentially dangerous to Japan, it 
showed the willingness o f the Meiji leadership to consider different foreign policy 
strategies or approaches. Equally intriguing, and similarly not known to historians, was 
Inoue's suggestion to Plunkett in 1887 of a tripartite alliance between China, Japan and 
Britain.
With regard to British diplomatic advice to Meiji leaders, Parkes stood out from 
other diplomats in adopting an outspoken approach. Not only did he urge the 
implementation of free trade, gradual reform in politics, the construction of railways and 
telegraphs, and toleration towards Christianity, he also frequently counselled Meiji 
leaders on the direction of Japan's foreign policy. Perhaps his overbearing manner, 
seniority, experience and knowledge of East Asian affairs explained his unusually 
forthcoming approach. Although other diplomats such as Plunkett, Adams, Satow, 
Kennedy and Fraser sometimes tendered their opinions to the Meiji leaders, their advice 
was not as frequent or direct as Parkes's, while other consuls and acting-consuls appeared 
to have confined their recommendations for improvement of some aspects of Japan 
mainly to their reports. While their advice may Have influenced the direction taken by the 
Meiji leaders, it is difficult to assess the extent of their influence as there were other 
factors that shaped the Japanese government's policy. Moreover, the Meiji leaders also 
obtained advice from the foreign advisers they employed in different ministries, as well 
as from other foreign representatives in Tokyo.
In giving their advice and offering assistance, British diplomats were concerned 
not only with the development of Japan but also the protection of British interests and 
influence, especially in view of the rivalry for influence with other Western Powers in 
Japan. Their perceptions of Japan were, thus, sometimes influenced by whether Japan 
turned to Britain or to other Western Powers in seeking models for reform. This may be 
seen in Plunketf s criticisms of Japan’s pro-German tendency in promulgating the Meiji 
constitution, in British diplomats' insistence on the Japanese navy's adherence to a British 
model, in their emphasis on the learning and use of the English language in Japanese
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educational institutions and in Japan’s future law courts, in their stress on the importance 
of retaining foreign workers by the Meiji government, and in Plunkett's remonstrance 
against the supposed attempts by Germany to take over Japanese railway contracts from 
British firms. Similarly, in matters of foreign policy, in advising Japan to follow the 
British lead in East Asian politics and not to involve herself in a war with China or 
Korea, British diplomats were undoubtedly aware that unwanted developments such as 
Japanese alliance with other Foreign Powers or a war between Japan and her neighbours 
might provide an opportunity for Russian encroachment and that this would affect British 
interests and influence in East and Central Asia.
Nevertheless, not all diplomatic advice and offers of foreign assistance were the 
results of diplomats' initiatives. There were times when Japanese leaders made the first 
moves in seeking advice and foreign aid. Such an instance was the request by a Japanese 
minister to Watson for advice on the opening of a railway line. There were also requests 
by the Japanese government to the British Legation to provide them with British naval 
instructors, engineers, teachers and other skilled workers. On one occasion in 1869, 
Iwakura asked for Parkes's opinion on the best course for Japan in adopting Western 
civilization, and in the 1880s there were several instances when Inoue requested 
Plunkett's advice in respect to Japan's foreign relations.
Interestingly, much of the valuable information gained by British diplomats was a 
result of Meiji leaders confiding in British diplomats. There were several motivations for 
Japanese leaders in doing so. One was Japanese need for the diplomats’ advice in order to 
ensure that their painstaking efforts in the modernisation of their politics, economic and 
society conformed to modern practices in the advanced countries. Such a confirmation 
was necessary not simply because they aspired to become a modem and strong state like 
the leading countries in the West but also to end the humiliating unequal treaties imposed 
on Japan by the West. Besides, the Japanese statesmen may have also felt that they 
lacked the necessary experience to choose the best systems for the country and the British 
diplomats could provide some guidelines. By confiding in the British diplomats the Meiji 
leaders could convey a message that Japan was undergoing changes and therefore, would 
one day be eligible for treaty revision. Similarly, through this means the Meiji leaders 
could also hope to obtain sympathy and understanding from British diplomats especially
235
in relation to some controversial and complicated issues like Christianity in Japan - to 
understand the difficulties faced by the Meiji government to end immediately the ban on 
Christianity.
Moreover, the fact that the diplomats were officials of a leading Western Power 
with high prestige and reputation may have also been a factor in that a favorable attitude 
shown by British diplomats towards Japan would be likely to influence representatives of 
other Western countries in Japan to take similar attitude. Furthermore, a positive response 
by British diplomats might well influence their government to soften its policy towards 
Japan. Similarly, any discouraging responses from British diplomats could have been 
viewed by Japanese statesmen as possible obstacles in winning the hearts of Western 
countries including Britain especially in abrogating the undesired unequal treaties.
In dealing with other countries too, Japanese leaders consulted and confided in 
British diplomats, perhaps because of the latter’s vast experience in international 
diplomacy and that they wanted Japanese foreign policy to be in line with international 
diplomacy of the leading Western countries. In disclosing information on Japanese 
foreign policy the Meiji leaders might have also aimed to assure the diplomats of the 
friendly policy of the Meiji government towards Britain and other Western Powers. Even 
when conflicts seemed to be imminent with neighboring countries like China and Korea, 
the Japanese leaders used to confer with British diplomats, perhaps to justify Japan’s 
occasionally bold policy towards these countries and thus prevent alienation of Japan 
from the West.
Nevertheless, not all British diplomats could have claimed to have good personal 
contact with Meiji leaders. One who could was British Minister Harry Parkes, who, 
though he was stem and harsh in dealing with Japanese leaders enjoyed considerable 
access to the latter perhaps because of his very considerable experience of East Asian 
affairs and his high reputation among foreign representatives in Japan. He was also the 
longest serving British Minister in Japan and he was present during the crucial years of 
the early Meiji period when the foundations for a modem Japan were being laid. A 
diplomat with a more friendly relationship with the Japanese was the British Legation’s 
Secretary, Ernest Satow, who engaged in many informal conversations with Japanese due 
to his ability to communicate in Japanese. It was through these conversations that many
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new ideas about modernisation of Meiji Japan came to be known. Another person worthy 
of mention was Francis Ottiwell Adams, the Legation’s Secretary and also British Charge 
d’Affaires for some time, who, despite his inability to communicate in Japanese and lack 
of prestige and reputation compared to Parkes’s, was able to hold many talks with leading 
Japanese particularly Iwakura Tomomi. His interest in securing in-depth knowledge of 
what was happening in Japan led him, accompanied with competent interpreters, to pay 
many less formal visits to the Japanese leader with the result that he felt able to describe 
the character of Iwakura in some depth and compare him with other Japanese.3 Last but 
not least was British Minister Francis Plunkett who often had conversations and 
discussions with Ito and Inoue. It may have been his less critical attitude that attracted the 
Japanese leaders to seek advice from him and disclose information especially in matters 
of foreign policy, and perhaps also the fact that he was there in the greater part of the 
1880s during which Japan experienced serious issues like deteriorating relations with 
China and negotiations for treaty revision.
Not all Japanese leaders were ready to disclose information to British diplomats. 
With the exception of Iwakura and Soejima, those who were likely to confide in the 
diplomats were the ones who spoke and understood English well. This was especially 
true of Ito and Inoue, who often engaged in conversations with British diplomats. Kido 
and Okubo, by contrast, rarely conferred with British diplomats, perhaps owing to their 
limited English. As reported by Adams, “Kido is a man of exceedingly quiet demeanour, 
but of the most fearless courage,” while “(Okubo) He is little known to Foreigners, and is 
not very communicative.”4
In conclusion, given the distinctiveness of British diplomatic views and images in 
1868-90, it is hoped that the findings of this thesis will contribute to the study of Meiji 
Japan. Through their formal and informal contacts with Meiji leaders, Japanese language 
skill, scholarly study and research on Japan, etc, the diplomats were able to gain insights 
into the modernisation of Meiji Japan which sometimes escaped the attention o f Western
3 Adams wrote, “Iwakura is the type o f  a Japanese gentleman. His manners are courtly and his politeness is 
exquisite. He is well versed in the history o f  his country, and he treats questions broadly, without that 
tendency to quibble and to wander from the point which is a characteristic o f  so many Japanese. He listens 
attentively to what is said, and states his opinions clearly and decidedly.” FO 46/151, No. 29, Adams to 
Granville, Yedo, Jan. 29,1872.
4 Ibid.
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visitors and writers. Such insights related in particular to the differences of views among 
Meiji leaders on the pace and extent of reforms, internal power struggles and han-based 
factional divisions in Japanese politics, problems of modernisation as seen and 
acknowledged by Japanese leaders themselves, Japanese views of Western progress vis- 
a-vis their own, and Japan’s position in East Asian politics.
Similarly, it is hoped that the findings will also contribute to the history o f the 
image of Japan in Western minds. In contrast to the stereotyped images o f Japan which 
were widespread among Westerners, those held by British diplomats were generally 
better informed and more realistic. Instead of seeing Japan as a topsy-turvy country 
where everything was different from the West, or as an Eastern paradise inhabited by 
geisha and little people, or as a difficult and unrewarding place for Western traders, 
British diplomats presented a variety o f interesting images of Japan and its people. These 
included images related to social, economic and political life o f Meiji Japan and foreign 
policy such as Japanese desire to imitate Western social and political system, Japanese 
desire for expansionism and many more.
Moreover, through their official capacity as diplomats, their views also contribute 
to the knowledge of British policy and diplomatic history towards Japan. The thesis 
findings for instance, demonstrate that the British earlier bold policy towards Japan 
gradually changed to be more favorable where more concessions were made by Britain in 
negotiating for the revision of the unequal treaties. This gradual shift of policy to some 
extent due to the diplomats’ positive views of Japan’s progress as contained in their 
official reports to the Whitehall and also the diplomats’ concern for British political and 
commercial interests in Japan as opposed to the interests of other Western Powers. 
Nevertheless, given the subjectivity of the issue of the influence of diplomatic views on 
general British policy towards Japan, it is hoped that the findings of this thesis would 
arouse serious attempts to cany out investigations into the issue.
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APPENDIX
Career Biographies of British Diplomats in Japan.
Adams, Sir Francis Ottiwell -  was appointed Attache at Stockholm, February 1, 1854; at S t  
Petersburg, May 14, 1856; 3rd Paid Attach^ at Tehran, July 24, 1858; was appointed 2nd Paid Attach^ at St. 
Petersburg, December 2, 1858; was transferred to Paris, July 8, 1859; was appointed a 2 nd Secretary, October 
1, 1862; was transferred to Washington, June 1, 1864; and to Paris, May 5, 1866, where he was Charge 
d’Affaires from July 1 to July 5, and from August 8 to August 11, 1867; was promoted to be Secretary o f  
Legation in Japan, January 6, 1868; was Acting Charge d’Affaires at Yedo from May 23, 1871 till May 25, 
1872. Was promoted to be Secretary o f  Embassy at Berlin, February 15, 1872, where he was Acting Charge 
d’Affaires from July 4 till October 12, 1873; and from July 4 till October 6, 1874. Was transferred to Paris, 
December 5, 1874, where he was accredited as Minister Plenipotentiary in the absence o f  the Ambassador, 
and acted as such from April 7 till May 14, 1875; from September 1 till October 10, 1875; from April 14 to 
19, 1876; form April 24 till June 3, 1876; from August 4 till October 20, 1877; from March 6 till April 6, 
1878; from August 19 to September 29, 1878; from August 12 till November 6, 1879; from May 5 to 13, 
1880; from July 18 till October 1, 1880; and from July 19 till September 17, 1881. Was appointed a Minister 
Plenipotentiary in the Diplomatic Service, October 10, 1879; was promoted to be Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minster Plenipotentiary at Berne, July 8, 1881. Retired on May 1, 1888.
(FO LISTS 1889)
Alcock, Sir Rutherford -  was Surgeon o f  the Marine Brigade o f  Portugal from July, 1833, till the close 
o f  1834, and served all through the Portuguese War under Don Pedro. Was appointed Deputy Inspector- 
General o f  Hospitals in the British Auxiliary Legion, May 5, 1835 till the close o f  1937. Was British 
Commissioner for the Adjudication o f the Claims o f  the British Auxiliary Legion, from May, 1839 to March, 
1840. Was British Commissioner in the Mixed British and Portuguese Commission o f  Claims, from March 
26, 1840, till he was appointed Consul at Foochow, in China, May 30, 1844; was transferred to Shanghai, 
December 10, 1846; and to Canton, August 10,1854. Was appointed Consul-General in Japan, December 21, 
1858, and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul-General there, November 30, 1159. 
Owing to his differences with the Japanese Government, Mr. Alcock temporarily removed the British 
Legation from Yedo to Yokohama from January 26 till March 2, 1861. Was appointed Chief Superintendent 
o f  British Trade in China, March 28, 1865, and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Peking, 
April 7, 1865. Retired on July 22, 1871.
(FO LISTS 1889)
Annesley, Adolphus Arthur -  served in the Royal Navy as Naval Cadet and Midshipman, from June 
9, 1846, till March 8, 1849. Was afterwards employed in the British Consulate at Amsterdam; was appointed 
an Extra Clerk in the Admiralty, April 26, 1855; was appointed Assistant in the Consulate at Nagasaki, in 
Japan, February 12, 1859, and was in charge o f  the Consulate as Acting Vice-Consul from June 1 till July 26, 
1861; from November 2 till December 15, 1865; from May 15 till May 29, and from November 3 till 
December 31, 1866. Was promoted to be a 1st Class Assistant, November 2, 1866 (appointment to date from 
April 1, 1867). Was appointed Her Majesty’s Vice-Consul at Hyogo and Osaka, July 6, 1869; was Acting 
British and Austrian Consul at Nagasaki, and in charge o f French, Italian, and Spanish interests, from October 
13, 1869, till October 10, 1871; and at Hyogo and Osaka, from August 1, 1874, till November 10, 1877. Was 
promoted to be Consul at Reunion, November 29, 1878; and was appointed Consul for the State o f  Maine, to 
reside at Portugal, October 30, 1882. Retired on January 1, 1885.
(FO LISTS 1885)
Aston, William George -  Was appointed a Student Interpreter in Japan, August 16, 1864; was made a 
3rd Assistant, May 11, 1869; a 2nd Assistant, July 8, 1869; and was appointed Interpreter and Translator to the 
Legation at Yedo, October 6, 1870. Was Acting-Japanese Secretary from August 8 till December 1, 1870.
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Was in attendance on the Japanese Mission in this country from August 8 till December 16, 1872. Was 
Assistant Japanese Secretary at Yedo from April 1, 1875, till April 1, 1882, when he was appointed Consul at 
Nagasaki. Was Acting Consul at Hyogo from February 10, 1880, till December 23, 1881; from January 5 to 
June 2, 1882; from July 14 to August 7, 1882; from October 27, 1882, to February 28, 1883; and from June 
21 to October 5, 1883. Was appointed, provisionally, Consul-General for Korea, March 17, 1884; and 
Japanese Secretary at Tokyo, May 20, 1886. Was given the local rank o f  2nd Secretary to the Legation at 
Tokyo, September 21, 1887. Retired on June 1, 1889.
(FO LISTS 1897)
Bunsen, Maurice William Ernest de, Bart -  was nominated an Attache, July 1877; appointed to 
Washington, November 1, 1878. Promoted to be a 3rd Secretary, September 1, 1879; transferred to Berne, 
November 9, 1881, where he was Acting Charge d’Affaires from November 12, 1881, to January 3, 1882; 
and to Madrid, January 3, 1882. Promoted to be 2nd Secretary, April 1, 1883. Was Acting Chargd d’Affaires 
at Madrid from January 25 to February 4, 1884; from April 2 to August 16, 1884; from December 30, 1884, 
to March 6, 1885; and from July 12 to November 30, 1885. Transferred to Paris, January 26, 1886. 
Temporarily attached to the Legation at Lisbon from July 31 to September 16, 1887, and acted there as 
Charge d’Affaires from August 9 to September 14, 1887. Promoted to be Secretary o f  Legation at Tokyo, 
January 1, 1891, where he acted as Charge d’Affaires from June 28, 1892, to February 25, 1894. Promoted to 
be Charge d’Affaires and Consul-General in Siam, August 6, 1894. Appointed Secretary o f  Embass / at 
Washington, December 7, 1896; and Secretary o f  Embassy at Constantinople, January 7, 1897, where he 
acted as Charge d’Affaires from May 27 to September 21, 1898; from September 13, 1900, to January 12, 
1901; from November 23 to December 24, 1901; and from June 10 to August 29, 1902. Appointed Secretary 
o f  Embassy at Paris and a Minister o f Plenipotentiary in the Diplomatic Service, August 9, 1902. Was 
Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris, from March 29 to April 4, and July 6 to 19, 1903. Appointed Envoy 
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at Lisbon, March 6, 1905. Promoted to be Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Madrid, February 10, 1906. Transferred to Vienna, November 1, 1913. 
Acted as an Assistant Under Secretary o f  State in the Foreign Office from March 15, 1915, to December 31, 
1918. Retired on January 1, 1919.
(FO LISTS 1919)
Dohmen, Martin -  was temporarily employed in the Consular Service in Japan from April 1 till 
September 21, 1861, when he was permanently appointed; was appointed Supernumerary Interpreter to the 
Consulate at Kanagawa, November 25, 1861; was appointed Interpreter at Kanagawa, January 25, 1864; was 
attached to the Legation, was Acting Japanese Secretary, April 1 ,1864; was Post Office Agent from 1862 till 
1865; served under the Japanese Government as Director o f  the Municipality o f  Yokohama with the rank o f  
Vice Governor, from October 11, 1867, till June 3, 1868; was appointed Assistant Accountant and Dutch 
Interpreter at Yedo, January 1, 1868, and joined the Legation, July 1, 1868. Was for some time 1st Class 
Assistant at Kanagawa, and was appointed Her Majesty’s Vice-Consul Cancellier at Yedo (Tokyo), August 
17, 1871. Was Acting Austrian Consul in 1871, and Acting British Consul at Yokohama from April 8, 1870. 
(FO LISTS 1882)
Enslie, James Joseph -  was appointed Interpreter in the Consular Service in Japan, March 16, 1861; was 
Acting Consul at Hakodate, from August 13, 1861, till June 1, 1863; was attached to the Surveying Squadron 
in the Inland Sea and Straits o f  Shimonoseki, as Interpreter, from July 19 till August 10, 1864. Was in charge 
o f  the Hakodate Consulate on several other occasions; was transferred to the Hyogo Consulate, January 1868, 
where he acted as Japanese Interpreter till February 17, 1869, when he was appointed Acting Vice-Consul for 
Hyogo and Osaka. Was Acting Consul at Niigata from May 27 till October 29, 1872; and has been Acting 
Vice-Consul at Hyogo and Osaka since November 8, 1872.
(FO LISTS 1874)
Eusden, Richard -  was appointed Dutch Interpreter at Yedo, Januaiy 17, 1859; was Acting Vice-Consul 
there from July 22, 1859, till December 7, 1860, when he was appointed Japanese Secretary and Interpreter to 
the British Legation at Yedo; was in charge o f  the Consulate-General from September 24 till October 20,
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1859; was Acting Consul at Hakodate from March 10 till September 10, 1861; was present on the attack at 
the Legation at Yedo, June 26, 1862, and at the action at Kagoshima, August 15, 1863; was in charge o f  the 
Legation at Yedo from October 1 to 29, and from November 3 till December 25, 1865; was attached to the 
Supreme Court at Shanghai from December 15, 1866, till May 2, 1867; was sent to Hakodate to act as 
Consul, July 20, 1867; was appointed Consul at Hakodate, January 1, 1868. Retired on April 1, 1882.
(FO LISTS 1897)
F low ers, M a rcu s O ctav iu s -  served in the British Consulate at Amsterdam from 1844; had charge o f  
the Consulate on several occasions; was appointed Unpaid Vice-Consul there, November 22, 1856; was 
Acting Consul from June 16 till December 15, 1858; from May 18, 1859, till February 2, 1860; and from May 
14 till June 14, 1860. Was appointed Interpreter at Kanagawa, February 19, 1861; was promoted to be Vice- 
Consul at Yokohama, April 1, 1864; was Acting Consul from December 24, 1864, till January 4, 1866, when 
he was transferred to the Nagasaki Consulate as officiating Consul, and took charge, February 10, 1866, Was 
promoted to be Consul at Hakodate, May 3, 1867; was transferred to Niigata, January 1, 1868; to Nagasaki, 
July 9, 1868; and to Hyogo and Osaka, April 1, 1877. Retired on March 24, 1882.
(FO LISTS 1885)
Fletcher, Lachland -  was appointed Student Interpreter at Yedo, December 30, 1858; was attached to 
the Legation at Yedo till June 1860, when he was appointed Acting Second Assistant at Hakodate. Was 
Acting Consul at Hakodate, from October 1860 till March 1861, when he was appointed Second Assistant. 
Was transferred to Nagasaki, September, 1861; was present at the action at Kagoshima in September 1863 as 
interpreter to summon Japanese commanders to deliver up their steamers; was promoted to be a 1st Class 
Assistant, November 26, 1866 (appointment to date from April 1, 1867); and Consul at Yedo and Kanagawa, 
January 1, 1868.
(FO LISTS 1869)
Fraser, Hugh -  was appointed Attache at the Hague, January 15, 1855; at Dresden, February 23, 1855; at 
Copenhagen, November 19, 1857; at Berlin, January 26, 1860; was appointed Paid Attache to the Legation in 
Central America, September 21, 1861; was promoted to be a 2nd Second Secretary, October 1, 1862; was 
transferred to Stockholm, June 25, 1864; but was Charge d’Affaires at Guatemala from April 19, 1864, till 
August 8, 1865. Was transferred as 2nd Secretary to Berlin, June 26, 1866; did not proceed thither, but 
retained his appointment at Stockholm. Was transferred to Peking, January 14, 1867, where he was Acting 
Charge d’Affaires from November 2 till November 28, 1869. Was transferred to St. Petersburg, February 13, 
1871 (but did not proceed); and to Florence, July 1, 1871. Was promoted to be Secretary o f  Legation at 
Peking, April 24, 1874, where he was Acting Charge d’Affaires from June 7, 1876, till February 28, 1879. 
Was promoted to be Secretary o f  Embassy at Vienna, November 8, 1879, where he was Acting Charge 
d’Affaires from August 3 till December 14, 1881. Was transferred to Rome, February 23, 1882, where he was 
Acting Chargd d’Affaires from September 1 to October 22, 1882; and from July 16 to December 22, 1883. 
Was promoted to be Minister Resident and Consul-General at Santiago, February 17, 1885; and Envoy 
Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary, and Consul-General at Tokyo, April 30, 1888.
(FO LISTS 1894)
Gower, Abel Anthony James -  went out to China in April 1856 as Private Secretary to the Governor 
o f Hong Kong; was appointed 4th Assistant in the Superintendency o f  Trade, May 27, 1856, and discharged 
both duties until the early part o f  1858, when he was promoted to be the 2nd Assistant in the Canton 
Consulate, where he discharged the duties o f  1st and only Assistant; and was appointed 1st Assistant in the 
Consulate-General at Yedo, in February 1859, where he also discharged the duties o f Secretary o f  Legation. 
Was present at the attacks on the Legation in 1861 and 1862; also present at the action at Kagoshima in 1863. 
Was Acting Consul at Nagasaki from April 1864 till May 25, 1865, when he was appointed Consul at 
Hakodate, but remained at Nagasaki till March 7, 1866. Was appointed Consul at Nagasaki, May 8, 1867, and 
transferred to Hyogo and Osaka, July 9, 1868. Retired on June 1, 1876.
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(FO LISTS 1877)
Griffiths, Ernest Alfred -  was appointed Student Interpreter in Japan, April 7, 1884; Acting Consul at 
Nagasaki in 1887 and 1888. Promoted to be a 2nd Class Assistant, October 1, 1888. Acting-Vice-Consul at 
Tokyo from October 17, 1888 to April 15, 1891; and Acting Consul at Hyogo in 1893. Promoted to be a 1st 
Assistant, August 8, 1896. Promoted Acting-Consul at Tainan from 1896 to 1900; Acting Consul at Tainan 
from November 24, 1896, to January 2 ,1897; and from July 10, 1897, to December 3, 1899; Acting Consul at 
Hyogo in 1900. Again Acting Consul at Tainan in 1902 and 1903. Promoted to be Vice-Consul at Hyogo and 
Osaka, May 21, 1903; Acting Consul at Kobe in 1903 and 1904. Promoted to be Consul for the Consular 
District o f  Shimonoseki, December 22, 1904. Retired, December 9, 1912.
(FO LISTS 1913)
Gubbins, John Harrington -  was appointed Student Interpreter in Japan, April 14, 1871; promoted to 
be a 2nd Class Assistant, April 30, 1875; Acting Vice-Consul at Yedo in 1879 and 1880; promoted to be a 1st 
Class Assistant, August 6 ,1882 . Was attached in April 1886, as English Secretary to the Conference
at Tokyo for the Revision o f  Treaties. Acting Vice-Consul at Tokyo in 1887 and 1888. Acting Consul at 
Yokohama in 1888. Acting Assistant Japanese Secretary at Tokyo from October 2 ,1884 , to February 8, 1886, 
and from May 28, 1887, to October 1, 1888, when he was promoted to be Assistant Japanese Secretary. 
Acting Japanese Secretary from January 1, 1883, to October 1, 1884; from February 9, 1886, to May 27, 
1887; and from November 8, 1888, to June 1, 1889, when he was promoted to be Japanese Secretary. Given 
the local rank o f  2nd Secretary to the Legation at Tokyo, February 13, 1890. Employed at the Foreign Office 
from February to July, 1894, in the negotiations which resulted in the conclusion o f  the Treaty with Japan o f  
July 16, 1894. Was a British Delegate on the Tariff Commission appointed for the negotiation o f  the 
supplementary Convention with Japan o f  July, 1895. Acting Charge d’Affaires in Korea from May 18, 1900, 
to November 4 ,1 9 0 1 . Given the local rank o f  Secretary o f  Legation in the Diplomatic Service, June 26, 1902. 
Retired, September 10,1909.
(FO LISTS 1913)
Hall, John Carey -  was appointed a Student Interpreter in Japan, December 24, 1867. Was for some time 
Acting-Consul at Yedo. Promoted to be a 3rd Class Assistant, January 1, 1872; a 2nd Class, April 1, 1872; and 
a 1st Class, April 1, 1877. Appointed Assistant Japanese Secretary at Tokyo, April 1, 1882; Acting Consul at 
Nagasaki on various occasions in 1882, 1883, 1884 and 1886; Acting Japanese Secretaiy at Tokyo, from 
October 2, 1884, to January 8, 1886; and from January 25 to February 8, 1886.Acting Registrar and 
Interpreter at Yokohama Court, from February 15 to November 12, 1886. Acting Consul at Yokohama from 
November 13, 1886, to April 20, 1888. Acting Judge o f  H.M. Court for Japan at Yokohama from April 21 to 
May 10, 1888, and Acting Assistant Judge o f  H.M. Supreme Court for China and Japan at Shanghai, from 
May 19, 1888, to May 13, 1889. Promoted to be Consul for Hakodate and Niigata, October 1, 1888; Acting 
Consul at Nagasaki from November 5, 1890, to February 11, 1892; and at Yokohama in 1895 and 1896. 
Transferred to Formosa, February 4, 1896 (did not proceed), and to Hyogo, as Consul for Higo and Osaka, 
August 21, 1896. A fresh Commission was issued appointing Mr. Hall to be Consul for Hyogo, July 28, 1897. 
Appointed a Companion o f  the I.S.O., November 9, 1902. Promoted to be Consul-General for Kanagawa, 
May 21, 1903.
(FO LISTS 1913)
Hodgson, Christopher Pemberton -  was Unpaid Vice-Consul at Pan, in the Consular District o f  
Bayomie, France, from October 15, 1851, till March 17, 1855; was appointed Vice-Consul at Caen, March 
12, 1857; and Consul at Hakodate, in Japan, February 21, 1859, which post he held till March 1861. Was Her 
Majesty’s officiating Consul at Nagasaki, from June 13 till October, 1859, where he was also Acting French 
Consul.
(FO LISTS 1865)
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Kennedy, Sir John Gordon -  was nominated Attache, December 10, 1857; was appointed to Mexico, 
March 5, 1858; was temporarily attached to the Embassy at Paris, from June 2 till August 14, 1858, when he 
was pennanently appointed to that Embassy; was transferred to Vienna, June 28, 1859; and to Washington, 
April 19, 1862; was promoted to be a 3rd Secretary, March 225, 1863; was transferred to Vienna, February 25, 
1865; was promoted to be a 2nd Secretary at Bogota, October 25, 1865 (but did not proceed thither); and to 
Constantinople, February 2, 1866. Was transferred to Brussels, August 21, 1871; and to Rome, August 3, 
1874. Was promoted to be Secretary o f  Legation at Yedo, August 7, 1878, where he was Acting Chargd 
d’Affaires from October 12, 1879, to January 25, 1882; and to be Secretary o f  Embassy at St. Petersburg, 
September 1, 1881, where he was Acting Charge d’Affaires from August 13 to October 22, 1883. Was 
transferred to Rome, March 14, 1885, where he acted as Charge d’Affaires from March 30 to October 2, 
1887; from January 16 to March 15, 1888; and from May 27, 1888, to January 2, 1889. Was promoted to be 
Minister Resident and Consul-General at Santiago, October 1, 1888; and Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary to the King o f  Romania, August 6, 1897. Retired, December 8, 1905.
(FO LISTS 1906)
Longford, Joseph Henry -  was appointed a Student Interpreter in Japan, February 24, 1869; Acting 3rd 
Assistant at Kanagawa in 1871 and 1872. Promoted to be a 2nd Class Assistant, June 1, 1872; and a 1st Class 
Assistant, April 1, 1882. Nominated, provisionally, Vice-Consul at Tokyo, September 9, 1884; and appointed 
to that post, May 20, 1886. Acting Consul at Hyogo in 1889 and 1890; and at Hakodate from November 23, 
1890, to April 12, 1892. Promoted to be Consul at Tainan (Formosa), February 4, 1896. Transferred to 
Tamsui (Formosa), August 21, 1896 (did not proceed); and to Nagasaki, December 28, 1896; appointed to be 
Consul at Nagasaki, July 2 8 ,1897 . Retired, August 15, 1902.
(FO LISTS 1913)
Lowder, John Frederic — was appointed a Student Interpreter at Yedo, in Japan, June 4, 1860; was 
promoted to be a 3rd Assistant, April 1, 1864; a 2nd Assistant, May 25, 1865; an Interpreter, November 26, 
1866 (appointment to date from April 1, 1867); and Vice-Consul at Hyogo and Osaka, January 1, 1868. Was 
promoted to be Consul at Niigata, July 6, 1869; Acting Consul at Kanagawa from August 12, 189, till July 
21, 1870. Resigned, September 4, 1872.
(FO LISTS 1878)
Mitford, Algernon Bertram -  was employed in the Foreign Office from March 1858 till January 26, 
1859; was appointed a Lieutenant in the 3rd City o f  London Rifle Volunteer Corps, April 30, 1861. Was 
temporarily attached to the Embassy at St. Petersburg from November 11, 1863 till May 1864; was appointed 
an Acting 3rd Secretary in Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service, November 23, 1863, and temporarily attached 
to the Mission at Peking, February 7, 1865; was attached to the Mission at Yedo, from October 16, 1866, till 
March 7, 1868, when he was appointed a 2nd Secretary in Her Majesty’s Diplomatic Service. Was transferred 
to St. Petersburg, July 1, 1871, but did not proceed. Resigned, August 5, 1873. Was appointed Secretary to 
the Commissioners o f  Works and Public Buildings, May, 1874.
(FO LISTS 1878)
Napier And Ettrick (William John George Napier), Lord -  was nominated Attache, June, 21, 
1869. Appointed to Athens, May 11, 1870; transferred to Berlin, February 13, 1871. Promoted to be a 3rd 
Secretary, January 1, 1873; transferred to Madrid, March 3, 1873; transferred to Lisbon, December 3, 1877; 
and to Brussels, July 24, 1883, where he was Acting Charge d’Affaires from December 11 to 27, 1883; from 
May 7 to 14, 1884; from July 2 to August 9, 1884; and from September 20, 1884, to February 13, 1885. 
Promoted to be Secretary o f  Legation at Buenos Aires, July 27, 1886. Transferred to Stockholm, January 1,
1887, where he acted as Charge d’Affaires from February 24 to June 25, 1888; and to Tokyo, December 1,
1888, where he acted Charge d’Affaires from March 8 to May 1, 1889.
(FO LISTS 1911)
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Parkes, Sir Harry Smith -  acted as Interpreter at Foochow, June 1842; acted as Interpreter as Shanghai 
in 1845 and 1846; appointed Interpreter at Shanghai, April 19, 1848; appointed Interpreter at Amoy in 1849; 
served as Interpreter at Canton, November 21, 1851; appointed Consul at Amoy, August 10, 1854; was 
Acting Consul at Canton from June 1856 till September 1858; and was transferred to Shanghai, December 21, 
1858. Was British Commissioner at Canton, January 1858. Was attached as Joint Chinese Secretary to the 
late Earl o f  Elgin’s Special Embassy in China, and was employed in various important occasions during the 
operations which took place in the Peiho, in 1860; accompanied Vice-Admiral Hope, when he advanced upon 
Tientsin, August 23, 1860; was taken prisoner by the Chinese at Tungchow, September 18, and subsequently 
released, October 8, 1860. Continued with the late Earl o f  Elgin’s Embassy till his lordship left China in 
February 1861, when he returned to his duties at Canton. Was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary and Consul-General in Japan, March 28, 1865. Was appointed'Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor o f China, July 1, 1883; and also to the King o f  Korea, February 27, 
1884.
(FO LISTS 1885)
Plunkett, Sir Francis Richard -  was appointed Attache at Munich, January 22, 1855; was transferred 
to Naples, July 20, 1855 till October 30, 1856; was temporarily attached to the Mission at The Hague, 
January 31, 1857; was transferred to Madrid, November 10, 1857; was appointed 2nd Paid Attache at St. 
Petersburg, July 8, 1859; was appointed a 2lld Secretary, October 1, 1862; was transferred to Copenhagen, 
January 19, 1863; to Vienna, October 25, 1865; to Berlin, April 27, 1868; to Florence, July 25, 1868; and to 
Berlin, July 1, 1871. Was Acting Charge d’Affaires at Berlin, from July 10 till September 2, 1872. Was 
promoted to be Secretary o f  Legation at Yedo, October 14, 1873, where he was Acting Charge d’Affaires 
from February 8 till March 17, 1876; and was transferred to Washington, January 28, 1876, where he was 
Acting Chargd d’Affaires from April 6 to 12, 1877; and from May 9 till November 18, 1877. Was promoted 
to be Secretary o f  Embassy at St. Petersburg, August 1, 1877, where he was Acting Charge d’Affaires from 
July 28 till September 26, 1878; from May 11 to July 2, 1879; from August 29 till December 17, 1879; and 
from September 10 till December 16,1880. Was transferred to Constantinople, March 1, 1881. Was Minister 
Plenipotentiary at Paris, from August 24 to October 23, 1882; and from July 22 to October 3, 1883. Was 
promoted to be Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary, and Consul-General at Tokyo, July 1, 1883. 
Was appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the King o f  Sweden and Norway, April 
30, 1888; and transferred to Brussels, July 1, 1888; appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary 
at Vienna, September 9 ,1900 . Sworn a Privy Councillor, February 9, 1901. Retired, May 7, 1905.
(FO LISTS 1906)
Quin, John Janies -  was appointed a Student Interpreter in Japan, August 3, 1867. Was promoted to be a 
3rd Class Assistant, August 23, 1869; a 2nd Class, January 1, 1872; and a 1st Class, April 1, 1873. Was Acting 
Consul at Hakodate from October 1, 1880, to February 18, 1883; was promoted to be Vice-Consul at Tokyo, 
August 6, 1882. Was nominated, provisionally, Consul for Hakodate and Niigata, September 9, 1884; and 
was appointed to those posts, May 20, 1886. Was Acting Consul at Yokohama from June 4 to September 24, 
1888; and at Hyogo from September 28, 1888, to February 18, 1889. Was transferred, as Consul, to Nagasaki, 
October 1, 1888.
(FO LISTS 1896)
Robertson, Russell Brooke -  was appointed a Student Interpreter in Japan, February 4, 1860; was 
appointed an Assistant in 1863; 3rd Assistant at Nagasaki, April 1, 1864; and 2nd Assistant, April 28, 1866. 
Was Acting Vice-Consul at Osaka in 1868. Was promoted to be 1st Assistant at Hyogo, July 8, 1869; was 
Acting Vice- Consul at Yedo from February 17 till August 28, 1869; was appointed Vice-Consul at Yedo, 
February 8, 1870; transferred to Kanagawa (Yokohama), August 31, 1870; and promoted to be Consul at 
Yedo, May 2, 1871. Was in charge o f the Vice-Consulate at Yedo from July 26 till August 31, 1871. Was 
Acting Judge for Japan from July 28, 1881, to February 1, 1883.
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(FO LISTS 1888)
Satow, Sir Ernest Mason -  was appointed a Student Interpreter in Japan, August 2 0 ,1 8 6 1 . Was present 
at the action o f  Kagoshima, in September, 1863. Appointed an Interpreter for the Japanese language, April 1, 
1865; and Japanese Secretary, January 1, 1868. Given the local rank o f  2nd Secretary to the Legation at Yedo 
(Tokyo), July 20, 1876. Promoted to be Agent and Consul-General at Bangkok, January ,16, 1884; and to be 
Minister Resident and Consul General, February 17, 1885. Transferred to Monte Video, December 17, 1888. 
Promoted to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor o f  Morocco, and Consul 
General in Morocco, August 1, 1893. Appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the 
Emperor o f  Japan, June 1, 1895. Transferred to Peking, October 26, 1900. Retired on a pension, October 26, 
1906.
(FO LISTS 1913)
Trench, power Henry Le Poer -  was nominated Attach^, June 10, 1859; and was appointed to Paris, 
August 17, 1859; was transferred to Constantinople, January 23, 1860; to Munich, December 17, 1861; was 
promoted to be a 3rd Secretary, November 10, 1863; was transferred to Rio de Janiero, August 10, 1865; and 
to Washington, January 6, 1868, where he was also Private Secretary to Sir Edward Thornton. Was promoted 
to be 2nd Secretary at Florence, August 1, 1870 (but did not proceed), and transferred to Washington, 
November 11, 1870. Was employed in the Foreign Office from January 1, 1879, till October 31, 1881, when 
he was transferred to Rome. Was promoted to be Secretary o f  Legation at Tokyo, May 28, 1882. Acted as 
Charge d’Affaires from August 30, 1883, to March 15, 1884; and from August 8, 1887, to March 7, 1889. 
Was promoted to be Secretary o f  Embassy at Berlin, October 1, 1888, where he acted as Charge d’ Affaires 
from October 25 to November 18, 1889; from September 7 to October 12, 1890; from November 1 to 
November 12, 1890; from January 4 to 11, 1891; from January 16 to March 10, 1891; from June 27 to 30, 
1891; from July 1 to 25, 1891; from September 16 to October 15, 1891; from April 21 to May 7, 1892; from 
September 11 to October 18, 1892; from November 17 to December 3, 1892; and from March 27 to May 20, 
1893. Was promoted to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at M exico, July 1, 1893; and 
appointed Envoy Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul General at Tokyo, Japan. Retired, 
January 20, 1896.
(FO LISTS 1897)
Troup, James -  was appointed Student Interpreter in Japan, August 31, 1863; 3rd Assistant, October 9, 
1865; and 2nd Assistant, January 1, 1868. Acting Consul at Niigata from August 5, 1869, to September 26, 
1871. Promoted to be 1st Class Assistant, January 1, 1872. Acting Consul at Hakodate from November 5, 
1871, to July 19, 1873. Promoted to be H.M. Vice-Consul at Niigata, April 1, 1873; and to be Consul at 
Nagasaki, April 1 ,1877. Transferred to Hyogo and Osaka, April 1, 1882; and to Yokohama, as Consul for the 
District o f  Kanagawa, June 23, 1888. Was a British Delegate on the Tariff Commission appointed foi the 
negotiation o f  the Supplementary Convention with Japan, July 16, 1895. Promoted to be Consul-General for 
the Consular District o f  Kanagawa (Yokohama), and also to be Assistant Judge o f  H.M. Court in Japan, 
November 18, 1896. Retired, A p ril, 1898.
(FO LISTS 1913)
Watson, Robert Grant -  was appointed an Ensign in 2nd Bombay Regiment in 1853; Lieutenant, 1855; 
was attached to the Staff o f  the late Sir James Outram in the Persian Gulf, in May 1857; to the Legation in 
Persia, June 1, 1857, to be temporarily employed at Herat, but was ordered to return to India to join his 
regiment on the outbreak o f  the Mutinies; was employed on active military service in the Southern Mahratta 
country from August 8, 1857, till close o f  the mutiny war; was appointed 3rd Paid Attache at Tehran, April 18, 
1859; was employed in the Embassy at Constantinople from July till October, 1859; was employed in the 
Caucasus in January 1862; was promoted to be a 2nd Secretary, October 1, 1862; and a Captain in H.M.’s 
Staff Coips, June 11, 1865, which commission he resigned, December 23, 1865. Was employed at 
Kermanshah and Hamadan, in January, 1865. Was nominated 2nd Secretary at Constantinople, August 10,
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1865, which appointment was cancelled, and he was transferred to Buenos Aires, October 5, 1865. Was 
employed in the Foreign Office from September 9, 1865, till February 28, 1866. Was sent on service to Santa 
Fe in May, to Patagonia in June, 1866, and to Paraguay in March 1867. Was transferred to Rio de Janeiro, 
January 28, 1867. Was sent on special service to the mining district in the province o f  Minas Geraes in April 
1868, and transferred to Constantinople, January 6, 1869. Was promoted to be Secretary o f  Legation at 
Athens, January 27, 1870, where he was Acting Chargd d’Affaires from April 16 to May 13, 1871, and 
Chargd des Archives from July 9 till September 21, 1871. Was transferred to Yedo, March 6, 1872, where he 
was Acting Charge d’Affaires from May 26, 1872, till March 26, 1873. Was transferred to Copenhagen, 
October 11, 1873, but did not proceed; and to Washington, February 16, 1874, where he was Acting Charge 
d’Affaires from June 27 till October 19, 1874. Was transferred to Lisbon, January 6, 1876, where he Acting 
Charge d’Affaires from February 29 till April 20, 1876; and to Stockholm, October 26, 1876; where he was 
Acting Chargd d’Affaires from August 17, till November 1, 1877. Was unemployed from April 5, 1879, till 
January 1, 1880, when he retired on a pension.
(FO LISTS 1882)
Winchester, Charles Alexander -  entered the Civil Service in China, June 4, 1842, as Medical 
Officer in charge o f  the settlement o f  Hong Kong; was appointed Consular Surgeon at Amoy, October 15, 
1843, which office was abolished, March 31, 1844; was appointed 2nd Assistant and Medical Officer at 
Amoy, July 1, 1844; 1st Assistant, February 1852; was Acting V ice- Consul at Whampoa from April 1 till 
December 24, 1854; returned to Amoy as 1st Assistant in December; was Acting Consul until the end o f  
March 1855, when he was removed to Ningpo as Acting Vice-Consul, where he remained till March 8, 1856; 
was appointed Vice- Consul at Canton, July 16, 1855; was Acting Consul at Canton from April 14 till June 
11, 1856; from February 21 till July 11, 1858, and from May 12, 1859, till October 19, 1860. Was summoned 
to Shanghai to take charge o f that Consulate, but allowed to proceed home on sick leave. Was appointed 
Consul for Hakodate, in Japan, March 28, 1861, and was transferred to Kanagawa, December 14, 1862. Was 
Charge d’Affaires in Japan from March 22 till May 23, 1862. Officiated as Consul at Nagasaki from July 1, 
1862, to March 23, 1863, and then returned to Kanagawa. Was Charge d’Affaires in Japan from December 
24, 1864, till July 8, 1865; was transferred as Consul to Shanghai, March 1865. Retired, June 9, 1870.
(FO LISTS 1886)
Woolley, William Abram -  was appointed a Student Interpreter in Japan, April 14, 1871. Was 
promoted to be a 2nd Class Assistant, April 1 ,1877. Was Acting Vice-Consul at Niigata from September 21 to 
October 8, 1879; Acting Consul at Nagasaki from October 30 to November 24, 1879, and from August 15 to 
September 12, 1880; and at Hyogo from December 24, 1881, to January 4, 1882; from June 3 to July 13, 
1882; fi*om August 8 to October 26, 1882; and from March 1 to June 20, 1883; Acting Vice-Consul at 
Hakodate from July 10 to October 5, 1883; and Acting-Consul at Hyogo from October 6 to December 3, 
1883. Was promoted to be 1st Class Assistant, December 16, 1883. Was Acting Vice-Consul at Hakodate 
from December 4, 1883, to October 27, 1884; Acting Consul at Nagasaki from November 6 to December 31, 
1884; and Acting Consul at Hyogo from September 8 to October 7, 1886. Retire, July 1, 1887.
(FO LISTS 1895)
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